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2ABSTRACT
This thesis is devoted to the study of the role played by 
Haj Amin al Husseini in Palestine Arab politics during the period 
1930-1937.
After a short introduction, the first part of the study will retrace 
his rise to power. It will describe his background and youth (Chapter 
1), his appointment tol the office of Mufti of Jerusalem (Chapter 2), 
his election to the office of President of the Supreme Moslem Council 
(Chapter 3), and his political activities until 1929 (Chapter 4). The 
last chapter of the first part will be devoted to an analysis of his 
character and personality.
The second part of the study will be devoted to the examination of the 
events and happenings which followed the disturbances of 1929 and which 
laid the basis for all future developments during the 30's, namely the
ft
Arab Delegation to London in 1930 (Chapter 6), the report of the Shaw 
Commission (Chapter 7), the Hope-Simpson report and the Passfield White 
Paper (Chapter 8) and the Prime Minister's letter to Dr. Weizmann (Chapter 9). 
Chapter 10 will be devoted to the Wailing Wall Commission and its report and 
Chapter 11 to the Islamic Congress in Jerusalem in 1931.
In the third part of this study will be examined the central issues 
of the Palestinian political life, namely the Lamd problem, immigration 
and constitutional development, as well as the Development Scheme which 
was an important issue during the early 30*s (Chapter 12). Also in this 
part which covers the political developments until 1937 will be examined 
the disturbances of 1933 (Chapter 13) and the Mufti's relations with the 
British (Chapter 14). Chapter 15 will dwell on the concept of "Armed 
Struggle" and the problem of Jewish Arms.
The Arab Revolt of 1936 is examined in Part IV. Chapter 16 is 
devoted to the Mufti's views and activities during the first phase of the
3revolt, and Chapter 17 to the Royal Commission,the partition plan and the 
Mufti's escape.
The concluding Chapter (18) presents an evaluation of the Mufti's
leadership
4Preface
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have helped me in the preparation of this thesis. Although they are 
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in London, the Israeli State Archives, Jerusalem, the Hagana Archives, 
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6LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
The Arab Executive - The Secretariat (bureau) of the Arab Executive Committee.
Cab. Con. - cabinet conclusions.
C.l.D. report - Palestine, Criminal Investigation Department political reports. 
C.O. - Colonial Office 
C.P. - Cabinet Papers.
C.S. - Chief Secretary
Col. Sec. - Colonial Secretary
F.O. - Foreign Office
The H.A. - The Hagana Archives
Hansard - Hansard, House of Commons Debates 5th Series.
Hansard, Lords. - Hansard, House of Lords Debates 5th Series.
I.S.A. - Israel State Archive
O. A.G. - Officer Administering the Government
r.
P. M.C. - Permanent Mandates Commission 
P.R.O. - Public Record Office
W.O. - War Office
The Z.A. - The Zionist Archive.
IINote:- For spelling of Arabic names I used the system of transliteration from
Arabic into English for official use" used by the Government of Palestine 
during the Mandate.
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IdTBODUCTION
Among contemporary international problems the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in and over Palestine is one of the longest and bitterest 
ones. It practically started following the first world war*- which 
caused a change of sovereignty in the Middle East. Ottoman domination 
was replaced by British and French rule through the application of the 
Mandates system, under which the two mandatory powers were called upon 
by the covenant of the League of Nations to render administrative advice 
and assistance to the ex-enemy territories so as to enable them to 
achieve full national independence.
The Mandate over Palestine, however, was intended to carry out the 
promise of securing the establishment of a Jewish National Home in 
Palestine as contained in the Balfour Declaration.
This declaration was understood, at the time, by the Arabs - as well
1*4
as by the Jews - to contain much more than its British sponsors really 
meant, namely that the Jews would be given predominant positions in the 
country and that Palestine wouJ.il become a Jewish State under British 
hegemony.
To fight this threat the Arab National movement in Palestine^ 
organised itself and in the 3rd Palestinian Congress-* which assembled in 
Haifa in December 1920 and decided to struggle for the abolition of the 
Balfour Declaration and the establisluaent of a local Arab government under 
a certain kind of British control. 123
1 Though it goes back to the first moves of Jewish immigration and 
settlement during the last decade of the 19th century
2 For the ideology of the movement see Ch. 1 "The Ideology of Arab 
Palestine" in my wider work "The Arab National Movement in Palestine 
during the 30's" which will be published shortly.
3 For the first two Congresses, and the early stages of the national 
struggle see Chapter II 'Developments until iy29" in my work Op-Cit.
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These aims - by and large - did not change all through the period 
of the British Mandates. Through the first decade of the Mandate, xfitex 
jos^^xieoaiiocxmxbdcxiiiaadaibtK, the Arab National movement was led by the 
Arab Executive Committee elected in this Congress to supervise and direct 
the national activities but already in the early twenties, the young 
Haj Amin el Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, and the President of the 
M.S.C. started to emerge as a national leader, and following the 1929 
disturbances he appeared as the first and supreme leader of the Palestinian 
Arabs.
The purpose of this thesis is to study the role played by the Mufti in 
the Arab National movement and in Arab Palestine politics during the period 
1930 - 1937.
A subject of particular interest will be the question of the Mufti's 
relations with the British. Uis earlier extremism and later developments 
when he collaborated with Nazi Germany during the 2nd World War gave rise 
to the current allegation that he was an anti-British extremist all along.^
This allegation cannot be reconciled with the available evidence which 
proves beyond doubt that at different times, the Mufti adopted different 
attitudes depending on the situation.
The study would show that the Mufti - on nary occasions and for a 
number of years - was willing to co-operate with the British authorities 
in order to obtain some advantage or another for the Arab cause and for 
himself, and that, on other occasions, however, he used his influence to 
organise opposition to the Government.
This behaviour conforms with what was termed "the two-faced policy" 
of Arab individuals and groups4 5 in order to ensure themselves on all fronts.
4. See for instance Ch. Sykes Op.Cit p.68
5. Both Sir H.Luke and Sir J.Shaw who served as C.s.'s in the Palestine 
Administration, and Mr. E.Danin and Y.Palmon, the Jewish experts on 
Arab affairs, spoke to me of this phenomenon. I purposely am using 
the term "two-faced" which denotes a statement offact and not the term 
"double-faced" which denotes disapproval.
And finally, I would like to qualify the scope and contents of 
this study. This is not a study of the Palestine problem, and, 
therefore, no attempt has been made to analyse the British, Jewish, or 
even the general Arab viewpoints in this controversial issue. However, 
since the subject of the iiufti's policy is intimately bound with, and 
can be understood only in the context of the Palestine problem, I found 
it necessary to digress into certain aspects of this problem in so far 
as they were relevant to my subject. The comparative lack of historical 
perspective and the highly controversial nature of any issue related to 
the Palestine problem render objectivity most difficult, out in an 
endeavour to remedy these adverse influences I have used as wide a range 
of sources as possible.
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PART X The Rise to Power of Haj Amin al Husseini 
Chapter 1.
The Mufti, Ha.j Amin al Husseini, Background and Youth
All students of Palestine Affairs agree that the most important figure
in Palestine Arab politics during the inter-war years was Haj Amin al
Husseini, Mufti of Jerusalem and president of the Supreme Moslem Council.
Some of them even claim that during these years he was the dominant
figure in Palestine as a whole1. In January 1930, the start of the
period covered by this study, he was described thus by Arab notables from 
2Gaza "The symbol of our hopes and the bearer of the aspirations of the 
Arab people in Palestine, our supreme national leader" ...
In July 1939, some two years after he was removed from his offices,
3and escaping as a refugee to Syria, he was still considered by Arabs as
"the esteemed chairman of the Arab Higher Committee" .. the faithful
trustee of our rights and the only person whom we recognise as our
4representative" and described by Musa al Alami as "the leader of 
Palestinian Arabs whose word alone counted".
Haj Amin was born into one of the chief families or clans in Palestine. 
The Husseinis consider themselves to be direct descendents of Hussein son 
of the Khalif Ali, and his wife Fatma the daughter of Muhammad, and 
describe themselves as "the oldest and most honourable family in PalestineJ". 
The family name is already mentioned in a Jerusalem chronology of the 13th 
century as leasers of the lands of Sharafat village, north of Jerusalem.
1. See J. Marlow The Seat of Pilate London 1939 pp. 3-4
2. In a letter to the Arab Executive Office 2.1.30 following the
discovery of a "plot" to murder him. Arab Executive file
01563.ISA
3. In a petition from the "youth of Mohammad" to the H.C. for Palestine.
No date, received on 20.7.39 C.S. file K/102/37.1SA. My italics.
4. Speaking to the Colonial Secretary Malcolm Macdonald 25.11.38 
AE File 00570 ISA. My italics.
5. See letter to the Colonial Office requesting pension for the family
of the Mufti Taher al Husseini 25.10.21. C.S's file 2287/Pal present No. 
245 I.S.A.
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Their opponents contested strongly this tradition and claimed that the 
family came to Palestine from Yemon in the 16th century and settled in the 
village Deir-Sudan (the dwelling of the black) near Ramallah from which 
they got their natte al-Aswad. Later tney moved to Jerusalem increasing 
their prestige and importance by marrying ixxto the Sheikh Abu-Ghosh 
family which was among the important families around Jerusalem. Some 
200 years ago, one of the family married a daughter of a real Husseini, 
and contrary to Moslem custom, he added his wife's family name to his own 
thus changing it to Aswad-llussein.
Mustafa Aswad al Husseini (the grandfather of Haj Amin) married into
the Jarallah family, the traditional holders of the office of Mufti of 
6Jerusalem . When the last Mufti from the Jarallalis died and having no 
suitable candidate from their own family they backed Mustafa Aswad al 
Husseini who became the Mufti in the late 1890's. He, in the meantime, 
dropped the Aswad and henceforth the family was known as Al Husseini6 7.
Whichever of these two versions is correct, the fact is that the 
fourth quarter of the 19th century saw the Husseinis well established and 
strongly entrenched in the Ottoman officialdom in Palestine, thanks perhaps 
to an ability to adjust themselves to the prevailing conditions of the Ottoman 
regime.
In 1886 Musa al Husseini, the leader of the family, was head of the 
Criminal Court in Jerusalem. His brother Salim was the Naqib (the head 
of the ashraf) and his son Shukri married the niece of Marnai Pasha the 
Grand Vizir. Another son, Ismail, was later made Director of Education.
6. However, Abd al Karim al Husseini was the Mufti of Jerusalem in the 
beginning of the 17th century. In the 18th century the office was 
held by the Al Alami family from which it moved to the Jarallahs.
7. Tne story goes that the Kashashibis and other opponents of the 
Husseinis intervened with Rashid Bey the Mutass<orif of Jerusalem to 
forbid them the use of the name. Only through the intervention of 
Shukri Bey al Husseini, who was married to the niece of ICamel Pasha, 
the Grand Vizir, were they saved from disgrace and allowed to remain 
with the name Husseini. M. Pearlman Mufti of Jerusalem London 1947 p.10. 
E. Elath Hai Amin al Husseini Jerusalem 1968 p.17.
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in Jerusalem and transferred to Adana. Another, Salim Ilusseini, was
8Qaimaqam of Jaffa , llusa Hazim Pasha al Husseini was Governor of Jaffa, Bitlis 
Yemen and other stations, and later Mayor of Jerusalem, to which office 
he was appointed by the British a few months after its occupation, when the 
previous mayor, who had handed them the keysnof the city on 9th December 
1917, his brother Hussein al Husseini, died. At tne elections, to the 
Ottoman Parliament in 1908, Said al Husseini, (the Mufti's uncle) was 
elected as a member representing Jerusalem.
We have already seen how Mustafa al Husseini became Mufti of Jerusalem 
in the late 1890's. He was followed by his son, Taher, who in turn was 
followed in 1908 by his son Kamel, who held the office until his death in 
1921 after the British occupation.
Mohammad Amin, the son of Sheikh Taher al Husseini, the Mufti of
9Jerusalem, was born in Jerusalem in the year 1896. He studied first in 
a local Moslem school (Kutab) and then in "Al-l'dadi" a government school 
in Jerusalem.
His family, grooming him perhaps as a future Mufti of Jerusalem^, 
sent him in 1912 to Cairo. He studied there at Sheikh Rashid Rida's school *9
0. The commercial business of the Husseinis in Jaffa were directed for 
30 years by the Jew Y. Rockah who was very much liked by Salim 
Husseini. Though it was said that as a rule the Husseinis did not 
like Christians and Jews as they were non believers. However, this 
did not hinder them from entering into business transactions with the 
Jews. It was further said that after the first Arab attack on the 
Jewish colony Petah-Tiqva in 1886 the Husseinis supported the Jews 
during the trial which followed. Assaf. Arab Awakening in Palestine 
and their flight. Tel Aviv. 1969 p.16.
9. Different books mentioned different years as the year of his birth,
he himself in an application for a passport which he filled in 8.1.21 
wrote 1896. see file 01820 original number H/582 I.S.A.
10 . N . Barbour Nisi Dominus London 1946 p . 129.
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"Dar al Da'wa walirshad" learning the latter's Pan Islamic views, and in
"A1 Azhar". His opponents maintained that the period of his studies in
"al Azhar" was very short and that he never achieved high academic knowledge
of the Islamic religion and law. They point to the fact that had he been
recognised as an "Alem" (expert on Islamic religion and law) he would have
been called "Sheikh"^*. Instead, Amin, after leading a life of privation 
12in Cairo , left Egypt towards the end of 1915 and returned to Jerusalem, 
visiting on his way the holy places of Islam, thus winning for himself the 
title "Haj".
After the outbreak of the war in 1914, Haj Amin entered the military 
training College at Istambul, joining on his graduation the Ottoman forces 
in Izmir. He returned to Jerusalem in the beginning of 1917 where he
was released from the army on medical reasons.
■ \
After the British occupation Haj Amin together with other young members
of his family, established towards the end of 1913 in Jerusalem, El Nadi
13al Arabi (The Arab Club). The aims of the Nadi _  "Arab independence,
union of Palestine with Syria, and prevention of any and every sort of
Zionism and Jewish immigration, were about the same of those of the al Muntada 
14al Adabi (the Literary Club)"but the members of the "Nadi" who were just
11. "Olarna" (pi. of Alem) do not generally use the title "Haj" even after 
going on pilgrimage,.
12. It seems that he was assisted by his brother Kamel from his own poor 
salary.
13. For full particulars of the Club as well as other Arab Clubs of the time -
see the report of Major J. Camp, Assistant Political Officer, Jerusalem, 
12.8.1919. Documents of British Foreign Policy 1919-1939. Vol. 18 pp 
360-365. ---------
14. Consisting mainly of the al Nashashibi family. Ibid.
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as much opposed to Zionism and Jewish immigration, were not so radical 
and so strong on Arab independence and were more pro-British. Several 
members of the club were connected with the Intelligence Corps and Haj Amin 
himself is kno\m to cooperate with them in recruiting Palestinian Arab 
volunteers to join Feisal's army.
He was employed for a short time in O.E.T.A. as a junior clerk in the 
office of Gabriel Pasha Haddad, the Arab adviser to the British Military 
Governor of Jerusalem. He then held a series of small clerical jobs, 
in the Department of Public Security, as a Customs Officer in Qaliqilyah, 
and then again in the security department at Damascus. While there, 
he established contacts with nationlist circles around King Fiesal's 
court^ and served as an official liaison man between the preparatory 
Committee of "the Syrian Congress" which met in Damascus in 1919 and 
the Palestinian leaders invited to the Congress by King Feisal^. Soon 
after he was discharged and returned to Jerusalem where he obtained ani'i
appointment, as a tutor at the Rashidiyah School. He also entered into a 
partnership with the owners of "Rawdat al Maaref" school which became 
later the centre of Arab Nationalist education in Palestine. He continued 
his activities in the Nadi al Arabi, writing and speaking about national 
matters, preaching his Pan Arab and Pan Moslem ideas, and calling for the
13. For the contacts between the Nadi al Arabi in Damascus, which became 
then the important national organisation in Syria, and the Ilusseini's 
Nadi al Arabi in Jerusalem see Y. Porat Op-Cit pp. 89-90.
16. He was later blamed by his opponents for receiving from King Feisal 
L.E. 150 to cover the expenses of the Palestinian representative 
participating in the Congress which he kept for himself.
E. Elath Op-Cit p. 20-21.
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unification of Palestine with Syria under the crown of King Feisal
And then, on the 4th April, 1920, being the day of Nabi Musa, as well
18as Easter, Anti-Jewish riots broke out in Jerusalem. The Palin Commission 
find that the causes of the trouble had been (1) the Arabs' disappointment 
at the non fulfilment of the promises of independence which they believed 
to have been given them in the war, (2) The Arabs' belief that the Balfour 
Declaration implied a denial of the right of self-determination, and their 
fear that the establishment of the National Home would mean a great increase 
of Jewish immigration and would lead to their economic and political 
subjection to the Jews and (3) the aggravation of those sentiments on the 
one hand by propaganda from outside Palestine associated with the proclamation 
of the Emir Feisal as King of a re-united Syria, and with the growth of 
Pan-Arab and Pan-Moslem ideas, and on the other hand by the activities 
of thè Zionist Commission, supported by the resources and influence of 
Jews in the world at large.
The Commission further concluded that "there is no proof for the existence 
of an organised plan .... the affair starting spontaneously." However, 
the report went on to say that political agitators decided "to exploit 
whichever opportunity they would find in order to provoke riots and that 
such provocatours participated in the Nabi-Musa procession for this aim"*y.
17
17. Zionist sources of the time say that Haj Amin who returned from 
Damascus towards the end of March 1920 reported to a meeting in 
Jerusalem that "Britian does not object to hand over Palestine to 
King Feisal". See Jewish Intelligence report No. 32 1.4 20 File 
2800 II 2/4 Zionist archives, Jerusalem.
18. A military judicial commission of enquiry into the causes of the 
riots, formed under the chairmanship of Gen. Palin. See Palin 
Report F.O. 371/5121.
19. Ibid p.58.
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The Jews claimed that the riots had been carefully planned and
directed by the Husseini's Nadi al Arabi, The Nashashibi's Muntade al
Adabi and other Arab organisations. Col. R. Meinertzhagen the Chief
Political Officer of O.E.T.A.(s) was more specific when he wrote "I
also had ample evidence that Haj Al Amin (who later became Mufti of
21Jerusalem) was stirring up the Arab element in Jerusalem" and if the
Pro-Zionist view of Meinertzhagen were well known, the same certainly could
not be said about the views of R. Storrs, the Military Governor of
Jerusalem, who wrote "The immediate fomenter of the Arab escesses had been
one Haj Amin al Husscini .... like most agitators, having incited the man
22in the street to violence and probable punishment he fled" . Much later,
an Arab source - expressing perhaps what became later an accepted Arab
23view - stated simply "Haj Amin commanded the April 1920 demonstrations".
o t
It seems that Haj Amin was given bail and had forfeited it f and escaped to 
Kerak in Trans-Jordan where he found refuge with Sheikh Rafeifan Pasha al 
Majali. During his absence from Palestine he went again for a while to
20
20 See the testimony of Dr. Eder, the head of the political department
of the zionisreoanaissiou before the Palin Commission Ibid. See also 
file 333 Z/3 and file 276 Z/4 Zionist Archives Jerusalem.
?1 Rntrv for 9 4.20 in Middle East Diary 1917-1956. London 1959 p.79
Meinertzhagen blames the military administration and specially Lt.
Col Watert-Taylor, the Chief of Staff to Gen. Bols, and also R.
Litorrs the military Governor of Jerusalem as encouraging Haj Amin 
and other1 Arab notables in Jerusalem to start the riots in order to 
¿.rove to H.M.G. the "futility of trying to impose Zionism on Palestine. 
Ibid pp. 56, 79.
22. R. Storrs. Orientations London 1937__e_.__383_
23. A. Sayegh "The Hashamis and the Problem of Palestine" (al 
Hashamiyun wa qadiyat Falastin) Beirut 19t>6 p.98.
24. N. Bentvich. England in Palestine London 1932 p.49 I did not come 
across any other source who mentions that Haj Amin was given and 
had forfeited bail.
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Damascus where he established on the 31st May 1920 the Arab Palestine 
25Society (al 2amiyya al Arabiyya al Falistiniyiya). Ke was tried in
, 26 absentia and sentenced to ten years imprisonment . A few months later,
in September 1920, on the occasion of the first visit of Sir Herbert
Samuel, the first High Commissioner for Palestine, to Trans-Jordan, and on
the general intercession of the local Chieftains who met him in Salt he
27extended clemency to llaj Amin and allowed him to return to Jerusalem 
It is generally agreed that being a Jew ana new in the country, Sir II. 
Samuel intended the amnesty to serve as a token of good will towards the 
Arabs. (The Jews, however, believed that Kaj Amin was pardoned because 
of his previous connections with British Intelligence and because the 
British believed he would be useful to them in their future policy of 
Pales tine^. *
25. , See II. Saciaqa "The Palestine Problem1 (qadiyyat Falstin) Beirut
1946 p.83 Other members were Aref al Aref, Rafiq Tamimi and Izzat 
Darwaza. During the short period of its existence it sent a 
protest against the decisions of San-Remo conference it published a 
long manifesto to the India Moslems and sent a petition to the Pope 
on "Zionist danger to Christianity in Palestine".
26. E. Elath notes that no official report of the trial was ever published. 
Only the paper Suriyah al Janubiyal(of which the editor Aref el Aref 
escaped, was sentenced and was pardoned together with the Mufti)of the 
27th April 1920 reported that a military court judged Haj Amin and 
Aref el Aref according to paras. 32, 57, 63 of the Ottoman Criminal 
Code. According to the bibgraphy of Aref el Aref published at the 
end of his book (page not numbered) Taarikh Al Quds Op-Clt the two
of them were sentenced to death arid only later the judgement was 
changed to 10 years of prison. No other source confirms this. Ch. 
Sykes, mistakenly states that Haj Amin was condemned to fifteen years 
imprisonment. See Sykes Qp-Cit p.60.
27. it should be noted that one of the first acts of Sir H. Samuel after 
arriving in Palestine, was to amnesty all prisoners sentenced by the 
military court with the exception of Haj Amin and Aref el Aref. It was 
therefore suggested that this points to the grave view taken by the 
authorities of the activities of these men. See M. Pearlman Op-Cit p. 
12. See also E. Elath Op-Cit p.26 for comparison see N. Bentwich, who 
as the Attorney General at the time knew perhaps more, but mentioned 
nothing of the kind, saying only that these two were not included in 
the general amnesty because they had forfeited bail. Op-Cit p.49.
28. See file on the Mufti No. 01949 I.S.A.
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Chapter 2
Hai Amin - His Appointment to the Office of Mufti of Jerusalem
When Haj Amin returned to Jerusalem he was not any more a young leader 
of the second line. His role in the riots, his escape, his trial and 
the special amnesty by the H.C. made him a man in the public eye, a man 
with a record of action, ready for future roles and actions.
On the 21st March 1921 Kamel al Husseini died and the office of 
Mufti of Jerusalem became vacant.
The Muftis1 2 3are Moslem jurisconsults, whose duty it is to quote 
relevant precedents and opinions on points of Moslem Keligious Law.
The Muftis depend for their authority, principally, on their reputation 
for learning.
The ruling of a Mufti is called a Fatwa, but it has no executive
sanction, which is in the hands of the Qadi. As an indication of the
relative status of Qadi and Mufti during the Ottoman rule, it may be noted,
that before the first World War, the salary of the Qadi of Jerusalem was
3£45 gold per month, that of the Mufti £5 per month . However, because of 
the frequent changes of Qadis as against the comparatively long periods 
of service of the Muftis, who in addition were local men of influential 
families, the importance of the Office of Mufti was growing. He was also
1. Or "Grand Mufti" as he became known. Contrary to the accepted belief
it was not Haj Amin who first attached the adjective "Grand" to his title. 
The British military authorities and later the civil ones, willing to show 
their appreciation of the assistance and cooperation they got from 
Kamel al Iiusseini after the occupation, described him as the "Grand 
Mufti the representative of Islam in Palestine". He received also the 
C.M.G. and was appointed as the President of the Sharia Court of Appeal and 
chairman of the General Waqf Committee. See C.S. file 245, I.S.A.
2. Mufti - giver of legal opinions of the non Ilanafite rites in the Ottoman 
Empire. D.B. Macdonald - Development of Muslim Theology Jurisprudence 
and Constitutional Theory. Mew York, 1930 p. 115.
3. See paper "Administration of Palestine before the British Occupation 
written by L. Perowne in 1932. C.O. 733/227/97462.
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ex-officio chairman of the local Waqf Committee and sat ex-officio on the
4Majlis Idara or the District Administrative Council .
The British occupation, further increased the importance of the office
of Mufti of Jerusalem. He ceased to be sub-ordinate to "Sheikh al Islam"
in Istanbul and as Jerusalem became the capital of Palestine, and the seat
5of the Supreme Moslem Council which was to be established his comparative 
importance vis a vis the other Muftis of Palestine increased. This was 
also accentuated by the personal high standing of Kamel al Husseini with 
the British Authorities.
The Husseinis did not intend to relinquish this important position 
and did everything they could to ensure that the office - for which they 
put up Haj Amin - would remain in their hands. Their opponents the 
Nashashibis^ tried as best as they could to prevent it and bring about the 
election of Sheikh Husam al Din Jarallah.
According to international law, regarding the administration of 
occupied territories, the authorities had to follow in the election, the 
relevant Ottoman law which stated, that the Ulema, religious notables of 
the Moslem community and the elected Moslem members of the District 
Administrative Council and Municipalities were to hold elections, and 
submit the names of the three men receiving the highest number of votes.
From these three eligible candidates the H.C., taking the place of "Sheikh 
al Islam" of Ottoman days, was to appoint the Mufti. In the elections,
Sheikh Jarrallah, received the highest number of votes, while Haj Amin 
came fourth and so failed to reach the short list of three eligible
4. See Ibid
5. See infra p. 27
6. See note 1.
7. The rivalry and bitterness between these two families was sharpened when 
R. Storrs, the Governor of Jerusalem, removed Musa Kazim al Husseini, 
the Mayor of Jerusalem, from his office for his participation in the 1920 
riots, and appointed in his place Ragheb al Nashashibi. See Storrs, 
Ou-Cit 390-391.
-20-
g
candidates. However, Sheikh Jaffailah retired from the list, giving an 
opening to Iiaj Amin who was elevated to third place and became eligible 
for appointment.
He v/as then informed, orally it seems, of his appointment over the 
heads of the other two, but no letter informing him of his nomination as 
Mufti of Jerusalem was despatched to him nor was his appointment ever
9gazetted . These facts point perhaps to the hesitations of the Government 
regarding his appointment.
These hesitations were based - partly at least - on ui3 insufficient 
qualifications for this religious post.
The Peel Goiauission statea*0 that Uaj Amin "had been trained for the 
post of Mufti" ... and had received a Moslem theological training with a 
view to representing the Husseini family in the post. We were informed 
by a competent witness that HaJ Amin was the only man -in Palestine at 
that time having the necessary qualifications for the post," This 
however was not the generally accepted view and his opponents used always 
to minimise his Islamic academic studies and knowledge. liven a source 
friendly to the Mufti wrote thus:**- "HaJ Amin did not belong to the (group of) 
religious men but to (the group of) those wearing the Tarbush - symbolising 
the Ottoman officialdom - as he studied in Istauboul in"al Hulkiye'j the 3
3. With a little bit of convincing by the Government for whom he was 
working as an Inspector of the Sharia Courts who were at the time a 
part of the Government's legal department. N. Hentwich Op-Cit p 56
E. Elath brings the strange story that Kagheb al Nashasuibi was ..art* 
in these discussions. See Elath Op-Cit p.27.
9. The Peel deport p.177.
10. Ibid
11. izzat Darwaza was close to the Mufti for many years and was appointed 
by him as the Director General of the Avqaf in the early thirties.
he later served as tne liaison man between the Mufti and the Istiqlal 
party. Harwaza. Concerning the Hew Arab (H*wJLa al llar^ a al
Arabiyya al Haditha) Saida 1950 - III pp. 4 6 - 7 .
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moderation vis a vis the Government and the Jews*4*. Their motive, it seem,
was their belief that the office of Mufti of Jerusalem should stay with the
1 ?Eusscinis. One those which was repeated in the petitions and cables
asking for his appointment was that haj Amin "is of the prophet* s lineage
ana a descendant of Huftis from a very long period."" Christian leaders too,
X0including the orthodox Patriarch supported his election ’ and so, according
to Zionist source©1' did the Emirs Faisal and Abdallah.
The decision, however, whom to nominate, rested with the H.G, Sir M.
Samuel, He, it aeons, was inclined to nominate EaJ Amin for he discussed
with him the possibility of his nomination even before the elections were held*
Besides the general clamor for Haj Amin's appointment, the U.C. had other
considerations too. He wished perhaps to soothe the Husseinic for the
recaaval of Musa Realm as Mayor of Jerusalem and his replacement by Ragheb 
»1
Kaahaeiiibi and as Arab political life in Palestine was largely conditioned 
by the rivalry between the two families, it »awed logical to balance a 
HashosUibi Mayor by a Husscini Mufti, /mother reason could be his hop*®, 
that a post would curb haj Amin's extreme activities (a stratagem which 
succeeded with Aref el href). Anyway they mot on 11.A.1921 and the 
conversation between thorn is very revealing.
21In a note to the Chief Secretary, Sir H, Samuel wrote on 11.4, 1921 ;
It, Sucii as Suiimoa al Kasif from Haifa and Sheikh Sana- al Curl, the 
Qodi of Jerusalem who was criticised ieter very strongly by the 
Mufti's followers for his opposition to subordinate toe Sharia Courts 
to the S.M.C. strangely enough, the Qudi of Jerusalem, in ufe cabio 
of 24,3.21 claimed that the Jews too supported the appointment of 
haj Amin. Ibid. Hot one Jewish source over confirmed this,
17. See Ibid.
18. See Memorandum by Richmond 7.6.21 C.S. file 245 I.S.A.
19. See biography of Haj Amin el Uusseini file 3üU8 s/25 Z.A.
20. One source even states that "Haj Amin stood as a candidate for the
post on the device of Sir Herbert". See L. Furago, "Palestine on the Eva"
bondon 1938 p.3$. Ho other source confirms this statement,' and I.am " "
not inclined to accept it as true.
21. C.S. File 245. I.S.A.
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"I saw Haj Amin Husseini on Friday and discussed with him at considerable 
length the political situation and the question of his appointment to the 
office of grand Mufti. Mr. Storrs was also present, and in the course 
of conversation, he declared his earnest desire to cooperate with the 
Government and his belief in the good intentions of the British Government 
towards the Arabs. He gave assurances that the influence of his family 
and himself would be devoted to maintaining tranquility in Jerusalem and 
he felt sure that no disturbances need be feared this year. He said that
the riots of last year were spontaneous and unpremeditated. If the
Government took reasonable precautions, he felt sure they would not be 
repeated".
22The Mufti himself gave a different version of this meeting saying ,
"When I was in mourning over my brother Kamel, Sir Herbert Samuel visited 
us at our house and we had a frank and open discussion during which I 
expressed to him my views and my intentions. And I asked him, "whom do 
you prefer, a candid adversary or a renegade friend?" He answered "a 
candid adversary" and on the basis of that came my appointment as the 
Mufti of Jerusalem."
Even if we add the Mufti's version to the more authoritative one of 
the H.C., there could be only one meaning to that discussion and the H.C. 
remained in no doubt regarding "the views and intentions of the candid 
adversary" who "proposed" that in return for his appointment there would be 
peace and public order in Jerusalem. The fact that this conversation took 
place a few days before Nebi Musa procession, the anniversary of the Anti- 
Jewish riots of 1920, was very meaningful.
22. G. Frumkin A Way, of A Judge in Jerusalem (Derech Shofet Biyerushalaim) 
Tel Aviv 1954 p.285.
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Though there was some serious Arab rioting early in May 1921 in Jaffa,
23and several Jewish colonies were attacked the Nebi Musa festivities 
in Jerusalem passed off quietly. Haj Amin was informed of his nomination 
and Lord Samuel could conclude thus in his memories : "with the exception 
of a small affray in Jerusalem in the following November, for a period of 
eight years no disturbance occurred anywhere in Palestine^." The 
final step in Haj Amin's installation as the virtual religious leader 
of the Moslem Community in Palestine was on the 2nd May 1922 when he became 
the President of the Supreme Moslem Council and Rais al Ulema.
23. See infra, p.40
24. Lord Samuel Memoirs London 1945 p.169.
*i
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Chapter 3
Hai Amin. His Election to the Office o President o__the Supreme
Moslem Council
During the Ottoman regime, the Sultan who was also the Caliph, and 
was the sole authority who exercised legislative powers promulgated laws 
affecting the constitution, jurisdiction, procedure and organisation of 
Sharia courts, and laws affecting the administration of the Awqafs. After 
the establishment of constitutional government this was done by the legis­
lative body created by the constitution.
The administrative powers with regard to the procedure and internal 
organisation Oi the Sharia courts were exercised by the "Sheikh-al-Islam", 
until the outbreak of the 1st World War when these powers passed into the 
hands of the Ministry of Justice. The Awqaf, after being registered by 
the Sharia Courts who enforced its terms, were either administered 
directly, or supervised by the Ministry of Awqaf.
When Palestine was detached from the Ottoman Empire and came under the 
rule of non-Moslem Government, it became necessary to create a new 
administrative machinery for the Awqaf and the Sharia Courts.
During the military occupation, a Director General of Awqaf was 
appointed and controlled by the Senior Judicial Officer. The Senior 
Judicial Officer also appointed judges of the Sharia courts when necessary, 
after consultation with a Moslem Coimnittee.
The majority of Moslems were not happy with this situation^.
On the 19th November, 1920, a few months after the civil administration 
had replaced the military one in July 1920, the H.C. summoned a conference 
of Muftis, principal Ulema and Moslem Notables, to discuss questions 
relating to the control of Moslem religious affairs and the administration
of Awqaf. It was decided at the conference to form a Committee consisting
2of principal Government officers and Ulema . The resolutions of the committee 12
1. Specially, since the Senior Judicial Officer was Norman Bentwich - a 
Jew. See C.S. file 163 I.S.A.
2. The sittings of the committee were presided by the H.C. C.O. 733/213/
97033.
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were embodied in an order of March 1921 providing for the administration 
3of Moslem affairs . The order provided for the creation of an elected 
Committee of four, for Moslem Religious affairs, vrtiose functions were to 
supervise the administration of Awqaf, to nominate and dismiss judges of 
the Sharia courts subject ...to approval of Government, and to appoint Muftis, 
subject to approval of Government.
Provision was also made for the creation of a Central Waqf Committee, 
but the Government retained financial control over Moslem Awqaf, and for 
this purpose it was provided that the Awqaf budget was to be approved by the 
Government and that loans to be secured on Awqaf revenues should also 
require Government approval. The central Awqaf Committee was given no 
legislative powers and no specific power of control over Sharia courts.
This order met with opposition from the public which found expression 
during the second conference of Ulema which met in August 1921^. The 
Moslems wanted wider autonomy in managing the Awqaf and the Sharia courts, 
and demanded that the power of dismissal of Sharia court officials should
5rest absolutely with the Supreme Moslem Council . Sir H. Samuel regarded 
with misgiving the proposal that judges should be dismissed by an executive 
authority and that the dismissal of such officials should not be in the 
hands of the Palestine Government which paid them. 345
3. See official Gazette No.43 of 15.5.21.
4. For full account of the discussions of these conferences, see 
Sir H. Samuel’s despatch to Lord Curzon of 14th November 1920,
H. Samuel papers I.S.A.
5. The National organisations attached the greatest importance to this 
proposal; when Sheikh Muhamad Saud A1 Ouri, the Qadi of Jerusalem, 
who had previously supported strongly the election of Haj Amin as 
Mufti, objected to putting the Sharia courts under the control of the 
S.M.C. he was described as traitor and the government was asked to 
dismiss him. "Falastin" 26.11.21 - 10.12.21.
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However, since this was the only outstanding point of disagreement 
between the two sides, and as the Moslem representatives attached particular 
importance to that demand he advised the British Government "to concede 
this point to the Moslems for political considerations"^. On 20th December 
1921 the old order of March 1921 was replaced by new order subsequently 
validated by article 74 of the Palestine order in Council 1922, by which a 
body to be known as the Supreme Moslem Sharia Council was constituted for 
the control and management of Moslem Awqaf and Sharia affairs in Palestine. 
This new order conferred upon the S.M.C. much wider powers than those 
conferred by the previous one.
However, the December 1921 relation was not clear enough on several
Qpoints , the most important of which turned to be the tern of office of 
the President of the S.M.C.
QArticle 2 of the regulation provided that the Council should be 
constituted of Rais al Ulema and 4 members, and that Rais al Ulema should 
be the permanent President of the Council. But article 4 provided expressly 
that Rais al Ulema should be elected by general election, the method of 
which was to be prescribed by the council in a special law, Article 6 which 
said that "Rais al Ulema shall in the present circumstances" (i.e. when the 
council was constituted in 1921 only) "be elected by the General Committee
elected by the secondary electors"......  did not make the problem any
clearer.
This ambiguity enabled Haj Amin, who eventually was elected as the 
President of the S.M.C. to claim that his election was for life and he 
actually succeeded to prevent further elections to this office. 6789
6. See his letter to the Colonial Secretary 8.10.21 C.O. 733/Vol 6.
7. Published in the official Gazette of 1.1.22, see Bentwich - Laws of 
Palestine Vol.ll.pp. 398-402.
8. It was hinted that this was owing to the fact that the regulation was 
prepared hurriedly, see C.O. 733/222/97208/2.
9. For the text, see the official Gazette of 1.1.22. My italics.
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Further ambiguities enabled him to reach a situation which was
described thus*0: "The Supreme Moslem Council, which for practical
purposes means the Mufti, controls both the Sharia Courts and the
administration of Waqf funds". And the Peel commission concluded:
"the functions status and precedence of the existing President (i.e. of
the S.M.C.) have not been defined and there has therefore been no legal
11limitation of his powers".
The elections were held on the 9th January 1922. The Electoral
College consisted of the 56 secondary electors to the Ottoman Parliament,
4 members for each of the 14 Qazas (a sub-division of district) of Palestine
during the Ottoman regime, of which 53 attended the elections. A last
minute effort by the Mufti's opponents led by Ragheb Nashashibi, to prevent
12his election, by proposing a delay, failed and he received 40 out of 47
13votes with 4 abstentions and only 3 votes given to other candidates.
His election, it seems, was secure from the beginning. All through 
the discussions leading to the establishment of the S.M.C. he was the main 
spokesman for the Moslems. He was accepted as such by the government who,
as many hints show, encouraged him to play that role and used him as its
14channel of communication with the Moslem representatives. 10234
10. In a minute by Mr. Williams from the C.O. on 27.8.30. My Italics, 
see C.O. 733/193/77364.
11. The Peel Report p.180. My Italics.
12. After this proposal received only 10 votes, Ragheb Nashashibi with 
5 of his followers left the meeting. Had they not left, the result 
of the election of the 2 members representing the Sanjak of Jerusalem 
could have been different. Said el Shawa from Gaza and Abdallah Dajani 
from Jaffa, both followers of the Mufti were elected with a very narrow 
majority. The other 2 members, Mohammed Murad the Mufti of Haifa 
representing the Sanjak of Acre, and Abd el Latif Salah representing 
the Sanjak of Nablus were elected almost unopposed. See H.C. despatch 
to the Colonial Secretary 20.1.22, C.O. 733.Vol. 18.
13. Ibid. See also the Mufti's testimony before the Shaw Commission. The 
Shaw Evidence Vol. I, p. 492.
14. See C.S. file 245 I.S.A. See also C.O. 733/Vol. 8.
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The establishment of the Supreme Moslem Council, in general, and
the election of the Mufti as its president, in particular, were hailed
by the Arabs and described by Jamal al Husseini as "a victory of the 
.. 15national movement".
16Approximately 15 years later, the Peel Commission described thus 
the situation which resulted from his election "the existence of the Supreme 
Moslem Council need not, in itself, have led to the development of an Arab 
"imperium in imperio". But the functions which the Mufti has contrived 
to accumulate in his person and his use of them have had that effect. He 
is now such a power in the land, that supported by the National Committees 
in the different towns of Palestine he may truthfully be described as the 
head of yet a third parallel Government."
The Commission, very generously, obscures here the part played by the
ft
Government in the creation of that situation described above, and one gets 
the impression that it was brought about only by the clever Mufti who 
"contrived".......
Much nearer to the truth was the Chief Secretary H. Luke who wrote15 67 18
"this constitution and these regulations involved a delegation to the
Supreme Moslem Council of Jurisdiction so extensive and of powers so wide
as to be, to some extent, almost an abdication by the Administration of
Palestine, of responsibilities incumbent upon a Government."
Mr. Luke goes on to justify this "abdication by the Administration"....
18by the success of this policy saying , "It must be recognized that the 
bringing into existence of this powerful Moslem body has in some directions 
had distinctly beneficial result. The grant of responsibility and extensive
15. See his "25th letter", to the Arab Delegation in London of January 1922. 
A.E. file 1722 I.S.A.
16. The Peel Report p. 181.
17. In a memorandum enclosed in Sir J. Chancellor’s Confidential despatch 
of 18th June 1929. C.O. 733/172/67296.
18. Ibid.
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powers to this body has given the Moslems of Palestine a new sense of 
confidence and of pride and interest in their past, one of the results 
of which has been the impressive work of restoration in the Haram el 
Sharif".
British spokesmen could find indeed several reasons to justify this
policy of extending to the Moslem community the widest possible autonomy
in religious matters, notably in connection with the administration of the
19Sharia Courts and the management of Waqf funds.
(1) It conformed with British policy in other parts of the 
British Empire.
(2) It conformed with British policy towards other religious 
communities in Palestine.
(3) It complied with the provisions of the Mandate which
1%
required the Mandatory to ensure religious freedom and
. 20the preservation of existing religious rights.
But the most important reason was that of political expediency. We have 
seen already^*- how Sir H. Samuel "bargained" with Haj Amin. The authorities 
believed that the policy of granting the S.M.C. the widest possible autonomy, 
and putting at its head a nationalist leader would afford some prospect of 
peaceable government with Arab co-operation in a country where the standing 
grievance of the Arab population was that their advance to the state of 
political independence enjoyed by neighbouring Arab states, (and, as they 
believed, promised to them), had been indefinitely frustrated by the 
commitments of H.M.G. in connection with the Jewish National home. 1920
19. See paper by Mr. H.F. Downie of the Colonial Office 18.5.32. C.O. 
733/222/97208
20. Though the Ottoman Government maintained closer official control over 
the Sharia Courts and the Awqaf funds, than did the Government of 
Palestine, the former was a Moslem Government with Islam as the 
established religion.
21. See supra p. 24
Success being the best criterion, the 7 peaceful years which followed 
convinced the government of the soundness of its policy.
In 1926 Sir J. Shuckburgh the head of the Middle East Department, in
22the Colonial Office stat’d that "the institution of a Supreme Moslem 
Council in 1921 has on the whole been one of our most successful moves in 
Palestine. It practically gives the Mohammedans self-government in regard 
to Moslem affairs. The arrangement has worked smoothly and has no doubt 
done much to reconcile the Mohammedans to the Mandatory regime, with its 
unpopular Zionist flavour".
For this co-operation with the Government, the S.M.C. was rewarded
financially and politically. The question of the administration of Moslem
Awqaf was already discussed at the first conference with the Ulema which
23met on 19.11.20 and it was agreed that the Government should allot to 
the Awqaf Administration (which was going to be established) the funds of 
certain Awqafs confiscated or resumed by the Ottoman Government. It was 
also agreed that the Government should continue the collection of Waqf 
tithes, and transfer them to the Awqaf administration, less the expenses 
of collection. The Awqaf administration, in consideration of the revenues 
which the Government agreed to place at their disposal, undertook several 
obligations such as maintenance of Moslem orphanages, reparation of Moslem 
religious buildings and property, education etc.
Later, under the order constituting the S.M.C., the council was charged 
with the administration and control of Moslem Awqaf, and in order to increase 
the revenue of the Awqaf Administration, section 8 (i) (g) of the order 
imposed a duty on the council "to enquire into all Moslem Awqaf and to 23
22. In a minute 11.3.26 C.O. 733/113/5627 My Italics.
23. See the official Gazette No.43 of 15.5.21.
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produce proof and evidence establishing the claim to these Awqaf with a
view to having such, returned to them".
24During a conference held at Government House on the 19th October 
1922,the Mufti requested that the accumulated Awqaf revenue held by the 
Government should be handed over. The H.C. gave an assurance that all 
proved Awqaf would be handed over, and issued an order on the 20th October 
1922, directing that the revenues of several known Awqafs (the Khasqi Sultan, 
the Nebi Musa Waqf and others) be handed over to the supreme Moslem Council 
as from the 1st April 1921.
The yearly budget of the Awqaf Administration following these
arrangements was around £50,000 increasing to £65,600 approximately in
1937*J when the Mufti was removed from his offices. The control of such
big sums of money placed in the hands of the Mufti was a mighty instrument
for the advancement of his personal and political ends.
At that stage, these political ends were modest, with the Mufti
aiming mainly to augment his position within the Islamic community, serving
as its representative before the Government on all religious aspects.
However, little by little, with some encouragement by the government,
he started to branch out into purely civilian matters. In May 1923, the
Government consulted both the Office of the Arab Executive, and the
President of the S.M.C. on the question oiaappointing local members for
, 26a Governmental Committee on taxation. 2456
24. G.O. 733/213/213/97033/1.
25. See C.S. files 192 and K/35/37 Waqf Estimates, I.S.A.
26. Letter by Mr. Richmond 2.5.23 C.S. file 158 I.S.A.
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Lacking a recognized constitutional channel of communication with 
27the Arab community , it may seem only natural for the Government to try 
and get the view of the community through whatever means it could. One
cannot, however, escape the conclusion that the Government and specially
28Mr. Richmond who initiated the above letter, were not averse to the idea 
that the Mufti might establish himself as the Arabs' spokesman on all 
matters, religious as well as civilian ones. This, however, was in 
accordance with the custom prevailing during the Ottoman regime, when the 
heads of the religious communities, were always, to some extent, the 
political representative of their community in its dealings with the 
Government. This attitude of the Government, confirmed further the Mufti's 
leadership in the eyes of the public. Even when the Government knew that 
the Mufti was working against its policy, as for instance in the case of 
the Legislative Council, it took no steps to weaken his position. He, on 
his side, acted cautiously. The drive for boycotting the elections to the 
council was led by the Arab Executive assisted by the S.M.C., but the 
Mufti personally was not openly involved.
This process of the increase in his power and influence, was 
accompanied by a similar process of the increase of the opposition to him, 
but about that later. 278
27. It should be noted that on 1st March 1922, the Colonial Secretary 
Mr. Churchill informed the Arab Delegation that "since no official 
machinery for representation has as yet been constituted; he cannot 
recognize them as representing the Arabs of Palestine. Cmdl700 June 
1922 p.5. Only in 1929 did the Government recognize the Arab Executive 
Committee as representing the Arabs of Palestine as the body 
representing the Arab case before the' Shaw Commission. See the Peel 
Report p.176.
28. It should be noted that Richmond could initiate these steps only after 
the Chief Secretary Sir W. Deeds was replaced in April 1923 by
Sir G. Clayton who was more responsive to Arab claims. As for Richmond's 
motive, it can be safely assumed that with his strongly anti-Zionist 
views, and recognizing the "Anti-Zionist potentialities" of the Mufti 
he decided to help him become the most important Arab leader in Palestine. 
For Richmond's assistance to the Arabs see Jamal al Husseini's letter to 
Musa Kazim al Husseini 17.8.23 A.E. File 02480 Correspondence with the 
Arab delegation in London I.S.A.
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Before finishing the chapter, mention should be made of two important
29activities of the S.M.C. We have seen already that according to the 
order of March 1921 the Awqaf administration (i.e. the S.M.C.), in 
consideration of the revenues which the Government agreed to place at their 
disposal, undertook several obligations two of which were (1 ) the reparation 
of Moslem religious buildings and property. (II) The eduction of Moslem 
children.
The Mufti paid special attention to these obligations and in their
fulfilment contrived to advance his cause as well.
At the end of the First World War, the 2 famous mosques of Jerusalem
A1 Aqsa, and the Dome of the Rock, were in a very poor condition with some
30parts of them in danger of collapse . The Mufti as the moving spirit, 
very enthusiastically started and directed a most impressive work of
I ' l
reconstruction and restoration. Delegations went to Hejaz and India in
311923 and Hejaz, Kuwait Bahrein and Iraq in 1924 collecting and bringing
32with them donations of around £85,000.
As a result of thefe works, the importance of the 2 Jerusalem Mosques 
was re-emphasized and re-introduced to the memory of Moslems in Palestine 
and elsewhere. The Fund-raising campaign which covered all Islamic 
countries concentrated attention in these countries towards the 2 mosques, 
towards Jerusalem and Palestine and towards the Mufti Haj Amin. To the 
Mufti himself, this restoration work became one of his proud achievements 
spreading his fame all over the Moslem World as the restorer of the "Haram 
al Sharif" and the defender of the Holy places against the designs of the 
Zionist usurpers. Many peaks in his future career, such as his success 29301
29. See supra p. 31
30. For description of their condition see R. Storrs OP-CIT pp.366-7.
31. For information about these delegations see A.E. file No.3589 I.S.A. 
See also C.S. file 184.I.S.A.
32. With King Fuad of Egypt donating £10,000 Elath OP-CIT-52 and the 
Nizam ofilAfdar Abad appr. £7,000 C.S. file 184 I.S.A.
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(if success it was) in arousing the Palestinian Arabs in August 1929
33to defend the "Buraq" , his call and the response of the Moslem World
3 4in supporting the Palestinian Moslems before the Wailing Wall Cormission,
35and his success in the Islamic Conference of December 1931, could be 
better understood in the light of his personal involvement and attachment
o
to the'Uaram al Sharif".
He established also within the "Haram al Sharif" area a Museum of
37Islamic art and a big religious library and in 1935 he established a
38"Committee on Moslem Monuments".
In the field of education, the SupremevMoslem Council financed several 
private schools in the big cities. These schools, most famous of which 
were "Rawdat al Maaref" in Jerusalem - managed by a relation of the Mufti - 
and "Al Najah" in Nablus, instructed their students in an extreme nationalistI \
spirit. The marching slogan of the students of Rawdat al Maaref when they 
kept order in all the big national and religious celebrations was "We are 
your soldiers Oh, Haj Amin" (Nahanu junudak ya Haj Amin).
One of these, was the Nabi Musa procession initiated - it is said - 
by Salah al Din, to counterbalance the concentration of Christian pilgrims 
in Jerusalem during £he Easter celebration, by a similar concentration of 
Moslem ones. The Nebi Musa Waqf was managed by the Husseinis, and by 
tradition, the Mufti of Jerusalem was the central figure of the celebrations. 
With Haj Amin's encouragement, Nebi M.sa became a big national festival. 345678
33. See Chapter 7, The Report of the Shaw Commission.
34. dee Chapter 10, The Wailing Wall Commission and its report.
35. See Chapter 11, The Islamic conference.
36. In his testimony before the Shaw Commission he said that his house
was in the area of the "Haram1' and that he used to look every day 
to the pavement before the Wailing Wall. The Shaw Evidence Vol. 2 
p. 530. My Italics.
37. See Memorandum by H. Luke. 14.1.29 C.O. 733/172.
38. On 14.7.35 he asked G. Antonios, a Christian, to serve on that 
committee. See G. Antonius file 00860 I.S.A.
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Consolidating his position inside Arab Palestine, the Mufti spread
his activities to inter-Arab and inter-Moslems affairs as well. He
attempted to mediate between Ibn Saud and King Hussein, before the latter's
defeat. He participated in the Caliphate Congress in I gypt and immediately
after that in the Islamic Congress of Mecca in 1925. He endeavoured to
reconcile the tv;o rival camps of the Syrian political refugees in Egypt in
1926-7, and he assembled the Islamic Conference of Jerusalem in December
391931 and was elected as its president.
The Mufti should have been satisfied with what he achieved with the 
40Supreme Moslem Council. Some 15 years after it was established it was
41described thus by one of the Mufti's closest supporters "For almost 
14 years from its establishment until today, the Council, as is generally 
known, has been the only national religious organization in Palestine which 
works for the public interest (A1 Maslaha al ¿\ma). It places the interests 
of the nation (Maslahat al Umma) above all other considerations, and it 
raises the dignity of Moslems and Arabs in Palestine. It guards for them 
their social existence ensures them their religious lav;, and it keeps their 
Awqaf from deteriorating (becoming useless)".
Other sources admitted too that39 401 2 "notwithstanding his limited official 
authority as the head of the Awqaf Committee, Haj Amin, with his strong 
personality his excellent social standing and his continuing exertion for 
the national cause, succeeded in giving the Supreme Moslem Council a 
predominant national political tone (colour) and in making it the core of 
war against Zionism and defence of Arab rights".
39. For the Islamic Conference see Chapter 11.
40. For a full summary of its activities since its establishment until 
1936 see Palestine Report. Col.No.129 p.202.
41. Munif al Husseini. Manifesto to the Nation.:toncerning the attacks 
against the Mufti. (Bayan Lilumma bishan al Hamalat al Atima alati)
N. Sadaqa Op-Cit p.108. ( tushan ala samahat al Mufti alkbar) ."al Jamiah al Arabiyaa. 20.4.1935.42 .
■*
Chapter 4
Political Activity until 1929^.
In order to better fight Zionism and the policy of the Balfour 
Declaration, the political elite of the Palestinians decided towards the 
end of 1918 to throw their lot with the Hashemite rule in Damascus.
In January 1919, tne first Palestinian Congress met in Jerusalem".
t
The two important items on the agenda were
1) The political future of Palestine
2) The Arabs' position with regard to Zionism.
The participants of the Congress were mainly of two kinds. Members
3of the 'Moslem Christian Associations' which were composed, usually, of 
the traditional leaders and local notables of the Moslem and Christian 
communities, and members of the 'Literary Club' and 'Arab Club' which 
were composed of younger educated Moslems who were more extreme in their 
Pan-Arab views. Under their pressure, and with support from French 
Agents who were agitating the Palestinian Arabs against the British, the 
Congress decided - against the views of the Pro-British who vere in 
favour of 'Palestine for the Palestinians' - to 'call for a government
4
which would be tied politically to sovereign Arab Syria' .
As for the second item, there were no differences of opinion, and
the Congress decided (with 25 out of 27 delegates voting for the decision)
to compose a memorandum to the Peace Conference in Paris explaining their
5absolute opposition to Zionism . 12345
37
1 . For a detailed study of the subject see Chapter 2 "Political Develop­
ments until 1929" in tiy Wider work.OPCIT.
2. For a full list of the delegates and the discussions see M.I.Darwaza 
'The Palestine Problem through its different stages'. (Al Qadiyya al 
Falastiniyya fi Muhtalef Marahiliha) Beirut 1959 pp 35-36.
3. For their constitutions see A.E. file 1787 I.S.A. see also CS file 
156 I.S.A. The Jews claim, with sufficient proofs, that these associ­
ations were initiated and assisted by the military authorities. See 
E.Elath OP-CIT p.22.
4. Bor full particulars of the Congress, delegates, discussions, resolutions 
etc. see C.S. fxle 156 I.S.A.
5. See Meoctiandum to the Peace Conference 3.12.1219 Ibid.
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However, on 25.4.1920, the Mandate over Palestine was assigned by 
the Principal Allied Powers to Britain, and with the end of the Sharifian 
rule in Damascus on 24.7.1920 the idea of Southern Syria and its unity 
with Greater Syria died completely.
With the decline of the Pan-Arab Literary and Arab Clubs, the 
political hegemony reverted once again to the traditional leadership of 
the notables centered around the Moslem Christian Associations with Musa 
Kazim al llusseini who proved his proud national .stand during the 1920 
demonstrations - for which he was removed from the mayorality of Jerusalem 
- emerging as the first among the national leaders.
He headed the third6 7* Arab Congress which started at Haifa on 
13.12.1920 and lasted for six days. We do not know much about the dis-
7cussions of the Congress . It resolved, however, to re~affirm the 
National Covenant of Palestine passed by the first Congress with a change 
forced by the different political circurostances. The text6 contained 
the following passage
The Palestine Arab Congress - "Demands of the British Government 
to embark on the establishment of a National Government in Palestine 
responsible to an elected Parliament (Majlis Niabi) to be elected by the 
Arabic speaking people who were living in Palestine at the outbreak of 
the Great War, on the same lines and principles which are being applied 
in Iraq and Transjordan, in furtherance of the friendly relations which 
long existed between Great Britain and the Arab Nation." —
6 . The first one was in Jan/Feb. 1917 see supra p.3ZThe second one which 
was supposed to meet in May 1920 was prohibited by the authorities for 
security reasons. See Darwasa Op-Cit note p.38
7. See Ibid. See also .ianifesto to the Palestinian Arab people" enclosed 
to the Police despatch of 4.1.1921 C.S. file 244 I.S.A.
For the full text see Al.Carmel 25.12.1920.8.
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We should note that the reference to Iraq and Transjordan and to 
the friendly relations with Britain made it clear that the kind of 
'National Government' which the authors of this Covenant envisaged was 
self-government under British Hegemony.
We should also note that the idea of unity with Syria was abandoned 
and the term 'Southern Syria' was not even mentioned once.
To sum up, the two bands of the National Covenant which became the 
basis of Arab policy in Palestine and from which they had not deviated 
during the mandatory regime were demands for
1) The revocation of the policy which embodies’the establishment 
of a national home for the Jews, based upon the Balfour Declaration, 
and the cessation of Jewish Immigration and
2) The establishment of a National representative Government tied 
to Britain.
The Congress also elected a central body to supervise and direct 
the national activities. This body became known as the Arab Executive 
Committee of the Palestine Arab Congress of which Musa Kazim was elected
9the president.
Following the conclusion of the Cairo Conference in March 1921, the
Colonial Secretary, Mr. Churchill, visited Palestine for a week. On the
advice of the H.C. he granted an interview to a delegation of the Arab
Executive headed by Musa Kazim'*’ , who presented him a memorandum stating
, 11the Arab demands as resolved by the third Congress. 910
9. For list of other members see Darwaza Op-Cit p. 38
10. Earlier, a delegation of the Executive went to Cairo to meet Churchill 
there, but he refused to see them. See correspondence March 1921 
C.S. file 244 I.S.A.
11. Palestine Arab Congress. Report on the State of Palestine, presented 
to the Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill, P.C., M.P., by Executive Committee 
of Third Arab Palestine Congress, Jerusalem, March 23.1921. Jerusalem 
1921. Ibid.
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In his firm answer, Churchill affirmed the British Government's 
and his own personal adherence to the policy of the Balfour Declaration. 
"You ask me to repudiate the Balfour Declaration and to stop immigration. 
This is not in my power, and it is not my wish". He affirmed, however, 
that Arab interests would be safeguarded - "The establishment of a national 
home did not mean a Jewish Government to dominate the Arabs". As for 
self-government, he said - "The present form of government would continue 
for many years, representative institutions leading to full self-government
would only be accomplished after 'our children's children will have
, , 12 passed away'.
As the attempt of the Executive to achieve a change in the Zionist
policy of the Government using political means failed, resort was made
to more desperate and violent means.
On the 1st May, 1921, excited by disturbances arising from an
internal Jewish quarrel between the Bolshevik group and the orthodox
Labour Party, the Arabs of Jaffa made a murderous attack on the Jewish
inhabitants of the town, and on subsequent days destructive Arab raids
were made on five of the Jewish rural colonies. In the course of the
trouble 47 Jews were killed and 146 wounded, mostly by Arabs. Of the
Arabs, 48 were killed and 73 wounded, mostly by the police and military
13in suppressing the disorders.
The H.C. appointed a commission of enquiry with Sir T. Haycraft,
14Chief Justice of Palestine, as Chairman. In their report the
Commissioners wrote 12 345 - "The fundamental cause of the Jaffa riots and 
the subsequent acts of violence, was a feeling among the Arabs of 
discontent with and hostility to the Jews due to political and economic
12. For the full text of Churchill's answer see C.S. file 244 I.S.A.
13. The Peel Commission p. 51.
14. And Mr. H.C. Luke and Mr. Stubbs as members.
15. Palestine. Disturbances in May 1921. Reports of the Commission of 
Inquiry with Correspondence relating thereto. Cmd. 1540 p.59.
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causes, and connected with Jewish immigration and with their conception
of Zionist policy as derived from Jewish exponents." The report went on
to say - "the outbreak was not premeditated or expected, nor was either
side prepared for it ; but the state of popular feeling made a conflict
likely to occur on any provocation by any Jews".
This conclusion is in line with the continuing claims of the Arab
Executive that it  was using - 'only legal and peaceful means' - for its
political struggle.*-6 Furthermore, the Arab Executive hurriedly expressed
its reservations over the rio ts ,16 7 18920and the fourth Congress resolved to
18achieve the national aims through legal and peaceful means. However,
there were some indications that there was an organising hand behind the 
19riots. Meinertzhagen even wrote : "The High Commissioner, however,
2oconsidered the recent disturbances to have been organised and premeditated.
1»
Remembering the conflict between the traditional leadership and the notables 
of the Moslem Christian Associations, and the young radical Pan-Arab 
elements and the fact that the latter lost their influence and 
ceased to be important, i t  can weel be assumed that these riots were the
16. To the H.C. of Palestine "manifesto published by the Moslem Christian 
Association" 13.10.21. A.E. f i le  1026 I.S.A. See for instance, letter 
from Jamal al Husseini, the Secretary of the Arab Executive to the H.C. 
27.8.23 A.E. f i le  No. 2700 I.S.A. see also sppech by Muza Kazim in
the Sixth Arab Congress 16.20 5. 1923. A.E. File 171 I.S.A.
17. Musa Kazim to the H.C. 10.5.21 C.S. f i le  244 I.S.A. at the same time
it  used the riots to prove the danger of "the Bolshevik immigration" and 
to demand its cessation. See letters and protests of the Arab Executive 
10.5.1921 C.O. 733/16.
18. See report on the Fourth Arab Congress opened in Jerusalem on 29 5 1921 
C.O. 733/13.
19. A rather impressive case, to prove that, based on circumstantial 
evidence is to be found in Y. Porath, Op Cit 149-52.
20. Meinertzhagen Op Cit p.109.
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last effort of this group - or at least parts of it - to re-assert their 
supremacy among the Arab public.
Towards the autumn they tried again, and the protest demonstration
of the 2nd November in Jerusalem turned into an anti-Jewish affray. But
the police reacted strongly, and the organisers of the demonstration
belonging mostly to the "Arab Club" were arrested and sentenced, with the
21Arab Executive congratulating the police for maintaining order.
And then "for a period of eight years no disturbance occurred anywhere 
22in Palestine."
There could be several reasons for the lack of violence during these 
years. The immediate one was perhaps the firm and strong reaction by the 
police and the military in suppressing the disorders, the proclamation of 
Martial Lav, the search for arms, the collective punishments, the trials etc 
Also at the time the Government took some steps aimed at appeasing the
Arabs, of which I shall write later.
There was also the appearance of the Pro-Arab British lobby* 23, who 
persuaded the Arab leadership that use of violence and illegal means would 
only damage the chances of the political endeavour which the intended Arab 
Delegation was going to launch in London, as it would present the Arabs 
as not ready yet for self-rule.
But the most important reason was the policy of the H.C. Sir H. Samuel
21. See Despatch from H.C. to the Colonial Secretary 11.11.1921. CO. 733/17.
22. Viscount Samuel. Memoirs. London 194_>. p. 169.
23 Eor its composition and its activities at the time see A.E. files 853 
and 1541 I.S.A. See also C.O. 733/57.
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a© stated by the Peel Commission t ’’Sir Herbert Samuel addressed himself
energetically to the task o£ conciliation” .
The most important proof of which the Peel Cousaission considered
was the establishment of the Supreme Moslem Council in 1921 and the
•lection as its  President 'the whole hearted Arab nationalist Raj Amin
•1 Hueseini who shortly before that was appointed Mufti of Jerusalem"»
Esj the extrema head of the "Arab Club" with its extreme radical
following of young Pan-Arabs needed now the goodwill of the Government in
order to consolidate his position as the President of the S.U.C. He
therefore ceased to support the use of violence, and since then had
2btried to prevent outbreaks of riots and disorders.
On 25th May the Fourth Palestine Arab Congress met in Jerusalem.
I t  reaffirmed it© objection to the Zionist policy of Britain, emphasised
the political character and the legal means of the Arab struggle, and
after long and d ifficu lt discussions succeeded in electing a delegation
26to go to Lon Ac« and Europe under the Chairmanship of Husa Kasem .
24
24. The Peel report pp.52-53. Among the "other proofs of the Government's 
desire to conciliate Arab opinion“ , the Commission enumerated the i l l -  
fated proposal made in 1922 to establish a Legislative Council which 
was meant primarily to please tne Arab politicians. 'The reduction of 
the tithe, which was the main tax which the Arab agriculturist paid, 
fro*» 12V4 to 10/,,“ "The settlement of the disputed land ownership of 
the Kudavarn Land© of Beissu, in which Arab public opinion was deeply 
interested, on terms very favourable to the Arab cultivator«“ , “the 
rapid development of social services“ , “ the new regime of equal low and 
Justice etc."
23. See “Political report for Bovewber 1921” . 6.12.1921. C.O. 733 Vol. 6.
The O.A.G. to Colonial Secretary Political report for December 1921 
30.12,1921. Ibid. Kelth-P.occh for the ii.C. to Colonial Secretary 
Political report for January 1922 2.2*1922 Ibid y «i. id,
26. Hi tli liaj Tawfic Hamad, Amin «1 Taraisai, Mu in al Maadi, Ibrahim Shataaas 
a© members and Shibli al Jamal as Secretary. Incidently, Jtuhi Abd al 
Uadi was also elected as Secretary but he preferred to join the Palestine 
Goveruncut becoming one of the highest ranking Arab o ffic ia ls .
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They stayed in London for almost a year (August 1921 - July 1922) 
and had lengthy negotiations with the Colonial Office in an effort to
deflect British policy from its Zionist orientation, but they failed.
After the return of the Arab Delegation from London, a fifth Congress
was held in Nablus on 22.8.1922. Following the recent disappointments
of the Arabs, the fifth Congress was characterised by a more extreme
20character than the fourth one . And the fact that it was held in Nablus,
the most extreme nationalist town, assisted this tendency even further.
29The Congress resolved to boycott the elections to the Legislative 
Council on the grounds that they were prescribed in the Palestine Order in 
Council of August 1922, which was based on the Zionist character of the 
Mandate.
The Congress took also certain steps to insure the success of the 
30boycott. The Imams and the preachers at the Mosques all over
Palestine were directed to insure that the Friday sermons would be used to 
explain the boycott. This last step was possible because the Mufti put all 278930
27
27. For report of their meetings and discussions see A.2. Files 1026 and 267
I.S.A. See also C.O. 733/13, 733/14, 733/16 and CP 70(21). For
full text of the correspondence see "Palestine Correspondence. 
Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist 
Organization. Cmd. 1700 London June 1922.
28. See report of the District Commissioner Samaria 25.8.22 C.S. file
163. I.S.A.
29. See Declaration of the Arab Executive to the Fifth Arab Congress 
concerning the boycott of the elections to the Legislative Council, 
and the condemnation of the implementation of the British Policy of 
the Jewish National Home. 1,9.1922 "A1 Sabah" - 2.9.22 as reported by 
Documents of Arab Resistance in Palestine against the British 
Occupation and Zionism 1918-1939. (Wataek al Kukawama al Falastinyia 
A1 Arabiyya dad al Ihtilal al Britani wal Shiyoniyya 1818-1939).
Edited by Abd al Wahah al Kayali Beirut 1968 pp.57-59.
30. Report of Thq District Commissioner Samaria 25.8.22. C.S. file 
168 I.S.A.
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his weight and that of the S.H.C. of which he was the President, behind the 
boycott campaign. In addition to the same national considerations which 
motivated the activitist elements of the Arab Executive, he also had a more 
personal one. Emergence of any elected representative Arab body such 
as would have been the Arab bio:k of the Legislative Council, with the 
Government's authority and prestige to back it, and with a possibility 
of influencing direction of funds to a certain area or to a certain scheme, 
would have reduced the importance of the S.M.C. as the only Arab public
body with an assured income of its own. The elected Moslem representatives
on the Legislative Council could have also interfered in what was going
31on in the S.M.C. thus reducing the Mufti's total mastery of it.
As against these steps of the Arab Executive supported by the S.M.C.
which proved very effective, as almost in every Mosque in the country a
proclamation was posted advocating the boycott, and exposing the dangers
32of voting in favour of the constitution, the Government followed a neutral
policy, namely, not to exert any pressure on the population to take part in
33the elections and to allow propaganda against such a participation. The 
population, accustomed to Ottoman methods, assumed therefore that the 
Government were not opposed to the boycott and were not sincere in their 
alleged desire to carry through the elections.
31.
32.
33.
Those were the reasons mentioned by the Anti-Mufti elements during the 
big inter party conflict towards the end of 1931. See Miraa't al
Sharq 30.10.31.See Kisch Palestine Diary London 1938. p.35.
See discussion between the H.C. and delegation of the A.E.6.2.23 
S.C's file 158 I.S.A. See also letter from Symes Governor of the 
Northern District, to C.S. informing him that he acted accordingly. 
10.3.22 C.S's file 242/2 I.S.A.
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The result was that the boycott was a complete success, with very
few participating in the primary elections. The H.C. was obliged to abandon
the proposed constitution, and even his attempt to return to the system
of nominated advisory Council, composed in the same proportions as the
35intended elected Council, failed.
Another Arab delegation left in November 1922 to Turkey and the peace
conference of Lausanne. They continued to London and had several meetings
with Parliamentarian and journalists s u p p o r t e r s ^ e -^eSation
returned to Palestine empty-handed, but in a report to the Sixth Arab
Congress which met in Jaffa (16-20th June) they reported on their work
.37and they stated their belief that continued firmness in their policy 
of non-cooperation and insistence on their maximum demands might yet result 
in greater concessions than those previously proposed.
When it became known that a Cabinet Committee had been appointed to
38review the British policy in Palestine a third Arab delegation left 
for London at mid-July.
34
34. For particulars see Palestine, Papers relating to the Elections for
the Palestine Legislative Council 1923 London June 1923 and 1889.
\
35. Though all the members who were going to be nominated had given their 
agreement at a certain stage of the negotiations. See despatch of II.C. 
to C.O. 15.6.23. C.O. 733 46. However, under pressure of the 
extremists they refused to serve.
36. Comprising Musa Kazim, Amin al Tamimi and Sheikh Muzaffar. For 
full particulars of their activities there see Y. Porath Op-Cit.
Third Chapter 4th Sub-Chapter. The Second delegation - the approach 
to the Turks pp. 183-192.
37. Report of the Second Arab Delegation on its workings to the Sixth Arab 
Congress "Falastin" 29.6.23. For full list of the "Resolutions of 
the Sixth Arab Congress" see A. Tarbin Lectures on the History of the 
Palestine Problem (Muhadarat fi Taarikh Qadiyyat Falastin) Cairo 1958
pp. 220-222.
38. Composed of Musa Kazim, Amin al Tamimi and Wadi al Boustani.
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The Cabinet Committee accepted the recommendation of the Colonial 
Office to continue the policy as laid down in the 1922 White Paper, but 
in a further attempt to meet Arab complaints of being discriminated against, 
the Committee recommended the establishment of an Arab Agency with a 
position exactly analgous to that accorded to the Jewish Agency. Furthermore, 
this Arab Agency was also to be consulted with regard to immigration.
39On 11.11.1923 the H.C. announced the new plan to a body of Arab leaders. 
But the Arabs were in no mood for compromise, believing that through their 
policy of non-cooperation they induced the Government to accelerate its 
plans for the establishment of representative institutions. They had 
secured in the Churchill White Paper an official disavowal of efforts to 
create a Jewish state, and now they had obtained an offer of an Arab 
Agency. They decided to adhere to this extreme line and rejected 
unanimously the Government's proposal, as "falling short of the demands of 
the Arab population.
In a letter to the H.C., Musa Kazim wrote, "the object of the
Arab inhabitants of Palestine is not an Arab agency analogous to the
Zionist Agency. Their sole object is independence. The Arab owners
of the country cannot see their way to accept a proposal which tends to place
them on an equal footing with the alien Jews".
40In a cable to the H.C. dated 9.11.23 the Colonial Secretary referred 
to the various proposald made to the Arabs and stated, "towards all these 
proposals Arabs have adopted the same attitude vis, refusal to cooperate.
His Majesty's Government have been reluctantly driven to conclusion that 
further efforts on similar lines would be useless and they have accordingly
39. Colonial Secretary to the H.C. 3.8.23. C.O. 733/Vol. 48.
39. For full list as well as full particulars of correspondence see Palestir 
Proposed Formation of an Arab Agency. November 1923. Cmd. 1989.
«0. Ibid
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decided not to repeat the attempt. You are accordingly authorized to carry
on administration of Palestine with the aid of an Advisory Council ...."
Samuel appointed such a committee composed entirely of British officials 
in December 1923.^
After remarking that "this was the last occasion on which a coherent,
pro-Arab Parliamentary pressure group was to make itself felt", J. Marlow 
42sums up the British-Arab negotiations through 1922-23, and I agree with 
him, thu3 :
"The non possumus attitude adopted by successive Arab Delegations 
tended to defeat their policy of persuasion and tended probably to weary 
their British supporters. In their rejection of the Arab Agency, which 
had been suggested by Arab sympathizers in the Cabinet Committee, the 
Arabs overplayed their hand.... The only possible way of negotiation was 
to proceed through a series of agreed modifications of the Balfour Declaratioi *42
41. C.O. Palestine Report 123. Colonial No. 5. (London 1924) p.3.
42 J Marlow Seat of Pilote"London 1959 pp.95196. Because of its
interest I shall also cite the rest of the quotation : ....  the
Arabs overplayed their hand. But in truth the intransigent attitude 
adooted by Arab Delegations in this as in other matters owed little 
to anv expectation that intransigence was the attitude best calculated 
to achieve the political ends in view. It was adopted as a result 
of the atmosphere of personal rivalry evenloping Palestine Arab 
politics which exposed to accusations of treason any Arab 
r^nresentative in favour of compromise. Thus Arab leaders, whether in 
london or in Jerusalem, always negotiated with their eyes fixed, 
not on the political object in view, but on the necessity for 
«reserving an unsullied reputation for patriotism among their 
fellow countrymen. This was incompatible with the retention of 
any British support based on a belief in the justice of their cause 
and led inexorably towards the violence to which they eventually 
found themselves committed."
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policy. It was unrealistic to suppose that the British Government could 
be persuaded, either by the Arab themselves, or by their British supporters, 
unequivocally to repudiate that policy".
We have seen above how after November 1921 the Arabs stopped and 
therefore failed to make a full use of their "policy by violent means".
Now, on the other hand, they failed to make a full use of their "policy 
by negotiations". There were perhaps good sensible reasons why these 
policies were followed by the Arabs in each case, but there is no doubt 
that in both cases personal considerations played a very important role.
The stoppage of violence was motivated - to a very great degree - 
by the desire of the traditional leadership of the notables to keep their 
supremacy against the young radical Pan-Arabs together with the desire 
of the ex;-radical Pan-Arab ilaj Amin al Husseini to consolidate his control 
over the S.M.C. While the refusal to pasticipate in any representative 
Government organ or official one - such as the Arab Agency, was motivated 
by - among other things - the desire of Haj Amin, the President of the S.M.C. 
and his followers, to prevent the emergence of any body or any organ which 
niight - directly or indirectly - diminish the influence of the S.M.C. in 
Arab society.
Towards the end of 1923, when it became evident that the Arab political 
effort to change the Pro-Zionist policy of the British Government failed, 
it was already too difficult and too late to re-start using violence.
Arab reaction, therefore, following this failure was either the barren 
non-cooperative attitude of the Arab Executive accompanied by disillusionment 
and despair which led to the weakening of the Arab National movement, or 
the attempts of some opposition elements to make the best out of the policy 
of cooperation with the Government. But these again came too late, and 
were too little for having a real influence on developments in the country.
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In January 1922 the Mufti, Haj Amin, was elected as Rais al Ulema
and President of the Supreme Moslem Council.
Thereafter, the old family differences and regional differences were
channelled into the basic conflict around which centered all the Arab
political life in Mandaroty Palestine, between the supporters of the Council,
43called the Council (Mejlis) party , and those who opposed it, known as
44.the Opposition (Muarada) Party
The first opposition body to appear was the Moslem National Club 
(al Jamiyya al Islamiyya al Wataniyya) which was established in the summer 
of 1921 and opened branches in many towns (Haifa, Acre, Nazareth, Tiberias, 
Jenin, Nablus and Jerusalem). Its policy was to oppose the policies of 
first Arab Delegation, Moslem Christian Associations and the Arab Executive
and to support the British Mandate including certain Jewish immigration 
45and settlement.
46The Jews on their side supported the club morally and financially .
The Nashashibis themselves did not join, but the Dajanis, the Fahoums 
from Nazareth, Assad Shoukeir from Acre and others jointed it, and it was
supported by the paper"Miraa't al Sharq. "
The club supported Arab participation in the elections to the 
Legislative Council, and the elections' failure marked the end of the 
club, which towards the summer of 1923 was dissolved and ceased to exist. 43 56 7
43. Known also as "Mejlisium" or "the Mufti's party" or the Kusseini party.
44. Known also as "Muaridum", or the"Nashashibi party" or t^ ie Mayor'-' 
Party, as their leader Ragheb Nashashibi was for many years the Mayor
of Jerusalem. y
45. See Cable of the Haifa Branch to Churchill 10.7.22 OS' s file 158
I.S.A. and cable of the Jerusalem branch to the’colonial Secretary 
24.6.23 Ibid. niai 5ecretary
46. See files 517, 518 5/25 the Z.A.
47> “ ,Co.1°nial Secretary Political report for May 1923. 15.6.23c.o. 733 Vol. 41 see also C.I.D. report 16.8.23 C.S ' 3 f i le  158 I.S.A.
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The National Arab Palestinian Party (A1 Ilizb al Watani al Arab! al 
Falstini) or the National Party as it was known, was officially formed 
on 10.11.23 when Sheikh Suliraan al Taji al Farouki from Ramie was elected
as its President. Unlike the Moslem National Club, the National Party
48emphasized its opposition to Zionism , but it was well-known that its 
policies both with regard to the Government and with regard to the Zionists
were moderate in comparison with those of the Moslem Christian Associations
49and the Arab Executive.
Early in 1924, several "Peasants Parties" were established in the rural
parts of the country, in the areas of Nazareth, Nablus and Hebron.
They were organized by the rural elite of the Shikhs of the villages,
whose position vis a vis the urban elite was reduced towards the last
years of the Ottoman rule, and especially after the British conquest, such
as the families of Sheikh Ahu-Chose, the Hdeibs in the Hebron area, the
Abu-Hantash from Qaqun in the Tul-Karm area etc. Their policy was to
cooperate with the Government, while trying to improve the lot of the
peasants by presenting certain demands such as the establishment of
Agricultural Bank, the reduction and even abrogation of the tithe,
Agricultural education and, in general, attention to economic needs etc.
They cooperated with opposition elements in the towns (the Toukans in Nablus,
50
the Fahoums in Nazareth) and also with the Jews who financed their activities. 
Darwaza states48 9501 that the National Party and the Peasants Party were
48. Though its leaders took care to inform Zionist leaders that this was 
"lip service" only. See letter of Kisch to the Political Secretary 
of the Zionist Organization in London, 15.11.23 File UL7 7 /a v a
49. See Darwaza Op-Cit pp.46-47.
50. See files 517 and 518 S/25 the Z.A.
51. Darwaza Op-Cit pp. 45-49.
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encouraged to follow the policy of "take and demand" (Khod w* Utlub), 
namely a gradual policy of step after step, by the Chief Secretary 
Clayton, "whose fingers directed these parties and made them dance" .
Darwaza goes on to state that these parties were established by the 
British Imperialism in order to fight and weaken the Arab National Movement, 
which they did with comparative success. He attributes part of the 
success to the fact that several well-meaning and sincere elements joined 
the National Party because of their opposition to the Husseinis and the 
Mufti, the President of the S.M.C., who exploited the Council - according 
to their claims - to advance his and his family's interests.
Following the establishment of its parties, the "National Party" 
and the "Peasants Party", the opposition started its offensive against 
the Council towards the end of 1923.»H " 52In a series of petitions the opposition tried to prove that the Mufti, 
not being an Alem, or filling any previous religious position, was not 
suitable to hold his high ranking religious post. They charged that 
by displaying favouritism and nepotism, he had packed by his appointments 
the Moslem Institutions with his supporters.
The opposition also criticized the method in which the elections to 
the Council took place, complaining that the old electoral college, which 
was retained in the 1921 Order and Regulations, was an effete and un­
representative body, and challenged the legality of several paragraphs of 
the 1921 Regulations.
The Government could not ignore all these petitions and protests,
and on 4.12.1923 the Chief Secretary asked for the comments of the
53
Districts Commissioners. R. Storrs, the Senior District Commissioner 52*
52. See C.S. files no. 172, 189, 190, I.S.A.
See Chief Secretary's circular 4.12.1923. C.S. file no. 172 I.S.A.53.
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of Jerusalem Jaffa District answered that the opposition’s complaints 
should be examined seriously necessitating perhaps some Government action 
and wrote54 5, "It is generally believed in Jaffa district that the Council 
is at least as active in political as in religious affairs, and surprise 
is from time to time expressed that the Government should tolerate this 
almost overt intervention in politics on the part of persons in receipt of 
official emoluments .... It is generally believed that strong political 
influence is being brought to hear by the representatives of the Supreme 
Moslem Council in favour of the political propaganua of the lloslem- 
Christian Association".
The other District commissioners answered in a likewise manner.
The Government, however, decided not to take any action, presumably 
. 55out of political expediency ,
The S.U.C., on its side, organized a counter-drive of support for 
itself56 57. Towards 1925, in preparation for the forthcoming elections, 
the conflict became more bitter. The opposition sent more petitions , 
alleging that the Supreme Moslem Council had wasted Waqf funds and that
54. See letters from Storrs to Chief Secretary 4.1. 1924, 28.2.1924 
C.S. files 172, 189 I.S.A.
55. See remarks of Clayton and H. Samuel on Storrs' letter C.S. file
172 I.S.A.
56. See C.S.'s file no. 190. I.S.A. The substance of the Council's 
supporters is summarized in a Statement of the bJl.C, .....
Jerusalem 1924.
57. The substance of the opposition's case is summarized in a booklet by 
a "certain virtuous Moslem", called "A statement obiectimt to the 
statement of the Supreme Moslem Council, directed to ail i;oslem3__in. 
the Moslem World in general, and in Palestine in particular.
(And Fudala al Muslimin. Bayan war ad ala Bayan al Majless al Island al 
aala, muwajah likul Muslem fi al alam al Island aama wa fi Falestin 
khasa) Jerusalem 1924.
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partisan decisions were given in the Sharia courts. They also called for
a meeting of the old electoral College to "enquire into the misbehaviour of some
58of the S.M.C.'s members. The Council's supporters retaliated by
proposing in that meeting a change in para. 3 of the 1921 regulation, which 
would transfer control over the new elections from the Municipal represent­
atives, amongst whom the opposition supporters were the majority, to the
hands of the old electoral College, in which the former were in the majority.
59The opposition withdrew from the meeting and the proposal was accepted.
go
However, after an ugly ,bitter and acrimonious struggle , the 
opposition won the elections in many parts of the country, with the 
Husseinis getting the majority of the votes in the Districts of Jerusalem 
and the South, with the only exception of Beersheba.
61The election was declared void by the High Court and the H.C.
62thereupon passed on the 1st April 1926 an Ordinance declaring that, pending 
the holding of fresh elections, he would nominate certain persons, who, 
together with the President would constitute the Council. *59612
58., Statement of the S.M.C. Op Cit.
59. The new election law was published in Palestine Gazette no. 148 1.10.1925,
6C. For the description of these elections and the demoralising effects
they had on the Arab National Movement in Palestine in years to come see 
Darwaza Op Cit. pp.53-59. See also N. Alush. Op Cit. pp.50-51.
61. The opposition challenged the results at Jerusalem, and Abd el Latif 
Salah the ex-member representing the Nablus district, where the 
opposition won, challenged the results there. However, the High Court's 
decision that the election would be declared void was based on the 
legal point that the majority of the old electoral College which voted
on the change of the election law, was less than 2 /3 of the members.
62. The Supreme Moslem Sharia Council Ordinance 1926.
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After a secret understanding had been reached between the two sides
63with the assistance of the Government, the H.C. appointed the 4 members,
2/each side. 63 4 65 The understanding had to remain secret, as the Husseinis 
did not want to admit publicly that they agreed to Governmental nominations
65to the S.M.C. claiming to endeavour to keep the independence of the Council.
However, the fact became later known, and "Al-Carmel", the opposition
66paper of the north, used to chide the Mufti about it.
The 1926 Ordinance also authorised the H.C.
«
(1) to constitute a Committee of Moslems to revise the 1921 
Regulation; and
(2) to make new Regulations concerning the holding of a fresh 
election of members of the Council.
The Committee was duly appointed on 14 May 1926 under the Chairmanship67 68
of the Mufti Haj Amin, and sat for almost three years. In April 1928 
39 Moslem opposition notables presented a petition , asking that it should 
be forwarded to the Colonial Secretary, in which they criticized the 
personnel of the Committee and asked for its abolition. Their petition 
also deprecated the appointment of the President of the Supreme Moslem Council 
for life, demanding that his appointment should be for 3 years only, and 
they pressed for the removal of the Sharia Courts from the influence of the 
S.M.C., and asked the Government to appoint a special committee to audit the
63. See the H.C.'s letter to the Colonial Secretary 12.2.1926. C.0.733 Vol. 112
64. Sheikh Mohammad Murad and Said al Shawa from the Husseinis and Abd el 
Rahman Taji and Amin al Hadi for the opposition.
65. Another reason for keeping the understanding secret was that not all 
branches of the opposition and especially the important northern one, 
were a party to it.
6 6. See issues of Al Carmel, April 1926.
67. Palestine Official Gazette No. 163, 16 May. 1926.
6 8. C.O. 733/168/57560.
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accounts of the S.M.C. and to supervise the Council's expenditure of the
Awqaf funds.
The Colonial Secretary answered the petitioners through the H.C., 
saying that their representations would receive due consideration. They 
were also assured that no proposals for the revision of the 1921 Regulation 
for the constitution and powers of the S.M.C. would be adopted by the
Government until they had been considered by a representative Moslem Assembly.
69But even before that the H.C. informed the Mufti "that legislative 
sanction would not be given to the proposed revision of the Regulation of 
1921 except in so far as is necessary for the holding of elections, until 
it has been submitted to the Elected Assembly. In that way the Government 
would ensure that the reform of the administration of Moslem affairs would 
be effected not only on the advice of an authoritative Moslem Committee, 
but also with the concurrence of an assembly duly elected by and representative 
of the Moslem community".
On 24th December 1928 the Committee headed by the Mufti submitted its 
report, which Included e draft amending order end a draft Electoral Law70. 
On several main points the proposed order differed fro» the 1921 Order.
In place of the Electoral College it called for the creation of an 
elected general Moslem Assembly with wider powers, including the power of
imposing a levy on the community and the assumptions by its Sharia Courts 
of the power of imposing fines for certain offences. It also proposed 
the abolition of the General Wt,£ Committee. An important provision was 
that the President of the S.M.C. need not he elected for life hut for a 
period of nine years. The Committee, however, recommended that the 
existing President, the Mufti Haj Amin, should remain in office for a period
69.
70.
In his letter dated 30.4.1928 Ibid.The draft law was already submitted in April 1927. On 28.6.1927 the
Government returned it to the Committee with its observations and on 
28.10.1927 the Committee forwarded a revised draft of the proposed
election Ordinance.
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of nine years, and thereafter for a further period of nine years unless a 
2/3rd majority of the general assembly decided otherwise71. on 14.1.1929 
a Committee of Government officials was appointed to analyse and summarize 
the proposals submitted by the 1926 Committee. It presented its report 
to the H.C. on 4.4.1929.
The report submitted by the 1926 Committee headed by the Mufti was not
published, but the opposition was worried by rumours and in order to re-asaure
72it, the Government published a communique stating, "Before a decision is
taken on this important matter" (i.e. the report of the Committee) "the
proposals will be published in order that Government may be able to ascertain
the general sense of Moslem opinion towards these proposals" .
On 12 June, 1929 the report and proposals of the 1926 Committee were
published, but in view of the tension preceding the riots of August 1929,
they did not raise many comments, though the opposition papers supported the
73dissenting report and continued their campaign against the Mufti.
Consideration of this question was interrupted by the disturbances in
74August 1929, but it should be mentioned that the H.C. sent the 1926
Committee's proposed draft ordinances to the Colonial Secretary, promising to
send his recommendations on them after studying the comments and criticism of
75Moslem opinion, and that the Colonial Secretary answered that he was waiting 
for them.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
Aref Dayana dissented, however, and presented a minority report, 
recommending that the question of the election of the President of the 
S.M.C. should be left for determination by the General Moslem Assembly.
C.S. file 240. I.S.A.
Official Communique Ko. 696/29 of 11.2.19¿J.
“ ftr-k 5.7.1929? 12.7.1929. Folestin 29.7.1929 11.9.1929. *1 Camel
In*hls^despatch no. 696/12 of 13.6.1929 C.O. 733/170/67296.
In his letter dated 17.7.1929. Ibid.
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This in short was the position with regard to the problem of elections 
to the Supreme Moslem Council, on the eve of the outbreak of the 1929 
disturbances.
During March-June 1927 municipal elections were held all over the
country. The inter Arab struggle became so bitter that the Ilusseinis
7 6were even ready to bargain, with the Jews , their moot hated enemies, in
order to remove ilagheb Nashashibi from the mayoralty of Jerusalem,
the office which was the basis of his power• The elections were generally
won by the Nashashibis, whose supporters were elected as Mayors of all the
important and most of the unimportant towns. Only Gaze and Majdal were
won by the Mufti's supporters. These results marked the strength of
the opposition, and the Arab Executive and the S.M.C. could not ignore it.
Any arrangements for the convening of the 7th Arab Congress had to be
»*1
pre-agreed with them. And so it actually was.
The Congress met on 20.6.28 in Jerusalem, attended by 300 delegates.
The main subject of discussion was the demand for the establishment of
Parliamentary institutions on the basis of democratic majorities, in
the same manner as in other Mandate territories.
The Congress was indirectly initiated by - among other reasons -
a series of 4 meetings held during July 1926 between Mr. E. Mills, the
a„A n or m m  of Arab leaders representing Assistant Chief Secretary and a group or
, , „77 , effort to re-examine the possibilitydifferent political shades , in an exioru 76*
76. See G. Frunkin. A judge's way in Jerusalem. (Derekh Shofet bi 
Yerushalaim) Tel-Aviv 1934. p 76.
77.
Bolous Sehade - the editor of Miraa't al Sharq - through whom the 
first contacts were made, and Omar Salah al Barguthi, moderates, 
supporters of the Nashashibis, Muin al Maadi a member of the first 
delegation, moderate as well, and Rashid Haj Ibrahim, Izzat Darwaza 
and Rafiq al Tarnimi, supporters of the Arab Executive.
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of Arab participation in any form of representative Government. The
Arabs agreed to participate in these discussions for 2 main reasons. (1)
They were both encouraged by "the sharp decline in the fortunes of the
National Home" 78 79during the years 1925-28, considering that "it had
proved a failure in a course of dissolution" which did not pose any longer
a uanger to the future of the Arabs in Palestine and (2) they were discouraged
by the low ebb of the organized Arab national movement in Palestine which
appeared to be disintegrating as a result of personal and factional 
79dissensions.
These contacts brought no fruits, mainly because the H.C. Lord 
Plumer considered 80 that it was desirable to defer the introduction of 
any form of representative government until local representatives had, 
through participation in the management of municipal affairs, obtained 
"practical experience of administrative methods and the business of government" 
and until the people of Palestine themselves "had learnt to apply 
discrimination in the selection of their representatives".
The contacts 81 terminated when Mills informed the Arab leaders that 
their proposals deserved further study but that before bringing them before 
the Colonial Secretary the H.C. would like to be sure that the proposals 
express the view of a representative body (Hayah Tamthiliyya) of the population.
78. See Peel Report p.64.
79. For the position of the Arab National Movement in Palestine at the 
time. See I. Uarwaza Op-Cit pp.53-57 see also N. Aluah Op-Cit pp.51, 52.
80. See Minute 7.5.28 C.O. 733/155/57316. For Plumer's view about self- 
governing institutions in Palestine, see Shaw Report p.18.
81. Darwaza Op-Cit pp.58-59.
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According to Darwaza, when these contacts became known and the letters 
exchanged were published, the Arab people tried to forget their differences 
and re-create a united front through the summoning of the 7th Arab Congress.
The Congress also elected an enlarged executive of forty-eight members 
- double the previous number, each Kaza (sub-district) represented by two 
Moslems, one from the Majlesium and the other from the Muaridum, to which
were added 12 Christians.
83
The Executive elected a bureau, to manage its day to day activities.
84Nationalist Arab writers stated that due to the influence of the 
more moderate elements of the opposition, the seventh Arab Congress 
represented a departure from the established policy of maximum demands and 
focused it on the demand for the establishment of a representative assembly 
which, after the 7th Congress, became the central major theme of Arab 
Politics. On its first day the Congress cabled the League of Nations
O Cand the Colonial Office stating that Palestine was as advanced as the 
neighbouring countries, which already enjoyed Parliamentary rule and *
82
82.
83.
84.
For the full story of those 2 7 1-28 1!' See'also H.
talks to examine how far and how much were Arab leaders ready to 
concede in order to cooperate with the Governmen . _ ,
composed of liusa Kazim, who again was elected as President with Y. Faraj 
(Greek Catholic) and Taufik Haqqi al Abdallah (the Mayor of Acre) as 
Vice Presidents (both from the opposition) and three joint secretaries, 
Auni Abd al Hadi (who later headed the Istiklal party) Jamal Husseini 
(a Uajlesi leader) and Mugannam Mugannam (.Protestant, from the
lbid8pp?58-59 see also Hamdi al Husseini Manifesto to the Palcsti.n.^ n 
Arab People a^nt the Seventh Arab Palestinian Congress.
ITshaab al Arabi al Falstini Khawal al Muutamar al Arabx al Falastini
al Sab,q)
Al Jamiah al Arabiyya 21.6.1928.85 .
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demanded the establishment of a representative assembly in Palestine.
The new Executive Bureau met the H.C. Lord Plumer and presented him with 
86a memorandum asking for the establishment of a Parliament and expressing
the willingness of Arab leaders to meet Government officials to discuss and
study the problem. Lord Plumer, however, was at the end of his term. Upon
the arrival of the new H.C. Sir John Chancellor in December 1928 the
Executive Bureau repeated its request during an interview on January 3rd 
871929 in which they emphasized the fact that the Palestinians enjoyed under 
the Turks wide political rights -including elections to the Parliament, and 
demanded the restitution of these rights. Chancellor, though not committing 
himself, promised to consider their equest. However, in his despatch to 
the Colonial Secretary he suggested that as a representative Government 
was established in February 1928 in Transjordan which was less advanced and 
developed than Palestine under a provisional constitution, it would 
become more and more difficult to delay the advance towards such Government 
in Palestine. The Colonial Secretary, Mr. Amery, in his answer advised
Ocaution in further attempts to introduce any form of representative Government 
However, in May 1929, the Labour Party won the election, and in the 
new Government of R. Macdonald, the Fabian Socialist, Sidney Webb (made 
Lord Pa38field) was appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies. 867
86. For the full text see Ibid 26.7.1928.
87. For the full text of the memorandum see A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya 10.1.29. 
See also Lord Chancellor to the Colonial Secretary 15.1.29 C.O. 
733/167/67015.
88. Amery to Cnancellor 4.3.29. Ibid.
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In a secret despatch the E.C. informed the Colonial Secretary that he 
had consulted representatives of all the various local interests and after 
a careful examination in which he considered all the difficulties, such as 
Jewish opposition, administrative inconveniences etc., he recommended to 
set up a Legislative Council composed of 14 official members (including 
the H.C.) and 15 nominated unofficials, of whom 10 would be Moslems, 
including one representative of the Bedouin, three Jews and two Christians.
When the II .C. wrote this despatch to the Colonial Secretary, he
already had the previous agreement of Musa Kazim, the President of the
Arab Executive, and Ragheb Nashashibi, the Mayor of Jerusalem, not only
to the establishment of the Legislative Council, but even to serve on it
when it would be formed. These two previous enemies had long discussions
with the C.S. H. Luke, which, according to Musa Kazim's wish were kept
secret, in which this agreement was reached. Musa Kazim asked for the
secrecy of the discussions as he was not sure what would be the Executive's
reaction to this agreement and whether he would be able to bring it over to
his views. Indeed, on tne eve of the H.C.'s departure, the Arab Executive
91presented him with a memorandum , signed by Musa Kazim himself, not 
referring at all to the above discussions and agreement, and repeating their 
demand for a representative government. Before departing to England in 
the end of June 1929, the H.C. publicly announced his intention to consult
0 9the British Government on the question of the suspended Legislative Council/ 89012
89. Chancellor to Passfield 12.6.29 Ibid.
90. See Luke reports on these discussions, enclosed to Chancellor's 
letter to Shuckburgh 14.6.29. Ibid.
91. 17.6.29. Al Jamiah al Arabiyya. 24.6.1929.
92. Report on the Palestine Administration, 1929. Col. No. 47 p p . 9 - 1 0 .
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Appearing before the P.M.C. in Geneva in July 1929, he repeated this
statement, adding the remark, which no doubt he remembered many times
in the future - "I think I can say that the relations between the two
93communities (Jews and Arabs) continue to improve.
On September 1, 1929, a few days after his return to Palestine, 
following the outbreak of the disturbances, the H.C. issued the following 
announcement : '’In accordance with an undertaking which I gave to the 
Committee of the Arab Executive before I left the country in June, I 
initiated discussions with the Secretary of State when in England on 
tile subject of constitutional changes in Palestine. Iu view of recent
94events, 1 shall suspend these discussions with Uis Majesty's Government.” 
Though nothing came out of the Legislative Council plan, the previous 
agreement reached with the Arabs pointed to a new re-alignment in internall'»
Arab politics, with ilusa Kasim and a considerable part of the Arab Executive, 
together with the Kastiashibis and their followers in and out of the 
Executive, on one side, against the Mufti and the Supreme Moslem Council, 
together with his supporters from among the young radical elements of the 
Executive, on the other.
The inter-communal conflict about the Vailing Y/all was then in 
full swing, 93 45 and the Mufti exploited it to edvance his own cause. On 
August 23rd the 1929 disturbances - called by the Arabs the hailing Wall 
revolt (Tawarat al Buraq) broke out. The disturbances spread
93. P.M.C. Minutes of the Fifteenth ¡Session 1929. p.79.
94. The Shaw Report p. 18. See also al Jamiah al Arabiyya 2,9.29.
95. See Chapter 11 . The Wailing Wall Commission,
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to other parts of the country, with Arabs throwing themselves on Jewish 
towns and settlements. Violent attacks were made on the orthodox old 
established mainly non-Zionist Jewish Communities at Hebron and at Safad. 
When on August 30th it was over, 133 Jews were counted dead and 339 
wounded and much of their property burnt, looted and destroyed. There were 
also 116 Arabs killed and 232 wounded, most of them by troops rushed from
This study tries to show that ever since his appointment as Mufti 
of Jerusalem in May 1921 and his election to the Presidency of the S.M.C. 
in January 1922, Haj Amin al Husseini tried not to come to an open clash
of which he was the main instigator, disprove this theme. However, I
The 1929 disturbances were the direct result of the dispute over 
Jewish rights at the Wailing Wall.
The story of ho» "the removal of the screen from the pavement In 
front on the «ailing «all on the Jewish Day of Atonement in September 1928, 
was the beginning of a series of incidents which led to the outbreak of the 
disturbances on 23.8.1929 is told in the report of the "Shaw Commission".
96. Shaw Report p. 65.
97. With the notable exception of his negative attitude to the Legislative 
Council which I already explained above.
96
with the Government. 96 7 * It could be claimed that the 1929 disturbances
do not think so
98. Shaw Report pp. 153-5.
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Cu 19.11.28, the Colonial Secretary, Hr. Artery, presented to Parliament
a White Paper on "The Western or Wailing Wall in Jerusalem",99 1023in which
the British Government set out the main facts of the dispute and defined
the Status Quo as it understood it. This document declared that the
Wailing Wall v;as legally a Moslem property, though holy to the Jews x;hose
custom of praying there extended back to the Middle Ages and possibly further.
The Paper went on to say, "The Jewish community have a right of access to
the pavement for the purposes of their devotions, but may bring to the Wall
only those appurtenances of »worship whiich were permitted under the Turkish 
XQ 0regime. " The Government regarded it a3 their duty to maintain this Status 
Quo, but had no wish to go beyond that as "it would be inconsistent with 
their duty under the Mandate were they to endeavour to compel the Moslem 
owners of the pavement to accord any further privileges or rights to the 
Jewish community.
The Moslems were very satisfied and considered that by this White Paper 
the British accepted their interpretation of the Status Quo. On 27.12.1928
102
the Mufti addressed the Deputy District Commissioner in the following terms,
... "The Supreme Moslem Council hopes that the Government will actually, 
and as early as possible, apply the terms of the White Paper that the Status Quo 
in force during the Turkish rule should be observed"• This demand to apply 
the terns of the White Paper was repeated several times by Arab spokesmen .
But as the White Paper defined the status quo in general terms only, a 
question was raised about the meaning of the tern "permitted" used in it.
99. Cmd. 3229. Ilia Majesty's Stationery Office London 1928. Published in 
Palestine in the Palestine Gazette 11/12/1928.
100. Ibid pp.3-4.
101. Ibid p.6.
102. The Shaw Report p.34.
103. See letter from Chancellor to Colonial Secretary about his talk with the 
Mufed held on 6.5.29, 10.5.29. C.O. 733/163/67013.1. See also letter 
from Chancellor to Colonial Secretary about his meeting with the 
delegates of Arab Executive on 14.10.29, 19.10.29. Ibid. See also 
Chancellor's despatch 17.1.30 C.O./733/180/77050 A.
66
Did it mean only those practices at the Wailing Wall xihich were
officially permitted by the Ottoman authorities as wanted by the Arabs,
or those practices tolerated by them as demanded by the Jews.
104Chancellor immediately adopted the Arab stand that "permitted" 
should be interpreted as referring only to those practices of the Jews which 
were admitted officially by the Ottoman regime.
This attitude of the H.C. encouraged the Mufti to continue his 
agitation. At the same time he showed the H.C. his appreciation. His 
address to the Jerusalem Deputy District Commissioner mentioned above, 
contained also the following passage "... .It (the S.M.C.) also thanks you 
and the Government of Palestine as you were the direct cause in explaining 
the facts which have elicited this just decision."*05 in an interview 
with the Wiufti on 6.5.29 the U.C. mentioned the "contribution" of the 
Palestine Government to the White Paper. Referring to the written documents 
which he asked the Jews and Moslems three months earlier to produce in 
order to prove their claims, and which the Moslems produced, he went on 
to say : "i can tell Your Eminence that as yet I have received no reply 
from the Jews as to the right to bring appurtenances to the Wailing Wall.
Your Eminence will no doubt say the reason for this is that they have no 
evidence to bring. Perhaps Your Eminence is right.
.... Accordingly it seems also likely to me that the contention of the
Moslems as regards the bringing of benches and appurtenances to the Wall 
will be established."104 506
104. He arrived in Palestine on 6.12.1928 to assume office as High 
Commissioner. In a letter dated 15.12.28 to the Colonial Secretary 
he already maintained that "It will be of greater importance for the 
Jews to be able to prove »¡urkish authorization in this respect than t 
prove practice. C.O. 733/160/51540. III. See also his letter to Amer 
28.12.1928. C.O. 733/163/67013.
105. The Shaw Report p. 34.
106. See Chancellor's letter to Colonial Secretary 10.5.29 C.O. 733/163/67
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Commenting on this, Williams, the Head of the Palestine Desk at
the Colonial Office wrote, "The High Commissioner goes dangerously near
admitting that, in his view, the absence of such documentary authority will be
conclusive against the Jews". Williams went on to write that by maintaining
this narrow interpretation, Chancellor accepted the Moslem position - "that
all the Jews have official authority for, under the Status Quo, is to use the
road leading to the Wall and to station themselves in front of it. Their
right to worship is challenged."*0^
No wonder, therefore, that at the end of the interview the Mufti told
108the H.C. "that he depends on the Government."
109The Mufti was further encouraged when certain constructions, which 
provoked bitter Jewish opposition and protests, were permitted by the 
Government on the grounds that they had no right to interfere,since the Wall 
was the property of the Moslems.
The question about the legal position of the matter had been referred 
to the Law Officers of the Crown.
Theymaintained*10 that the establishment of a Moslem hospice (Zawiah) 
nearthe Jailing Wall was "a question of degree" and that if it resulted in 
genuine annoyance or disturbance they "would regard this as an interference 
with existing rights". The final decision, however, was left in the hands 
of the High Commissioner, who granted the permission, although there was 
no doubt that the construction works as well as the other innovations at the 
Wall were designed by the Moslems to annoy the Jews. 10789
107. Minute by Williams. 29.5.29 Italics by Williams. Ibid.
108. ibid.
109. Opening of a doorway which would have turned the pavement before the 
Wall into a passage and building of a Moslem Hospice (Zawiah) 
adjacent to the Wall.
110. See Amery's despatch to Chancellor 8.5.29 C.O. 733/164/67015.
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Officially, the permission was granted by Keith Roach, the Deputy 
District Commissioner of Jerusalem, who precipitated at the time the "screen 
incident" and was thanked by the Mufti^^. Previous approval, however, had
to be received from T.T. Richmond, the Director of the Antiquities Department.
Chancellor also urged the Colonial Office to endorse his views ....
113In a letter to Amery the Colonial Secretary written a few days after his 
interview with the Mufti of 6.5.29 he stated his interpretation of the 
Status Quo. "The term status quo as used in the White Paper with reference 
to the Wailing Wall, is intended to refer to such practices of the Jews as 
were officially admitted by the Ottoman Government and not to those 
which were tolerated in virtue of private arrangements with the Mutawali" .
In a similar manner he wrote to the new Colonial Secretary, Lord 
Passfield11^* 123
1
111. See above the Mufti's address to the Jerusalem Deputy District 
Commissioner. Keith Roach himself, however, who signed the licence, 
claimed that he had done so by inadvertence, and was "very agitated 
when he discovered that he had dropped something which might have been 
a lighted match into a powder magazine". See letter from Mr. H. Sacher 
of the Palestine Zionist Executive to the Zionist Executive in London 
1.3.29 as reported in C. Adler, Memorandum on the Western Wall. 
Philadelphia, 1930. pp.81-82.
112. Any building permit within the old city area had to be authorized by 
the Antiquities Department. See evidence of L.G.A. Gust the Private 
Secretary to the H.C. before the Shaw Commission. Shaw Evidence.
Vol. I. p. 169. About Richmond, the most Anti-Zionist British Official 
through the Mandate, see E. Kedourie The Chatham House Version
pp. 64-67.
113. See Confidential Despatch 10.5.29 J.C. Box 11/5 my italics.
1*4. See Confidential Despatch 14.6.29 C.O. 733/163/67013. I.
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The Colonial Office, however, was reluctant to acdept this
interpretation. After studying the subject, and for other reasons ,
it was decided that the Government should rather get away from the phrase
"status quo" and use the phrase "existing rights" of article 13 of the
Mandate, to which they favoured a wider interpretation than that proposed
by Chancellor, namely, that "existing rights" mean "not only rights based
on statutory authority, but also prescriptive rights acquired by long
X X (3usage or unchallenged practice."
The II.C. was informed of this decision only three months later, 
probably because Lord Passfield, the new Colonial Secretary, wanted to 
study the subject before giving his decision.
Whatever were the reasons of the delay, Haj Amin's reading of the 
situation was most probably the following : In Palestine the II.C.
15»
told him specifically that he accepted the Arabs' view and that their 
position in the dispute was just. The publication, however, of the 
instructions regulating the use of, and conduct at the Wall, based on the 
1928 White Paper, was delayed in London, no doubt as a result of Jewish 
pressure there**^. The best way, therefore, to neutralize this Jewish 
pressure in London was by counterbalancing it with a stronger Arab pressure 
in Palestine. This was the background to the organized agitation campaign 
in defence of the "Buraq" and against the Jews which preceded the 1929 
disturbances.
In the Wailing Wall dispute the Mufti found an issue which, by stirring 
up Moslem religious feeling might have enabled him to beat the opposition 
and assume control over the Arab public, while, at the same time, would not 
have dndangered his relations with the H.C., whose views with regard to the 
dispute were similar to his own.
116. See Minute by Shuckburgh 31.5.29. Ibid. It should be noted that 
Dr. Weizmann was consulted before this decision was reached.
117. The draft of a letter to the O.A.G. was ready on 15.6.29. The 
letter however was sent only on 14.8.29. Ibid.
118. See the H.C.'s cable to Colonial Secretary, enclosing a cable by 
the Mufti. 8.8.29 Ibid.
115. For footnote see p.70.
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Indeed, following the 1929 disturbances the Mufti emerged as the 
foremost political leader of the Arabs in Palestine, and the attitude of 
Chancellor towards the Arabs remained friendly and positive.
115. Mainly (because the Colonial Office feared complications which might 
arise with the Christian Communities in Palestine i f  the narrowed 
interpretation would have been given to the term "Status Quo".
Writing about the maintenance of the Status Quo at the Christian Holy 
Places, Williams remarked that the rights, practices and usages as 
covered by the Status Quo were also "not specifically safeguarded 
by written o ffic ia l authority except in vague and general terms".
See Minute by Williams. 29.5.29. Ibid.
71
Chapter 5
Haj Amin, Character and personality.
It Is rather difficult to analyse the character and personality 
of a person about whom opinions differ so much, specially so, if this 
person is approached and judged emotionally. Jews, as many non-Jews 
including many Arabs, considered the Mufti as the devil, the root of 
all evil and the main source of most of the troubles in Palestine.
The majority of Arabs considered him as a saint'*', and most foreigners 
he met were impressed by his sincere patriotism.
2His private life in his family circle was quiet and happy . During
31921/22 he married his cousin Aishah born in 1902 who has been described 
as a charming wife. They had two daughters, Zeinab, born in 1924 and
Suad, born in 1925, and a boy, Salah, born in 1930. The Mufti did not
/| * ,smoke , neither did he drink". He had a lot of charm and suavity
of manner as well as natural dignity**. He was pleasant to talk to,
&but rather slow in speech. *23456
!• Including G. Antonius, described as "one of the most cultivated 
of men". ch. Sykes Op-Cit p.159-160.
2. Mrs. Brooks, who knew him well, in a letter to the "Manchester 
Guardian". 27.10.37.
3. In his application form for Passport which he filled on 8.1.21 he 
declared himself to be not married. On a similar form filled on 
5.2.23. he was already married. C.S. File 01820. I.S.A.
4. See his evidence before the Shaw-Commi3sion. Shaw Evidence Vol.II 
P. 529.
5. CH. Sykes Op-Cit p. 169 Assaf Op-Cit p. 265.
6. Musa Alami in his sketch of the Mufti, in the file "Who is who" in 
Arab Palestine. C .0./733/248/17693.
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This could be attributed to the fact £mt m  wo* very careful to ®&iar«*siai 
iiia views. tlcport«« uko «j>proac..ed hits with queetious vara tolJ to
¿.resent tnuu in writing nai w i t  2 - 3  days for .is written « uv« h , ' 
la ti few ease# were lae w i pressed to give »a ¿staeUiate answer, .¿a 
either repeated s o «  oatwre M tiss iU it declexetiens vuicu he jprobeiily 
knew by aeert or ej;pr««8ed nlnseif in seen geaerel torus so as not to 
coraut ainceif. Records of aix interview« vita the li.C. oau ot a*
¿3ice o ffic ia l« chow that .;« prepared hi* “ii«eww*rtt!1 cad um ve il
fl * $
brief«. On the other ,**«4» though skilled in ar& agent, vimi
inced vita oaeasficcto ■ question* as win» he was cress «.'usuine«.: by the
Sint1»  CoHiMion mti by Cue Teel Caasissioa, «ichor hi» «awry bocaos
iieiacfcivc cad It« cbo»« ’'not to tmmukux ' several fact# or he yroduceu
10-•■■.•....... :<••. .I*« «
I t  was generally agree*» end by tint majority oi Jew* « «  well, that 
m  was rot rotivateu by fines-cial a«if-i»tere*t, ana ro was even
, hiS
there was no need for .¿a to be corruptible» as his dcetiaanc« over the 
lima« « «  oil the Avqaf aw« later oi« **ui»U*ite«r Supply of aoney iron 
Gersuay Italy wore aere then enough to f i l l  «11 his earthly needs),
7• See Fa ins tin i , i ,3 l,  Tbe ¿toper*s reporter in damsel«» pose , 
q .or tions both to the Mufti, «ad 8sgW> >—hceuld*,. iateahiag I 
publish ti«iir answers la his specie! issue ot tuu Mew Year.
answered on the spot. The Mufti beared ns describe. 
>;b©vc. The M l  was «sperieaced by 8ai. Ooldberg, the eoitor od 
the Jewish Mew York paper "Tag", ubc eueeeeJed eon*uov to interview 
the Mufti. See RcMMt« 12.9.32.
tt. For exeeg»!*, ni* interview with baa K.C. on toe 1st October 1. j.. 
C x. >33/217/9*72 «Md hi* interview vie Ur, aownie of tu  Colv 
Office C.i>/sJU/22F/1/223.
y. C.. Sykes u-C lt , .  1M Marlow ; .K-3.
10. Siam» Evidence Vol. I .  -ad I I  pp. 513-3*3. tool Evidence p?>.2>2.
U . IhAtiow C-,.HSiC p. 74. ITtfCi0 j^ C l t  p.fcl. A. COiOB Uraol , ■ 
rab Wartu baadon 19 ». p.275.
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He was described12 as "one of the ablest politicians that the Kiddle 
East produced in recent years", a description which is agreed to by many
writers. lie was a very calculating politician.
Reading Palestine Arab papers of these years one is struck by his 
"public relations" efforts. Almost every Arab or Moslem leader who 
visited Palestine, be he a sympathizer or an opponent, was entertained 
by him, and the same is true about most foreigners visiting Palestine,
unless they were thoroughly Pro-Zionist. He himself admits tnat
made it his policy to try and establish good relations and cultivate the
13
good will of everyone who could help him in the Palestine problem.
The fact that he was affable, courteous, charming and dignified certainly 
helped him in this. Iiis dignity was further emphasized by the lack 
of it so prevalent among some other Arab leaders. Even when he was
a refugee in Germany during the second world war, totally dependent on the 
good will of his hosts, he tried to keep his self-respect, as proven 
by his talk with the German Deputy Foreign Secretary when he said,
"we are not here knocking on your doors to ask for work and employment.
We have our principles and ideals, and we are responsible for organisations 
in many parts of the Moslem World, even if our friends would prefer to 
ignore it".1'* *15
1 2 .
H .  I t m a b a  my father, who war working In the "Banco-do Roma in the 
old city of Jerusalem and mho toe« many leaders personally as they 
did their business with this bank telling mo when I mas young, boy 
it mill be terrible If the Mufti wilt have his way with us (i.e. the 
Jews), and therefore we should arm ourselves, but 1 must «emit he
15. B e l u n i s h ^ X s f e h t e l S t s  M a r y  the 1I.A After the war was over
the private papers and correspondence of the Mufti fell into tne oanos 
of the American army and taken to the D.S.A. Through the assistance ol 
a well-wisher they were microfilmed and sent to Israel. A small part was 
re-typed and is open fcr examination in the Israel Defence Army Museum.
J. Marlow. Rebellion in Palestine. London 1946. p.74 see also 
Ch. Sykes Op-Git v.' 155. His description in the File "Who is Who" 
Qp-Cit.
Amin al Hussein!. Haqa’i.-q Op-Cit 72.
Unlike most of the British who met him and were impressed, Sir
J. Ilope-Simpson got this negative impression."He (the Mufti), is a man
of small attainments, and had he not been appointed Grand Mufti by
Sir 11. Samuel, nothing would ever have been heard of him .... The
impression which he made on me was that of a man who had no conception
of the method in which such a subject (the Wailing Wall) should be
handled. He has a petty mind and his whole attention is directed to
16.manoeuvres which will fortify his personal position."
This brings us to one of the important questions of this study.
What were his motives ? A Pro Arab author writes of the "personal
disinterestedness with which he had worked for the cause of the
Palestine A r a b s . W h i l e  another author, a more objective one,
writes, "He was not primarily interested in national independence,
18he was interested in his own personal ascendency." How which of
these 2 evaluations is the correct one ? His opponents believed the 
19latter , while his supporters claimed the absolute correctness of the 
20former. I think that the best answer to this question was given
by the Mufti himself writing very revealingly in his own personal
2idiary . "My plan is clear, personally I have no interests. But I
have a share in a company, and each time the shares of the company rise,
my profits in the plan are increasing as well".
A similar view is held by the doyen among Jewish students of
22Palestine Arab affairs who wrote , "the Mufti combined his personal, 1678920
16. In a letter to the Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield 18.8.1930 
C.O. 733/290/75072/Pt.II My Italics.
17. N. Barbour Op-Cit p. 129. My Italics.
18. J. Marlowe Rebellion Op-Cit 74 My Italics.
19. For their views see infra pp. 172
20. For his supporter's views see Bayan Lilumma ... Op-Cit.
21. The Mufti's Diary, entry in early 1942. The H.A.
22. M. Assaf. Op-Cit. p.265.
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fuuily and national alias together!*.
This philosophy is summarised in a saying which the liufti used to 
repeat "tie who makes good, (makes it) for hinself and for his country. 
(Fauaa shsana, falinafslhi valibil&dlhi). This, I think sums up 
the issue. .'hid if our present day understanding of civilized 
democratic rule accepts the distinction between public interests and 
private ones, it must be remembered that the Haiti belonged to a society 
in which combining one’s interests to those of the public was not 
only legitimate but an accepted tradition. Heedless to say that in 
many cases the latter were subordinated to the former.
llany comparisons were made between the two main leaders of Arab 
Falestine, It will be adequate for this discussion if I cite the 
opinion of the K.C. Sir A, Uauchoe who had no special reason to 
prefer the generally more extrema one to the moderate one. Uriting
about Ragheb Kashashibi after he laid lost the mayoralty of Jerusalem 
he said that he is simply out for his private advantage and that "his
23policy is dictated by selftinterest and his de3ire to return to power"
24Speaking about the liufti he said that he was "genuinely sincere and
patriotic". His enthusiasm for the cause of Arab nationalism
after first world war was such that he even played comic parts in a
dramatic society production, the aim of which va3 to raise funds for the 
25movement, 4>nt--o£-cours<»-~he~fcad -no-idea then -of -his -future-exalted 
Poeitioel Even as a youth, he as a scion of an honoured religious 234*
family was not supposed to "act".
23. in a letter to the Colonial Secretary received on 30.4.1935 C.O.
/733/278/75156. See also his denigrating letter about the 
Hashashibis14.7.37. C.O. 733/332/75156.
24. To Mrs. A. Brooks, at his own dinner table. See her letter to the 
Manchester Guardian 27.10.1937. See also C.O. 733/409/75872/53.
• R.J. Simson. British Rule and Rebellion. London 1237. p, 166,
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Once we start from the premise that his motives were genuinely 
patriotic - though mixed with private ones- some of the adjectives 
used by his detractors such as crafty, sinister figure, an arch-plotter 
and master of intrigue lose some of their negative aroma. Actually, 
his supporters could describe these same qualities as smartness and 
the Mufti as diplomatic and deep, fighting as any honourable man would 
- to save his country and his people from what they believed to be 
extinction.
Identifying the national interests with his own, more perhaps than
is generally accepted in the west,^^ the Mufti did not admit of any
real political (as opposed to personal) opposition. To him, those who
27-id not agree to his views were not political opponents•but traitors ,
"the followers of Imperialists and Jews", who put themselves outside 
the national orbit. At the same time he tried his best, and has been 
able on several occasions to unite the Arab front on issues of major 
importance for the Moslems and the Arabs at large.
The need for keeping a united front and emphasizing what was common 
to all "parts" of the national movement was stated by the Mufti on
A Q
all important occasions. R. Hashashibi, on the other hand, was out 267*
26. Though there is not much difference between the sentence what is 
good for "General Motors", is good for the U.3.A." and "What is 
good for the Supreme Moslem Council and its president is good for 
the Arab national movement in Palestine".
27. This definition does not refer to the Istiqlalists whom he viewed 
less harshly.
22. At the Arab Executive Committee’s meeting on 25.7.1930 following 
the return of the Arab Delegation to London. File 3797 65 I.S.a T 
His opening address at the Islamic Conference, Jerusalem 6.12.1331. 
A1 Jamiah al Arablyya 7.12.1931. His speech at the popular meeting 
held in Jaffa on 26.3.1933 al Jamiah al Arabiyya 26.3.1933.
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to emphasize the existence of different views and opposing parties among
29the Arabs. The following exchange of words between the two is 
illuminating.
ilagheb Eashashibi:- "Opposing views in Parliaments may even reach the 
stage of exchange of blows and punches, Ve have got two proposals, 
let us vote on them even if they clash with each other".
The Mufti (who was sure to win the voting as he had a big majority 
in that meeting) "I would like to answer ilagheb Beg. To us it is 
very important that there would not be differences of view betv?een 
each other in a meeting like that. We would like that a mutual 
understanding should prevail in this meeting from start to end. This 
is our intention and this our goal in tne first place. And this is 
more important than the legal point (i.e. the voting)."
11 is desire for unity caused his hesitations in letting his
30supporters form a political party during 1933/34 , and when in July/
August 1933 there were efforts and discussions in order to effect peace
between the liusseinis and Eashashibis it was the Mufti who on the whole
favoured the proposed peace, while Jamal al llusseini opposed it, stating
that his party represented the majority and should not give its opponents
31an opportunity of reinstating themselves through cooperation . 29301
29. During a meeting of the General elective committee to the S.M.C.
. . ' on 24th August 1925. , See Statement of the Supreme Moslem Council 
regarding the proceeding of tne General assembly neld bv the 
General Elective Committee on 24 and 25 Ausust 1925. IBavan min 
almajles .... 1 Jerusalem 1925.
30. See C.1J). Periodical Appreciation Summary Eo. 8/33 of 1Q.3.1S33
F.U./371/16926.
31. C.I.D. summary Mo. 12/35 of 5.S.1935 F.O. 371/18957.
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At the same time, it was made clear that this desired unity was 
conditioned on his being the leader. One of the adjectives in 
which his supporters used to describe him was "The master of Arab 
leaders with no competitor"32 34567(rival) (Sayyid Zuama alarab bila munaze) 
and people who observed^ some of the great demonstrations in the old 
city, of thousands of Arabs, surrounding and carrying the Mufti shoulder- 
high round the sacred grounds of the Haram esh Sharif, proclaiming him 
"the master leader" was convinced that the Mufti, and his followers, 
would do anything in their power to prevent any such potential 
"competitor" from trying to replace him.
In that connection we should note that it was said at the time tnat 
the idea of "leader" (Duce, Furher) was perhaps one of the things which
' g/,attracted the Mufti to Fascism and later Nazism . We therefore can 
assume that he would have liked the following description "He (the
35Mufti) was one of the authentic stuff of which dictators are made".O •*"The Mufti, able and determined ° was more of a "doer",a man of
action than a man of principles. But he stuck to those he had. In
37discussing the Wailing Wall controversy, we shall see that at a 
certain stage, the Arabs through an agreement with the Jews, could have 
got a better and more favourable settlement than that which was decided 
by the Wailing Wall commission.
32. ' Muhammad Tawfic Jana. The Political evidence before the Royal
.Commission. (Alshehadat alsiasiyah aman illugna almalakiyya fi 
Falastin) Damascus 1937 p.6,
33. My father, a communication.
34. Assaf. Qp-Cit note 1493 p.280.
35. Marlowe The Seat of Pilote Op-Cit p.5.
36. Ch. Sykes Op-Cit p.155
37. See infra p. 156
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When the II .C. pointed this out to the Mufti during their meeting
on 5th October, 1330, the latter answered that "he himself would prefer
that a less favourable decision should be imposed on him from without
rather than that he should acquiesce in a settlement however favourable
which was in any way contrary to his convictions".
This is a very important answer and a very revealing one, and could
serve as a key for understanding many of the Mufti's policies, especially
what was described as his negativism. (One could speculate how
things would have developed had the British imposed all their policies
and not retreated in face of Arab opposition). It also throws a
better light on the Mufti as a person faithful to his principles.
Later, during the meeting, when the H.C. counselled the Mufti to
show statesmanship, he answered that he was not a statesman but a man
of religion (Alem) • This certainly sounds unctuous, but at the same
time it served end. Whenever he felt that his political arguments
were not strong enough, he took refuge in using religious ones. However,
4ohis "modesty" is not shared by the generally accepted view, which is
that "the Mufti's talents were as definitely political as religious".
41Musa Alami in his sketch of the Mufti notes that he combined the 
attributes of an Alem, politician and a soldier.
Ch. Eastwood, Sir A. Wauchope's private secretary, continuing the 
Mufti's sketch vTote "the Mufti" is in the difficult position of trying 
to ride three horses at once. He is a sincere Arab Nationalist. 389401
38. Chancellor to Passfield C.O. 733/179/77013 V. My italics.
39. Ibid. My italics.
40. N. Barbour Op-Cit p. 192. See also Assaf 0p-Citll9, Sykes Op-Cit 
155 Marlow Op-Cit 103 Darwaza Op-6it 50 N. Sadaqa Op-Clt 108.
41. See File who is who in Arab Palestine C.O. 733/248/17693.
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lie is an equally sincere Moslem and a leader in the Pan-Islamic 
movement. At the same time he derives his chief source of influence 
from his quasi-official position as President of the Supreme Moslem 
Council. It needs all his very considerable skill in diplomacy and 
intrigue to stay in all three saddles". Of these he had perhaps 
enough, but from circumstantial evidence it can be inferred that he 
lacked this physical courage which would have enabled him to live in 
rough conditions in pursuance of his political belief. Thrice 
he was cautioned by High Commissioners that they would hold him 
responsible for seeing that order would be preserved on different 
occasions. This may seem very ordinary, but the manner in which the 
cautions were delivered is significant. Sir J. Chancellor xarote "Before 
he left me, I took the opportunity of asking the Mufti if he liked a
42hot climate. The significance of the enquiry was not lost upon him."
«■ 43An opposition paper accused the Mufti of being a coward and hiding 
in his house during the 1329 riots.
44In a chapter of his memoirs published in 1957 he tells that after 
the dissolution of the Arab Higher Committee and his removal from his 
offices, he planned to join one of the armed bands in the mountains and 
participate personally in the fighting. Only after the field commanders 
pleaded with him and explained to him that the British were certain to 
concentrate a strong force of planes, tanks and artillery against the 
band which he was to join, and that therefore this band would suffer 423
42. During their meeting on 8.10.29, when the Mufti threatened that 
disturbance would occur if the Wailing Wall instructions would be 
enforced. See Chancellor's typescript for memoirs, section on the 
Wailing Wall. J.C. Box 18/2. See Infra p . l^îhe other case was with 
Lord Plumer. See Faragu 0p-Cltp.60. The third one with Sir A. 
Wauchope. See his letter 23.11.1933 C.O.733/236/17313.
43. Miraat al 6harq 2.3.22 8.3.32. The same accusation however was
directed to the opposition leaders by the Iiusseini's paper al - 
Jaini^h al Arabiyya 3.3.32 6.3.32.
44. In the Cairo daily Akhbar al Yom 5.10.57.
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heavy casualties if not totally annihilitated, only then was he
convinced and agreed to escape to Syria. Again, in his book Haqaiq, 
the Mufti tried very hard to explain why he was not in Palestine during 
the fighting in 1947-8, and maintained that British pressure on Arab 
Governments prevented him from fulfilling his "life's ambition" to 
fight the Jewish invaders. In both cases the explanations sound 
implausible, apologetic and unconvincing and the reader of these two 
pieces gets the impression that the Mufti did not really try hard 
enough to be in Palestine during the fighting.
That did not prevent him from using violence. From his early 
career in 1920 he used violence as a political means for the attainment 
of his political ends. Heedless to say that as is customary in such 
cases, the terror and violence initiated against the external enemies 
turned later against his own people.
Using violende against Jews came easy, because he hated them. And
this was another political tool which he used. Under the Mufti's
46leadership "Arab nationalism adopted anti-semitism". In 1925 he
47came across the "Protocols of the Elders of Zion", and he must have
learned it by heart. It could be said that the Mufti was just using
its contents to further his aims, but that he personally never really
believed in what was written in the book. I doubt it. Ideas and
direct quotations from the book are spread here and there in his sermons
48and speeches and in his book Haqaiq ...... mixed with Islamic anti-
Jewish sayings. 45678
45. Amin al Husseini Ilaqaiq Op-Cit pp .80-85.
46. Ch. Sykes Op-Cit p. 155.
47. See his evidence before the Shaw-Commission, The Shaw-Evidence 
Vol. II p.527. Extracts of the book were published in the
Jamiah al Arabiyya. The S.K.C. reprinted them and distributed them 
freely.
48. Specially in the second chapter about the designs of International 
Jewry of the Middle East pp.25-32.
45
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How deep was his hatred to the Jews we can discern from the
49following verses which he wrote in his diary early in 1S42
"How is it that Jews are respected for their wealth at the time 
that they bring into the world poverty and wickedness. They 
tortured their blameless (pure) prophets, they killed Jean (the 
Baptist) and refused Jesus, they murder the morale of each country, 
they destroy all religions and they sympathize with Russia. They 
are robbers and steal money by usury, they are the bearers of anarchy, 
and bring suffering to the world, they are like the mouth who eats 
(gnaws at) all our good qualities. They destroyed our country with 
axes, they are monsters and the root of all evil in the world".
50His hatred of the Jews did not prevent him from working with them 
when he thought that it would serve his needs.
At the municipal elections in 1923, he approached the Jews'**, 
proposing that In return for Jewish support to his candidate opposing 
his main rival Ragheb Nashashibi for the mayorality of Jerusalem, he 
would be ready to compromise on several points and give his agreement 
to a legislative Council debarred from discussing the problems of 49501
49. The Mufti1s Diary. The H.A.
50. The same is true of his relations with the communists.
51. The approach was done via Judge Frurckin of the Appellate High 
Court. See Frumkin Op-Cit p. 287. It must be stressed, 
however, that at the time of the approach, the Zionist movement 
was at its lowest ebb - the number of emigrants in 1927 being 
higher than the number of immigrants - and the Mufti was 
considering perhaps that Zionism no longer constituted a threat 
to Arab Palestine.
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immigration and land sales. On another occasion the Mufti employed
52a Jewish Architect to build for the S.M.C. the Palace Hotel , but
53following the Arab decision of boycott the Mufti told the conference
of Ulema which met in Jerusalem on the 25th January 1935 that "he
54used only Arab manufactured goods" .
The Mufti tried hard to fight the pessimism and fatalism of the
55Arabs. On many occasions he spoke of the need to re-arm with hope
and faith and urged his listeners to have confidence in God, in
themselves and in their ability to do things. Speaking to a
German in 1944 he said "We Arabs we do not know the meaning (taste) of
despair. We fought the Jews and the British before you, and we shall
56go on fighting them under all conditions."
He himself, however, was given at times to pessimistic doubts"*^.
In his testimony before the Royal Commission he said this important
sentence, "What I can see, and my experience up till now shows, that
58the Jews can do anything as far as Palestine is concerned".
The Mufti dominated every Arab gathering in Palestine which he 
attended. Reading the reports of the Arab Executive Committee's 5234678
52. And connived with him to keep some information secret from the 
Mayor of Jerusalem R. Nashashibi, who might have caused them some
difficulties. See B. Katinka since then (Meaz Ve'ad Hena) Jerusalem 
1 9 61 p p .  2 5 3  -  6 1 .
53. See Infra. 212
54. See A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya 26.1.1935.
55. See for example his words at the Arab Executive Committee's meeting of 
2.3.1931. File 379765. I.S.A. and his speech at the popular meeting 
held in Jaffa on 26.3.1933. Jamiah al Arabiyya 26.3.1933.
56. Entry in his diary 29.7.44. The Mufti's Diary. The II.A.
57. Erskine Op-Cit p. 164.
58. The Peel evidence p.297. My Italics.
opponents (with the exception perhaps of Ragheb Nashashibi) much older
Coto him were cowed by his personality. (Then in public he was held 
in respect and reverence, and most visitors to his office used to kiss
A1his hand , and even in the streets people, old and young, unless stopped
62by his body guards, did the same. He employed body guards as he
63was always in fear of his life. In April 1935 he again asked for
police protection from hired assassins and was given a bullet-proof
jacket . His sketch in the file "Who is Who" in Arab Palestine
ends with the following sentence "A dangerous enemy and not a very 
65trusty friend". 59601234
meetings attended by him one is struck by the fact that even his known
59. See record of meetings on 25/7/30 and 2/3/31 File 3797-65 I.S.A.
60. Farago writes "The real wire-puller who influences the Mufti ... 
and has an almost hypnotic power over him ... is.Jamal al Husseini 
Op-Cit p.60, I do not agree with this view. The wire-puller 
was the Mufti. Jamal al Ilusseini was his Chief Captain.
61. Farago Op-Cit p. 61.
62. Communication by my father.
63. His followers claimed that in January 1930 the family of Musa II'deb 
(the leader of the Peasants' Party in Hebron, who himself was 
murdered in 1929 as a result of his friendship with the Jews. See 
Kisch Op-Cit p. 125) received money from the Jews in order to kill 
the Mufti see Al Jamiah al Arabiyya 1.1.30 Sawt al Sha'ab. 2.1.30 
The police denied this story totally. See also Wauchope's cable to 
the Col. Sec. 31.5.37. C-0. 733/311/75523.
64. Drawing the following remark from the II.C. "I was amused to learn 
that the Mufti asked for Police protection"... see his letter to 
the Colonial Secretary April 1235. C.O. 733/277/75156.
65 C.O. 733/248/17693
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Chapter 6
The Arab Delegation 1930
The Arabs entered 1930 with certain expectations. The disturbances 
of August 1929, besides drawing out the Movement from the epporofic state 
in which it was since 1923, drew attention towards Palestine in Britain 
and the Arab and Muslim worlds (some European countries were perhaps only 
too happy to try and create difficulties for Great Britain). The Arabs 
felt that the disturbances had a positive impact in forwarding their 
claims. There was more readiness to listen to their complaints and 
grievances not only in Jerusalem but also in London. The H.C. was their 
friend and sympathised with many of their demands^. They knew it well 
enough though they used to complain that the Palestine Government was out 
of sympathy with them. They also must have felt (what has been established 
since) that he succeeded in convincing the members of the "Shaw Commission"
i 2(with the exception of H. Snell) to accept his views and recommendations .
The Labour Government wa3 less committed to Zionism and the Balfour
Declaration than were the previous Conservative and Liberal Administrations,
and as for the Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield, he w-s willing - so at
least they were informed by St. John Philby - to solve the Palestine
3problem in a "manner satisfactory to the Arabs" . 123
1. During an interview with the Arab Executive on 14.10.29 he told them "I 
am a friend of the Arabs. I like the Arabs, I sympathize with you and 
I desire to help you in any way that is in my power". Box 14/2 
Chancellor Papers. Rhodes House, Oxford. For Chancellor's attitude to 
the Arabs see, Chapter 9 in P.Ofer "The Role of the Hifh Commissioner in 
British Policy in Palestine; Sir John Chancellor. 1928-1931. (unpublished 
Ph.D thesis, London School of Oriental and African Studies, 1971).
2. As early as the beginning of 1930 the Arab press prophesied that the 
"Shaw Commission’s" conclusions would be inatheir favour. See'Falastin"
1.1.30 "Miraat al Sharq" 4.1.30.
3. In December 1929 J. Philby, while passing through Palestine, contacted 
Arab leaders informing them that he was asked by some Labourite leaders - 
hinting that among them was Lord Passfield himself - to discuss with 
them what came to be known the "Philby Plan" to solve the Palestine 
problem by establishing a free Government representing the Arabs and the 
Jews in their then proportional numbers. Muhammad Izzat Darwaza 
"Alqadiwa al Falastinia" p,64 Passfield Informed later, Jewish leaders 
that he never gave Philby any authority to negotiate on his behalf with 
Arab leaders in Palestine "Haaretz" 10.2.30.
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The time wa3 ripe, they felt, for a new Arab Delegation to London.
The H.C. who on several occasions used to express his opinion that it was
very unfortunate that the Arabs had not a "body of Arab propagandists in
Downing Street to counter the Jewish propaganda", and so the "Arab side of
4the case does not receive equal attention" encouraged them. There were
5also insistent demands in Pro-Arab circles in Britain for the despatch 
of a delegation, and a similar advice was given by the British advocates 
who defended the Arab cause before the Shaw Commission.
But the Arab leaders could not agree about the composition and 
leadership of the delegation and started a long ugly and acrimonious 
series of arguments in meetings, the press etc. During a meeting of the 
Executive on the 28th September 1929, a proposal to send Musa Kazim and 
Shibly Jamal only, was discussed and rejected. The discussions dragged on, 
and owing to the inability of the Executive to adopt a definite decision, 
the Mufti decided to send Jamal al Husseini ostensibly on behalf of the
S.M.C. The Executive who objected to his going, changed later its mind 
and empowered him to represent it as well. (Still the followers of 
Sheikh Ass’ad Shukairi, the leader of the opposition elements in the north, 
circulated in Acre a petition (mazbata) to the effect that Jamal al Husseini 
did not represent the people of Palestine and that his visit to England 
should be considered a private one).
He left Palestine on the 2nd November 1929, after being carried and 
and accompanied to the ship by more than 300 people. Though his interview 
with the Colonial Secretary (Which took rather a long time to arrange) on 
the 19.12.29 seems to have been lukewarm , it appears that on the whole, 456
4. In a private letter to Sir J. Shuckburgh, 16.11.30 F.0.800/232,
5. For the Arab lobby in Britain, see J.M.N. Jeffries "Palestine. The 
Reality". (London 1939) pp.XVIII-XX.
6. C.O. 733/178/67500.
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his visit was successful. He got a good coverage in the Press who 
published many of his letters, and his lectures and appearances in debates- 
presenting the Arabs' case to the public - were good.
As he met some reservations in the C.O. regarding his "right" to 
represent the Palestinian Arabs, he sent a wire to the Executive, asking 
for a power of Attorney to enable him to open negotiations with the British 
Government. But perhaps there was more in that wire than simply 
ascertaining his credentials. There was no progress in the election of 
the members of the delegation, and the opposition elements, were even 
ready to try and prevent the delegation from going to London at all, unless 
its composition would reflect the opposition's success in the seventh 
congress. The wire of J. Husseini forced the issue. As some of the Arabic 
papers urged the Executive to send him a power of Attorney by cable, the 
opposition papers (with the exception of Al Carmel which opposed the
t
delegation all along) urged that other delegates should b selected and 
proceed immediately to join him in London, and carry out the negotiations 
together. But the hesitation about the delegation's composition continued. 
The followers of the Mufti wanted the delegation to be composed of the 
Mufti, Jamal Husseini, Auni Abd el Hadi and from the opposition, Mughannam 
Mughannam, while the "Falastin" and "Mira" at el Sharq came out for 
R. Nashashibi. On 9th January 1930 the Executive met and elected, in 
secret ballot, the Mufti as the leader and R. Hashashibi, Auni Abd Al Hadi,
J. Husseini and Alfred Rock as members. Only 26 members out of 43 attended 
the meeting. The fact that the election would take place in this meeting 
was not mentioned in the agenda and 2 members abstained, so that only 
half the Executive's members voted. A storm followed, Musa Kazira the 
President of the Executive, Y. Farraj the Deputy-President, and Moghnnam 
Moghnnam one of the secretaries, all resigned and there were rumours that 
R. Nashashibi and Auni Abd Al Hadi would resign from the delegation.
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After much "give and take", an arrangement was reached, and the Executive 
met on 21st January 1930 for the formal elections. This time, 37 out of 
the 48 members attended the meeting, and elected Musa Kazira as the leader 
and the Mufti, Ragheb Nashashibi^, Jamal Husseini, Auni Abd El Hadi and 
Alfred Rook as members of the delegation. This was a clear victory for 
the non-moderates, and as a compensation to the opposition it was agreed 
that Yacoub Farraj, the Deputy President would act as head of the 
Executive, during the absence of Musa Kazim.
But the meeting took another important decision which bound the 
delegation's hands and precluded it from reaching a settlement on its own. 
It decided, on a proposal by Rashid Haj Ibrahim, that "the Delegation is 
free to use any means which it deems appropriate in order to achieve for 
the Arab3 their national, political and economical rights, but the last 
decision is in the hands of the nation" and it instructed the delegationl 8to report continually to the Executive and the nation .
All signs indicate that the Arabs approached the talks in London
with certain hopes. The Arab press sounded a note of reserved optimism.
Jamal al Husseini during his interview with the Colonial Secretary in
London on the 19.12.29 "expressed the hope that some settlement of the
9Palestine Question might be reached" .
7. Ragheb Nashashibi's election angered the Jews in particular, as they 
were the majority in Jerusalem, of which he was the Mayor, and 
furthermore, they actually helped him during the elections in 1928. That, 
and specially the fact, that Yacoub Farraj the Arab Vice-President was 
appointed as acting Mayor during the absence of Nashashibi and not the 
Jewish Vice-President, caused the resignation of the Jewish members
of the Municipality on 26.3.30. The Arab members of the Jerusalem 
Municipality accepted the resignation at a meeting held on 10.4.30 
and continued to act alone. In an interview with Al-Mukatam on
15.12.31, Jamal al Husseini said that Ragheb Nashashibi was in the 
delegation only because the Government wanted it.
8. Al Jamiahal Arabiyya 22.1.30.
9. C.O. 733/178/67500.
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The Mufti himself, daring an interview which the H.C. gave to the 
delegation on the 28.1.30*° »aid they hoped to he able to cone to some 
agreement in London and that after their return the atmosphere would then 
be better end the population quieter**.
i*ow if theee hopes of the Arab loaders were within the sphere of 
reality and not dreams, their demands had to be within the scope of the 
Mandate. Asking for the abrogation of the Mandate and the Balfour 
Declaration would have led then nowhere. The Mandate was the basis (at 
least the legal ana) for the British presence in i’aiestine, they Intended 
to stay there, and they would have opposed - aa much as they could - any 
such abrogation.
That this was the intention of the Arab leaders was coniinaed by Musa
Kasim the leader oi the delegation whan ha reported on the talks to the
Executive sayings "You will note, that this time the Delegation tried to
12hold tho discussions within the terms of the Mandate , by which the
Government always justifies itself in talusing our demand*, ¿¡till, the
delegation had to declare on this occasion also, that the Arabs did not
and will not recognise the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration, and will
13always strive for their abrogation” .
Auni Abdal Hadi said openly "the Delegation did not go to ask for
complete independence because the Arabs knew quite well that the
«14Government were not in a position to meet such a demand 1023*6
10. J. Chancellor in a letter to a friend on 16.3.30, wrote about this 
meeting, "they (the Delegatton) were very anxious for me to advise 
them as to what they should do whan they got to England'.* J.C. Box 
20/MF/ll. At the same time he was unhappy that the Delegation 
included c&o many exert mats. See letters to his son 26.11.2i> and 
13.1.30.
11. C.O. 733/17V/77013.
12. My Italics.
13. Ai Jamtah Al Arabiyah 27.7.30, The'Ya las tin” paper admitted too that
the delegation did not ask for the abrogation of the Balfour
Declaration. Feinstin 16.5.30.
16. In en interview of the H.C. with a deputation of Arab notables on 
24th February 1333. G.O. 733/234/17272.
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An advice for moderation was given to them by the H.C. who told 
them, "the last time I saw you I counselled you to be moderate in your 
statement of your case. I repeat that advice. It is most important"*5.
The delegation reached London on 30.3.30 and already on 31.3.30 - 
the same day on which the report of the "Shaw Commission" was published - 
it met the Prime-Minister and the Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield.
We do not know, fully and exactly the real picture of the discussions 
between the Government and the Delegation*5,
Some Arab descriptions*^ of the talks say that during the first 
meeting on 31.3.30, the Delegation handed to the Government a memorandum 
including its demands. The Government did not even answer them directly, 
but the speech of the Prime-Minister in the House of Commons on 3.4.30 
was an indirect answer in which he refused all their demands, and because 
of that the talks failed.I
Now, the main points in the Prime-Minister's declaration are: that
H.M. Government will "continue to administer Palestine in accordance
with the Mandate'.'.....that is an international obligation from which
there can be no question of receding..... A double undertaking is involved
to the Jewish people on the one hand, and to the non-Jewish population of
Palestine on the other, and it is the firm resolve of His Majesty's
Government to give effect in equal measure, to both parts of the Declaration
18and to do equal justice to all sections of the populations of Palestine" . 15678
15. During an interview on 14.10.29 J.C. Box 14/2.
16. For some strange reason, Filesno. C.O. 733/183/77053 Pt. I & II "Arab 
Delegation to London" were transferred to the Safe-Room of the P.R.O. 
for 100 years. And as far as I know, none of the Arab or Pro-Arab 
writers who wrote about the subject did really give the facts in full, 
and neither did the press.
17. Muhammed Izzat Darwaza "Alqadivva al Falastinia" p.70
Naji Alush Al mukawama al Arabiwa fi Fa las tin 1917-1948 p.65
18. Hansard Vol.237 Cols. 1466-7.
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These general statements were in an answer to a question by Baldwin 
as pre-agreed in a meeting on the 2.4.30 between the Prime-Minister and 
the opposition leaders. Jewish Leaders were informed and agreed to the 
formula
Though the Arabs saw the statement in the Commons as a wrong step, 
because the Prime Minister mentioned the Mandate, surely there was nothing 
in it new to them. Furthermore, it was all done in a way that was 
intended not to offend, but to reassure and encourage them. There are 
clear signs that some progress and understanding was achieved between 
the two sides after 3.4.30.
20In an unofficial meeting some of the Arab delegates seemed Inclined 
to accept the concessions on immigration and land questions which the 
Government was ready to give, and to be ready in return to defer their 
demands for constitutional changes. On 28th April 1930 the Colonialr
Secretary telegraphed to the High Conmissloner asking for his view on the
question, whether the suspension of all immigration would be desirable, if
practical, pending the determination of future policy on the receipt of
Sir J. Hope-Simpson'8 report. On May 2nd the Arab Delegation was informed
that this telegram had been sent and that a reply was awaited, and though
they were told that the Government could not give them a pledge of an
immediate stoppage of immigration there and then, they were promised that
21the Government would see what could be done in the matter . (On 14.5.30 
the H.C. informed Y. Farraj, the Acting President of the Arab Executive in 
Jerusalem that H.M.G. had approved of suspension of immigration pending 
submission of report of Sir. J. Hope-Simpson). It is very difficult to 
assume that the Government would have taken these steps unless there was a 
certain progress in the discussions. 1920
19. See CAB 23/63. 18(30) 2.4.30.
20. Held on 23rd April 1930 and attended by J. Husseini, Auni Abd al Hadi 
and A. Rock P.C. (30) 2. 30th April 1930 CAB. 27.423.
21. C.O. 733/188/77113 Pt.1.
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On this formal meeting of 2nd May, the discussions mentioned 
previously (at the informal meeting of 28.4.30) were further pursued.
Though little progress was made the Prime-Minister informed the delegation 
about the appointment of Hope-Simpson which in his view was a token of 
concession (at first it was proposed that Smuts the staunch Pro-Zionist 
should be appointed). When the Mufti remarked "What is the use of sending 
such an expert to Palestine so long as experience has shown that no effect 
is given to the reports of previous commissions, which were in favour of 
the Arabs owing to Jewish pressure?". MacDonald replied "I assure you on
my honour as the Prime-Minister of Great Britain that this report will be
22sincerely enforced" . And then, on the question of the right to initiate 
legislation in the proposed Legislative Council, the negotiations struck 
an obstacle and later broke down. It should be stressed that until then the 
delegations statements were quite hopeful and their optimism was reflectedi
by the Palestinian Arab press.
On the next meeting held on 6th May, Passfield informed the delegation
that the Government was ready to make further concessions concerning the
limitation of immigration and land sales. But the Arabs were not satisfied
23and stuck to their essential demand for self-government . The more 
extreme line of the delegation was also expressed by a letter which they 
wrote to Yacoub Farraj, the acting president of the Executive in Jerusalem - 
which reached him around the 9th May - instructing him "that as much as 
possible should be made of 16th May" (which has been declared as Day of 23
22. Evidence of Haj Amin A1 Husseini before the Royal Commission 12.1.37 
Palestine Royal Commission. Minutes of Evidence P.296. See also 
Haj Amin A1 Husseini (Haqaiq An fladayat Falastin) the Truths of the 
Palestine Problem. Cairo 1954 p.49.
23. C.P. (30 6 12th May 1930 Cab. 27423.
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Remembrance for Palestine by the Indian Moslems) "and that demonstrations
*7 /should be organised”
On the 12th May 1930 the delegation telegraphed the Executive in
Jerusalem ”....... Government rejected our just demands.... In view of
this deadlock discussions closed. Delegation leaves homeward with
impression that Arab case will not justly be solved by British Goverrment
25influenced by Zionists”  ^.
Ever since, Arab spokesmen - or their mouth-pieces - blamed the 
British Government for the failure of the talks. "The Arabs”, they say, 
"had certain demands. They put them forward. The British Government 
refused them, so the Arabs broke off the negotiations and returned horn#. 
This presentation ignores the fact that the Delegation came to London ready 
to talk, that is, ready to bargain and compromise. Lhat made them become 
less compromising is not completely clear. 245
24. C.O. 733/137/77105. It is interesting to note that when the II.C. 
informed Farraj that demonstrations would not be permitted he 
answered that he would hold back the Delegation’s letter until after 
16th liny when it would be too late to act upon it. Accordingly,
the Executive issued on the 9.5.30, a proclamation calling on the 
people to observe this day by a peaceful strike and prayer, but not 
to demonstrate. A1 Jamiah A1 Arabiyya 13.5.30. On the whole, the 
day in Palestine passed quietly. For those in IncU_ see J.M.N. 
Jeffries Palestine the Reality London 1939 p.620.
25. A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya 14.5.30. In a communique issued on the
f following day, the Colonial office declared that the conversations
were at an end and that the sweeping constitutional changes demanded 
by the delegation were wholly unacceptable since they would have 
rendered it impossible farllis Majesty’s Government to carry out its 
obligations under the Mandate. C.O. 733/133/77053 II.
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They certainly got some bad advice from their local friends in the 
"National League" this marginal unimportant organisation which used to 
give them foolish and even damaging advice*'"'.
Perhaps they ware encouraged by developments In India, Vvhere an 
all-India lies lea conference for Palestine, started to be active on behalf 
of the "Palestine Cause", and declared the loth Uay to be "lv les tine Day" 
to be observed all over India, Burma-and Ceylon.
Perhaps they thought that the Government would not let them break 
off the negotiations so shortly after the publication of the deport of 
the .‘-.haw Commission which prove! the "justic-e” of their case. Maybe they 
misread the support they got from the r*.css Lords ilothermere and Baavcrbrook 
and they over-estimated the impact of the 1929 disturbances on public 
opinion in Britain and on how far, the British Government would be ready 
to accommodate them. Ilaybe the delegation broke the talks as part of its 
bargaining. Was it a part of a political manoeuvre? because the 
delegation did not leave London. It stayed there until the 23rd Hay, and
ry y
actually it net the Prine-ilinister on the 19th llay“ . The Parliament was 
then in session and their friends could raise the issue, was it that they 
demanded much more than they really were ready to settle for?*-' But having 
once put forward their demands they could not go back on them for fear 
they would be accused of treason. This terrible accusation which was the 
lot of every Arab leader who seemed to compromise. This accusation which 2678
26. The Colonial Office was unhappy about the negative influence of the 
British pro-Arab lobby had on the delegation, encouraging it to be 
intransigent, especially on the important issue of a Legislative 
council as a first step towards Arab independence. See Passfield to 
Henderson 26th December 1930 C.O. 733/183/77050 D. See also Williams1 
memorandum 23rd April Cab 27.4.23 on the contacts between the Palestinian 
Arab leaders - specially Jamal al Husseini - and the "National League"
see A.E. file 1730 I.S.A. See also Furlough G. Palestine is liy Country 
The Story of Musa Alami, London 1969 p.63.
27. Al Jsmiah al Arabiyya 23.5.20.
28. Y. Parraj, the acting President of the Arab Executive admitted to the 
H.C. in Jin. on 10th Hay, "that demands of Delegation were extravagant 
but explained that they T/ould accept something less. C.O. 733/187/77105
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in the atmosphere of personal jealousies, and family rivalries dominating 
Arab Politics could lead cnly towards extreme, negative and at tines 
violent policy, and never towards compromise, settlements or solutions.
Or was it once again a repetition of the same motto ’’all or nothing” which 
plagued Palestine Arab Politics since 1913. And as they could not get 
’’all" they preferred the "nothing" to anything else they could get. The 
true answer as to what made the Delegation become less compromising would 
be a mixture of all thc3e possibilities mentioned above, with the last 
two points the more important.
On 23rd May, the delegation left London. Auni Abd El Uadi went to 
Ccneva for the meeting of the Permanent Handstc Commission where he 
delivered - on behalf of the Delegation - a memorandum to the P.U.C. and 
had a long interview with ilr. Rappard, a member of the Commission. The 
Ilufti too, went to Geneva for 3 day3 where he met Sir E. Drummond, the 
Secretary General of the League of nations"". ¿vfter returning to Palestine, 
the Delegation ceased to exi3t as a formal body, but for sometime it was 
known unofficially as the "Delegation" and continued to appear as such in 
the eyes of the Government.
Before finishing the subject, it is interesting to examine the 
Mufti's position with regard to the Delegation.
He was in favour of sending the Delegation to London. Ilis mouth-piece, 
the Daily, A1 Jamiah A1 Arabiyya demanded it consistently. The Ilufti, and 
specially his paper, ceased ct the time to criticise and attack the Arab 
Executive, knowing that he would have to co-operate with them in that matter. 
When there was no agreement about the Delegation's formation, he sent 
Jamal al Hussein! alone, in an effort to force the issue. When financial 29
29. Al Jamia al Arabiyya 6.6.30. According to the Ilufti, Drummond told 
him during the meeting - which Emir S. Arslan and Ihasan al Jaabari 
attended too - that it was the British who drew up the "Mandate" cud 
not the League of nations. Iiaqaiqqp-Cit. p.37
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difficulties arose, his followers were those active in trying to raise
30funds to cover the Delegation's expenses . His followers even tried to
31get him elected as the Chairman . Eut at the same time there were soma
signs that "the Mufti was trying to get out of going to London on the 
32Delegation” , using the argument that he had to stay in Palestine to
prepare the Arab case before the Mailing Wall Commission. The Palestine
Government too was in a kind of a dilemma. They desired that ha should
go "as he would make trouble if he were left alone”. They also appreciated
that any agreement reached with a delegation of which he was a member "would
carry much more weight with the Palescinian Arabs. At the same time they
33were unhappy that the delegation included extremists . Actually, no
agreement was reached in London and the negotiations failed.
\.Ticn the rift between the Mufti and his opposition widened again,
Fa lehri Uashashibi declared that the Mufti * for personal ambitions - tried
his best to cause the Delegation's failure*^. another source, which was
close however to the Uashashibis, blames the Mufti's extremism for the
35Delegation's failure .
As there is no additional clear evidence on that, and as his policy 
towards the British during the next 3-4 years was less extreme than that 
of some other Palestinian elements, I am disinclined to accept the view that, 
were it not for the Mufti» the talks would have succeeded. The reasons for 301245
30. For lists of contributors see files of the ’’Financial Committee for 
Collecting the Expenses of the Delegation” (A1 lugna al maliya li jame 
nafakat el wafd) . The Arab Executive files no.1/2 T 2 2/2T number of 
file in the Israeli Government Archives ho.01524. There were rumours - 
later denied - that the Barclays Bank was going to give the S.M.C. a 
loan guaranteed by the Governxnt, to cover these expenses.
31. Supra p. 87
32. This was the impression of Ruhi Abd El Hadi from the Chief Secretary's 
Office, who served as "contact” man between the II.C. and the Arab leaders. 
C.O. 733/179/77013. See also Doar Hayom 2.1.30.
33. See note No.10 in p. 89
34. Miraat el Sharq 21.3.32 as reported in the Jewish Daily Dcar-IIayom of 
23.3.32. I could not locate the original paper.
35. See Mrs. S. Erskine, Palestine of the Arabs London 1935, p.162.
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the failure are stated previously and he was affected by them in the sane
manner - more or less - as other members of the. Delegation.
3 6The Mufti himself stated " that the talks x?ere brought to a standstill 
by the Delegation’s insistence on their demand for the establishment of 
a National Democratic Government, lie emphasized, however, that the atmosphere 
during the talks was cordial and friendly.
In conclusion, however, the Delegation's visit was not a complete 
failure. Thougit the delegation leit unsatisfied, it achieved some positive 
results.
The first immediate result was the suspension of Jewish immigration 
. 3 7to ¿alestine . This suspension proved beyond doubt that the British 
Government ** at that time - were guided in immigration matters by political 
considerations - which suited the Arabs much better - rather than by the
economic absorptive capacity of the country, as was laid down in the White1
Taper of 1922^.
Another positive result of the Delegation's visit to Britain, was its 
success in bringing the Arabs' case to the knowledge and perhaps sympathy 
of a much bigger public in Britain then ever before.
And thirdly, its indirect contribution to Passficld's White Paper. 
Both MacDonald and Pass field knew better and understood better the Arab's 
paints of view and demands, and this knowledge and understanding certainly 
made the confirmation of Tie Iliite Paper by the Cabinet, much easier. 367
36. fo A1 Ahrram correspondent in Jerusalem as reported by "Falastin"
3.6.36,
37. Supra p. 91
33. This actually was admitted by Dr. Ghiels, the Under-Secretary of State 
for Colonies in a talk with the journalist II.N. Brailsford, a prominent
Pro-Ticnist....... labourist. See Ben-Gurion, Memoirs. Tel Aviv 1971
n. 15.
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Chapter 7
The llenort of the Shaw Commission
The Shaw Commission*- was appointed on the 13th of September 1929, 
to ’’enquire into the immediate causes which led to the recent outbreak 
in Palestine and to make recommendations as to the steps necessary to 
avoid a recurrence” .^
The Commission arrived in Palestine on tne 24th of October 1929, 
and remained there until the 29th of December. While in Palestine 
it held 47 sittings - 3 of which were held at the offices of the S.M.C. - 
in open session and 11 in camera.
It heard evidence of 130 witnesses, 47 of whom were called by or 
at the request of the Arab Executive. It examined documents - mainly 
memoranda furnished by the Palestine Government and it visited many 
parts of the country and Trans-Jordan.
The Commission reached England on the 4th of January 1930. Its 
report was presented on the 12tli of March** and published at the end of 
the month**.
The report has been vidly analysed, and I will not try to do so here 
again^. Ily intention is to examine the relevance of the report on the 
Arab national movement in Palestine but before that to try and see how 
much the report affected the position and future career of the Mufti.
1 am doing that, because in a certain way, the enquiry of the Chaw 
Commission was a "semi-trial” of the liufti.
1. The personnel of the Commission wasi - Sir Walter Shaw, an ex-chief- 
Justice of the Straits Settlements as Chairman, and Sir Henry 
Betterton a Conservative M.P., Hr.R. Hopkin Morris a Liberal M.P., and 
Hr. Harry Snell a Labour 11.P.»members.
2. Shaw Report p.3
3. Ibid pp. 4-6
4. Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August 1929. 
Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by 
Command of liis llajecty. March 1930. Cad. 3530.
5. For pro-Arab view of the Report See Jeffries, op-cit pp.606-17. For 
Zionist view - Memorandum on the Report of the Commission on the 
Palestine Disturbances of August 1929, by Leonard Stein London, May 1939. 
For a British view see Peel Report, pp.50-53
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The Jews, all along, in their press, interviews, and evidence before 
tne Commission, stated and re-stated that it was the Mufti and his 
followers m  the S.M.C. who had organised and incited the disturbances 
of August 1929, mainly by propagating propaganda among the Fellahin 
t’lat the Jews had designs on the "llaran-el-Sharif", thus using the 
religious issue - for political ends - against the Jews and against the 
Mandate,
The Comission exonerated him from these charges. They concluded 
that the outbreak was not premeditated, and that the Mufti had no intention 
of utilizing the religious campaign over the Mailing Wall as the means of 
inciting disorder. Their criticism of him vent only so far as to say 
that the. Mufti, and the Arab Executive, cannot be acquitted of blame for 
wot trying to control their folloxvers, during the week preceding the 
disturbances, by declaring publicly and emphatically that they were on 
the side of law and order6.
The only Commissioner x;lio dissented from this "not guilty" verdict 
v;as Mr, II, Snell, lie thought that "the Mufti must bear the blame for 
his failure to make any effort to control the character of an agitation 
conducted in the name of a religion of which in Palestine he was the 
head"7 89.
The Commission, no doubt, was led, to reach its conclusion, by the 
Palestine Administration. Mr. Preedy, the counsel for the Administration,
declared that they had no evidence that the Mufti and his followers "had
3organised or incited or brought about these disturbances" •
The 11,C, x/rote to Sliuckburgh "until evidence is produced, the Mufti 
and other Arab leaders cannot be prosecuted, I dare say that the report 
of the Commission may throw some light on this matter"^.
6. Shaw Report pp. 153-59,
7. Ibid pp, 172.
8. Shaw Evidence ii. p, 944
9. 3.1.1930 C.O. 733/173/67524.
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1'ut it scans that both Chancellor and the Colonial Office - 
because of political considerations - did not really wish the "light 
to be throvm on the natter". Chancellor himself admitted that he 
considered that "Snell in his reservation had nore correctly assessed 
the part played by the Mufti in the disturbances than the rest of the 
Corriission"^9
And b’illiaus, the head of the "Palestine Section" in the Colonial 
Office v/rote "I think I nay say that it is our private opinion in. the 
Office that the Mufti, and cone of hia supporters, mere probably very 
much nore responsible for sone of the deplorable incidents wdiich have 
occurred in Palestine than the majority of the dhow Commission appear 
to think., and such intelligence information as v/e have had since the 
outbreak has tended to confirm this inpression. It mill be seen that 
Mr. Mayle proposes in effect that his Majesty's Government should concur 
In the findings of the Gnaw Report on this head. I do not see that v/e 
can do otherwise, since we have no definite facts supported by unimpeach­
able evidence which we can bring forward in a contrary sense, and even 
if wo had, 1 do not see what use we could make of it unless it x/as 
sufficient to enable U3 to take definite action against the Grand Mufti, 
whicu is obviously impossible. lie is much too wily a bird to give us 
the chance. On the whole, I do not think, there is much to be loot, and 
there is perhaps something to be gained, in accepting the findings of the 
Report without qualification. To suggest any doubt as to the soundness 
of their conclusions on this point in a public statement would, of course, 
have unfavourable reactions in our negotiations with the Arabs''^-. 10
10. In an interview with Mr. P. Rutenberg on 20.10.1930 J.C. 20/I IF 11.
11. In a minute to the draft statement prepared by II. Mayle of the 
Colonial Office for the British accredited representative at the
Permanent Mandates commission. 2G.4.1930. C.0.733/1C3/77050 B.
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The negotiations to which Williams referred, were those held at 
the tine with the Arab Delegation in London, of which the Mufti was 
a leading member* These negotiations failed owing - so it was said - 
to the extreme stand taken by the M u f t i #
It would be shown later^ that all through the thirties, the 
British authorities, or at least part of them, sometimes vigorously, 
sometimes less so, were always looking for various ways and means, 
which could be justified, and which w’ould have made it possible for 
the Government, to curtail the power and influence of the tiufti or 
even to remove him from his offices, as was actually done in October 1937. 
The Shaw Commission could have supplied them with such justification.
Not perhaps the "definite facts supported by unimpeachable evidence" 
which a legal court would have demanded, but justification which could 
be defended in any other foruia, and which would have been more than 
enough for the Government had it really wished to act at that time.
But for reasons of expediency, explained above by Williams, the argument 
of "no evidence" was used to clear the Mufti. He was not removed from 
his offices, his power and influence was not curtailed, his prestige was 
higher than ever, enhanced by expressions of respect, such as the Shaw 
Commission coning to his office at the S.M.C. to listen to his evidence^ 
and following and as result of the Wailing Wall dispute and its aftermath 
he emerged as the most important and influential leader in Arab Palestine. 1234
12. See p. 96
13. Supra p. 277
14. No other local witnesses, including Jewish religious dignitaries were 
accorded a similar respect.
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Returning to the general conclusions or tne Commission, we find
that it asserted that "die outoreatt neither was, nor was intended to
Le a revolt against nritish authority m  P a l e s t i n e " c l e a r e d  
tiie Administration of all accusations' .„ado against its conduct oafore
"id during the cUs turn sue us, and stated that "the üov animant did
discharge to the best of their ability the difficult task of maintaining
a neutral and impartial attitude Lot'/can two peoples whose leaders have
suown littie capacity for campr ogtisc
As in the case of the Mufti, the Arab executive and the rest of
the Arab leaders were cleared likewise.
The Commission enumerated 6 immediate causes for the outbreak*-?, 
hut they emphasized the fundamental cause, without which, the disturb- 
ances would not have occurred. This was "the Arab feeling of 
animosity and hostility towards the Jews consequent upon the disappoint­
ment of their’political and national aspirations and fear for their 
economic future".
The feeling as it existed then, continued the Commission, was 
"based on the twofold fear of the Arabs that by Jewish immigration and 
land purchase they may be deprived of their livelihood, and in time 
pass under the political domination of the Jews"*-^.
By this statement, as in all^ other conclusions and ro cor.mandat­
ions the Commission tended to accept the Arab center.tiens which in most 
cases vers almost identical to those of the Administration. 1567*9
15. Shaw Report p. 158
16. Ibid p. 161
17. Ibid p. 164
lo. Ibid p. 103
19. The one big exception was the Commission's conclusion "that the out­
break in Jerusalem on the 23rd of August was from the beginning an 
attack by Arabs on Jews for which no excuse in the form of earlier 
murders by Jews lias been established" and that the disturbances took 
the form, for the most part, of a vicious attack by Arabs on Jew’s 
accompanied by wanton destruction of Jewish property". The £uaw 
Report p. 158. Arab papers which welcomed the report objected to this 
conclusion. See Palastin 1.4.1930.
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The first basic recommendation, to which the Commission 
attached "the highest importance" was that His Majesty's Government 
should issue a clear statement of the policy which it intended to be 
pursued in Palestine, that it should be done with the least possible 
delay and that it should be made clear that the Government intended 
to give full effect to that policy with all the resources at its 
command. The Commission continued that the value of this statement
"would be greatly enhanced (I) if it contained a definition in clear 
and positive tems of the meaning which - is Majesty's Government 
attach to the passages in the Mandate providing for the safeguarding 
of the rights of the non-Jewish communities in that country, and
(II) if it laid down for the guidance of the Govcrnm t of Palestine,
directions more explicit than any that have yet been given as to the
20conduct of policy cn such vital issued as land arc! immigration".
This reference to the passages in the Mandate waich provided 
for safeguarding of rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine,
was certainly an indirect criticism of these garagr ./m in the Mandate 
which emphasized the obligation to promote the Jewish National Home.
It was also a refusal of that interpretation of the Mandate 
which gave the first part of tue Balfour Declaration, regarding the 
establishment of tae Jewish national home, a priority over the second 
part, that of the safeguarding of civil and religious rights of the
other inhabitants of Palestine. *
20.Shaw lienort p. 164-3
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By this refusal, the Commission assisted in confirming and 
establishing the idea of the "Dual Obligation" or "double undertaking 
of equal weight inherent in the ¿laudato" which was stated clearly by 
the Trine ilinister in tna house of Commons on tue 3rd April 193Ü-1,
3 days after the publication of the Commissions report.
This idea, which in practice meant departure from the iiandate - 
in spirit if not in letter - found its strong expression in Passfield's 
l.aite Paper of October 1930.
As to the conduct of policy on such vital issues as land anu 
immigration, the Commission recommended that:
(a) "A scientific enquiry should be undertaken by experts into
the prospects of introducing improved methods of cultivation 
in Palestine", and that "Land policy could then be regulated 
in the light of its findings".^ In the meantime, the 
Commission recommended steps should be taken to insure 
"further protection of the position of the present cultivators
O Oarid some restriction on the alienation of land".^ 
and (b) Immigration should be controlled with "the object of prevent­
ing a repetition of the excessive immigration of 1925 and 1526" 
which as a result of the economic crisis in 1927 - 1528 turned 
to be a heavy burden on the shoulders of the population in 
Palestine.
It also recommended that "non-Jewish" interests in Palestine should 
be consulted upon natters of immigration.^ 2134
21. See Lansard Vol.237 Cols.1460-7
22. The Shaw Report p.166
23. Ibid p.124
24. Ibid p.166
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On constitutional development, the third Arab grievance, the 
Commission "did not make any formal recommendation", but it drew the 
attention to the fact that "the absence of any measure of self- 
Government is greatly aggravating the difficulties of the local 
Administration.^ It asserted that Arab failure to get "some measure 
of self-Governuent", was a main cause of the 1929 disturbances, and 
"will constitute a continuing grievance" until amended.
From among the other recommendations of the Commission, two had 
already been acted upon at the time of the report's publication. These 
were (a) The one calling for the appointment of the Wailing Wall 
Commission.^
and (b) The one calling for an enquiry into the organisation of the 
Department of Police in Palestine.^
The British Government submitted the Shaw Report to the League of 
Rations in June 1930 accompanied by a "statement with regard to British 
Policy".28 The Times commenting on this statement said that the Govern- 
ment announced in it their "substantial acceptance of all the findings and 
recommendations of the Shaw—Commission".^
The Permanent Mandates Commission met in June 1930 to discuss the 
Palestine question and the Shaw Report. In the report which they prepared 
for the Council of the League, they criticized very strongly the actions 
of the Mandatory and rejected the findings of the Shaw Commission.*^ 25678930
25. Ibid p.166
26. See Chapter 10
27. The Government appointed to that task Sir ll.Bowbiggin, the Inspector 
General of Police in Ceylon who visited Palestine during January-!larch 
1930 and reported to the Colonial Secretary his findings and recommend­
ations. C.0.733/180/77015. See also Peel Report pp.140-41.
28. Cmd.3582. His Majesty's Stationary Office, London, May 1930.
29. The Times 7.6.1930
30. See C.355, M.147, VI. Minutes of the Seventeenth (Extroordinary)
Session held at Geneva from June 3rd to 21st 1930, including the Report 
of the Commission to the Council and Comments by the Mandatory Power. 
This report of the P.M.C. was criticised strongly by Arab Press. See 
Falastin 30.6.1930.
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An amended report, more in harmony with British views was adopted 
in September 1930 at the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations.31 3245
The Arabs were satisfied with the Shaw Report, It should be 
mentioned here that at the ties, the Arabs almost boycotted the Shaw 
Commission. In a big meeting of the Arab Executive, which ret cn the 
27tlx - 28th October 1929, under the Chai man ship of Y.i’arraj-Musa ICaziia 
beins ill * a strange coalition, so common to Palestine Arab politics, of 
real extremists and iioderates-turucd-cxtrcniists, succeeded almost in passing 
a resolution calling for Arab boycott of the Shaw Commission. Only a
balanced stand by the Executive's secretariat with baching fror, the Mufti's
followers defeated the boycott notion,
As the hearings proceeded, the Arabs felt rore and nore at ease, and 
already in the beginning of the year the Arab press was predicting that the 
Coumission'a findings would be an their favour,33
Alien the report was published, the Arabs as r.L. Hanna said "received 
it vita jubilation as a vindication of their case against tie national
iene
The Arab Delegation in a declaration to neuter's said: "the report 
of the bhavT Commis sicii, describes the situation as regards the Arabs, 
fairly and justly. The iarab Delegation in Louden weleones the report and
hhopes taut its recommendations would be followed
31. ns for the way in vmich the Dritisn Government achieved tins harmon­
isation, see p.Oler op.cit Pp, 234—3o.
32. 1 alas tin 28tu-29th October 1930. Among those favouring tlie boycot 
me tioii were nhdei uauar Muzaxfar, sainu iaji Ei faro uni, uasan Sidki
el Dajani and Kolous Sehada, the editor of "Mira at el Gharq"• Against
it ¿iUi.ii *i.sd hi hadi, lazst uamvaza and L>iic*fiq Assal.
33. bee fainstin 1.1.1920. A1 Jaiiah al Arabiyya 3.1.1930.
34. ?.L. Hanna, Dritish Policy in Palestine. Washington 1942. p.100
35. Al Jariiah al Arabiyya 3.4.1930.
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Falas tin caLia up with a big headline "The Shaw Report a bip; 
success for the Arabs” and vent on to cay that "the Comission in its 
conclusions repeated actually what V7as said to it by the counsel for 
the Arabs, not core not less”.*'0 And A1 Jam.ah al Arabiyya in its 
editorial said "the Report is in favour of the Arabs. The Labour 
Govern lent aim at solving its problem in the Riddle hast on the basis 
of recognizing the right of nations to independence. The Shaw Report is 
in iiamony with this ain".37
The Hufti, writing about the Shaw Report in his book said "and when 
it was published, the Arabs welcomed it and showed open acceptance of it".3b 
The Arabs also noted with satisfaction the positive impact which the 
report had in drawing the attention and the sympathy of the British public 
to their case.3^ *379
3b. Faiastin 1.4.1030
37. Al Jamiah al Arabiyya 3.4.1930.
3b. naj Aiain al Aussuini naqaiq. op. cit p.45
39. Sc? "In the '.'eke of tiri Report in The? Times 19.3.1930
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Tho Report of Hope-31;
The Government' s G 
Pacsfield Unite Pc per 
published sinultancou
mpson end the has slid cl Uhite
tatcmciit of Policy, generally 
i, and the Report of Ilogc-Sim; 
sly on the 2CtL October IS'30.
Paper .
known as the
¿,:son , were
Sir John Hope-Simpson vac appointed as a result of a Cabinets*
4decision , following the recommendation of the Shea; Commission that 
the Colonial Secretary would appoint a representative with the right 
kind of experience "to visit Palestine, confer with the 11 .C. and report 
on the economic questions involved, i.e. Land Settlement Immigration 
and Development, and to such extent as night be seemed desirable, 
on the political question in the background". The ain of his enquiry 
was to assist the Government in formulating their future policy for
Palestine. lie vas preferred to General Smuts vho vac considered too
' 5Pro-Zionist, and the Arab Delegation vas informed of his appointment.
He reached Palestine on the 20th Hay 1330 and stayed there until 
24th July. He based his enquiry on information from official sources, 
and consulted Arab and Jevish authorities and organisations. lie vas 
in constant consultation vith the High Commissioner, by whom lie vas 
influenced very much°. After completing his enquiry he left for 
Athens, from where he sent his report, to the Secretary of State for
the Colonies, on 22nd .August 1930.
1.
2 .
3.
4. 
3 •
Statement of Policy by His Ilajesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament 
by Coi.mand of His ILijesty, October 1930• II.11.3.0., London 1930 CHD.3632.
Palestine Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development,
C1D 3036, 11.11.3.0. London 1930.
Hopc-Simpcca - a distinguished e:»-civil servant in India, later 
became the Vice-President of the League of liations Refugee Commission
in Athens.
On 2.4.1930 CAB-23. 18(30). 4.
Supra p. 92
0. See Oler op-cit Cnap. 4. pp. 237-31.
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t\& its practical influence on future developments was almost nil,
7I shall not analyse it here . His most important and basic conclusion 
was that "It it as emerged quite definitely that there is, at the present 
time ana with the present methods of Arab cultivation, no margin of 
land «available for agricultural settlement by new immigrants, with the 
exception of such undevaiopec lane, as the various Jewish Agencies hold 
in reserve".
However, he went on to say "that with thorough development of the 
country there will be room, not only for all the present agricultural
population on a higher standard of life than it at present enjoys,
9but for not leas than 20,000 families of settlers from outside".
Two recommendation;, which followed his basic conclusion were :
1) 'Xhat "in cases in which immigration of Jews results in
preventing the Arab population obtaining the work necessary 
for its maintenance" it should be reduced and even be suspended.10 
and 2) "That control of all disposition of land, must rest with a 
"Development Commission, which he recommended to appoint,
and that" all transfers of land, should be permitted by it.1*" 
............. ........ ........ .,1,1. . ..... ......... ......  ....... .
7. For analyses of the report see Marlow, the Seat of Pilote pp, 120-1 
Jeffries op-cit pp. 621-6. For Jewish elimination of the report 
see "The Statistical Bases of Sir John Hope Simpson's Report on 
Immigration Land Settlement and Development in Palestine. Tne 
Jewish Agency London May 1931. The Jews succeeded in this work to
k# the accuracy of these bases and so to raise doubts as to 
"scientific*, /alue" of the report.
8. Hope Simpson Report, p. 141.
9. Ibid. p. 153.
10. Ibid. pp. 138-9•
• Ibid. p. 143•11
110
Tug- f i r s t  o f  t h e s e  recommondations i n t r o d u c e d  Arab unemployment 
as  a d e c i s i v e  f a c t o r  i n  d e c i d i n g  p o l i c y  over  Jew is h  i m m ig r a t io n ,  w h i l e  
t h e  second con f irm ed  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  C o n t r o l  and l i m i t a t i o n  of  la nd  
t r a n s f e r s .
These recommendations t o g e t h e r  w i t h  Hope-Gimpson*s a s s e r t i o n  t h a t
122G.4 of nrah villagers were landless , (some of them as result of 
Zionist land policies and settlement), were most gratifying to the 
Arabs who since then used to point to the deport as justifying and 
endorsing their claims.
Actually, at the start of the enquiry, cue Arabs were suspicions of
its intentions, and some Arab papers criticised the Arab Executive for
meeting llope-Simpson on 24/5/20, asking v/hether this meeting was
13authorised by the Arab Delegation then in Loudon. But shortly
„ 14afterwards, the Arab press started to praise his rairuess and justice
When t h e  Arab d e l e g a t i o n  r e t u r n e d  from London he had a  v e r y  c o r d i a l
m e e tin g  w i t h  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  Arab E x e c u t i v e  Musa Kazem and w i t h
15
Jamal  a l  k u s s e i n i .
The latter accompanied him later on most of his visits to Arab 
villages. lie called also on the liufti at his office in the S.I1.C..
The report would have had some effect if his recommendations 
concerning development policy would have been put into effect. But
16
1 2 . I b i d  p . 2 6  al ,so p . 1 4 2
1 3 . Al J a n i a h - a 1 Arab biyy a 2 6 . 5 . 3 0  l i r . Y. F a r r a j ,  Amin Tornimi and
G a l i u  F a r a h , at tended,  t h i s  m e e t i n g .
1 4 . I b i d .  2 . 6 . 2 0 F a I c s t i n  6 . 6 . 3 0 .
1 5 . ¿-1 Jamran a l f . r abbiyya  G . 6 . 3 0 .
1 6 . k i c  i m p r e s s i o n s  of  t h e  l i u f t i  were r a t h e r  n e g a t i v e  - see  s u p r a  p .
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the huge sum involved (£6m - £8m) was "certainly much larger than anything
17the British Government was ready to put up" . As it was, nothing 
much came of it and the only real contribution of the report was in 
supplying the Arabs with good "scientific" arguments in their propaganda 
efforts.
Much more important was the Fassfield White Paper. It was based 
on and reflected the views and recommendations of 3 earlier documents. 
These were: The Shaw Report, the report of Sir John Hope-Simpson,
and the now famous despatch of the H.C. Lord Chancellor of 17th January 
1S30.18
The paper is roughly divided into 2 parts :
(a) "an exposition of the general principles which have to be taken 
into account as governing policy in Palestine, and the limiting 
conditions under which it must be carried out. 
and (b) Considerations of the "practical problems with which His
Majesty's Government are faced in Palestine".
I shall treat the second part first. The problems with which the 
White Paper dealt fall under the 3 heads :
1) Security
2) Constitutional development
3) Economic and Social Development *IS.
17. C.P. 301 (30) 15 Sep. 1930. The sum allocated to the Development 
Plan was reduced to £2.5m. and later to £250,000 only.
IS. Despatch 17.1.1930 C.P. 108 (30) C.O. 733/183/77050/B in this
despatch Chancellor submitted to the Colonial Secretary "his views 
as to the causes which led to the recent outbreaks in Palestine and... 
reconanendations as to the measures necessary to prevent their 
recurrence." Both the majority members of the Shaw Commission, and 
Hope-Simpson, were influenced to a very big extent by Chancellor, and 
the views and recommendations in their respective reports reflect 
almost totally those expressed in his despatch. See P. Ofer.
Op-Cit Chapters 5-8 pp.138-292. I shall not discuss the despatch in 
my work as it was secret at the time and could not therefore cause 
reactions among the Arabs. However it is very probable that Arab 
leaders were acquainted with most of the views which Chancellor 
expressed in this despatch.
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As for security the paper stated that adequate military forces
would be retained in Palestine, to ensure peace, order and good
20government, and that the recommendations of Mr. Dowbiggin were and 
will be carried out.
On Constitutional Development, the White Paper stated: "that the
time has arrived, for a further step in the direction of the grant 
to the people of Palestine of a measure of self-government compatible 
with the terms of the Mandate", and that "His Majesty’s Government 
accordingly intend to set up a Legislative Council generally on the 
lines indicated in the statement of British policy in Palestine issued 
by Mr. Churchill in June 1922."^
Under the head "Economic and Social development" the Paper 
considered the questions of Land, agricultural development and ¿¿emigration
and adopted almost word for word most of Hope-Simpson's estimates,
1 22 opinions and recommendations .
But as the British Government was not ready to provide all the 
necessary funds to carry out Hope-Simpson’s comprehensive development 
plan, it decided to commit itself only to a limited scheme, to be 
implemented over a long period of time, providing only for the resettlement 
of the dispossessed Arab families, so actually that part of the plan 
which would have facilitated settlement - and therefore immigration - 
of 20,000 Jewish families was left out. And though the White Paper does 
not state it openly, but only in an implied form, the Cabinet meeting 
which discussed these matters decided that "His Majesty's Government are ... 1920
19. Passfield White Paper p.12.
20. Sufra, see p.
21. Passfield White Paper p. 14.
22. Su£ra, see pp 109 - 110
19
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morally bound to see that provision is made for those Arab tenants
who have been dispossessed of their holdings, as a result of the manner
in which the Policy of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate has hitherto
been applied .... No financial obligation, however, of any kind rests
on the Government in regard to the settlement of Jews on the land for
23the purpose of the Jewish National Home".
Another omission in the White Paper, as compared to the equivalent
section in the Hope-Sirapson Report was that when it repeated the latter's
argument as to the connection between Arab unemployment and the rate
of immigration it made no reference to his view that the employment of
Jewish Capital, which would not otherwise be available, might justify
24the continued immigration of Jewish industrial labourers
The result was that the policy of the White Paper concerning control 
and limitatiori of immigration and Land transfers was even more favourable 
to the Arabs than the Hope-Simpson recommendations.
Much more harmful to the Jews was the first part of the Paper dealing 
with the general principles governing policy in Palestine.
It started by declaring the determination of the Government to pursue 
its policy without being moved by any pressures or threats.
It then expressed its full acceptance of the principle of "Dual 
Obligation" or "double Undertaking", which was presented by Chancellor 
in his despatch of 17.1.1930, stated in the Report of Shaw Commission 
and re-stated emphatically by the Prime-Minister in the House of Commons 
on the 3rd April 1930. Since then this principle became a fundamental 
basis of Britain's policy in Palestine. 234
23. Cabinet meeting £4/9/30 CAB 23/65 55(30) 6
24. Hope-Simpson Report, pp. 131-2.
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On the character of the Jewish national Hone and the position of
the Jewish Agency the White Paper based itself on Churchill's White Paper
of 1922, and likewise in re-affirming "economic absorptive capacity" as
the principle which should govern immigration. However, there were
25several deviations, from the principles as laid down in 1922, more in 
agreement with the new line because there was quite a difference between 
the two.
Churchill's White Paper laid stress on the growth and development of
the Jewish National Home, considering this development as a basic factor
in British policy towards Palestine. Passfield's White Paper was based
on the premise that the Jewish National Home had already reached the
size suited to serve British interests in Palestine and that further
development was not desirable. It therefore laid stress on the
limitations tq be imposed on its growth. This policy became later
known as the crystallization of the Yishuv.
The British Government actually endorsed - although never publicly
27disclosed - a recommendation by the 'Experts Committee' "that the 
time had come to declare that the settlement of Jews on the land for 
the purpose of the Jewish National Home must be regarded as completed". ° 25678
25. For the nature of these deviations see The Palestine White Paper
of Oct. 1930. Memorandum by L. Stein, Jewish Agency for Palestine 
London. Nov. 1930. See also Ofer. Qp-Cit. pp.296-9.
26. Yishuv - the Jewish population in Palestine,
27. This committee was appointed in Sept. 1930 to examine the financial 
aspects of Hope-Simpson's recommendations. He himself was a member 
of this committee.
28. C.P.309 (30) CAB 24/215. C. Sykes writes "on p.5. of the Passfield 
White Paper (Cmd 3692) it is suggested that the obligation to 
Zionism had been discharged by 1930, since under the Mandate the 
Jewish Community "has in fact its own national characteristics". 
Op-Cit note p.149.
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Furthermore, the White Paper ceased in fact to consider World 
Jewry as a "partner" to the Mandate and busied itself only with the 
Jewish Community living then in Palestine.
The Chancellor, summing up the Jewish opposition to Passfield's 
White Paper said : "I believe that the Jewish hostility to the White 
Paper was due.... mainly to the fact that the White Paper made it clear 
that the social, political and economic conditions of Palestine were 
such as to make it impossible for a Jewish National State to be 
established in Palestine within any period that can now be foreseen". 
"There is no doubt that when the Balfour Declaration was made, most 
Jews believed that it meant that Palestine would soon become a Jewish 
National State".^
This different approach towards the Jewish National Home expressed 
by the principle of "dual and equal obligation", constituted at the 
same time official recognition of the National rights of the Arabs 
of Palestine. From being "non-Jewish communities whose civil and 
religious rights had to be protected they became one section of the 
population in Palestine towards whom the Government had an obligation 
equal to that towards the Jews, the other section. And being the 
numerous section, and discovering that - after all - they did have 
powerful influential friends in the Mandatory power, they could hope 
that in future the obligation towards them would not only equal but would 
supersede the other one.
The Arabs rejoiced, not only because of the contents, but also because
of the tone of the White Paper which "suggested a more definite30inclination towards their side of the controversy", than had 2930
29. In a memorandum to the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
16.12.1931. C.O. 733/215/97050/9.
30. See Peel Report p.73.
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the Shaw and Kope-Simpson reports.
They received the White Paper with approval. They were less
jubilant than when welcoming the Shaw Report, as in the meantime the
negotiations which the delegation held in London failed. Still, on
the whole, their reaction was favourable. When first news of its
contents were published in Palestine, Mogannam Mogannam, one of the 3
joint secretaries, declared on the 22nd October on behalf of the
Arab Executive that it would comment on the White Paper only after
a "full study" of it, but that they noted that the Mandate and the
31Balfour Declaration were not abrogated.
Much more enthusiastic - and realistic was the daily "Falastin"
in its editorial. "We are happy with the White Paper. We see
before our eyes the last breath of the Balfour Declaration. Die,
oh declarationj die. We fought against the spirit of the declaration
32and not against its name, and we won.
We say to those who argue that the Legislative Council is the same one
we refused in 1922, that the political atmosphere changed, and now we
have new and better spirit. Now that our views and the Government
views are identical - as proven by the White Paper, which proclaims
our right - let us march forward together. Forward to work and labour,
33forward towards fulfilling the realisation of our aims".
The Mufti's paper "A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya" was more reserved and
stressed that the Arabs could not accept a legislative council which they
had refused 8 years earlier, but he welcomed the spirit of the document
34and all those parts which proved the justice of the Arab case. 3124
31. Falastin 23.10.1930
32. Ibid. My italics.
33. Ibid.
34. Al Jamiah al Arabbiyya 23.10.1930.
117
The significance of the interpretation given to the Uhite Paper
by the simple man in the street can be gathered from the fact that
several dozens of Christians in Haifa protested to the Government on
23.10.1930 against the policy of the Uhite Paper vàlidi "means a
33possibility of Arab dominance".
The Arab Executive in its meeting on 29.10.1930 decided not to hold
any demonstrations or strike on Balfour Day the 2nd November, "as the
36present conditions do not call for strikes". For the first time
since the liandate, Arab Palestine was quiet on that day. Tue Arab 
papers omitted their customary broad black borders and instead wTote 
positive articles about the Government. After the publication of 
the Uhite Paper, Arab press generally and "Falastin" specially maintained 
a moderate friendly line towards the British.
As late as the end of the year long after it became known that the
British Government had invited members of the Jewish Agency to confer
with then about the compatibility of some passages of the Uhite Paper
37with some articles of the Mandate, the Arab leader, ilaghcb liashashibi, 
when asked his opinion about the Unite Paper, answered, "I think that 
the Uhite Paper - if fulfilled - could serve as a positive basis for
the cooperation with the Government.
True, it does not grant us all our demands, but it makes it possible
38for us to achieve them gradually". 356*
35. It must be stressed, however, that at the time there was much 
tension between Moslems and Christians in Haifa following the 
Murder of J. Bahrj., A Christian journalist, Icould not locate these 
protests , but "Falastin" criticized then strongly. Gee Falastin 
24.10.1930.
36. Falastin 30.10.1930.
37. The Arab Executive protested about these negotiations . 15.11.30
Falastin 16.11.30
33 Falastin 31.12.1930
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The Mufti, who was asked the same question, failed to answer, but
years later he said this : "When the White Paper was published the Arabs
were not negative in their attitude. They welcomed it, accepted it,
3dand their attitude towards it was very positive.
Mashashibi's opinion reflected the thoughts of vide and growing
circles of the Arab Elite in Palestine.
A high ranking Government official reporting on Arab reactions to
the Unite Paper wrote, "While the moderate and pro-Government elements
among the Arabs considered that the policy announced in the Unite Paper
of 1920 did not fulfil all their aspirations, it satisfied them that
the Home Government was alive to their principal grievances and proposed
to rectify them. They were convinced that the White Paper contained
the unalterable policy of His Majesty's Government and that nothing vac
to be gained by, further agitation or pressure. They therefore felt
they could co-operate with the Government and were also able to persuade
many who had previously held aloof from politics, or who were not zealous
40extremists, to join their ranks".
The official Arab answer to the White Paper was a long memorandum 
written by Auni Abd A1 Iiadi.*^ It was discussed in a meeting of the 
Arab Executive and confirmed unanimously. It was forwarded to the
H.C., together with an un-dated covering letter, signed by Musa Kazim, 39*41
39. Iiaj Amin al Ilusseini Ila.qaiq Op-Git p.46.
40 • M. Bailey, the Administrative Officer, Mablus in a letter to the
Chief Secretary of the Palestine Government 11.3.31 C.O. 733/197/07050/2.
41.
42
A l  J a n i a h  a l  A r a b b iy y a  3 0 . 1 2 . 1 9 3 0 ,  2 . 1 . 1 9 3 1  
F a l a s t i n  2 9 / 1 2 / 1 9 3 0 .
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the president of the Arab Executive. He surlierised in it Arab 
demands as withdrawal of the Balfour Declaration, and the abolition 
of the Mandate, the establishment of a government for Palestine 
responsible to an elected Parliament, and prohibition of further 
immigration and land transfers. It also requested that copies of
43tnc memorandum be transmitted to the Permanent Mandates Commission. 
The memorandum was written before Macdonald’s letter to Dr. Weisma
/.
•i »
but after the negotiations between the British Government and Zionist
leaders had become known and had been protested against by the Arab
45Executive on 15tli llov. 1930. It can be safely assumed that but
for these negotiations the memorandum would have been far less critical 
of the White Paper.
However, it was more conciliatory in its tone than the covering 
letter, and perhaps most representations by the Executive. Though 
the memorandum maintained the Arab’s previous objection to the Balfour 
Declaration, it discussed the interpretation placed on it by the 
Government, which was rarely done before.
The memorandum tried to prove that both the British Government 
and the Palestine Government had failed to carry out the provisions 
of the Mandate relating to the safeguarding of the rights of the 
Arabs (i.e. non-Jewish communities). It then went on to say that the 435
43. The fact that the British Government and apparently the Palestine 
Government learned for the first time the contents of this letter 
through the press, moved Mr. Beckett from the Colonial Office to 
remark, "What can one do for such people". It could also be that 
this note concerns the contents of Musa Kasim's letter and not only 
the way by which he heard of it, because it was followed by another 
note of Shackburgh ’It is the old, old story. The Arabs have not 
budged an inch from their maximum demands’. 16.1.1931. C.O. 
733/197/87050/2.
44. See Chapter 9.
45. Al Jamiah al Arabbiyya 16/11/1930.
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policy laid down in the Unite Taper would not ensure the due observation 
of these provisions in the future.
Still the memorandum is so formulated as to indicate a certain 
willingness to cooperate with the Government should things develop 
right. At the same time, fearing the outcome of tne negotiations 
between tne Government and the Jews, the memorandum concludes; "The 
Unite Paper of October, 1930, does not contain anything new with regard 
to the political rights of the Arabs. The principles enunciated 
therein with regard to their economic and social rights do not ensure 
to the Arabs their national rigats and economic interests. The importance 
is not in enunciating principles, but in the execution of such principles'1.
The Memorandum reached the Colonial Office in London towards the 
end of January 1931. On 13th February Ur. Macdonald's letter to Dr. 
Ueiznann made it obsolete.
T h e r e  i s  a  c e r t a i n  a m b ig u i t y  -  p a r t l y  in t e n d e d  p e r h a p s  -  w it h  
r e g a r d  t o  t h e  M u f t i ' s  v ie w  o f  t h e  U h i t e  P a p e r .
Ue saw that following the publication of the Uhite Paper, Palestine
A r a b  p o l i t i c s  w as m a rk e d  b y  t h e  r i s i n g  i n f l u e n c e  o f  m o d e r a t io n • T h i s
process was very noticeable. Not only were Arab leaders ready to
cooperative with the Government, but it seems most probable that the
Arab Executive even considered holding a meeting with Dr. Ueizraann,
a n d  t h a t  t h i s  w as a g r e e d  t o  b y  -  am ong o t h e r s  -  t h e  m o d e ra te  M usa K a s im
46and non moderates Jamal Iiusseini and Auni Abd El Uadi.
At the time, the Mufti did not express himself clearly on the 
subject in public. But there are some indications that he too 46
46. C.O. 733/197/87050/2.
see also Reporter on Arab Affairs. Doar ilayora 21.3.31.
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was ¿or itioceration aud in favour of cooper«tion with the British in 
the execution of the policy of the White Paper,
JT e.' I.;
The Newspaper Al Jmi&h Ai Arabbiyy*« generally considered as hia
y  o i . ■ „<jci lije *
mouth-piece« main tatuca a. line oí passive approve l with regard to the
; , r « v .'t í í '¿m -  m  White Paper* ' - ■ i U ' b t
*
Lore indicative perhaps was the fact that two persons with vaoe
- - - - - i ■ • > d .
he was ia. close contact at the time preftct'.ed tao iierctiou •
One was the Indian Moslem leader Shavkat A ll, in Palestine for the
47 4bburial of his brother fiouaaad Alt , who in speeches and in tor views
advocated most strongly that the Arabs should cooperative with the
Government in fu lfilling  the policy announced in the White Paper. He
also said that when in London he had discussed Che Palestine problem
with Lord Passfiald who promised hi» taut there would not be any
meaningful ci/ange in tin» Whit« Paper •
The second one waa the Mufti** closest political ally» Jamal al
uussciai* vio after returning from London visited several places in
Palestine« where Ue said tout the Mandatory power favoured the Arabs«
that the White Paper would be fu lfilled« and that tne Arabs had to
49cooperate with the British.
This end his moderation towards the British during the neat 3-4 years 
compared with whet he said years later in his book Hagaitf« a ll
indicate that he at that tim was for ctoaeratlon.
But i f  lie wes for moderation he was against the rise into power
47. Strangely enough« the burial itse lf gave actually an impetus to
the opposite extreme line« as the funeral - unintentionally as it  
happens so often - turned into a demonstration.
4d. Falastin 7.2.1930.
49. In the Club of the Moslem Society in Haifa on U.1.30* In the
Municipality Bldg. Acre 17.1.30. In a school in Harareth 18.l,3u. 
See Faleatin ib.1.30 and 19.1.30.
uu. Supra p. ns.
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of his opponents the Moderate party, which undoubtedly would have 
followed the rising influence of moderation. He need not have 
worried for long, the publication of the Prime-Minister's letter to 
Dr. Ueizmann enabled again the extremists and extremism to regain 
their political prestige and the chance - perhaps the last one - of 
the moderate party to dominate Palestine Arab politics was over.
I
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Chapter 9
The Frime-IIinistcr Letter to Dr. Ueizmann.
Cn 13th Feb. 1931 the !rme Minister, Ur. 11. Macdonald, sent a latter 
to Dr. Ueizoann, the President of the Jewish Agency, on the policy of 
His Majesty's Government in Palestine. Among Arabs this document became 
commonly knowm as the "Black letter" .
The letter was published to the House of Commons as a written answer 
to a question*’ and not as a parliamentary paper, but it was communicated 
as an official document to the League of Nations and was embodied in a 
dispatch as an instruction to the British High Commissioner in Palestine.
In the first paragraph, the Prime Minister stated that the letter 
"will fall to be read as an authoritative interpretation of the Unite 
Paper on the matters with which this letter deals".
2But tne interpretation v7as such that as almost everybody has 
agreed since, the letter was in effect a complete repudiation of the 
policy laid down in the Unite Paper. 12
1. Hansard. Commons. Fifth Scries Vol. CCHLVIII Cols. 751-b
2. Notable exception was the Prime Minister. Uhen asked by tnc Pro- 
Arab, II.P. Ilovard-Bury vhether with the letter, "there has been 
a complete change of policy with regard to the Uhite Paper"? The 
Prime Minister, not listening or understanding exactly the question, 
anGW'crcd, "Yes, my Hon. and gallant friend may accept that 
assurance." Only when Col. Howard-Bury repeated and said, "There 
has been a complete change?" The Prime Minister answered: "I am 
sorry if I misheard the Hon. and gallant Member. There has been 
no change of policy." Official report of 12th Feb. 1931, for 
another exception see A. Toynbee in Survey of International Affairs 
1930 Uoyal Institute of International Affairs London 1931 the 
Feel Commission in Peel Report p.75, and all pronouncements by 
Government officials.
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The letter (a) 
undertaking to 
of Palestine".
"recognises that the untier taking of the Mandate ic an 
the Jewish people, and not only to the Jewish population 
(b) states that the Uhite Paper did not mean "that
existing economic conditions in Palestine saould be crystallised", and 
goes on to say, "on the contrary, the obligation to facilitate Jewish 
immigration and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land remains 
a positive obligation of the Mandate, and it can be fulfilled without 
prejudice to the rights and position of other sections of the population 
of Palestine, (c) declares "That the statement of Policy of liis Majesty'£ 
Government did not imply a prohibition of acquisition of additional land 
by Jews• It contains no such prohibition, nor is any such intended",
(d) "that his Majesty's Government did not prescribe, and do not 
contemplate, any stoppage or prohibition of Jewish immigration in any 
of its categories" and that "the practice of sanctioning a labour Schedule 
of wage-earning immigrants will continue" and (e) that in all the works 
or undertakings carried out or furthered by the Agency it shall be deemed 
a matter of principle that Jewish labour shall be employed".
Musa Kasim, summing up the Arab view of the letter wrote :
"In brief, Mr. Macdonald in his letter, overruled all the provisions of 
the Uhite Paper in favour of the Arabs as regards the immigration and land 
questions, and added thereto new provisions, which are in favour of the
Jews and prejudicial to the Arabs".'5
The * \rabs became uneasy from tue moment it was announced on 14 hov.
4 ■I'd30 "that doubts having been expressed as to the compatibility of some
3. In a memorandum to the Officer Administering the Palestine Government
on the lota Sept. 1931 in which the Arab Executive inform the Government 
of tucir rejection of tne Development Scheme, because it is based on 
the principles embodied in Mr. Macdonald's letter. This memorandum is 
the official Arab analyses of the Prime Minister's letter to Dr.Uei 
For a pro-Arab evaluation of the letter see Jeffires On-Cit pp.633-
• Already earlier, on 11.11.30, the Cnristian-Moslem Club of Jaffa cabled 
the d.C. cautioning the British Government against "a retreat from the 
Uhite Paper's policy" Falastin 12.11.30.
4
w o
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passages of the White Paper of the 20th October with certain articles of 
the Palestine Mandate, anti other passages having proved liable to luic- 
uaderstending - His Majesty's Government had invited members of the Jewish 
Agency to confer with then on these matters1'. On 15.11.1930 representative: 
of t:ie Arab haoentive met the High Commissioner and later cabled him 
expressing their wonder as to "why there is need for clarification of a 
very clear Unite Paper, and their worry lest these clarifications would turn
5out to be unfavourable to the Arabs" .
Although the Arabs did not look upon the negotiations with favour, it 
did not cause them alarm as they had been impressed by that portion of the 
White Paper and the statements made in Parliament and elsewhere that the 
Government voula not be susceptible to pressure brought to bear by Arabs or 
»J GV* S •
The debate on the Unite Paper in the House of Commons on 1C.11.1930, 
proved to them once again how much Parliamentary support for their opponents 
was stronger than any sympathy they could raise there. Hot only the 
majority of the Conservatives and the Liberals, including those on the front 
benches, but also a sizeable section of the Labour party itself opposed the 
policy of the Unite Paper°.
As the negotiations became more protracted and reports appeared in the 
press that Zionists had obtained seme concessions, a certain ¿'mount of 
uneasiness was apparent and the confidence in the Government was shaken.
5 .
o.
H a l a s t i n  1G.1 1 . 1 9 3 0  A1 J a n i a h  a l  Arabiyya 1 6 . 1 1 . 1 9 3 0 .  
were Musa Mazim, Y. F a r r c j ,  Auni Abd c l  Uadi ana Uoga
Those prosoul 
.m.m Mogaansae.
¿.s tn a  Government d e s i r e d  to  a v e r t  the danger  of  t u r n i n g  P a l e s t i n e  
a f f a i r s  i n t o  an i s s u e  o f  P a r t y  p o l i t i c s ,  t h i s  w id es prea d  o p p o s i t i o n  to  
time p o l i c y  of  t h e  U n i t e  Paper  was cue of  t u e  main r e a s o n s  which made 
t a e  Government s t a r t  t h e  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i t h  th e  Z i o n i s t s .  The o t h e r  
one had to  do w i t h  " i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i c y " .  dee l a c s f i e l d ' s  l e t t e r  to  
C h a n c e l l o r  o f  6 th  Feb .  1 9 3 1 .  " I  nave e x p l a i n e d  to  you b e f o r e  t h a t  we 
i c l t  bound, f o r  p o l i t i c a l  and i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e a s o n s ,  t o  c a t e r  upon 
t u e s e  d i s c u s s i o n s . "  C.Q. 7 3 3 / 1 9 7/G7C50/1.
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But even then Janal al llusseini in a speech before the Hosier's Association 
Club said on 15th Jan, 1931 that the white Paper would be fulfilled not­
withstanding; the Jews’ opposition and that he had learned in London that
7the Laudatory power favoured the nrabs • Baawkat Ali, who was then in
f')
Palestine, w-as speaking in a like manner . These voices though emanating
from influential leaders were in marked contrast to the growing suspicion
of the Arab Community• In mid December "Fainstin" the most pro-Britisn
Arab daily wrote in its editorial "Is the White Paper only a political game
aimed at nocking the Palestinian Arabs, the way Britain made fun lately
of tae Egyptiana and Iraqis ? Let the British know, the Palestinians
ocannot be mocked at". When the news reached Palestine of the Prime
Iiinistcr's letter, a wave of sorrow mimed with indignation, vaich later 
turned into anger, swept Arab Palestine, Part of it was nourished perhaps 
by the opposite expressions of satisfaction by Dr. Ueiemanu^ and the 
Jewish Community and Pro-Zionist press which heralded the letter as a 
Zionist victory.
’’Falastin”, perhaps in order to atone for its previous enthusiasm to 
Britain and the Unite Paper, came out with an editorial "Black interpretation 
of a Unite paper’’, in whicu it called for a "new period of ver against the
7. Falastin 16.1.1931.
C. Bee Cupra p. 121
oJ • Falastin 12.12.1930,
10. In his statement of 13 Feb. 1931. 
"This Statement of Policy (the I’.11' 
the basis for that cooperation with
Dr. Weiumaan eeelared: 
s letter) ... re-establisned 
tue Laudatory Fewer on vnicn
our policy is founded." new Judea Feb. 1931. London.
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British Government which the
. . 11
t n e y  u i c a "  .
£ >w* I l L> 0 • ily lead whenever and wherever
"Al-.:ay«f, the paper of the elements which later acre orgauised in the
"Istiqlai." ("Independence") party, wrote in an editorial - which was marked
by <...-»Li“->..iiiitic uu„nrtcaes ~ tact tte Edition Coverament, t ¿icing rinuaclti
c i  ioiw  ^ ¿a”'*w ri. ao w i .j 0 :1 , t i i t  *vOtiii j *i i  1 iag un^ a i l  ocae r  Jeuxsn
international financiers • "Al-llayut" aentionovl the resignations of the
Jewish loaders following the pub lie at ion of the Mhite Paper and demanded
that ail leavers of the Arab Executive ana the S.Ii.C. and all Arab judges
12and high ranking Government officials should resign their posts.
Protest meetingo were held in all toons and large villages. The central one
took place: in Jaffa, waerc Mogannani iiegannara, a joint secretary of the arab
Executive, said before a big croud "Ac Lave lost our faith in the British •
Nobody, not one soul in Arab Palestine and perhaps in ¿11 the nrab and
13tea Moslem worlds, believes now in England”•
The ncucrate elements lost all their influence, which was so apparent 
¿'.ftcr the publication of the White Paper and had to follow a mere extreme 
line. The moderate paper 'Mira'at al Gharq' wrote that "henceforth 
the Arabs should depend only on themselves, as British policy is intent 
on cstablishing the Jewish National Uorna."*^
The reaction following the Prime Minister's letter was particularly 
noticeable in the towns, but it also existed in the larger and more advanced 
villcigas.
There the fellaheen, whom tae Government was trying so herd to convince 123
11. Ealastin 15.2.1931.
12. Al-hayat 15.2.1931.
13. Palastin 17.2.1931.
. liiraat al Sharq 23.3.1931.14
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t h a t  i t  uas  t h e i r  i n t e r e s t s  a t  h e a r t ,  were l o s i n g  hope t h a t  any measures  
w hic h  were recommended by th e  r e c e n t  commissions f o r  t h e i r  immediate r e l i e f  
mould be a d o p t e d ,
TMe s i t u a t i o n  became t e n s e  and r a c i a l  a n i m o s i ty  had a g a i n  become a c u t e .  
The r e a c t i o n  of  th e  Arab l e a d e r s h i p  t o  t h i s  new and dangerous c h a l l e n g e  
to o k  th e  u s u a l  'method of  p r o t e s t i n g  t o  t h e  II,G.
Tne u r a b  E x e c u t i v e  \;as c a l l e d  f o r  an emergency meeting on 1 5 . 2 . 1 9 3 0 ,
v/hicli was c o n t i n u e d  on t h e  ne::t day,  fo l l o w i n g  which the y  w a i t e d  upon t h e
15
I l i g a  Commissioner  t o  p r e s e n t  a formal p r o t e s t  a s s e r t i n g  t h a t  th e  Prime 
m i n i s t e r ' s  l e t t e r  c o n s t i t u t e d  a new p o l i c y  of  the Government wliica was 
a b s o l u t e l y  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  p o l i c y  l a i d  down i n  the U h i t e  Paper  of  
O c to b e r  1 9 3 0 .  The main p o i n t s  i n  t h e  p r o t e s t  which was w r i t t e n  and s ig n ed  
by Auni Abd El  Uadi on b e h a l f  o f  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  llusa Kazim were : t h a t  th e  
Arab E x e c u t i v e  c o n s i d e r e d  t h a t  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r ' s  l e t t e r  c r e a t e d  new 
p r i n c i p l e s  and r i g h t s  c a l c u l a t e d  e x c l u s i v e l y  to  f u r t h e r  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  
o f  t h e  Jew is h  n a t i o n a l  Hone. They p r o t e s t e d  i n  p a r t i c u l a r  a g a i n s t  th e  
p r i n c i p l e  o f  g i v i n g  employment t o  Jew ish  labou r  on M unic ip al  and P u b lic
works i n  p r o p o r t i o n  to  J ew is h  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  t o  p u b l i c  r e v e n u e ,  i g n o r i n g  
a l l  t h e  r i g h t s  i n  such m a t t e r s  of  th e  overwhelming Arab m a j o r i t y .  They 
o b s e r v e d  w i t h  deep r e g r e t  t h a t  th e  p o l i c y  o f  th e  Government had been 
s u b j e c t e d  t o  c o n t i n u e d  and u n j u s t i f i a b l e  changes and v a c i l l a t i o n s  and t h a t  
t h e  Government v i o l a t e d  u n d e r t a k i n g s  g iv e n  i n  th e  U h i t e  P a n e r .  They 
c o n s i d e r e d  t h i s  development  as a v e ry  s e r i o u s  one,  as i t  would r e s u l t  in  
c r e a t i n g  a deep abyss  between t h e  Government and t h e  Arabs and would prompt 
t h e  Arabs to  l o s e  c o n f i d e n c e  i n  th e  Government. They s t a t e d  t h a t  th e  new
d e c l a r e d  p o l i c y  \:ould en ab le  t h e  Z i o n i s t s  t o  c o n t i n u e  t o  pu rch as e  a d d i t i o n a l  
l a n d s ,  and th e y  p r o t e s t e d  most s t r o n g l y  a g a i n s t  th e  " i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s "  made 
by Mr. Macdonald.  *
. F a l a s  t i n  1 7 . 2 . 1 9 3 1 .  P r e s e n t  were Musa Kazim, Y. F a r r a j ,  Auni Abd e -
H adi,  Jamal H u s s e i n !  and Mogannam Mogannam.
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They o b s e rv e d  t h a t  i u  uph old ing  th e  Jew is h  Agency * 3 r i g h t  t o  employ 
J e w i s h  l a b o u r  o n l y ,  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r ’ s l e t t e r  e n t i t l e d  them t c  b o y c o t t  
Arab l a b o u r ,  so t h e y  v o ulu  be compelled to  fo l l o w  the same p r i n c i p l e  and 
s t a u y  t n e  p r o p o s i t i o n  of  b o y c o t t i n g  t h e  Jews i n  a l l  m a t t e r s  by v i r t u e  of  
th e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  r e c i p r o c a t i o n . I n  c o n c l u s i o n  th ey  s a i d  t h a t  th e  l e t t e r  
uaa ruined,  any hop es ,  i f  tu ey  had c i l i a t e d ,  o f  any p o l i c y  of  c o o p e r a t i o n  
between Arabe and Jews and had mace tiie p o s s i b i l i t y  of  u n d e r s t a n d i n g  
between t h e  two p a r t i e s  c o m p le te ly  i m p o s s i b l e .
I n  tu e  l a s t  p a ra g ra p h  of  t h e  p r o t e s t  th ey  s a i d  t n a t  th ey  would le a v e
i t  to  t n e  i h i c c u t i v e  Committee o f  th e  Seven t a  Arab Congress  to  det ermine
t n e  l i n e s  o i  p o l i c y  which i t  n i g h t  c o n s i d e r  c o n s i s t e n t  w i th  th e  c o u n t r y ’ s
i n t e r e s t s  i n  v ie w  o f  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t* s  new p o l i c y ^ .  
ni . 1 7
r e p o r t  of  t h i s  amceing makes ver y i n t e r e s t i n g  r e a e y • I t  n uot  
nave been v e ry  p a i n f u l  to  a l l  i t s  p a r t i c i p a n t s .  The h ig h  Commissioner, 
b i r  J .  C h a n c e l l o r ,  who d id  peruap s  more th en  any o t h e r  per son  to  b r i n g  about  
t i i i s  change i n  b r i t i s h  p o l i c y  towards P a l e s t i n e  v k ic n  found i t s  e x p r e s s i o n  
i n  th e  U n i t e  Paper  s to o d  t n e r e  d i s a p p o i n t e d  and b i t t e r ,  having to  defend  
t h e  r e v i s e d  p o l i c y  which a c t u a l l y  s p e l t  th e  bankruptc y  o f  e v e r y t h i n g  which 
he had s t r i v e d  f o r  d u r in g  th e  p e r i o d  of  h i s  s e r v i c e  i n  P a l e s t i n e .  According
h i s  defer.: of  t h e  Prime m i n i s t e r ’ s l e t t e r  was v e r y  lame m d  when p r e s s e d
by Auni Abu h i  Audi he p r a c t i c a l l y  a d m i t t e d  t n a t  tn e  l e t t e r  constituted a 167*
1 6 .  For a f u l l  t e n t  o f  th e  p r o t e s t  s ec  C.O. 733/197/G7UOO/2.
1 7 .  Accord of  th e  me et ing w i th  th e  Arab E x e c u t iv e  a t  Government House, on 
Holiday, F e b r u a r y  1 6 t h  1931 a t  3 . 4 5  p . n .  I b i d .
1 0 .  A f t e r  me eting  Lord P a s s f i e l d  on 2 3 . 9 . 1 9 3 0 ,  one day b e f o r e  t h e  c a b i n e t
approved f i n a l l y  th e  p o l i c y  o f  the U h i t c  P ap er ,  C h a n c e l lo r  n o t e d ,  ’’Lord 
P a s c f i o l d  wished to  c o n g r a t u l a t e  me on havi ng bro u g h t  I l i s  M a j e s t y ’ s 
Government round to  my views as  r e g a r d s  f u t u r e  p o l i c y  i n  P a l e s t i n e -  
i t  was a g r e a t  achiev em en t” . J . C .  Lon 2o/MP 1 7 .
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r e v i s e d  p o l i c y
As f o r  te e  Arab l e a d e r s ,  one co uld  f e e l  t h e i r  g r i e f  and sor row,  t h e i r  
f r u s t r a t i o n  and t h e i r  h e l p l e s s n e s s  i n  th e  fa c e  of  t h e  new p o l i c y .  But 
t h e r e  was a owe t i l ing a d d i t i o n a l .  In  t h e i r  c a s e  to o ,  th e  me eting  pronounced 
t h e  b a n k r u p tc y  of  t h e i r  l e a d e r s h i p .  Very r e v e a l i n g  i n  t h a t  r e s p e c t  a r e  
t h e  wcrac of  Ilusa k a x l n ,  t h e  P r e s i d e n t  o f  t h e  E x e c u t i v e ,  who s a i d  " t h a t  
t h e y  ( t h e  l e a d e r s )  had now to  meet tiie p u b l i c ,  wnicu Lad had g r e a t  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
a s  t o  w.n.t t h e  B r i t  i s  ft Government would do f o r  them, and th ey  d id  n o t  knot; 
what  t o  say to  them. They co u ld  only  humble themselves  b e f o r e  t h e n " .
Y. B a r r a j ,  the d e p u t y -  P r e s i d e n t  of  the E x e c u tiv e  bctri;yed t h e  same worry 
ne s^tiu elicit ” t h e i r  ( t h e  l e a d e r s )  s i t u a t i o n  b e f o r e  t h e  p u b l i c  was net; 
p r e c a r i o u s  and a n x i o u s ” . . . . “ . And when Auni Abdel Uadi -  on b e h a l f  of  
lie so. KchiL; c excluded his p r o t e s t  with t h e  words,  ”1 must,  however, le ave  i t  
t o  t h e  Ik'.ecu Live Ccimaitcec . . .  to d e term in e  t h e  l i n e s  o f  p o l i c y ” . . . .  one 
wonders  w hether  i t  was of  c h o i c e  o r  r a t h e r  r e c o g n i t i o n  of  how much th e  
o f f i c e  of t h e  Arab e x e c u t i v e  and i t s  g e n e r a l l y  moderate p o l i c y  were c r i t i c i z e d  
and d i s c r e d i t e d .
Anan when th e  o f f i c e  of  t h e  Arab E xe c u t iv e  s to o d  d i s c r e d i t e d ,  t h e r e  
re m a in e d  only  cue n a t i o n a l  f i g u r e  t o  when th e  Arabs co uld  look f o r  d i r e c t i o n  
and lc u u e i  s m p .
a l r e a d y  on 1 5 th  F e b .  1531 I s s a  e l  I s s a ,  th e  e d i t o r  of  " F a l a s t i n "  -  
g e n e r a l l y  c o n s i d e r e d  th e  organ of  t h e  Arab E x e c u tiv e  a t  t h a t  time -  and 
h i m s e l f  n o t  s p e c i e  l l y  f r i e n d l y  to  th e  H a i t i ,  c a b l e d  to  t n e  l a t t e r  u r g i n g  him 
t o  c o n s u l t  Ghawknt m i i  and o t h e r s  in  o r d e r  to  p l a n  a u n i f i t e d  p o l i c y  f o r  th e
Arab and Hosiers c o unt ri c;  1920
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1 9 .  Auui Bey s a i d  lie b e l i e v e d  t h a t  h i s  E x c e l l e n c y  would a g r e e  t h a t  t h i s  l e t t e r  
l a i d  do\/n what was p r a c t i c a l l y  a new p o l i c y .  I ¿.1C j-i * vG e l l e n c y  observed  
t h a t  His m a j e s t y ' s  Government den ie d  t h a t ,  and he co u ld  n o t  a s s e n t  to  i t .  
I b i d  p . 5 .
2 0 .  I b i d  p . 2 .
2 1 .  I b i d  p .  7.
2 2 .  ” F a l a s t i n "  1 5 . 2 . 1 9 3 1 .
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fca tu« «ve oí «n i»j>ort«»t ««««afely oí tua Executive Cocaaiit«« u*id 
iii order to di*cu*« tu* iñri»* Kiaiatcr*« letter, tu* Huit!1« ?**>«*, Al J««uU.i 
*1 ¿TAbi^t, cao« out with * *cercUio¿ attack oa tim duocutiv«, fckiu# braafciiig 
tilt *.>oUtic*l truc* vhic;» Lad **i*t*d Ui i»t«r-***l«»tiai*a Avtb ¿olitic i
•lace Utrtljr hciort tu* Arab £*i***aU.o« veat to ia*M.au «  y©*r er •© «arlior*
_ 23I »  &a «tutorial «Sktitit* *Th* /o«itiou oí tim country» th« violati«»»,
• I  tú* wait* l'u a^r «nd tut 4 iy  oi u «  Arali l i i iu t lv »“ , tú* í»*¿>*r tru ie  
«unruly tuoa* miuioú i>l*«ííuú*'» &i ¿oou tidiog«" wuo bad tany uo¿?*» í r «  
tu* Hkit* ¿'«¿Htf ««mí yrtotktu wouaratiuu* Xu« oaly uso oí t i*  Khit* P«i>*r 
wt» «  n a t iv a  one iu tiM it  uecovercu t i*  truth* i',.« oatlou expected 
r««ulttt ¿earn tu« Executiv*'« u«u*t »«utiug» aod imi*«* túojr got tú«« they wer« 
cuU titl to cali ¿or au âtu Congre«* buamù oa uav fouadatloü* «a*i iww 
pregruu* *
" 24
Cent timing tbe attack in D t ItUowiaf it t t t t »  dit ptptr. w i l  »
"Tu* leadership oi tu« executive*e üíiice 1* a tvi«te~ ouc* Xt lacks 
ability «ad it  lack* eiaperieoc«, out i t  abeeud* with jealouai*« end 
couXiictô, i t  la a £ors»l iMiicriUÿi not * ru l ou«* It* «ejalocrauip 
i*  decl<-*<¿ according to periou*.! «ad locai U tor oat»« The Cxocutlve
cenai*u  oi ruai « r ic a i l i iU  and oí tuo«« «ho are not «o kwt tfjf to apporr 
au «ueu, tueraíore there 1« ao uaity mui cokftTOCC«. Th* Esecutiva «houle 
activate «uà direct the people* hut i t  i »  Lì* other «g f roanâ* the people
row, --y* ><** *» < **
wOeuUkmjHi ta <**. ^iVtaJLii^aC.«
Ami tuo iutintr couclut«t<i : "Me «le net <s.v«et a -c:. irua tka M N U > l y
23* ‘Ai JauitU al ’xtbiyya” 2?#2.iV31*
* ibid i.um .24
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b e c a u s e  we know hew u s e l e s s  th e  E x e c u t i v e  had become. A l l  i t s  d e c i s i o n s
r e m a in  on t h e  pap er  o n l y .  Let th e  E x e c u t iv e  wash i t s  hands from b ein g
o u r  l e a d e r s h i p  s i n c e  i t  i s  n o t  s u i t a b l e  f o r  t h a t . "
25
And i n  a t h i r d  a r t i c l e ,  the paper  blamed th e  h u e c u t i v e  f o r  P a l e s t i n e ' °  
d i s a s t e r ,  and a t t a c k e d  i t  f o r  i t s  p o l i c y  of  m o d e ra t io n ,  weakness and 
s e l f - a b a s e m e n t ,  and c r i t i c i s e d  i t  fo r  i t s  " p r o n i n i t y ” to th e  High Commiss ioner ' s 
P a l a c e .
Cn th e  same day i n  which t h i s  a r t i c l e  ap p e a re d ,  t h e  Arab E x ec u tiv e  
Committee had 3 m e e t i n g s . The f i r s t  one only d e a l t  x;ith th e  f i n a n c i a l
a f f a i r s  o f  th e  E x e c u t i v e .  The second one met a t  th e  a f t e r n o o n  under
t h e  p r e s i d e n c y  o f  l lusa k a a i n  and was a t t e n d e d  by 22 members.
Auni Abd a l  Had 
Pap er  and th e  Prime 
Though th e  s p e a k e r s  
i n  t h e i r  pr cnounccn
i  a n a l y s e d  th e  d i f f e r e n c e  between P e s s f i c l d ’ s U h i t e  
M i n i s t e r ' s  l e t t e r ,  and the n fo l lowed  a  g e n e r a l  d i s c u s s i o n  
-  i n c l u d i n g  t h e  n o d e r a t e  ones ,  -  were more extreme 
n u t s ,  th e  g e n e r a l  tone of  th e  me et ing  was n o t  s o .  The
e x t re m is m ,  as much as  i t  was e x p r e s s e d ,  was mainly d i r e c t e d  a g a i n s t  th e  
J e w s ,  w i t h  v e r y  l i t t l e  a g a i n s t  t h e  B r i t i s h .  The only  one who a t t a c k e d  
t h e n  was Sheikh Abdul Hader l l u r a f f a r ,  who demanded f a r  r e a c h i n g  d e c i s i o n s  
a s  t h e i r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  towards th e  Arab P a l e s t i n i a n s  was g r e a t .  He p r o p o s e s  :
a )  t h a t  a l l  lands  s o l d  to  Jews i n  P a l e s t i n e  s i n c e  t h e  war should r e v e r t  
t o  t h e  Arabs as t h e i r  purchas e  was i l l e g a l .
b )  A l l  Jew is h  immigrants  t o  P a l e s t i n e  s i n c e  a f t e r  t h e  war sh ould  be
c u p e l l e d .
mid c )  I n  c a s e  th e  Government s h o u ld  r e f u s e  t h e s e  demands, t h e  Arabs should
a b s t a i n  from paying ta n c s  and should d e c l a r e  a g e n e r a l  b o y c o t t  a g a i n s t  
th e  J e w s .
25 I b i d .  2 . 3 . 1 9 3 1
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by Y.
,2 7
a a r r n j  and at tain. .
p r  c sc. iice gave th e  me et ing
. 2 u
l a c k e f
I n s a  a l  I s s a ,  t h e  e d i t o r  of  " E a l a s t i n " , commented on th e  f a c t  t h a t  
o n l y  l e s s  th a n  h a l f  t n c  members a t t e n d e d  t h i s  m e e t in g ,  which was c o n s i d e r e d  
t o  be o f  p r i d e  im p o r ta n c e ,  and proposed to  hold  a t h i r d  m eet in g  and to  
i n v i t e  to  i t  t n a  members of  th e  London r e l e g a t i o n .  °
A c c o r d i n g l y ,  a t h i r d  me et ing  s t a r  t e e  a t  9 o ' c l o c k  a t  n i g h t  p r e s i c e d
oy ti,’.c Uufti ana ivcpiicj l»aSj..wtCixi.oi . oncir
s p e c i a l  importance  v h i c ^  o t h e r  meetings  u s u a l l y
‘ahe main i s s u e s  on which t u c  me eting was c a l l e d  t o  d ec id e  were :
a )  IIox; to  r e a c t  a g a i n s t  Jew is h  e f f o r t s  to  meet Arab l e a d e r s  fo r  
common m e etings * ”' ,  o r  what  was known as  th e  p o l i t i c a l  b o y c o t t  of  
th e  Jews and
b) The economic b o y c o t t  c f  t h e  J e w s • On each of  t h e s e  i s s u e s  th e  two 
l e a d e r s  ad o p ted  opposing s t a n d s .  On t h e  problem o f  me eting  th e  Jews,  
dagheb K a s h a s h i b i  s a i d ,  ~J "Suppose Ueicmann would come t o  P a l e s t i n e  and
s hould  meet him and l e a r n  h i s  v ie w s ,  what co uld  be th e  harm i n  t h a t  
u n l e s s  you w i l l  say t h a t  i t  w i l l  be a q u i e t  ad m iss io n  ( i n  th e  o r i g i n a l  
" s e c r e t " )  (on  our s i d e )  i n  t h e i r  ( i . c .  th e  Jews)  r i g h t s  i n  t h i s  c o u n t r y . "
w
2 6 tuc Haiti and Hagueb ilaskashibi as the otner delegation's 
rs were anyway members of the Executive Committee.
2 7 .  x '-I ivcl ziru l e f t  beca use  of  t i r e d n e s s .
Al Jamiah a l  A rab iyya  o f  4 / 3 / 1 9 3 1  took s p e c i a l  c a r e  t o  n o t e  t h a t  th e  
a tm o a^n ere  ¿it t h a t  me eting  was p l e a s a n t  and n i c e .  dome months l a t e r , 
th e  J a u i a h  Al Arab iyya  o f  2 2 / 1 0 / 1 9 3 1  h i n t e d  t h a t  the Government t r i e d  
to  i n t i m i d a t e  t h i s  me et ing  by sending a m i l i t a r y  a e r o p l a n e  over  t h e  
E x e c u t i v e ' s  b u i l d i n g ,  whose loud engin es  d i s t u r b e d  th e  d i s c u s s i o n s .
2 9 .  
30  •
3 1 .
Gee s u p ra  p .  190 - 1 9 2 .
For  r e c o r d  o f  the m e e t in g ,  as w e l l  as t h e  p r e v i o u s  2 m eet in gs  s ee  f i l e  
"Aeport  of  th e  Arab E x e c u t iv e  Committee meetings"  U o . 3 7 9 7 : 6 5  I . S . A .
The H a i t i ' s  paper  i n  an a r t i c l e  " t h e  n a t i o n a l i s t s  and t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  i n  
t h e i r  r e a l  c l o t h e s "  wrote  t h a t  Raghcb t l a c h a s h i b i  c o n t i n u e d  and s a i d  " I  
do n o t  a g r e e  t h a t  w hat  you say i s  enough to  b r i n g  us to  r e f u s e  nee t i n
Al Jami ah Al Arabiyya 2 2 . 1 0 . 1 S 3 1 .  II o such s e n t e n c e  a p p ea rs  mhir;
o f f i c i a l  r e c o r d  of  t h e  m e e t i n g .  There were a l s o  s e v e r a l  o t h e r  
d i f f e r e n c e s  between th e  two v e r s i o n s ,
to u
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U h i c a  i n  t a e  t h e n  c i r c u i t s t a n c e s  was no f a r  ao one co uld  e m p r e s s ' h i m s e l f
i n  f a v o u r  or  a ccr.ar.oii m e e t i n g .  On Cue problem of economic boycott*: ,
kaghcb Haohashibi mentioned t n a t  i t  was a c t u a l l y  he,  uno i n  th e  p a c t ,  was
t h e  f i r s t  to  propone suck a b o y c o t t .  b u t  i n  the p r e s e n t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  when
t h e  c o u n t r y  and th e  people  were n o t  re a d y  f o r  such a b o y c o t t ,  d e c l a r i n g  one
32
m oul t  c:u y  r e s u l t  i n  i t s  f a i l u r e ,  as happened to  t h e  p re v io u s  one.
The H a i t i  spoke tw ic e c u r i n g  tn e  m e e t i n g . The f i r s t  time he d e c l a r e d  
h i s  a cc ord  w i t h  t n e  Arab lk:ocutive~>'>, s a y i n g ,  "The Arab b n e c u t i v e  r e p r e s e n t s  
t n e  c o u n t r y *  Tut  members o f  t h e  d e l e g a t i o n  a r e  o nly  i n d i v i d u a l s  c o o p e r a t i n g  
w i t h  i t  axul £ollevying i t s  d i r e c t i o n s  • The l l u f t i  d id  n o t  touch a t  a l l  upon 
t n e  q u e s t i o n  of  meeting; tn e  Jews,  as i f  to  express tue  t o t a l  i n p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  nuca a m eet in g t a k i n g  p l a c e ,  b u t  on economic b o y c o t t  he  s a i d  :
"the- b o y c o t t  i s  one o f  th e  b a s t  m edic in es  to  our ma lady.  The re a s o n  v a i c h  
c a u s e d  th e  f a i l u r e  of  cu r  p r e v i o u s  b o y c o t t  was s h o r ta g e  o f  s u f f i c i e n t  
q u a n t i t i e s  o f  com modit ies ,  as w e l l  as  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  we did  n o t  c o n t a c t  our 
b r o t h e r s  i n  tn e  n e i g h b o u r i n g  c o u n t r i e s .  But th e  most im p o r t a n t  r e a s o n  f o r  
t h e  f a i l u r e  was laclc o f  f a i t h  i n  o u r s e l v e s .  M e  should spread  s e l f - c o n f l u e n c e  
among each, one o f  our  n a t i o n a l s  • However, l e t  n o t  our  p re v io u s  f a i l u r e  debar  
us from t r y i n g  a g a i n .  The a c u t e  f i n a n c i a l  p o s i t i o n  in  which we a r e  would 
be one of t h e  r e a s o n s  which would f a c i l i t a t e  th e  b o y c o t t .  Me. i n  t h i s  
c o u n t r y  a r c  v e r y  p o o r • I f  we c o n t i n u e  to  spend our  l i m i t e d  r e s o u r c e s  we 
s h a l l  c e r t a i n l y  go b ankrupt  and t h a t  means s e l l i n g  land s and s u c c e s s  of  th e  32
3 2 .  U h i l c  t a l k i n g  on th e  b o y c o t t  ne a l s o  s a i d ,  "from where s h a l l  wo buy our
no-, u.., r  ca. J y r  *u you say ,  w e i i ,  want d i e  Syr ¿.a uv or  v..o t o r  os t f t  
s o l d  th e  land whicii i t  owned i n  P a l e s t i n e  t o  t h e  Jews” • 3 7 3 7 : 6 3  1 . 3 . A.
To bo tu t u e  irait 1 eau ¿ruai ¿.su d  ..aux a m v e r u f ,  " t h o s e  who s o l e
la nd  to  t h e  Jews were S y r i a n  i n d i v i d u a l s ,  n o t  t h e  S y r i a n  p e o p l e .  They 
a l s o  rocmated u i s  i r o n y  when ne s a i e ,  "snow mu a d o t a  o f  n a t i o n a l  
p r o d u c t  auci promise to  wear i t " .  /.I Jamiah a l  Arabiyya 2 2 . 1 0 . 3 1 .
3 3 ,  TJiiile a t  t h e  same p e r i o d  his p a p e r ,  7.1 J a n i a h  a l  Arabiyya, was doing i t s  
b e s t  to  undermine t u e  L n c c a t i v e ’ s a u t h o r i t y  aim i n f l u e n c e .
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J e w i s h  n a t i o n a l  home. Ue t h e r e f o r e  have t o  c o n s i d e r  v ery  s e r i o u s l y  u s i n g  
ou r  p r o d u c t s ,  such as  th e  c l o t h  of  our cx m  m a n u f a c t u r e • I t  may be d i f f i c u l t
and i t  r.ay n o t  prove an immediate s u c c e s s ,  b u t  g r a d u a l l y  wo w i l l  succeed 
i n  w e a r in g  i t ,  and by t h a t  v;e w i l l  advance an im p o r ta n t  s to p  both  i n  th e  
b o y c o t t  o f  ti ie Jews and i n  p r o g r e s s  of  cur  ec onc uy. I  propose t h a t  the 
E x e c u t i v e  o f f i c e  f o r a  a committee of  e c o n c u i s t s  and c a v o r t s  to  s tu dy  v ery  
th o ro u g l i ly  a l l  t h e  a s p e c t s  of  t h i s  problem, and t h a t  t h i s  committee p r e p a r e  
a pii n  fo r  n a t i o n a l  p r o d u c t i o n .  I  a l s o  propose to f o r a  a committee of  
v o u c h to  a s s i s t  i n  t h e s e  n a t t e r s  and l o c a l  committees  i n  each of  our 
co rc n u n i t ic s  and w i t h  God’ s h e l p  we s h a l l  succ ee d” • S e v e r a l  sp e a k e rs  
s u p p o r t e d  K a s h a s h i b i ’ s o p in i o n  as  f a r  as  tn e  i m p r a c t i c a b i l i t y  of  th e  
b o y c o t t  and t h e  damage i t  may ca use t h e  A ra b s .  h u t  a l l  were a g a i n s t  n e e t i n g  
Ueinmrmn.
A f t e r  r e p e a t i n g  t h e  A r a b s ’ t r a d i t i o n a l  demands f o r  th e  a b r o g a t i o n  or  th e  
Mandate and t h e  B a l f o u r  D e c l a r a t i o n  th e  me et ing  dec id ed  :
" a )  To r e f u s e  c o m p le te ly  and t o t a l l y  any c o n t a c t s  w i th  t n e  J e w s •
To c onf ir m  t h e  p r o t e s t  o f  t h e  E x ec u tiv e  O f f i c e  to  tu e  11.G. a g a i n s t  
t h e  l e t t e r  o f  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r  to  Dr. U e i r u a n a .
To d e c l a r e  an a n t i - J e w i s h  b o y c o t t  and a p p ea l  to  tn e  ¿urnus to
enc ou ra ge and s u p p o r t  P a l e s t i n i a n  Arab p ro d u c ts  and e s p e c i a l l y
, , . 34
c l o t u m g .
d)  To e s t a b l i s h  an ’’Arab n a t i o n a l  Fund” ( t o  be d i r e c t e d  by Puau oaba )  
bas ed  on s mal l  p e r i o d i c a l  payments of  one-two Qurush.  (1/1G0 o f  £1 )  
The A r a b i c  p r e s s  e x p r e s s e d  i t s  d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  w i t h  the E x e c u tiv e  
Com m it tee’ s d e c i s i o n s  .
b)
c )
T h i s  had a c e r t a i n  e f f e c t .  The " n a t i o n a l  d r e s s ” movement s t a r t e d  to  
s p r e a d  from Gaea (Gaea and I l a j d a l  being t h e  c e n t r e  o f  th e  c l o t h i n g  
i n d u s t r y ) . The r e p o r t e r  o f  "The Times" w rote  t h a t  "The t a r b u s h  
was pushed out  by t h e  "more n a t i o n a l ” S i d a r a  or F a i s a l i y a ” , b u t  goes 
on to  say t h a t  "however, t h i s  d r e s s  re f o r m  r e c e i v e d  a f a t a l  check
when i t  t r a n s p i r e d  t h a t  t h e  C h ie f  i m p o r te r  o f  
n a t i o n a l i s t .  The Times 2 7 / 3 / 1 9 3 1 .
. rbusnes was a sound Arab
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A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya continued its attacks, saying that the meeting
was a failure and that the decisions taken were ordinary ones and did not
roatch the enormous challenge facing the Arabs. It mentioned sarcastically
the fact that less than 2 the members attended the meeting and remarked
that since there was no harmony among the Executive's members, the meeting
was marked by a spirit of weakness. It concluded by demanding the expulsion
°f the destructive and treasonable elements from the Executive Committee.
But even the papers who generally were more friendly to the Executive,
such as Al llayat, Mira'at al Sharq, and Al Carmel, criticised the decisions.
Al Carmel Said‘S  that the Arab people were tired with the policy of
delegations, petitions, protests and useless festivals.
Still, the decisions calling for an anti-Jewi3li boycott and for the
establishment of an "Arab National Fund" were welcomed.
Accordingly, the Executive Office published a declaration to the Arab
People asking them to abstain totally from any economic transactions with
the Jews. Jamal al Husseini who signed the declaration explained the
boycott thus: "The Arabs will sell to the Jews everything but land, and
37will not buy from the Jews anything but land." Some months later the
Arab Executive - on behalf of the Palestinian Arabs - published a manifesto
appealing to Arabs and Moslems all over the world to show their support
„ , „ 38co the Palestine cause by boycotting the Jews. *38
^3. Jamiah al Arabiyya 4.3.1931.
3b. Al Carmel 7.3.1931.
3?» Falastin 11.3.1931.
38. The manifesto was signed by Musa Kazim and appeared in all Arab
papers of 29.10.31 Al Jamiah al Arabiyya of 7.11.1931 in his editorial 
explained that the boycott should spread to all Arab countries and 
include their Jews as well.
35
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To reply to all the criticism directed against it, the Arab
Executive published a "Manifesto to the Noble Arab Nation" saying it
was very easy to criticise as it is easy to destroy, but that their aim
was to build. "It is our duty, we the Arab nation*,4 to strengthen the
ties of unity between us, to unite our ranks". The manifesto was a
dignified and proud document and its main theme was self-dependence.
"Before anything else, we should give up thinking of relying on H.M.G.
in defending our national and economic interest and entity .... Let
us depend for help upon ourselves and upon the Arab and Moslem world ...
Palestine is an Arab country and shall remain such". The manifesto
took special care to emphasize that the Arab people would fight the
39 •policy expressed in the Prime Minister's letter with lawful means 
The widespread reaction to the Executive Committee's decisions 
proves once again what is termed as the "negativism" of, the Arab 
National movement in Palestine. With the exception of a small group 
of extremists centered around Sheikh Muzaffar, whose proposals for 
civil disobedience were refused - with the Mufti's tacit agreement - 
none came forward with any positive proposals other than those agreed 
by the Executive. The papers and the critics demanded that "the 
Executive" should be less moderate and more active, that the Arabs 
should rise to the occasion and face the challenge etc. etc., but none 
kspecified what that meant in practice.
The Executive's resentment against the criticism directed against it 
to the effect that the Executive was using nothing but words with no 
real and substantial policy behind it, could well be understood because 
it applied as well to the critics themselves. They too used words 
with nothing real and substantial behind them. 39
39. My italics.
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There were, however, then other elements who thought of other means
than words. Their basic profession was violence, and at the time they
were outside the traditional circles of those who constituted the recognised
national movement. They professed the idea of "armed struggle" which
40in due course came to dominate political Arab action in Palestine.
The Prime Minister’s letter to Dr. Weizmann contributed perhaps more
than any other factor to re-direct the Arab national movement once again
towards its rendez-vous - several years hence - with violence.
On the Jewish side the effects of the policy of the Prime Minister's
letter were summed up by Dr. Weizmann thus: "It was under Macdonald's
letter to me, that the change came about in the Government's attitude,
and in the attitude of the Palestine administration which enabled us to
41make the magnificent gains of the ensuing years".
On the opposite side, the Arabs' reaction to the letter was the re­
start of the chain of events leading to the Anti-British disturbances of
October 1933 and the Arab revolt of 1936-39.
42As for the Mufti it was said that the disillusion caused by the 
Prime Minister's letter originated, or it at least accentuated, the 
change in his attitude towards the British. Basically it is so, but 
as future chapters of this work will show this change was slow, and it took 
several years - through which the Mufti cooperated with the H.C. more fully 
than ever before, for the change to be a complete one. There are even some 4012
40. See infra. Chapter 14.
41. In his autobiography Trial and Error p.415. However, even the letter did 
not succeed in restoring the amicable Jewish-British relations to what 
they had been in Plumer's time. Sykes. Op-Cit. pp.153.
42. By the Pro Arab writer N. Barbour Nisi Dominus London 1946 p. 130.
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h i n t s  p o i n t i n g  t o  th e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e ly  p e a c e f u l  Arab
r e c e p t i o n  of  t h e  k . M . ' s  l e t t e r  v a s ' c a u s e d  by a t a c i t  u n d e r s t a n d i n g
43
between t h e  a u t h o r i t i e s  and th e  H a i t i •
C h r i s t o p h e r  d ykes ,  i n  h i s  v e r y  i n f o r m a t i v e  book w r i t e s  : ‘' B r i t i s h
b e l i e f  i n  Haj-vaain1s m ode ra t ion  hel ped  oa th e  a t te m p t e d  B a s s f i e l d  p o l i c y
more t h a n  any o t h e r  s i n g l e  f a c t o r .  I f  the b e l i e f  vas  t r u e  t h e  p o l i c y
Ah
made some s e n s e ,  i f  n o t  i t  made n o n e " . ' dykes i s  v e ry  c l e a r  i n  h i s
s t a t e m e n t  t h a t  t h i s  b e l i e f  vas  based  on B r i t i s h  m is c o n c e p t i o n  of  th e  
H a i t i ' s  c h a r a c t e r .  He proves  h i s  o p in i o n  by f u t u r e  developments  and e v e n t s ,  
by t h e  H a i t i ' s  c o o p e r a t i o n  v i t a  th e  I Ias is  d u r in g  t h e  v a r  e t c .
But i n  h i s  e n t h u s i a s m  t o  b la cken  th e  H a i t i  Sykes i g n o r e s  t h e  f a c t  
t h a t  t h e  " P a s s f i e l d  p o l i c y  vas  n ev er  a c t u a l l y  a t t e m p t e d " ,  b u t  vas  r e p l a c e d  
by t h e  p o l i c y j o f  t h e  Prime M i n i s t e r ' s  l e t t e r .
One i s  tempted  to  s p e c u l a t e .  Had t h e  P a s s f i e I d  p o l i c y  r e a l l y  been 
a t t e m p t e d  and implemented would t i l l s  B r i t i s h  b e l i e f  i n  t h e  H a i t i ' s  
m o d e ra t i o n  have been proved wrong ? I f  wc ta ke i n t o  ac count  t h a t  a l th o u g h  
t h e  f a s s f i e i d  p o l i c y  vas  n o t  a t t e m p t e d  a t  a l l ,  t h e  M ufti  n e v e r t h e l e s s  
c o o p e r a t e d  w i t h  t h e  II.C. S i r  A. Uaucaope f o r  th e  n e a t  few y e a r s ,  one would 
f i n d  i t  d i f f i c u l t  to  say t h a t  t h e  b e l i e f  vas  wrong. 43
43. dee mtra p.
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Chapter 10«
The Wailing Wall Commission and its report.
In the aftermath of the disturbances of 1929, the report of the "Shaw 
Commission”, the Ilope-Simpson's enquiry, and Passfield's White Paper were 
all attempts to give recommendations and solutions for settling the 
political issues.
The Wailing Wall Commission, which was established on 14 January 
1930 by Ills Majesty's Government with the approval of the Council of the 
League of Nations ”to determine the rights and claims of Moslems and 
Jews in connection with the Western or Wailing Wall at Jerusalem", was 
supposed to settle the religious conflict over the Wailing Wall, which - 
as is generally agreed - was one of the main reasons, and the most direct 
one, for the outbreak of the disturbances.
The story of how "the removal of the screen, from the pavement in 
front of the Wailing Wall, on the Jewish Day of Atonement in’ September 
1928, was the beginning of a series of incidents" which led to the 
outbreak of the disturbances on 23.8 .1929 is told in the report of the 
'Shaw Commission'. *
The religious importance of the Wailing Wall - "Al-Buraq" in Arabic 
2- for Moslems in Palestine in particular and throughout all the world 
is well and widely known and it Is not for us to examine it here.
1. See Shaw Report (Report of the Commission on the Disturbances of 
August 1929 Cmd 3530) pp.153-5.
2. See Memorandum on the "Buraq" presented by the S.M.C. in Palestine
to the League of Nations, Geneva 17 February 1930. C.O. 733/179/77013. 
See also Aref el Aref (A1 Mufasal fi taarikh al Quds) the complete 
History of Jerusalem, 1961 Jerusalem, pp. 498-9.
See also G. Poliak "Jerusalem and the protection of the Holy Places 
in contemporary international politics*'1 2 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,’ 
London School of Economics and Political Science 1957) pp.81-2.
141
But it is important for our study, to note, that the Moslems feared
vhat they called "Jewish intentions to take possession of this holy place of
theirs". Jewish repudiation of such intentions did not convince them to
3the contrary, for they knew of several Jewish attempts to acquire the
pavement in front of the Wall, which belonged to the Waqf, by exchanging
it with some other plot. The S.M.C. in a memorandum submitted to Luke
in a protest against the introduction of the screen on the Day of Atonement,
stated that "having realised by bitter experience the unlimited greedy
aspirations of the Jews in this respect, Moslems believe that the Jews'
aim is to take possession of the Mosque of El-Aqsa gradually on the
pretence that it is the temple, by starting with the Western Wall of this
4place, which is an inseparable part of the Mosque of Al-Aqsa".
There is no doubt that the Mufti and his followers made much of
1the Wall incidents and succeeded in bringing a revival of nationalist 
feeling throughout the country. And the ways in which they exploited 
this religious issue to further their political ends and advance their 
position within the Movement \*ill be studied later, but it must be stated 
at this juncture that the Arabs' anxiety concerning the Wall was a genuine one 345
3. In 1899 by Baron Edmond de Rotschild and Nissim Bahar. See Memorandum 
by Bahar attached to Sokolov's latter to Kol. Kisch 19/6/30. London. 
Zionist archives S/25 File 2899. In 1911 see Zionist Archives S/25 
File 2911. In 1915-1916 see M. Assaf (Hitorret llaaravim Be'cy 
Uberichatam) Arab awakening in Palestine and their escape p.231 remark 
Ho. 953. In 1918 Dr. Ueizmann was ready to spend £75,000 and even more 
R. Storrs, Orientations London 1937 pp. 406-7. Further attempts were 
made later. As Waqf property may not be sold, plots of land were 
exchanged. This practice known as "Istibdal" was quite common.
4. October 8th 1928. Quoted in the Shaw Commission Report Cnd 3530 pp.31-2.
5. See A Survey of Palestine I p.23.
See also Darwaza op-cit p.63.
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The Arabs' view that it was the Jews - and not themselves - who 
turned this religious issue into a political one and that the Jews were 
to blame for causing the difficulties over the Wailing Wall, was shared 
by the Government of Palestine. In one of his despatches after the 
"screen incident", Luke wrote "Here it will be well if I point out that 
Jewish public opinion in Palestine has quite definitely removed the matter 
from the purely religious orbit and made it a political and racial 
question. Jews who have made no point of practising their faith have 
been as loud in their protests as the most orthodox". Writing after 
the disturbances Chancellor said "there is evidence to show that the 
Jews, realising the need for arousing interest in the National Home 
among the Jews in the world and the need for a rallying cry to stimulate 
subscriptions, deliberately seized upon the Wailing Wall incident of 
a year ago,'and worked it for all it was worth, and converted the
•7religious question into a political one." The Shaw Commission trying
'to select - out of a series of events - an incident, which in their 
view was more than any other single incident, an immediate cause of 
the outbreak' selected the Jewish demonstration which took place at
O
the Wailing Wall on the 15th August 1929.
And Arab apologists have hinted since that there was a political 
motive for this demonstration i.e. "it may have been designed to produce
such disorders indicating that the country was unprepared for self-
hgovernment" 678
6. To the Colonial Secretary Amery 13.10.1928 C.O. 733/160/57540.
7. In a letter to his son, Christopher 30.9.1929. J.C. Box 16/3.
A similar claim is made by R. John and S. Hadawi The Palestine Diary 1914 
1945 Beirut 1970 pp. 199-200.
8. Shaw R-eport p. 155. Though they go on to state "that the acting 
members of the Palestine Zionist Executive were in no way responsible 
for and in fact opposed that demonstration".
John and Iladawi op.cit p.207.9.
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It nay be argued that both Luke and Chancellor were not totally
objective. Because had they blamed the Moslem leadership for inflaming
the Wailing Wall dispute, they would have admitted indirectly that the
Government was responsible for doing so little to contain the dispute.
However, by putting the blame on the Jews they absolved the Government from
this responsibility. And as for the Shaw Commission, it has been
established since that they were influenced by Chancellor to a great extent.
Still it is a fact that the Administration joined the Arabs in putting
the blame for the Wailing Wall dispute on the Jews.
Having stated this, let us now examine what were the considerations
of the Mufti. He was experienced in exploiting the Wailing Wall
problem for his benefit. Already in 1921, during the campaign for the
election of a net? Mufti of Jerusalem (which ended in his appointment to
the post), the Ilusscinis used the Wailing Wall as a means of assuring
the election of their candidate. They claimed that if one'of their
opponents were elected he "would assist the Jews by selling to them Waqf
property and particularly the Waqf of Abu-liidian which included the
Western Wall .... he w^ ould hand over to the Jews the Dome of the Rock and
.1 10the Aqsa Mosque so that they might pull them down and rebuild the Temple •
In 1922 the S.li.C. - with the Mufti as its president - was established. 
Increasing the importance of Jerusalem in the Moslem World, and repairing 
and promoting the two big mosques of Jerusalem became two basic elements 
of its policy and defending the Wailing Wall from Jewish encroachments 
became its battle cry.
10. A notice posted on 19/4/1921 in the old City of Jerusalem entitled 
"Wake up Moslems, the Jews are interfering in the election of the 
Mufti." see C.S. file 245 I.S.A.
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According to two decrees issued in 1840 and 1911, the Jews were
prohibited from using certain appurtenances at the wall. By various
means (mainly money) the Jews - during the last years of Ottoman rule
- succeeded in getting some concessions. These were not official, but
were tolerated. The British, after their occupation of Palestine
adopted^ - in regard to the Holy places - the Ottoman formula of the
Status Quo. During the first years after the war the Jews continued to
12bring to the Wall benches and other appurtenances , but once the S.M.C.
came into existence, it demanded that only the practices which were
recognized officially by the Ottoman regime should be allowed but not
the tolerated ones. The Jews objected and the dispute began.
This dispute enabled the S.M.C. to present itself as the defender
of the Moslem Holy places. A picture of the Dome of the Rock and above
13it the Shield of David served their purpose in proving the Jewish 
designs on the Dome. The delegates of the S.ll.C. to the Moslem countries 
used this picture again and again in their efforts to get support.
The years 1924-28 were comparatively quiet in Palestine. The Arabs 
were busy in their own conflicts (the S.M.C.'s followers against its 
opposition) and as a result the Wall dispute was in abeyance as well. 1234
11. General Allenby's first proclamation in Jerusalem 9/12/1917.
12. It must be remembered that Karon 1 al Ilusseini, the llufti at the 
time and Haj Amin's predecessor was tolerant and showed moderation 
towards the British and the Jews.
13. All Jewish explanations that the picture served as an ornament or 
for the purpose of collecting money abroad were of no avail. The 
Mufti himself made use of this picture in his evidence before the
Shaw Commission. Shaw Commission Evidence pp.496-7.
14. Even during these years the Jews renewed their efforts to acquire 
the area in front of the Wall, but could not raise the money.
See Zionist Archives S/25 File 748. Frumkin pp. 279-276opCit
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After the screen Incident on the Day of Atonement in September 1928,
Mr • Amery, the Colonial Secretary, presented to Parliament a Memorandum
15(published as a White paper) on the Western Wall in Jerusalem , in which
the British Government set out the main facts of the dispute and defined
the Status Quo as it understood it.
On the whole, this White Paper was more favourable to the Arabs'
stand and they were satisfied with it. But as it defined the Status Quo
only in general terms and did not specify exactly what appurtenances the
Jews could bring to the Wall, the difficulties remained.
The screen incident also gave the Mufti an opening he was looking
for. If the Jews were going to conver the religious issue into a
political one, he too could do it, and even better. Thus started the
famous series of events leading to the outbreak of the disturbances in
August 1929 with the Mufti playing the leading role. Though the Shaw
Commission concluded that the Mufti "had no intention of utilising the
religious campaign over the Wailing Wall as the means of inciting disorder"
it is now generally agreed that this was so. Even at the time Mr. Snell
disagreed with his colleagues on the Commission and stated that the Mufti
"must bear the blame for his failure to make any effort to control the
character of an agitation conducted in the name of a religion of which
17in Palestine he was the head".
More definite was Mr. Williams of the Colonial Office, who wrote,
"I think I may say that it is our private opinion in the office that the 
Mufti and soma of his supporters were probably very much more responsible 1567
15. Cmd 3229. Kis Majesty's Stationery Office London 1928. Published
in Palestine in the Palestine Gazette 11/12/1928.
16. Shaw E.eport p. 158.
17. Ibid p. 172.
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for sons of the deplorable incidents which have occurred in Palestine 
than the majority of the Shaw Coinaission appear to think, and such
intelligence information as we have had since the outbreak has tended to 
confirm this impression,"17 18920
We have also the addssion of Xzzat Darwaza - who was employed by
the S.K.C. as director of At/kaf - about "those who initiated the rising
18fron behind the sconas".
loliowing the disturbarxes, in which the Wall played such a 
conspicuous part, Chancellor pressed for "appointment of a commission 
under Article 14 of the Mandate, terms of reference of which should be 
confined to studying, defining and determining rights and claims of Moslem
t aend Jews in connection with the Wailing Wall". A similar recommendation
2qwas included in the Shaw Report end on 14 January 1330 the Wailing Wall
21Commission vafj appointed . While the Jews welcomed the Cararaission,
the Moslems declared that they did not recognise the competence of any body,
22except a Sharia court to settle a question about a Moslem Holy Place*
17. In a minute 26.4.1930 C.O. 733/133/77050 B.
18. Izzat Darwaza. (Ravi al Rarka al Arayiyya al Iladiha) Concerning the 
Moslem Arab movement. 1950 p. 86 My italics.
19. Telegram to Colonial Secretary 4/3/1929 App ll.C.P.241 (2) CAB 24/205
20. Shaw Report p. 166, Actually this was done even before the report 
vas published. See letter by T.I.K. Loyd, the Commission’s Secretary 
to the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies 20/12/1529 C.O. 
733/177/67492.
21. Because of the opposition of the Catholic Powers, the appointment was 
under article 13 of the Mandate which facilitated the limited enquiry of 
the Wailing Wail issue alone, and not under article 14, which would 
have meant a wider enquiry on the Holy Places in general.
22. Wailing Wall Commission Report, p. 19 see also Esco II, p.614.
147
However, before the Comission was appointed, Chancelier issued on
23the 1st Oct, 1929 instructions regulating the use of and conduct at 
the Uall by both Jews end Ko siens* These instructions acknowledged the 
Jews* right of access to the Vail and specified the appurtenances to be 
allowed there. Both Arabs and Jews shoved much resentment to these 
instructions. The Moslems complained that these instructions constituted 
a violation of the ’’existing rights” as stated in the 1920 White Paper 
regarding the Wailing Wall, On 0,10.29 the Kufti delivered a protest
to the II,C. saying that "the S.H.C. cannot bear any responsibility for
* 24the Moslems who cannot find it possible to accept thi3 violation”•
Eut the II,G • was firm. Describing their meeting Chancellor \rrites that 
the Kufti "threatened that disturbances would occur if the instructions 
were enforced. I told him that X had approved of the regulations after 
careful thought ... I also told him that I had no intention of altering 
a word of the regulations, and that I would hold him responsible for 
seeing that order vas preserved during the ceremonies at the Wall .... 
Before no left me, I took the opportunity of asking the Haiti if he 
liked a hot climate. The significance of the enquiry was not lost upon 
him."23
The Executive met on 13.10.29 and decided there would be complete
end peaceful stoppage of work, on the luth Oct. 1929 by Arabs all over
26the country as a protest against these instructions. 23456
23. For full tent of the instructions sec Shaw Evidence II Exhibit 41, 
pp. 1047-8.
24. "Al Jamiah el Arabiyya" 9.10.29.
25. Chancellor's typescript for Kcmoirs section on the Wailing Wall.
J .0• Box 18/2. See also p. 80.
26. "Ai Jamiah al Arabiyya" 14.10.29.
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The timing of the publication of these instructions is interesting.^ 
In a communique which was published on 10.10.1929 the H.C. stated that 
the "instructions are of a temporary character .... and will remain in 
force only pending the determination of existing rights by an authoritative 
body which "he” has requested the Secretary of State to cause to be 
constituted”.
By making his proposal - to appoint the Wall Commission - public, 
the II .C. forced the British Government - which was very reluctant
90
to do so - to back him up.
The Moslems, too, opposed the appointment of the Wailing Wall
Commission and were speaking of boycotting it. Their view was that
the Wailing Wall was their property and they resented the interference
of foreigners in regard to Moslem Holy places. Furthermore, they claimed
that the White Paper of 1928 had already dealt with the problem - and
demanded that it should be implemented. The most clamorous paper
expressing this extreme line and calling for boycott of the Wall Commission
29was "A1 Jamiah el Arabiyya" , the mouthpiece of the Mufti. 2789
27. The delay in their publication was criticised by the P.M.C., which 
stated that "had regulations been issued earlier ..... many 
incidents would have been avoided. The dangerous excitement to 
which they led was kept at high pitch until the eve of the 
disturbances". Summary of the Report of the P.M.C. 17th 
Extraordinary Session.
28. The first reaction to his telegram of the 4th Sept. 1929 in
which he proposed such appointment was very cool. Shuckburgh informed 
him that his proposal "was raising a good many difficult questions" 
and that he does "not feel .... that it will be found practicable" • 
(Private letter 12.9.1929. J.C. Box 16/4). After his communique 
the Colonial Office found itself "committed to a commission of some 
kind" since the II.C. "would be placed in an awkward position if he 
had to announce that his proposal had not been approved". The 
Colonial Office in a Memorandum to the Cabinet 8.11.1929. CP. 309(29) 
CAB 24/206.
29. See "Jamiah A1 Arabiyya" 19/5/30.
But as for the Mufti himself, though he spoke and acted in accordance with 
the general Moslem line, one gets the impression - from close examination 
of the Mufti's pronouncements, that his opposition was less than that of his 
followers. Not perhaps in the natter of principle i.e. that only Sharia 
Court can settle a question on Moslem Iloly places - but on the practical 
question of boycotting or not boycotting the Uall Commission. Maybe it 
was because he realized how adamant the II.C. was about the Uall Commission 
and he did not want to antagonise him, or perhaps because he knew that 
the Commission would come anyway. But there is another explanation.
The Mufti recognised how much the Uall dispute contributed to his 
emergence as the most important Palestinian Arab leader. The dispute 
emphasized the religious aspects of the national struggle against Zionism. 
The Uall became a real and concrete object which the Arab people had 
to defend, and which meant to them and was understood by then much more 
than the abstract national slogans put forward by the Executive. And it
was the Mufti who represented this fight to the Moslems and was its 
symbol. And if the 1929 disturbances reactivated the national movement 
and placed him on the throne of local Arab leadership to continue the 
struggle before an international forum could canalise and organise the 
widespread sympathy for the Palestine Arab cause which was manifested in 
the neighbouring Arab and Moslem countries, and at the same time advance 
his fame and strengthen his position.
It can be safely assumed that already at this juncture the Mufti 
was thinking of the Moslem delegations which would come to assist the 
SJI.C. in presenting their case before the Uall Commission and of the 
Islamic Congress which net in Jerusalem towards the end of 1931. As he 
was also thinking of the possibility of using the Commission's coming in 
inter-Palestinian Arab politics and with regard to his relations with
the Government
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3ûAt a meeting with the II.C. on 28.10.1930 , he proposed that the
Wailing Wall Commission should come only after the Arab delegation had
returned from London, so as not to interfere with the delegation's work.
After their return with - as he hoped - a certain agreement reached in
London, the atmosphere would then be better and the population quieter
and a solution of the Wailing Wall question would be found easier.
He also expressed his sorrow that the members of the Commission were not
British, because the Moslems believed in Eritish Judges and British justice
and because British members of the Commission would think of their
Government's reputation and their large Moslem interests, while other
judges would be affected by Jewish influence which was very strong
31throughout the world.
Thinking of his position in the Moslem World, if something were to
go wrong - he went on to say that the S.M.C. was preparing a memorandum
!
addressed to the League of Nations regarding the Wailing Wall Commission,
which would show the importance of the Wailing Wall in the eyes of
Moslems. So that if they were displeased with the decision of the
32Commission they would be excused before the Moslem World, 3012
30. C.O. 733/179/77013. II. Musa Kasim, the President of the Executive
and Ilagheb Nashashibi, the Mayor of Jerusalem, participated in that 
meeting as well, but it was the Mufti who did most of the talking.
31. Several days earlier on the 24th Jan. 1930 the Mufti told Ruhi Abd 
El Uadi of the Government's Secretariat that he hoped no French
or Italians would be appointed as these nations had interests in 
Palestine and their representatives would intrigue. He went on 
to say that the Jews could bribe French or Italian members of 
the Commission. Ibid.
32. My italics.
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It is important to note that the II.C. tried his best to impress upon 
the Mufti the limited scope of the inquiry saying that "this Commission 
had only to deal with comparatively small issues .... and only to decide 
what actually were existing rights. That the Wall and pavement were 
admittedly lloslcm property and there was no question of deciding to 
whom the Uall belonged or of the Jews being granted new rights or of the 
Moslem Iloly places being put under foreigners as some Moslems seemed to fear.” 
The Memorandum to the League of nations was sent through the Palestine 
Government on 17.2.1930*'' * Tne S.H.C. lodged in it their protest 
against tne League's resolution to appoint the Commission but did not hint 
of any boycott, on the contrary one could read between the lines that the 
Moslem side would appear before the Commission. However the League's 
attention was drawn to the fact "that lioslem3, in no circumstances, will 
accept any such settlement or interference which they consider as an 
infringement of their established rights".
The protest also said that "any reference to the rights and claims 
of Jews in this Moslem holy Place is in itself,notwithstanding our 
non-recognition thereof, a serious infringement of the rights of Moslems" .
We have seen above that the question of the Uall Commission got 
intermixed with that of the delegation to London. Those of the opposition 
elements who objected to the delegation in general, and to the Mufti's 
membership of it in particular, used the Wall Commission's coning as an 
argument, and claimed that it would be much better and befitting if the Mufti 3
33. For a full text see C.O. 733/179/77013. II
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who was the president of the S.M.C., should stay in Palestine and prepare 
the Moslem. case before the Uall Commission and organise delegations to 
Arab and Uoslen countries and not go to London.^
This same argument was held in reserve by the Mufti himself, if he 
should decide - for one reason or another - not to go to London. And 
the Government, fearing that he would make trouble if he stayed alone in 
Jerusalem, pressed for delay in the Commission’s arrival, until after 
the delegation's return, so as to deprive the Hufti of an encuse to remain 
behind.
Accordingly, the Uall Commission reached Jerusalem only on 19.6.30. 
They stayed in Palestine for a month, during which they held 23 meetings 
and visited and studied the various sites and other circumstances bearing 
on the dispute. Each side had a set of authorised and recognized 
representatives to act as Counsel. The 3.11.C. authorised a battery of 
lawyers and Sheikhs, headed by Auni Abd A1 Uadi and Ahmad Zaki Pasha 
from Egypt, who represented Moslems from practically every country in 
the world with a Moslem p o p u l a t i o n T h e  Moslem side repeated its 
well-known arguments and based its case on the decisions of 1G40 and 1911. 
Uith regard to the legal status of the area in dispute, they referred to 
the registers of the Sharia Court in Jerusalem and especially to Uaqf 
documents.
36Tha Commission left Palestine on 19.7.1930 after concluding their 
work there, Before leaving the Commission tried to bring about a friendly 
settlement between the parties. 3456
34. A1 Karma1 11.2.1930.
35. For full details of the proceedings, witnesses etc. see Mailing Uall 
Commission import. Uith Moslem population.
36. They were seen off by’ the Mufti. The day being Saturday, there were 
no Jewish representatives•
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At the closing meeting the Chairman emphasized that an agreed solution
would be very much preferable to a verdict, and promised that the Commission
would hold the door open until the 1 September for proposattsi and arguments
from the parties directed towards that end.
During the sittings, and actually all through the controversy, the
Palestinian Christians showed their solidarity with the Moslems. Even
those Christian papers which were very anti-Mufti identified themselves
with the cause, and contended that the dispute was not a religious, but
a national issue which concerned the Christians as well as the Moslems of
Palestine, and called on the Christians to support - with all their strength
, 37their brothers, the Moslems, until justice should be achieved.
Outside Palestine, Moslem interest and support was forthcoming and
British representatives reported being approached with enquiries, protests 
38etc. ,
The negotiations to achieve an agreed solution continued, directed 
by Sir Spencer Davis.  ^ No agreement was reached by the 1 September, 
but the negotiations showed progress so the Uall Commission - in response 
to a request by the Government - extended the delay until 15 Sept. A 
second delay until the 8th of October was given as the Moslem authorities 
in Palestine wanted to consult Moslem representatives from Syria, Iraq and 
Egypt who appeared before the Commission. It seems however that the 
decision was left in the hands of the Palestinian Moslems. 3789
37. "A1 Carmel" 25.6.30 "Mira't el Sharq" 27.6.30.
38. See letter from British Consul in Dauiascus to the Foreign Secretary,
A. Henderson, 21.6.1930 C.O. 733/179/77013. II.
39. The Treasurer of the Palestine Government who in the absence of the 
H.C. and the Chief Secretary was the Officer administering the Palestine 
Government at the time that his mediation started.
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Doth the Jews and the Government preferred an agreement between the
two sides to a decision by the Wall Commission. The Jews were ready to
40concede on several points, (mainly in form but not in substance. Still 
these concessions met lioslem religious objections). After long and weary
discussions - with each of the parties alone - Sir Spencer Davis prepared
, 41a craft agreement.
Tue llufti opposed the draft agreement, saying he could not agree 
to a section in the preamble of the agreement, stating that the Jewish 
Community have a right of access to the pavement in front of the Uall for 
the purposes of their devotions. (This formula was already a Jewish
concession. Their original one was that ’’they have a right of access" 
for the purposes of praying). lie was supported only by Amin el Tamimi, 
another member of the S.ll.C. The three other members were inclined to 
accept the draft agreement and especially Amin Abd al-lladi who was entirely 
in favour of it.
The decisive meeting between representatives of the Government and
42the S.1I.C. was held on the 5th Oct. 1930 401
40. See F.1I, Kisch Palestine Diary. London 1938 pp. 334-335. Describing 
the proposed settlement Kisch wrote, "The lloslems intend to make the 
pill as unpleasant as possible for us to swallow. It is, however, 
worth taking a good deal of medicine.
41. For full particulars of the discussions see llemorandum on discussions 
with the parties with a view to voluntary settlement of the Western 
(Wailing) Wall dispute, prepared by Sir Spencer Davis 10.10.1930.
See also letter from C.S. to S.ll.C. 10.9.30. liemorandum from S.H.C. 
to C.S. 14.9.30. Letter from C.S. to S.M.C. 9.10.30 memorandum from 
S.ll.C. to C.S. 15.10.30 C.O. 733/179/77013 V.
. Present were the II.C. the Chief Secretary, Sir Spencer Davis, and 
on behalf of the S.ll.C. the llufti, A.min Abd A1 Kadi, Amin al Tamimi, 
and Abdul Rahman Taji with Ruhi Abd Al Uadi to interpret. Ibid.
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The II .C. explained to the members of the S.ll.C. that he did not desire 
to coerce then in a matter affecting their religion, but he tried to
impress them again and again with the advantages of agreement and to 
overcome their hesitations and reservations. lie explained that the 
proposed settlement would be eminently advantageous to the lloslems, in 
as much as it ruled out many things which were desired by the Jews and 
opposed by the lloslems, and which had actually been allowed by himself 
in his instructions of 1.10.1929.
By then, the terms of decisions of the Wailing Wall Commission were 
more or less known, and as the Haiti himself hinted there was every 
prospect that they would be far more favourable to the Jew3 and more 
repugnant to lioslem feeling than the proposed agreement prepared by Sir 
S. Davis.
The li.C. remarked that if the terms of the proposed agreement and of
\
the Wailing Wall Commission’s decision would be made publicly-known at 
the same tine, it might damage the prestige of those who will decide tc 
reject the agreement, and went on to ask how the S.M.C. if they reject 
the agreement would be able to justify their attitude and thereafter be 
blamed by their Moslem antagonists for what they had brought upon tnemselvcs 
by throwing away a far mere favourable settlement •
The llufti, after repeating his objections, said that he himself would 
prefer that a less favourable decision should be imposed on him from 
without rather than that he should acquiesce in a settlement however 
favourable which was in any way contrary to his convictions.
When the 11.C. counselled him to show statesmanship, he answered 
that he was not a statesman but a man of religion.
The discussions lasted almost two hours, but no conclusions were 
reached. Before the llufti and the members of the S.M.C. left the II .C. 
again expressed his sincere hope that in their further deliberations on 
this matter they would appreciate the paramount importance in their own
156
interests and in the interests of peace, good order and the general welfare 
of the country of accepting the proposed settlement.
Two days later the S.H.C. informed the Government of their refusal 
to accept it.
It should be noted that the Mufti, though in a minority, forced upon
the S.H.C. his extreme line. Ilis reasons for refusing the agreement
were clearly summed up by the mediator, Sir S. Davis, who write in his
memorandum above mentioned "Apart from the difficulties experienced by the
President of the Supreme Moslem Council by reason of Moslem religious
law, there is, I think, a reluctance on his part to come to an agreement
owing to uncertainty as to the future policy of His Majesty's Government
in regard to Arab interests. It is neverthless apparent that in keeping
alive the Wailing Wall controversy the President retains politically in
A3his hands a weapon that may be employed at his will"•
It may be asked why did the Mufti agree at all to start these long 
negotiations if after getting so much he still refused the agreement.
Certainly he did not expect more, when he embarked on then. And it is
hardly possible to believe that he entered the negotiations only to 
satisfy the Government, the Mali Commission etc., because their 
disappointment following the failure of the negotiations would be even 
bigger.
A probable answer would be that the Mufti knew well enough that the 
Government, under pretence of reforming the Sharia Courts and the 
administration of the Awkaf, was aiming to eliminate or at least to reduce 
his power, by curbing his control over the S.M.C. Some cables were 
actually exchanged between London and Jerusalem for that end. Sir S. 
Davis, who at the time was the officer administering the Government, firmly 43
43. Hy italics.
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objected to any declaration of intention to reforn the Sharia Courts and
44Avkaf, because it might hinder the Wailing Uall negotiations. Because
of tnat objection it was decided to postpone any such action for the 
time beins. So it could well be that by enterins into the negotiations,
the Mufti prevented an action asainst hira^ and von a respite of some 
months durins which his position became stronger and any thought of 
eliminating his influence later became even more difficult.
The negotiations having failed, the Uall Ccmiaission completed its 
report and submitted it to the Foreign Secretary on 16.12.1930. fhe 
findings of the Commission confirmed those of tne Unite Faper of hov. 
192G, but vdiilc the latter was vague and in general terms, the report 
is couched in clear and explicit terns. The Commission found tuat the 
Uall and the pavement were Moslem property. The Uall was a sacred
place to the Moslems, the pavement was not. To the Jews botu were holy.
The Jews had no legal claim to the pavement, but they had rignts of
access to the Uall for their devotions at all times. As for tne practices of
worship, and the appurtenances which the Jews night bring to the Uall,
the Commission accepted Chancellor's provisional instructions of October
1929. They restricted the right of the Jews to bring the Scroll of the
Law only to special festivals, and prohibited the blowing of tne ^an s
horn. The Moslems should not be permitted to carry out the Zikr close 
to the pavement during Jewish devotions, and they were not to build or 
repair any buildings adjacent to the Uall in such a way as to encroach on 
the pavement, impair the access of the Jews to the Uall, or involve 
interference with the Jews during their prayers /f° 456
44. See his telegram 4.9.1930 and minute by Uilliams 15.9.1930 C.O. 
733/193/773C4.
45. There were rumours that the Mufti sent Jamal Ilusscini to London to 
try and prevent any action against him. See letter by J . Chancellor 
to his son, Christopher 24.10.1930 J.C. Bom 16/3.
46. See Summary of Wall Commission's recommendations in N. Bentwich. 
England in Palestine. London 1932 pp. 209-10.
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The P.U.C. at its 20th Session in June 1931 confirmed the report 
and expressed its hope that "it will put an end to the past controversies". 47 
Following the Mufti's refusal to accept the settlement proposed by
48Sir S. Davis the "Society for the Protection of the lioslea Holy Places" 
resumed its activities. Several informal meetings and discussions took 
Place, and the Government and specially the Police were worried lest a 
new wave of agitation, on the lines of that which preceded the 1929 
disturbances, would start if the report of the Wall Commission were prejudicial 
to Moslem interests. The Government, therefore, had some hesitations about
the publication of the report in Palestine.
The funeral of Mohammad All, the Indian Moslem leader, too!-, place in 
Jerusalem on the 22nd Jan. 1931, and drew attention in the Moslem Horid.
The Government thought it undesirable to do anything which might add to
the excitement,49 and the publication was delayed.
' _ , i j ipt-ter of the Prime Minister toOn the 13 Feb. 1931 iras publisnwd the 1
. prti Kisch. the Chairman of theDr. 17 eizmann causing a lot of tension.
- i his apprehension and thePalestine Zionist Executive in Jerusalem, *P
Government asked for further delay. *
^7* P.U.C. Minutes of the 20th session 1931. p.96.
After the screen incident on 24.9.28 a General Moslem conference was 
convened In Jerusalem on the 1st 17ov. 1928 under the presidency of the 
Mufti. This conference decided to establish or rather to adopt an 
organization which was established shortly before that by the name of 
"the Society for the Protection of tne Moslem Holy Places . The Shaw 
Commission described the activities of this society as the second important 
cause in the chain of events leading to the 1923 disturbances. See Shaw
Report p. 155.
^3, Minute by Mayle 17.1.1931 C.O. 733/19u/870l3/l.
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The Nebi Musa festival that year fell on 2.4.1931 coinciding with 
Passover. This again caused some apprehension. The idea was either 
to, publish the report as early as possible before the Nebi Musa festival 
in order to allow time for the excitement which the report was likely 
- perhaps with some help from the Mufti - to generate among the Moslems, to 
abate. Or to delay publication - as actually was done - until after the 
festival.
Then the II.C. went to Britain for his holiday, and the British
50Government was reluctant to publish the report in his absence.
At last the report was published on 8 June 1931, approximately six
months after its completion. Together with it the British Government
published an order in Council empowering the H.C. to implement its 
51recommendations.
The Jewish Community, on the whole, accepted the report with
satisfaction. But not the Arabs. The Arab Executive met on 9.6.31
to discuss it, and all the Arab papers criticized it sharply. Auni Abd
el Hadi, who headed the Arab lawyers appearing before the Commission,
declared that the report could be considered formally as a Moslem
victory, but there was no doubt that it constituted a political and
religious victory for the Jews. The report granted them the right of
devotion while according to Moslem's view they were entitled to mere
52visits of the place. 501*
50. Minute by Shuckburgh 3.6.1931 Ibid.
51. The Palestine (Western or Wailing Wall) order in Council in Drayton 
the Laws of Palestine in Force on the 31st day of Dec. 1933.
London. 1934 Vci. Ill p. 2635.
52. "Al-Hayat" 9.6.1931.
160
T h e  M u f t i ,  i n  a n  i n t e r v i e w  w i t h  t h e  New Y o r k  T im e s  s a i d  "We c a n n o t
a c q u ie s c e  w i t h  t n e  r i g h t s  g r a n t e d  t o  t h e  J e w s .  N o on e  c a n  e x p e c t  th e
M o s le m s  t o  s u r r e n d e r  t h e i r  l e g a l  r i g h t  o f  o w n e r s h ip  o f  t h e  N a l l  i n  s u c h
a  m a n n e r . We n e v e r a a g r e e d  t o  t h e  a p p o in t m e n t  o f  t h e  C o m m is s io n ,  a n d
53
we c a n n o t  a c c e p t  i t s  d e c i s i o n .  A l l  t h e  a f f a i r  i s  u n j u s t .
T h e  f e l l a h e e n  who w e re  t h e n  o c c u p ie d  i n  r e a p in g  t h e i r  c r o p s  t o o k
l i t t l e  i n t e r e s t  i n  t h e  r e p o r t ,  a n d  th e  a n n o u n ce m e n t -  s h o r t l y  b e f o r e
t h e  r e p o r t ’ s  p u b l i c a t i o n  -  o f  t h e  r e m is s io n  o f  t i t h e s  an d  o f  th e
p r o m u lg a t io n  o f  t h e  P r o t e c t i o n  o f  c u l t i v a t o r s  o r d in a n c e ,  h a d  a  g o o d
e f f e c t  u p o n  t h e  A r a b  p o p u l a t i o n .  H o w e v e r , t h e  r e l i g i o u s  le a d e r s  s t a r t e d
t o  o r g a n i s e  ¿1 c a m p a ig n  o f  p ro p a g a n d a  a g a i n s t  th e  r e p o r t ,  a n d  a  f l o o d  o f  
t , , ,54
c a o l e s  a n d  m em ornnua a l l  p r o t e s t i n g  a g a i n s t  th e  r e p o r t  w as s e n t  t o  
t h e  G o v e rn m e n t , t h e  C o l o n i a l  O f f i c e  i n  L o n d o n , a n d  t h e  L e a g u e  o f  N a t io n s  
a n d  P . I I . C .  i n  G e n e v a .
T u a  o p p o s i t i o n  d i d  n o t  l e t  t h i s  c h a n c e  g o  w it h o u t  u s i n g  i t  t o
c r i t i c i s e  t h e  M u f t i .  I n  a  m em orandum  s u b m it t e d  on t h e  22 n d  J u n e  1 9 3 1 ,
55
b y  t h e  P a l e s t i n e  L i b e r a l  P a r t y  t h e y  s a i d  " I t  m u st b e  re m a rk e d  t h a t  t h e  534
5 3 .  " A l - J a m i a h  a l  A r a b b iy y a "  9 . 6 . 1 9 3 1 .
5 4 .  T h e  e x e c u t i v e  A r a b  Women C o n g r e s s  2 2 .6 .1 9 3 1  
T h e  M o s le m  C h r i s t i a n  S o c i e t y  N a b lu s  1 1 . 6 . 1 9 3 1 .
" ” " ” J a f f a  4 . 7 . 1 9 3 1
T h e  Mohammedan S o c i e t y ,  H a i f a  1 4 .6 .1 9 3 1
T h e  U le m a s  o f  H e b ro n  2 3 .6 .1 9 3 1  e t c .
A r a b  V i l l a g e r s  A s s o c i a t i o n  A c r e  2 1 .6 .1 9 3 1
s e e  C . O .  7 3 3 / 1 9 5 / G 7 0 1 3 / 4
5 5 .  T h e  P a l e s t i n e  L i b e r a l  P a r t y  wTa s  fo u n d e d  on  1 1 .1 0 .1 9 3 0  i n  H a i f a ,  
r e p r e s e n t i n g  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n  e le m e n t s  i n  N o r t h e r n  P a l e s t i n e  ( s u c h  a s  
A s s a ' a d  S h u k a i r j . - A c r e  a n d  T a w f iq  F a h o u ia -N a z a r e t h  e t c . )  w it h  a  v ie w  
t o  c o u n t e r a c t  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  t h e  S .M . C .  a n d  t h e  M o sle m  A s s o c i a t i o n  
o f  H a i f a  w h ic h  s u p p o r t e d  th e  C o u n c i l .
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Supreme Moslem Council in Palestine which is constituted of officers
drawing monthly salaries from the Palestine Government, have but restricted
powers", and went on to 6ay that "the S.M.C. did not hold any powers
of representations" from the Moslem World. "As this is solely the right
of the Moslems Kings and Princes"
The S.M.C. itself appointed a sub-committee, h e a d e d  by the Mufti,
to study the report. The sub-committea met on the 18.6.30 and drafted
a short statement of protest which was sent to the Government on 25.6.1931.
57A second detailed statement was sent on the 25th October 1931.
A point raised in this statement is interesting. In its last 
paragraph, the statement says "Article 5 of the Palestine (Western or 
Wailing Wall) Order in Council, 1931, entitles Eis Majesty, His heirs 
and successors in Council, to revoke, alter to amend this order at any 
time. Under this Article the ownership of Moslems in their Holy Places
r
is subject to revocation or alteration through a non-Moslem authority 
having no religious jurisdiction to determine such matters which are of 
great religious concern'!.
At some point in the discussions on the Western Wall, during the 
Islamic congress, which met in Jerusalem towards the end of the year,
Auni Abd A1 Eadi raised an objection to this same issue, i.e. that ownership 
of Moslems in their Holy places is subject to revocation or alteration 
by His Majesty the K i n g ..... in council. It was a heated discussion 56*
56. C.O. 733/195/87013/4.
57 Ibid
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and there were strong differences of opinion. The Indian Muslim leader,
Shaukat Ali, claimed that the policy of the Moslems towards the British
should be one of friendship, while Sheikh Muzaffer, and especially Auni
Abd A1 Hadi, demanded that the struggle should be against the British and
Jews together • When he proposed that the congress should pass a
resolution protesting against this right of the British Crown, he was
58stopped by the Mufti, who ruled him out of order. It says much about
the Mufti's position and relations vis a vis the British that the same 
protest which he himself submitted in writing should be ruled by him out 
of order in public meeting.
Before concluding this subject two important facts should be 
recorded :
1. The Report of the Wailing Wall Commission and the Palestine 
(Western or Wailing Wall) Order in Council, 1931, did put,
r
de facto, an end to the Wall affair, as the Royal. Commission 
said in its report ; "on this particular question of the
59
Wailing Wall there has been no serious controversy since".
2. The Wailing Wall dispute, the Wall Commission and its report, 
mark the start of a real Arab and Moslem interest, and later 
interference, in the Palestine problem, which was first 
expressed during the Islamic Congress of Jerusalem in 1931.
In the sphere of Palestine Arab politics, it marked the emergence 
of the Mufti as the most important Palestinian Arab leader. 589
58. "Doar Hayora" 12.12.1931. The Arabic press did not describe this 
incident, mentioning only that following Auni's speech the Mufti 
urged the speakers to shorten their speeches as time was limited 
and many more wanted to talk. "Al Jamiah A1 Arabiyya" 13.12.1931.
59. The Royal Commission Report p. 70.
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Chapter 11
The Islamic Congress of Jerusalem 1931
On 6ta December 1931, on the eve of the Moslem feast (Laylatu-
*lisra), the Islamic Congress opened in A1 Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem.
Tais was the third Islai.dc Congress which mot after the First World
War. Tae first one was convened by a committee of Ulema, with the
full support and backing of the Egyptian King, in Cairo in ïîay 1)26 to
1investigate the situation of the Caliphate . The second one, termed
tne Congress of tne Islande Uorld, was convened by King Ibn-3aud and
2met in Mecca, from the 7th June to 5th July of tae same year . Tne third 
one, in Jerusalem, to wuich both kings were ratner cool, was to a con­
siderable degree a * one-naan snow* of the kifti ox Jerusalem.
During June and July 1930, many Moslem personalities arrived in. 
Jerusalem to support the S.M.G. in presenting the nosleiu case before the
Wailing Wall.ConTdssioa. View3 were exchanged about the possibility of
3holding a general Islarric conference and opinions were favourable .
Ko re practical discussions followed in January 1931 when many Moslem
leaders attended the funeral of toe Moslem Indian leader Mohammad Ali. 
the initiator of the Congress together with the Mufti, was ¿.aaujeat Ali 
the Indian leader4, who had attended the Round Table Conference on India 
in London, and who came to Jerusalem for the burial of nis bcotner.
Moslem Indian leaders wishing to emphasise tue Islamic character of tueir 
Movement and distinguish it from the general stream of Indian nationalism
i .. ._ <,»«> v.. Kedourie Egypt and the Caliohate*• For account of tus Congro-.s see ---rqr — —  ----
1 3 1 5 -1 0 5 2  i n  t h e  Chatham H o u se  V e r s i o n .  t p .  194 195
2. See Ibid . Saa note p. 48
3. See declaration of the «ep areto.7 Cowittee of the General Islamic 
Congress. "A1 Janiah al Arabiyya 29.10.1331
4. I. Darwaza states that tne initiators were the Mufti and the Tunisian 
leader Abd al Aziz al Ta’ala&i. b e e  barwaza On_Cit p . 7 . ;
That is perhaps true as far as tua taaa ox tae congress is concerned.
See J.C. Smith Lond°U 1946 PI3,247”24^5.
164
w e re  s e e k i n g  t o  s p r e a d  am ong I n d i a n  ¡M oslems s y m p a th y  t o w a r d s ,  a n d  a  
f e e l i n g  o f  m u t u a l in t e r d e p e n d e n c e  w i t h ,  M o slem s e v e r y w h e r e .  I n e  
W a i l in g  ' J a i l  d i s p u t e ,  a n d  t h e  1 9 29  d i s t u r b a n c e s , d i r e c t e d  t h i s  s y m p a th y  
to w a r d s  P a l e s t i n e ^ 3.
B r i t i s h  I n t e l l i g e n c e  r e p o r t s  o f  e a r l y  1 9 3 l7  s p e a k  o f  a  sc h e m e  f o r  
u s i n g  P a l e s t i n e  a s  a  f o c u s  f o r  a c h i e v i n g  A r a b  a n d  I s l a m i c  u n i t y ,  w i t h
t h e  f i n a l  
im p o r t a n t
o b j e c t  o f  r i d d i n g  M o slem  c o u n t r i e s  o f  'v ie s t e r n  d o m i n a t i o n ' . A n  
f e a t u r e  o f  t u e  sch e m a  w a s t o  b e  t h e  c o n v o c a t io n  o f  a n  I s l a m i c
C o n g r e s s  i n  J e r u s a le m  i n  th e  e a r l y  sum m er o f  1 9 3 1 . T h e  r e p o r t s  go  on  
t o  s a y  t h a t  b e c a u s e  o f  A r a b  d i s s e n s i o n s  i n  P a l e s t i n e ,  t h e  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t y  
o f  v a r i o u s  M oslem  e le m e n t s ,  a n d  t h e  l o c a l  p r e - o c c u p a t i o n s  o f  n o n - ? a l e s t i n i a a  
d e l e g a t e s ,  t h e  c o n g r e s s  m ig h t  b e  d e la y e d .
t in e a  3’n a u k a t  A l i  w a s i n  D a m a s c u s  d u r i n g  F e b r u a r y  1 9 3 1 , l ie  t o l d  h i s  
f r i e d d s  t n a t  s e v e r a l  M o slem  l e a d e r s ,  s u c h  a s  2 Iu 3 t a f a  l ia n a s  f r o m  E g y p t ,
E m ir  S a i d  A b d a l  X a d e r  f r o m  S y r i a  a n d  Y a s s i n  P a s h a  a l  » la s h a ia i f r o m  I r a q ,  
h a d  p r e v i s i o n a l l y  c o n s e n t e d  t o  fo r m  a n  I s l a m i c  C o m m itte e  t o  p r e p a r e  t h e  
I s l a m i c  Con.grc3£»P. h e  a l s o  s p o k e  o f  h i s  a g re e m e n t  w i t h  t h e  M u f t i ,  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  a  M o slem  U n i v e r s i t y  i n  J e r u s a l e m ,  f o r  v n i c h  s u b s c r i p t i o n s  w e re
t o  b e  s o u g h t  f r o m  M o slem s a l l  o v e r  t h e  w o r ld  w h ic h  w o u ld  s e r v e  a s  th e
9
n u c le u s  o f  a  v a s t  I s l a m i c  p r o p a g a n d a  o r g a n i s a t i o n  .
On 17 M a rch  1 3 3 1 , th e  M u f t i  a r r i v e d  i n  E g y p t .  T h e  A r a b  P a l e s t i n e
p a p e r s ,  a n d  e s p e c i a l l y  ' a l  C a r m e l '  ( w h ic h  a t  t h e  t im e  w a s a g a i n s t  t h e
10
M u f t i )  w e re  s p e c u l a t i n g  a b o u t  t h e  r e a s o n s  a n d  a im s  o f  t h i s  v i s i t  . T h e
M u f t i ' s  p a p e r  ' a l  J a n i a u - a l  A r a b i y y a ' ^  r e p o r t e d  o n ly  h i s  s o c i a l  e n g a g e -
12
m e rits  d u r i n g  t h e  v i s i t .  B u t ’ i t  .‘i s  know n t h a t  i n  a  p r i v a t e  c o n v e r s a t i o n  67*9102
6 .  S e a  S u p r a  p .
7 .  S e e  C .O .  7 3 3 / 2 0 4 / 3 7 1 5 6 1
3 .  T h e  r e p o r t  a d d s  -  " I t  i s  d e s i r a b l e  t o  a c c e p t  e v e n  t h e s e  a l l e g e d  p r o ­
v i s i o n a l  a s s n a t s  v r i t h  som e r e s e r v e " .  B e c a u s e  o f  h i s  s u b s e q u e n t  
o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  C o n g r e s s  t h e  a p p e a r a n c e  o f  J | 3 i n  a l  d a s h a n d 's  
nam e i n  t h e  l i s t  se e m s s t r a n g e .
9 .  I b i d .
1 0 .  ' A l  C a r m e l '  1 7 . 3 . 1 3 3 1 .  2 0 . 3 . 1 3 3 1 .
1 1 . A l  J a m ia n  a l  A r a b i y y a  1 3 . 3 . 1 9 3 1 .  2 2 . 3 . 1 9 3 1 .
1 2 .  S e e  I n t e l l i g e n c e  r e p o r t  1 8 .6 .1 9 3 1  C . O .  7 3 3 / 2 0 4 / 8 1 1 5 6 / 1
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h e  d e s c r i b e d  t h e  s i t u a t i o n  i n  P a l e s t i n e  a s  ' d e c i d e d l y  s e r i o u s '  a n d  
s a i d  t h a t  u n l e s s  t h e r e  w as a  r a d i c a l  c h a n g e  i n  t h e  p o l i c y  o f  t h e  M anda­
t o r y  G o v e rn m e n t , t h e r e  w o u ld  b e  t r o u b l e .  R e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e  P r im e  
M i n i s t e r ' s  l e t t e r  t o  D r .  G e iz m a n n  he s a i d  t h a t  i t  h a d  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  
c e m e n t in g  m o re  c l o s e l y  I f o s l e r r - C u r i s t i a n  c o - o p e r a t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  B r i t i s h  
a n d  t h e  J e w s .  S h a u k a t  A l i ' s  v i s i t ,  h e  s a i d ,  h a d  made a  d e e p  a p p e a l  t o  
M o slem  c o n s c i o u s r x s s  a n d  m ig h t  u l t i m a t e l y  a l t e r  t h e  w h o le  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  
e c o n o m ic  s i t u a t i o n  i n  t h e  F i d d l e  E a s t .  h e  a l s o  s a i d  t h a t  h e  w is h e d  t o  
d i s c u s s  w i t h  M o slem  le a d e r s  i n  E g y p t  t h e  p r o p o s e d  I s l a m i c  C o n g r e s s ,  w h ic h  
w a s p r o j e c t e d  f o r  J u n e  o f  t h e  sam e y e a r ,  a n d  a t  w h ic h  t h e  f o r m a t io n  o f  
a n  I s l a m i c  F e d e r a t io n  j o u l d  b e  e la b o r a t e d .  T h i s  f e d e r a t i o n  w o u ld  b e  o f  
v a s t  im p o r t a n c e  t o  a l l  M o slem s a n d  w o u ld ,  i f  i t  s u c c e e d e d ,  m ean t h e  e n d  
o f  'w e s t e r n  d o m in a n c e ' i n  t h e  I s l a m i c  c o u n t r i e s .
On t h e  1 2 t h  H a y ,  h o w e v e r ,  t h e  M u f t i  r e c e i v e d  a  l e t t e r  f r o m  S a a u k a t  
A . l i  s u g g e s t i n g  t h e  p o s tp o n e m e n t  f o r  a  w h i l e  o f  t h e  C o n g r e s s  b e c a u s e  o f  
h i s  p r e - o c c u p a t i o n  i u  I n d i a .
13
A  m e e t in g  <of t h e  Su p  reuse M oslem  C o u n c i l  o n  2 6 .7 .1 9 3 1  , a t t e n d e d
b y f o u r  o f  t h e  f i v e  m e m b e rs , a n d  l a s t i n g  s e v e r a l  h o u r s  a u t h o r i s e d  t h e  
M u f t i  t o  s e n d  i n v i t a t i o n s  t o  t h e  C o n g r e s s .
On t h e  4 t n  S e p t e m b e r ,  S u a u k a t  A l i  d e c l a r e d  p u b l i c l y  t h a t  t h e  
I s l a m i c  C o n g r e s s  w o u ld  b e  h e ld  s h o r t l y  i n  J e r u s a le m .
C u r i n g  a  c o n v e r s a t i o n  w i t h  S i r  J .  C h a n c e l l o r ,  t h e  e x - i l i g h  C o m m is s io n e r  
o f  F a l e s t i n e ,  c n  2 3 .9 .1 2 3 1  S h a u h a t  A l i  s a i d  t n a f  a r r a n g e m e n t s  w e re  b e in g  
m ade f o r  the. M o s le m  C o n g r e s s  t o  b e  h e ld  i n  J e r u s a l e m  a b o u t  C h r i s t m a s  t im e .  
Ue e m p h a s is e d  t h a t  i t  w o u ld  b e  p u r e l y  r e l i g i o u s  i n  c h a r a c t e r  a n d  e x p r e s s e d  
t h e  h o p e  t h a t  i t  w o u ld  h a  a t t e n d e d  b y  e m in e n t  M o s le m s , i n c l u d i n g  t h e  
b r o t h e r  o f  t h e  A m ir  o f  A f g h a n i s t a n .
13,:. T h e  M u f t i ,  A m in  a l  T a r a im i,  A m in  Abd a l  U a d i ,  M o h i a l  D i n  A b d  a l  S h a f e i .  
T h e  T im e s  2 7 .1 1 .1 9 3 1  a s  r e p o r t e d  b y  i l .  A .  R .  G ib b .  T he I s l a m i c  C o n g r e s s  
i n  D e ce m b e r 1 9 3 1 , s u r v e y  o f  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  A f f a i r a ,  1 9 3 4 . 
p p 9 9 .  'T o  t h e  b e s t  o f  my k n o w le d g e  t h i s  i n f o r m a t i o n  w a s  n o t  p u b l i s h e d  
a t  t h e  t im e  i n  a n y  o f  t h e  A r a b i c  P a l e s t i n i a n  p a p e r s .
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T h e  i n v i t a t i o n s  w e re  s e n t  o u t  on  2 0  O c t o b e r ^ .  T h e y  w e re  s e n t  n o t  
o n ly  t o  th e  I s l a m i c  G o v e rn m e n ts  a n d  p u r e l y  r e l i g i o u s  b o d i e s ,  b u t  a l s o  to  
d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  a n d  s e a l - r e l i g i o u s  o r g a n i s a t i o n s  ( s u c h  a s  t h e  M afd 
P a r t y  a n d  t h e  I n d i a n  C a l i p h a t e  C c n n i t t e e )  \7h i c h  a c c o r d in g  t o  t h e  o r g a n ­
i s e r ' s  v ie w  fo rm e d  a  new  a n d  im p o r t a n t  e le m e n t  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  a n d  l i f e  
o f  t h e  h o s ie r s  s o c i e t y .
T h e  a im s  o f  t h e  C o n g r e s s ,  t h e  i n v i t a t i o n s  e x p l a i n e d ,  w e re  t o  d i s c u s s
t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  s i t u a t i o n  o f  t h e  Í I 0 3 le ía s  a n d  e x a m in e  t h e  c e r t a i n  p r o b le m s  
a f f e c t i n g  t h e  M o slem  w o r ld ,  s u c h  a s  th e  s a f e g u a r d i n g  o f  t h e  M oslem  h o ly  
p l a c e s  i n  P a l e s t i n e ,  a s  w e l l  a s  o t h e r  s u b j e c t s  f o r  t h e  p r o m o t io n  o f  M o slem  
i n t e r e s t s  a n d  w e l f a r e .
Ix i  a d d i t i o n  t o  p o s i t i v e  r e a c t i o n s ,  t h e  new s o f  t h e  C o n g r e s s  b r o u g e t  
a  s t r o n g  o p p o s i t i o n  o n  d i f f e r e n t  g r o u n d s  a n d  i n  d i f f e r e n t  w a y 3 .
J u d g i n g  b y  t h e  M u f t i ' s  e f f o r t s  t o  a p p e a s e  i t ,  t h e  c o s t  im p o r t a n t  
o p p o s i t i o n  fro m  th e  o r g a n i s e r ' s  p o i n t  o f  v ie w ,  cam e fr o m  t h e  E g y p t i a n  
G o v e rn m e n t a n d  I g y t i a n  C o u r t ,  a n d  I  s h a l l  d i s c u s s  i t  l a t e r .
O t h e r  I s l a m i c  G o v e rn m e n ts  o p p o s e d  t h e  C o n g r e s s  t o o .  T u r k e y ,  i n  
a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  i t s '  s e c u l a r  p o l i c y ,  a s  t h e  F o r e i g n  M i n i s t e r  d e c la r e d  
i n  t h e  G r e a t  n a t i o n a l  A s s e m b ly  w o u ld  h a v e  n o  d e a l i n g s  w i t h  t h e  C d n g r e s s  
a s  s u c h  i n v i t a t i o n s  w e re  o f  no v a l u e  t o  a n y  c o u n t r y  . . .  a n d  d i s t r a c t e d  
t h e  p e o p le  f r o m  t h e  p a t h  o f  p r o g r e s s .  " I n  p a r t i c u l a r " ,  he  a a i d ,  " v e  a r e  
o p p o s e d  t o  a n y  i n t e r n a l  o r  e x t e r n a l  p o l i c y  w h ic h  m ake s u s e  o f  r e l i g i o n  
a s  a  p o l i t i c a l  in s t r u m e n t
T h e  T u r k i s h  G o v e rn m e n t , h e  c o n t in u e d ,  h a d  c o n s u l t e d  t h e  P e r s i a n ,  
A f g h a n i a n ,  A l b a n ia n  a n d  i i e d j & z i  G o v e rn m e n ts  a n d  t h e y  h a d  a l l  a g r e e d  n o t  
t o  p a r t i c i p ó t e  i n  t h e  c o n g r e s s  o f f i c i a l l y ^ .  L a t e r  t h e  T u r k i s h  C o n s u l  145*
1 4 . " F a l a s t i n "  2 0 . 1 0 . 1 9 3 1 .
1 5 .  O r i e n t e  M od erno K o v e tu b e r 1 9 3 1  p p . 5 7 9 - S ü  a3  r e p o r t e d  b y  G ib b
Or,'cCit p.101.
I S .  A s s a f .  O p - G it  p .1 2 6
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G e n e r a l  a p p r o a c h e d  t h e  M u f t i  a s k i n g  h im  t o  t a k e  d o w . t h e  T u r k i s h  f l a g  
f r p m  am ong t h e  f l a g s  o f  t h e  I s l a m i c  c o u n t r i e s  w h ic h  w e re  h o is t e d  a ro u n d  
t h e  m e e t in g  h a l l .
I o n  G aud t o o k  t h e  e a s y  w ay o u t .  v T h ile  in f o r m i n g  n i 3  C a i r o  r e p r e s ­
e n t a t i v e  t h a t  h e  w as a g a i n s t  h o l d i n g  t h e  I s l a m i c  C o n g r e s s  i n  J e r u s a l e m ^ ,  
h e  w r o t e  t o  t h e  M u f t i  c o n g r a t u l a t i n g  h im  a n d  w i s h i n g  t h e  C o n g r e s s  f u l l
s u c c e s s ,  h u t  in f o r m i n g  h im  t h a t  t h e  i n v i t a t i o n  h a d  r e a c h e d  h im  to o  l a t e
13
t o  b e  a b le  t o  s e n d  a  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e
A  s y m p a t h e t ic  m e s s a g e  w as r e c e i v e d  f r o m  t h e  A m ir  o f  K u w a it  who 
e x c u s e d  h i m s e l f  f o r  n o t  a t t e n d i n g  t h e  C o n g r e s s  b e c a u s e  o f  h i s  p r e o c c u ­
p a t i o n  w i t h  h i s  l o c a l  a f f a i r s ^ .
T h e  o n ly  A r a b  K i n g  t o  s e n d  a n  o f f i c i a l  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  t o  t h e  C o n g r e s s  
_ 20w a s t a e  c . in g  o r  fem en
T h e  u n o f f i c i a l  I r a n i  d e l e g a t i o n  w as d i s t i n g u i s h e d  b y  i t s  i n c l u s i o n
21
o f  K a s h e f  a l  C h a t a ,  t h e  fa m o u s C h ia h  d i v i n e ,  t h u s  m a k in g  a  c e r t a i n
e f f o r t  t o  n a r r o w  t h e  d e e p  s c h is m  b e tw e e n  t h e  tw o g r e a t  s e c t s  o f  I s l a m .
I n  E g y p t ,  t fre  o p p o s i t i o n  t o  t h e  C o n g r e s s  w as d e r i v e d  f r o m  l o c a l
p o l i t i c a l  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i n  w h ic h  i t  b ecam e i n t e r m i x e d .  A s  i t  w as
ru m o u re d  t h a t  t h e  C o n g r e s s  m ig h t  d i s c u s s  t h e  C a l i p h a t e  p r o b le m ,  t h e  K in g
22
a n d  t h e  C o u r t  o p p o s e d  i t  . T h e  a l  A z h a r  a n d  i t s  U la u a ,  w e re  n o t  p le a s e d
w i t h  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a  new  I s l a m i c  u n i v e r s i t y  m ig h t  b e  e s t a b l i s h e d
i n  J e r u s a l e m .  Gome E g y p t i a n  l i b e r a l  e le m e n t s  h a d  t h e i r  r e s e r v a t i o n s  t o o ,
23
o w in g  t o  t h e  ’ r e a c t i o n a r y  c h a r a c t e r ’ o f  t h e  C o n g r e s s  . T h o s e  who 
s u p p o r t e d  t h e  C o n g r e s s  vre re  c e n t e r e d  a r o u n d  t h e  U a fd  P a r t y ,  who b e c a u s e  
o f  t h e i r  g r o w in g  o p p o s i t i o n  -  a t  t h e  t im e  -  t o  t h e  B r i t i s h  w o re  l o o k i n g  *19203
_ _ _ _ _  _ _ _ _ _  ;
1$. I n  a n  u n d a t e d  l e t t e r  p u b l i s h e d  i n  ' a l  ’ E u k a tta ra ' a n d  ' A l  J a m ia h  a l  
A r a b i y y a ' ,  1 0 . 1 . 1 9 3 2 .
1 9 . I b i d .
2 0 .  Gee h i s  l e t t e r  t o  t h e  M u f t i  o f  6 . 1 1 . 1 9 3 1 .  ' A l  J a m ia h  a l  A r a b i y y a '  
2 0 . 1 1 . 1 9 3 2 .
2 1 .  K a o  o n  t h e  o p e n in g  n i g h t  o f  t h e  C o n g r e s s  l e d  t h e  p r a y e r s  o f  a  p r e d o m in ­
a n t l y  S u n n i  c o n g r e g a t i o n .
2 2 .  S e e  E .  K e d o u r ie  E g y p t  a n d  t h e  C a l i p h a t e  O p l C i t . 197
2 3 .  G ib b  O p - C i t .  p . 1 0 4 .
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for Ar ab end Eastern sympathy and saw in the Congress a good oooortuaity 
to make a bid for popularity.
Fearing that Egyptian opposition right endanger the Congress as a 
whole, the Mufti tried hard to appease it. Already on 17.10.31, even
before the invitations were sent, the S.M.C. had denied that the Congress
would discuss the Caliphate problem. This was repeated, in an interview
74which the Mufti gave to an Egyptian gaper""*. La, himself, vent to Egypt
25on 4.11.1931 to explain the air s and. objects of the Congress . On
7.11.1931, he called on the Egyptian Trim Minister for a visit of l hour.
i.c: assured him that the Congress would not discuss matters relating to
Egypt, that tne Caliphate problem vculd not be discussed, and that the
proposed University of Jerusalem would not affect the primacy of al~
26Aahar. ha later repeated this assurance in writing . It seems that
27he succeeded in allaying Egyptian suspicions as the Government con-
28seated to send representatives .. It later changed its mind, but made 
no difficulties for individuals going in their private capacities. Most
of those ware followers of the Mafd, wnose leader Mustafa haha3 supported
onactively the Congress all along“".
As for Arab Christian Communities outside Palestine, if they had some
reservations towards the Congress they took care not to express them.
30Come communities later sent it their support
There is no conclusive evidence as to british official view with
regard to the Islamic Congress. *&
S4. 'A1 Jihad' 27.10.31 as reported by 'Al Janiah al Arabiyya' 30.10.31.
23. Interviews with him were published in Egyptian dailies 'Al Abram',
'al Jihad', & 'Al lialagh' 6*11.31 as reported in 'Al Jamian al Arabiyya' 
7.11.31 and 3.11.31.
26.
27.
29.
30.
'Al Jamah, al Arabiyya' 9.11.31.
'Al Jaau.au al Arabiyya' described viffit in Egypt as 'victory'. It followed 
visit to Egypt of Fakhri al Kashashibi who stayed from 30.10. to 2.11.32
& 'with unlimited funds supplied to him by the Jews' as claimed by paper 
'tried to wreck Congress' Ibid 14.11.31.
'The Times' 9.11.31 as reported by ¡^bh Op-Cit 104. of the Pales­
tinian Arab papers mentioned this.
Sea his very warm irable of 6.12.31. 'Falastin' 7.12.31.
See for example the cable of the Christians of Irbid and Ajloun in 
Trans-Jordan. 'Al Jaraiah al Arabiyya' 7.9.32.
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The Foreign Office suggested that the Mufti should be threatened 
with removal from the post of President of the Supreme Moslem Council 
if he did not exercise proper control of discussions at the Congress.
The H.C. wa3 strongly opposed to sucn a threat and the suggestion was 
dropped^*.
However, towards the end of November, the Mufti was called to the 
32h.C. , in order to define the objects of the Congress and was warned 
that the Government would not allow the convening of a Congress in 
which questions migat be raised affecting the internal or external affairs 
of friendly powers. This information was communicated to all govern­
ments concerned. The Jews had opposed the Congress. Considering it 
as an instrument to fight and destroy the Jewish National Home- which 
it was - they urged that it should be prohibited. They believed that 
the Palestine Government advised against the holding of this Congress but 
wa3 pressed into it by the Colonial Office. The latter rejected that,
and said that it was primarily at any rate a religious conference and
33that while certainly not wanting it they had allowed it to proceed
Shaukat Ali, it seems, invited Sokolov, the President of the Zionist
Organisation to address the Congress but he refused and suggested instead
34a Hound Table Conference
The Arab opposition elements also believed and kept on hinting that 
Britain was supporting the CQngress. In an interview given to al~
Mukatam reporter in Jerusalem^Sheikh al Taftazani from Egypt, vnile 31245
31. See C.O. 733/193/77364.
32. Gibb The Islamic CQngress Op-Cit p.103
33. See letter from Parkinson to the H.C. (Parkinson's Italics) 11.3.32 
C.O. 733/215/97054 about his conversation with Arlozoroff.
34. 'Falastin' (English version) 12.12.31. Zionist sources are not clear 
about this subject. See file S/25-5 The Z.A.
35. As reported by the Jewish Daily 'Doar Hayom' 15.12.31. it seems that 
this interview irked tue Mufti. His paper, came out with a long 
editorial criticising sharply al-Taftazani. 'Al Jaraiah al Arabiyya'
29.12.31.
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speaking on the Congress, said about the Mufti, that it was evident 
not only that he was an official of the Palestine Government, subordinate 
to the H.C., but that ha was a tool in the hands of. the Government which . 
directed him at it3 will.
And in an editorial about the Congress, the opposition paper, 'Miraat 
al Sharq* said - 'how, it was proven again, that the Government moves 
and directs the Mufti' " .
An enthasiastic article about the Congress widen appeared in tne 
English version of 'Fala3tin' had this to say - "The British Government 
stood to both gain and lose from the Congress. It stoood to gain if 
Congress dispersed without bringing political questions into debate, and 
it effectively closed the door by forbidding the discussion of the 
affairs of friendly powers. On the other hand, it wanted the Moslem 
and Arab opinion on its side, in order to help it in its trade, in
keeping control of India and in keeping the overland route in friendly
,  • i,37countries
\
However, i f  we take into consideration earlier British support for 
certain Pan-Is-lanic plans, and her subsequent support foo some Pan-Arab
33plans , and judging by the general trend of its middle Eastern policy 
at the tine, we can safely assume that the British in general supported 
the Congress. 367*
36. Mira'at al Sharq 21.1.32.
37. Falastin (in English) 12.12.31. The article is signed by the 
initials M.R.A. but there are signs that it was written by
G. Antonius.
33. For British sympathetic views of these plans see minute by
Eastwood 21.9.36 and the letter by Sir A. Kerr to the Foreign 
Secretary 27.10.36. C.O. 314/75528/44.
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As for France and Italy, the other imperial powers, which had a
large Moslem population under their control, they did not oppose the
Congress openly but approached Britain to make sure that no subjects
dealing with their colonies would be discussed and also prevented some
39delegates from attending the Congress
The most bitter opposition to the Congress came from aoraa of the 
people whose interests it va3 going to defend. The Arab opposition 
elements in Palestine claimed that the Mufti's main object in convening 
the Congress was to enhance his own prestige. They pointed to the fact 
that the Preparatory Committee lacked representative character as it was 
composed of unknown persons^, all followers of the Mufti. The fact 
that they (i.e. the opposition) were not consulted in the preparations
for the Congress proved to tdera that the Congress was intended by their
rivals as a tool by which to exploit the prestige and support of the
Islamic world in gaining supremacy in Palestine.
The papers 'Miraat al Sharq* and 'Al Sirat al Hus talcin' criticised
and fought the Congress all along. One of the opposition leaders,
Fakhri al Nashasliibi, preceded the Mufti in his v is it to Egypt and spread
rumours about the objects and programme of the Congress, moving some
Egyptian papers to write anti-Congress articles and influencing some
41al-Azhar Ulami to come out against the Congress . On 19.11.1931 the 39401
39. Actually several delegates who represent the French North African 
Colonies and Lybia had lived for many years as political refugees 
in Cairo, and not in their countries.
40. The Committee consisted if the Mufti as Chairman, and Abd al Aziz 
Ta'alabi Amin al Tamimi, Izat Darwaza, Ahmed Ililrai, Sheikh Mahmoud 
Dajani, Sheikh Nassau Abu Saud, and Ajaj Nuwayhid as members.
See I. Darwaza Op-Cit p.79
41. This in fact, is admitted by the Mufti's paper who attacked Fakhri 
Kashashibi's visit to Egypt. The paper mentions that most of the anti- 
Congress articles which appeared in Egyptian press such as that in 
'Al-Balagh' of 29.10.31 and 'La Bourse Egyptienne' of 3.11.31 etc., 
were published in papers either -owned by Jews or influenced by them 
because of their important economic standing. The paper goes on to say 
that all the anti-Congres3 campaign of 'Mira'at al Sharq', 'Sirat-al- 
Mustakim' and Fakhri Nashashibi was financed by Jews. See 'Al Jamaih 
Al Arabiyya' 16.11.31.
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opposition published a “Message to the Islamic World*' in which they
42explained their view of the Congress . The Mufti felt bound to
publish a counter-message in which he blamed the Jews as instigating
43all the efforts to cause the Congress to fail
Recognizing the bad effect and the damage which this bitter division
and rivalry might have on the gathering delegates, several independent
Palestinians tried from early November to mediate between the two camps.
. 44These efforts were taken over by Abd al-Hamid Said from Egypt, but with 
not much success. he was joined later by Shaukat Ali and the two of 
them succeeded in convincing the opposition to participate in the Congress 
and accept invitations^“*. Later, however, the opposition changed their 
minds and did not participate.
During the Congress, the Mufti tried to prevent any contact between
the non-Palestinian delegates and the Palestine opposition elements and
there existed a kind of 'war of invitations' with both sides inviting the
delegates to dinners, entertainments etc. at exactly the same hour.
The anti-Congress 'Congress of the Palestine Moslem Nation” met in
Jerusalem at King David Hotel on 11 December 1931. If will be di3-
46cussed lisewhere , but it should be emphasised here that an impressive
gathering which commanded quite a considerable support of the urban and
rural Moslem population of Palestine, decided unanimously to withdraw their
47confidence from the president of the Supreme Jfoslem Council , who only 
a few days earlier had been elected as the President of the Executive 
of the Moslem Congress. 423567
42. 'diiraat al Sharq’, 'A1 Sirat al Mustakim' and 'Falastin' 20.11.31.
43. 'Al Jamaih al Arabiyya' 25.11.31.
44. The head of the 'Moslem Youth Associations' in Egypt who was con­
sidered Oo be the unofficial observer of Ismail Sidqi the Egyptian 
Premier at the Congress.
45. See their declaration 'Falastin' 7.12.31.
46. See Chapter 14.
47. 'Falastin' 12.12.31.
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But all this opposition, could not realty detract frori what seemed 
t
to the majority of the Arabs the importance and eventually the success 
of the Congress.
Following the set-back which the Frine Minister's letter to Dr. Ueiz- 
mann caused to the Palestinian Arabs and believing that only with the 
support of the Islamic Uorld would the Palestinian Arabs be able to counter 
balance the support of Morid Jewry to Zionism, the Mufti sought to consol­
idate and systemically organise the widespread sympathy for the Palestine
A 3Arab cause which the 1929 disturbances aroused in the Islamic Morld
The subjects of discussion as submitted by the Preparatory Committee to
49the general Congress were :-
1. Moslem Co-operation. 2. Purification of the Islamic religion, 
preservation of its traditions, diffusion of its culture and defence of 
its holy places (including A1 aqsa Mosque and the Buraq). 3. The estab­
lishment of a Moslem University in Jerusalem. 4. Restoration of the îlijaz 
50Railway
The Committee goes on to say that since the aim was to co-operate and 
maintain a unified front, delegates were requested not to discuss contro­
versial subjects which night increase and cause differences of opinions 
between the Moslems.
The proceedings'*^ of the Congress which opened on 6.12.31 and in 49501
49. In an undated minute. bee entry No. 1 in G. Antonius file The Moslem 
Congress Mo. 00707 I.S.A. See also Oriento Hoderno October 1932
pp.324-5 as reported by Gibb. The Islamic Congress Op-Cit p.102.
50. It is interesting to note that an undated article in the Vatican 
paper 'L'osservatore Romano' stated that the Congress had 2 objects :
1. The question-of Baghdad-liaifa Railway. 2. The establishment of 
the Moslem University in Jerusalem. See entry No. 15 in G. Antonius 
file The Moslem Congress file No. 00707 I.S.A.
51. For a full report ofthe meetings see 'Falastin' 7-13. 12. 1931. 
or 'A1 Jamaih al Arabiyya' 7-13.12.1931
48. See E. Kedowrie Egypt and the Calphate. 1915 - 1952. in the Chatham 
House version Op Cit p. 196. see also N. Sadaqa Op Cit. p. 160 
and I. Darwaza Op Cit. p. 80.
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*mic.\ 233' “ del<sg«Us participated vare on the whole orderly and in
53
accordance witu tne program»« i t  is interesting to note that tu* iu fti 
in bis opening speech attack Javish national hosts bet did not
one word at out Britain or the ¿«Icufciae authorities . it yg» mainly 
a religion* speech with a call to return to the truu; lalaa.
towards the end of tao second neetins tna dalegates tooc the
tolloving oath - *1 swear by Almighty God to defend the holy places in
•- - 55
Palestine against all offensive acts .
the Mufti, as ejected, was elected 1‘rsBidant of che Executive of
the Congress* . Eight aub-cona;ttoes were formed to auks reports on the
following subjects :
1. the Constitution of the Congress. 2*
3. Finance« and organisation. 4.
3. The tied jag hallway.
6 . defence of the Holy plac&a and
the Vailing Vail. 7.
,.*» -r the cuKOaao.:
8 . troposals laid before the Congress.
52. Palestine-14, Xransjordan-l :is-d, 1 ra^~ 12, Cgypt-17,
«•odjas-ti-, ïeuatf? *\srr. ia-13, turkey-2 , ir'.poli (Li,va)-li, .uni'.‘-*3, 
:iorocco~lCt Àlgerie~$, Caucasus-15, fusala-7, Yugoslavia-22, Ligeria-19, 
lndia-2;>, Java (Indonesie)** 4, Ceylon-9, China-1, tsaa al Safari 
p.178. Other Sources give different numbers according to a version 
rationed by Assef there were 133 delegata*• Assai note 1475
¡>•280 and Antonius also speaks of 130 delegates. dee als annual report 
of 1932 to the Ins of current world affair». C.AuCdntus file 00734 I.s.A. 3*
33. Thera was a scuffia during opening cerersony hetween 2 Egyptians delegate«,
and tua di»tun ance which followed the attach by Abd al Eauuan Aaaai against
Italian GovaroasUlt for its policy in Tripoli, in boto cases police had
to interfere. Aiwa was later expelled from falustioo by British authorities
before the end of toe Congress*
54. i?or tue full text of tue speech see Al Janiah al Arabiyya 7.12.31.
55. Assai OpJtCit p.126
3b. vlith ilia al Din Tabatabei iron Persia, Hohatxaad All Alube-Î5gypt Sir ümh-
swaad tqbal-India and Hohaumd Zubara-Yemet* Vice Presidents, ftauf al
Ceylani“*India, 2hayUh ibraiti» ai bai a** Iraq and. Shiefch ¿.;u*af£ar A lasse
Darvaxa frou rales tino &» secretaries, and Aiuaad illesi, à hheihh /iaamoud
3sjani frors talentine as Ireasarerà, and Stinti al Solk-Leoanon 4 SUiùri al
ì Cuvatly-Syria as marshals, (contrôler«) see ’Faiastin’ 12.12.31 see also
barvaxa Op-Cit p,63.
Propagation of Islau.
Mu»low Culture .»ni the 
proposed University oi 
&l*4qsi.
Publicity, propaganda and 
guidance.
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The sub-Cocmittee on the Constitution of the Congress recommended 
a constitution consisting of 17 articles which was accented. Articles 
3 ~ 5 envisaged the re-assembly of tae Congress every other year, nor­
mally in Jerusalem. It called for the election of an executive con­
sisting of 25 membersand of a central permanent bureau of 7 with the 
Mufti as President and Tabatabai a3 Secretary . Other recommend­
ations concerning Palestine which were resolved by the Congress were 
ho.3. complete boycott of Jewish goods in all Islamic countries, 
ho.9. establishment of a big agricultural association in Palestine to 
purchase and exploit Palestinian lands. No.11. to protest against the 
Walling Wall report as well as against the policy of the ’Mandatory Power 
in this respect.
Other protests were against the usurpation of the hedjaz railway,
the Italian regime in Lybia, persecution of Moslems in U.S.S.R. and
French law concerning tlie Berbers in North Africa.
The Congress showed its weakest side when it discussed tne problem
of finances. As' for the expenses of the Congress itself, it 'was
60generally understood that they were paid mainly by tue Indian Caliphate 
Committee, out that a certain sum was paid by the duprene Moslem Council.
Tut in order to facilitate its future activities the Congress
resolved to levy a uniform small tax on all the world Moslem population, 
and besides it take a part of the "Zakat" as well as skins of the sacri­
fices"^* which in practical terms amounted to nothing.
The call for contributions resulted inaa very poor response. The 
biggest one wa3 of LP.IOO^2 - Amir Said al Jazairi gave gift of a gold 57*9601
57. For their names see Darwaza Qp-Cit p.85. From Palestine it included 
the Mufti, Auni abd al Hadi, and ¿aj Taufic ilaranad from iJaolus.
53. Mohammed Ali Aluba, Treasurer, Kaoia al Azrna Assistant Secretary and 
Ta’alahi, Riad al Solh, and Said Shane1 as members.
59. See a. Sadaqa Op-Cit p.150
60. Gibb, The Islamic Congress Op-Cit pp.105-106
61. ’Falastin’ (English version) 12.12.31.
52. ay Ahmad Hilmi,vho according to certain report, was moved to it by the 
Mufti, with nope of making good impression on delegates wao would elect 
, aiw Treasurer. 21.12.31. File S/29 the ii.fi.
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vat e. i  and d r .  C h ar les  Crane ( o f  t h e  d in g - C ra n e  Coi. n is s io n )  s e n t  as h i s  
p r e s e n t  a p i c t u r e  o f  J a m l  a l  d i n  a l - A f g h a n i ° J J
Jut these uere -sorries for the future. At the tine, tne enthusiast* 
and excitement verc great. Though several da legate:? ~ including, it socr.is, 
LCnuxat All hit 1.5elf “ started to be cool tovarda the Congress, and the
[ulti personally, and shoned a riora reserved approach. Tn.is mas the 
result of tue dufti’s behaviour in tne conference and the naans no 
adopted to secure his nomination to tac presidency and the election of 
ais followers.
irof. A. h. il. Gibb renarhs that 'care vas tahen that the Conor a ns
should not assume the appearance of a i’an-Arab rather tnaa a lan-Islan
. ¡.64■gnuicring
J.aauhat All, soetver, ‘bras disappointed at .iO.T fir ah ratner than 
Islamic, tne Congress turned to be"'0 .
lee dufti ana nis Palestinian followers \'crc indeed satisfied ''its. 
the Congress 'resolutions' in uhica politics and religion rare, blinded
together and v.iica \.Tere in accordance vith tne Arab Palestinian*s point
. 46of vi.cn
dost observers agreed at the tire tnat the Congress v;as a success.
6 7G. Antonius rent so far as to describe it in tac following manner ;
It deserves to rank as an cjpoclt-rinlning conference for this reason, if 
for no otner, that for the first tine in centuries doslcn effort uas at 
last found its expression in systematic and business-like organisation ... 
I nave no hesitation in regarding this as potentially the nost important
63 Ine ceremony of presentation vas described in a long letter nfiich 
G. Antonius vrrote to dr. Crane. G.Antonins file 00368 I.O.A.
64. Gibb, I’na Islamic Congress Op-Cit p.107
65. d. C. 6mitli 0ag9it p.249 
.6. '’» --aaaua Op— Cut p.loo
67. In his annual report for 1832 to the Institute of Current dorId Affairs, 
dy Italics. G. Antonius file 00704 I.S.A. This pronouncement seems 
very misplaced in the light of the absolute death of tne Congress 3 
or even 2 years later.
c o n s t r u c t i v e  e f f o r t  arsons o s l e i n  i n  r e c e n t  y e a r s , and one m i c a  i s
f r a u y n t  n i t n  f  a r - r e a c n i n y  po s s i b i l i t i e s "  . Gone t u r e e  lsont.a. n i t e r  t i e
end o f  t e c  C ong res s ,  t i e  p e r m n c n t  e x e c u t i v e  of  tn e  C e n t r e s 3 bo pan o;ar- '
. . GO . 62
a t i o n s .  uranca es  T;ere on cue a m e  1  tie and o u t s i a e  T a l e s t i n e
7n
In  P a l e s t i n e  cacn openin'; o f  a branch m s  a p a r t  of  ¿1 l o c a l  f e s t i v a l  
The Mufti  and T a b a t a b a i ,  t h e  P e r s i a n  s e c r e t a r y  of  tu e  C o n r o s s  m a c u t i v e  
m o  l i v e d  as an e x i l e  in. P a l e s t i n e ,  u s u a l l y  cane fro::: J e r u s a l e m ,  ar.d 
a f t e r  p r a / i n y  i n  t a a  l o c a l  mosque the y mere e n t e r t a i n e d  ay t a e  l o c a l  
n o t a b l e s .
The f r a n c a  c f  t a e  hosier: Congress  m s  t n e n  opened o f f i c i a l l y  i n
a p o p u l a r  yatuorin.;., v i t a  sp ee ch es  ab out  t a e  need t o  r e t u r n  to th e
t r u e  I s la m ,  and t a e  c a l l  f o r  s a c r i f i c e s ,  c o n t r i b u t i o n s  e t c .  O n  th e
71
u u o l e  pe o p l e  v e r e  c o n t r i b u t i n g  y c n e ro u s ly
This  co n t in u in ' ;  a c t i v i t y  c r e a t e d ,  no d o u b t ,  t n c  f e e  l i n y  of  do in;;.
72
and a c h i e v i n g  t u i n y s .  Tue bu re a u  n e t  r e g u l a r l y  “ to d i s c u s s  i t s  v i d c -  
s p r e a d  p l a n s  ( c o n s t r u c t i o n  and r e p a i r s  of  mosques, c s t a ^ l i s a i n y  h o s p i t a l s ,  
c l i n i c s  e t c . , o r y a n i s i n e  s o c i a l  a s s i s t a n c e  t o  t a e  needy and p o o r ,  
en c o u ra y in y  c o - o p e r a t i v e  s o c i e t i e s  e t c . )  m i c a  v.Tc rc  e x p l a i n e d  by T a a a t a m i  
t o  a r . e e t i n y  of  th e  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s  o f  a l l  brancb.es m i c a  n e t  i n  J e r u s ­
alem on 12.3.123373. 3*
I l l
33.  by t h e  end of  1 3 3 2 ,  13 bran ch es  \;ere  opened a l l  over  P a l e s t i n e .
63 .  The p ap er  'Al  J a m i u  a l  Arabiyya*  r e p o r t e d  t n a  c s t a o l i  shneii t  o t  t,.;:
f o l l o v i n y  b r a n d i e s  i n  i t s  fol lovinq; i s s u e s :  1. I n d o n e s i a  4 . 3 . 3 2 .
2 . I n d i a  1 3 . 3 . 3 2 .  I r a q  2 6 . 4 . 3 3 .  3 T r a n s j o r d a n  ( I r h i d - A j l o a n )  £ § . 3 . 3 2
4 .  b e i r u t  Lebanon 4 . 2 . 3 2 .  3 .  L i b e r i a  4 . 1 0 . 3 2 .  6 .  Movaasa f o r  f a s t
A f r i c a  1 0 . 1 0 . 3 2 .  7 .  f e r l i n  Germany 1 . 1 . 3 3 .
7 0 .  f e e  f o r  example t h e  d e s c r i p t i o n  of  opening  t a e  bran ch e s  i n  Lydda.
’Al Jam!ah a l  A r a b iy y a ’ 1 2 . 7 . 3 2 ,  i n  b e e r s h e b a  XUid-2. 3 . 3 2 .  b e i t - M n a ja n
I b i d  2 4 . 1 1 . 3 2 .
71 .  see C . I . D .  r e p o r t  n o . 3 1 / 3 2  of  2 9 . 1 2 . 3 2  TO 3 7 1 / 1 6 9 2 6 .
7 2 .  There v e r e ,  a o v e v e r , rumours o f  s t r o n y  d i f f e r e n c e s  of  o p i n i o n  eo tvocn  t  in
Mufti  and T a b a ta b n i  as r e  y ard  3 met nod of  v e r b  -  Mufti  advocatiu:; open
a c t i v i t y  as a y a i u s t  s e c r e t i v e  n e t  nods p r e f e r r e d  by T a m t a m i .  There v e r c
a l s o  d i f f e r e n c e s  a., o u t  f i n a n c i a l  r d : f a i r s . l e a  d e p o r t s  i n  l i l e s b / T J  6 3/3.)
tu e  M.A.
7 3 .  Tor t a e  f u l l  s p c e c a  and d e s c r i p t i o n  of  t h e  Kieotin;; see * da l a s  t i n ’
1 3 . 3 . 3 2 .
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But the main efforts of the bureau, said Tabatabai, were directed
towards establishing the Al-Aqsa University. Mo'damrnad Ali Aluba wrote
7 4  7 5aii article a^out the intended University and so did Suakib Arslan
The bureau published a manifesto vrhica it sent to Moslem architects
and planners asking them to volunteer and cone to Jerusalem to prepare
76tue plans for the future university
Another manifesto was published a week later, directed to all 
authors, libraries etc., requesting then to donate books for the library 
of the intended university.
At its meeting of IS.11.1932, the Sunreme Moslem Council decided
to participate in covering part of the survey expenses when the university
7 3would open, and to let is use the building of Palace Hotel
hut money was short and the financial position of the Congress became
worse. In January 1933, it was decided to send a delegation to India
79to collect funds for the university
The delegation, composed of the !!ufti Mohammad Ali Aluba and 
assistants left Jerusalem on 5.5.1933^.
After the tour of the Moslem world they returned to Palestine, having 
visited India, Afghanistan, Persia and Iraq. ho announcement was made 74*6
74. 'A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya' 25.8.32.
35. Ibid 22.1.33.
76. 'Al Jamiah al Arabiyya' 15.8.32.
77. Ibid 22.8.32.
73. Ibid 30.11.32. ' later the Hotel itself caused the S.il.C. a fin­
ancial loss as the constructor went bankrupt.
7‘J. Talastin' 14.1.33. I. Darwaza says that the fund were both intended
for the university and for rescue of Arab lands see Darnaza Op-Cit p.86
30. 'Falastin' 6.5.33.
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as to the result of the tour, but it seems they were far from successful^. 
However, the Mufti's followers believed that tne moral effect of the 
delegation's visit was greater than the material benefit. The depar­
ture of the delegation was connected with the report tnat the question
of the Caliphate would be raised at the forthcoming second session, and
32the permanent bureau had to publish a denial^“ saying that the delegation 
would absolutely not discuss the Caliphate issue, and that its only aim 
was to try and establish the A1 Aqsa university before the second 
session; of the Congress.
Uhen the war broke out between Ibn Saud and the Imam of the Yemen
in April 1934, the Congress formed a delegation consisting of the Mufti,
Mohammad Ali Aluba, liashem al Atassi and Amir Shakih Arslan. The
delegation visited Mecca and San'a and their efforts at mediation played
a certain part in-the peace treaty which was concluded a&out the middle
83of June 1934 between the two Arab states
This however, proved to be the swan song of the Congress. The
bureau continued to exist in Jerusalem confining itself to routine
duties, until it also ceased to be.
Observers agree that the failure was because of lack of money and
. . 84the political feud xrith the Washashibis . Darwaza in his summary of 81234
81. The Mufti claimed that their campaign was very successful, that the 
Nizam of liaydarAbad contributed Million Rupees, and that other Indian 
princes undertook to contribute big sums amounting all together to 
several millions (rupees?) but that the British Government put 
obstacles in the delegations' way, so they failed. Amin al Llusseini 
Op.:Cit p.143. I.Darwaza also blames the British and Jewish influence 
as well for the delegations' failure. (According to Darwaza the 
Nizam of EaydarAbad contributed only 100.000 rupees - and not million - 
to be spent under the supervision of the Govjrnmggt^or ggyjhS lgn^ru.*
c?lon^^fcie^Bri^iSrP an^Dy^ionis^prBpaganda, the other reasons given 
for the failure of the delegation were: the obstruction by Shaukat Ali 
because of his opposition to the Mufti, the death of King Feisal of 
Iraq, and the financial crisis.
82. 'Al Jamaih al Arabiyya' 30.5.33.
83. Darwaza 0p~Cit p.86
84. Gibb. The Islamic Congress Qp-Cit p.108
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tne Congress says : "In a moment of exciting splendour the Congress 
organisers really believed that they had succeeded in establishing a 
big Islamic association ... but later the oriental character started to 
assert itself by snoring neglect, ignoring the regulations, deviating
egotism etc., so that the deep and meaningful substance of the Congress
. . 8bwas dissipated and only the frame remained .
r  fyd. Sadaqa"' claims that though many resolutions of the congress 
remained only on paper, it still had a far rescuing influence on iJoslem 
public opinion and stimulated their feeling towards the Palestinian 
problems.
before finishing the chapter, I would like to examine the reactions 
of the Arab Christians of Palestine towards the Congress.
Their views were not uniform. They could not ignore some anti- 
Christian undertones during the proceedings, and the resolution to 
combat missionary activities.
Still, the paper 'al-Camel', which usually opposed the Mufti,
87changed its line 'and explained it by saying that a3 the Mufti -was 
making the Palestine prob1era into a problem of the vmole Arab Moslem world, 
trey should give him their full support. At the end of tie Congress,
O':
the Mufti°sent them a letter of thanks for their support.
On tne other hand, the paper ’Saut al Shaab* of Issa bandak from
33liethlohera, who in general was pro-Mufti, opposed the Congress saying that 
the Palestine problem should remain as an all-Arab problem and should not 
be turned into a Moslem one. The paper also mentioned that many members 
of thh Arab executive expressed their view that the Mufti should leave 
politics and confine himself to religious matters. *89
83. Darea2a Qp-Cit p.85 
•vO■ Gadaqa Op—**xt p.loO
37. 'Al-Carne 1* 7111.31 
33. '1 Camel* 9.1.32
89. 'Saut al Shaab' 23.11.31.
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’- alastin’ supported, on the whole, the congress of the opposition, 
but its English version supported the Moslem Congress.
The Arab Orthodox Conference which met in Jaffa sent the Islamic 
Congress their greetings. In response to an appeal by Ilakhlah Kattan, 
the Chief supporter of the Mufti amongst the Orthodox Arabs, the Moslem 
Congress adopted a resolution to regard the Orthodox question as a part 
of the Arab cuase, and to request the Government to grant the Orthodox 
Community it3 rights in the church and the right of electing an Arab 
Patriarch
It also passed a vote of thanks to the Chiistians of Palestine and 
Transjordan for their sympathy towards itself.
The Mufti could well be satisfied with the Congress results. For 
what it was worth, and ai long a9 its influence lasted the Congress 
enabled him better to organise sympathy towards Palestine, and to enhance 
his personal prestige in the Arab and the Moslem world.
n 90
90. *A1 Jarnaih al Arabiyya* 21.12.31.
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Chapter 12
The Political Issues
The three issues around which revolved the politics of Palestine 
during the British Mandatory regime were those of: (i) The Legislative 
Council and self-government. (ii) Immigration, (iii) The problem of 
land sales. A fourth issue which was important during the early 30's 
was the subject of the Development Scheme.
We shall now examine, in short, each of these problems.
(il The Legislative Council
Article 2 of the Mandate which read "The Mandatory Government shall 
be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative 
and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish 
National Home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of 
self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and 
religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, Irrespective of race 
and religion"*',' imposed on the Mandatory Power three difficult obligations:
1. The establishment of a Jewish National Home.
2. The promotion of self-government.
3. The safeguarding of the civil and religious rights of all 
the inhabitants.
The obligation to promote self-governing institutions was not embodied
2in a separate clause or article , It was lumped together with other 
provisions into one single article. The compression of these three 
obligations into a single article gave rise to intractable difficulties.
It raised the problems of their compatibility and the degree of priority to 
be attached to each one of them. 12
1. Cmd 1785 p.2.
2. Article 3 which read "The Mandatory Power shall, so far as cir curas tances 
permit, encourage local autonomy" refers to the level of Municipal and 
Local Government. See J. Stoyanosky "The Mandate for Palestine" London 
1928 pp.243-7. See also Palestine Report for 1925 Col. No.20 (1926) p.4.
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The fact that in the sphere of central government, the mandatory 
obligation was limited to the development of self-governing institutions 
only, was continuously denounced by Arab leaders as a violation of the 
Covenant. But even when they were prepared - for the sake of argument - 
to accept the Mandate as a legally binding document they maintained that
the provision relating to self-governing institutions had been grossly
3 Uinfringed . This was practically admitted by the Peel Report which said
"Nowhere indeed in all the fields in which the Mandate operates is the
deadlock so complete as in this last field" (of self-governing institutions)"*.
(ii) Immigration
The Hebrew word for immigration into Palestine - Aliyah - means
"ascent", a term derived from the Old Testament where the verb meaning
6"going up" is always used for entry in Palestine .
Aliyah - immigration - was the essence of Zionism. At the end of the 
First World War, the Jews of Palestine were less than ten per cent of the 
whole population. The National Home depended from its beginning on 
immigration from abroad. And it could be stated in the most simple terms - 
no immigration, no National Home.
The enactment of the first Immigration Ordinance^ on 26.8.20 granting
3. See evidence of Arab leaders before the Peel Conmission, Jamal al 
Husseini - The Peel Evidence p.318 Raghab Nashabishi ibid p.336 and others.
4. The Peel Report p.362.
5. For a detailed history of constitutional development in Palestine during 
the 1920*8 see the paper "Notes on Constitutional questions" written by 
Mr. Lloyd - The Colonial Office December 1929 C.O. 733/178/67500.
The Churchill White Paper Cmd 1700 p.20.
6. Esco Op Cit p.349.
7. See the Para "Samuel and Bentwich and their impact on the establishment 
of the Jewish National Home. Darvæa Op. Cit. pp.33-35.
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a quota of 16,500 immigrant Jews for the first year facilitated the 
start of regular immigration.
The Mandate for Palestine which was approved by the Council of the 
League of Nations on 24.7.22 contained 2 articles xjhich specifically 
dealt with immigration. Article 2 and especially article 6 which stated
"the Administration of Palestine....shall facilitate Jewish immigration
9under suitable conditions" .....
Summing up Zionist policy from 1917 to 1939, Arab idealogists^ 
stated that "in the first flush of triumph after the issue of the Balfour 
Declaration, the political Zionists behaved and spoke with the greatest 
frankness.... and even Dr. Weizmann.... spoke of making Palestine as Jewish 
as England is English. The opposition and misgivings which such statements
aroused however caused a change in Zionist tactics.... although no doubt,
they remained faithful to the ideal of a Jewish State, tactically they
thought it best to postpone all other political demands and concentrate
nupon one demand which although essentially political could be disguised \ 
in economic or humanitarian terms: large scale immigration which, if only 
it could be achieved would make possible the achievement of all other 
objects.
(iii) The Land Problem
The first issue being more abstract touched mainly the intelligentsia, 
and meant nothing to the average illiterate fellah. As for immigration, 
the second one, immigrants were seen and heard and therefore were more real 
and more of a problem. But their impact was limited on the Arab urban 
population of the mixed towns, and perhaps in the villages in their immédiate 
surroundings. The third problem, however, was brought to the personal
8. Indeed, with the exception of the year 1925 when there were 33,801 
immigrants, this quota was not reached until 1933. For full numbers of 
the authorized immigration from September 1920 to the end of 1936 see 
table the Peel Report p.279.
9. Cmd. 1785. The Mandate for Palestine p.3.
10. See Arab material submitted to the Anglo-American Committee Op. Cit.
C 13 Zionist Policy 1917-1939.
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notice of almost each fellah even in the remotest village, as wide Jewish 
purchases of land resulted in an acute land hunger^' described thus by 
Hope-Simpson in 1930 "The extent of land hunger is evident from the fact 
that every available plot of soil is cultivated, even when it is so small that 
the plough cannot be employed.
The Arabs well knew that acquisition of land for agricultural settlement, 
has always been held by the Zionists as a necessary pre-requisite for the 
re-birth of the Jewish people.
The first ever organized Arab action against Zionism was a petition
to the Ottoman authorities signed by 500 Arab notables and people in
Jerusalem in 1891, prompted by Jews' purchase of land. The petition which
said "the Jews are taking all the land away from the Moslems, starting to
12control all the commerce and are bringing arms to Palestine" . They saw
how from the small beginning of 1832, when the Jews possessed only 22.530
dunums of agricultural lands, the Jewish-owned area gradually increased to
13420.500 dunums by the end of the first war . At the start of our period of
14study in 1930, it Increased to 1.200.000 dunums , reaching more thar.
151.3QQ+00Q dunums at the end of 1935 , after big purchases specially during
1933-35.
11. Jewish efforts, mostly successful, to disprove the correctness of
this statement are irrelevant. Arabs, even if only as a result of 
political agitation, believed the statement to be true, and as I 
emphasized not the facts, but when man believes them to be, dictate 
conduct. The land hunger was described thus - "There, cultivation is 
carried on with the mattock and the hoe". The Hope-Simpson Report 
Op-Cit. P.14.~T , ,
12. A. Cohen Op-Cit pp.49-50.
13. The J e w i s h  Case b e f o r e  t h e  An^lo-.vEier,i.ca,n Committee o f  Inquiry i n  
Palestine. Statements and Memoranda. Jerusalem 1947. p.339.
14. Evidence of Dr. Ruppin, of the Jewish Agency before the Shaw Commission.
The Shaw Report p.113.
15. The Peel Report p.18.
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This Jewish area, was wore than 1/5 of the cultivable lands of 
Palestine, excluding Beersheva a sub-district, of such grade as to be 
tax assessed for Rural Property tax, and included most of the richer and 
fertile land of the 5 plains of Palestine^.
The Development Schema
But as the result of Jewish policy, not only to acquire ownership of 
the land, but to ensure that - as far as possible - all the work required on 
the land, should be performed by Jews, and in the case of the Jewish 'national 
Fund, (the official land-purchasing agency of the Zionist Organization) by 
Jevs only, it followed, that when land v s  purchased by Jews, net: only was 
the landlord changed, but the tenants, and practically all the wage earning 
class were compelled to move also.
As a result of this policy, a number of Arab villages hal entirely 
disappeared, and have been deleted from the official schedule of villages^.
The problem of land-hunger was brought to the fore by the reports of
l
the Shaw Commission and Sir J. Hopa-3impson and dramatised by the human.
aspect of evict-’ landless Arabs, the most celebrated case of which, in the
13early thirties, wa3 that of kadi Hawareth .
During the years, there grew up a body of landless Arabs. In the
19white Paper of Passfield the Government accepted responsibility for the
settlement of Arab cultivators who were landless. 167*9
16. See Palestine Annual Report for 1934 p.52. See also "Memorandum of 
sales of land3 by A.rabs to Jews", 22.2.36. C.O. 733/272/75072.
17. See Memorandum by L. Andrews, the Development Officer 27.4.34. C.O. 
733/252/37272/1.
IS. For a full description of the case see the files "Jadi llawareth Lands". 
File 190/77182 for the year 1930 File 20Q/37C32 for 1931 file 213/97082 
for 1932 and file 234/17232 for 1333. F.Il.O.G.O. 733.
19. Cind 3692 para 15 p.15. In the Prime-Minister's letter to Dr. Weizraann 
this responsibility was narrowed and defined. See The Prime-Minister's 
letter, para 9 p.2.
t
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Speaking in the House of Commons on 17th November 1930, Dr. Shiels, 
the Under-Secretary for the Colonies said, "The scheme (i.e. the Development 
Scheme) is intended in the first place to provide for those landless Arabs 
who can be shovn to have been dispossessed as a result of land passing 
into Jewish hands, any balance will fee available for both Jewish and Arab
2o
settlement" . As for the funds required for the scheme Dr. Shiels spoke
of a loan guaranteed by the Government of £2.5 millions.
I shall not try to present here a detailed study of how the Arab
21National Movement in Palestine dealt with these 4 issues . I shall,
however, concentrate on the views and activities of the Mufti in that regard.
22Already on January 1930, the magazine "the Christian Century" published
an interview with the Mufti in which he strongly eritized the Balfour
Declaration and demanded the stoppage of Jewish immigration. "it is
impossible to put two swords into the same sheath, likewise it is impossible
to put two people into ona small country."
23Uhen the Arab Delegation reached London towards the end of March 
1930, they presented their customary demands of cessation of immigration 
and land sales, and the establishment of a democratic government. At a 
certain stage, some of the Arab delegates seemed inclined to accept £he 
concessions on immigration and land sales which the Government was ready 
to grant, and to be ready in return to defer their demands for 
constitutional changes.. The more extreme line, however, prevailed and the 
delegation closed the discussions and returned to Palestine. 2013
20. Hansard. Commons. 5th Series Vol.245 Col. 95-6.
21. For a full study of the subject see Part IV of ay wider work Op-Cit.
22. As repated in "A1 Jamiah A1 Arabiyya" 9.1.30.
23. See chapter 6 "the Arab Delegation" 1930.
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2AThe H.C. was trying his best, at that time , to salvage what he 
could from the policy, as laid down by the Passfield's White Paper, 
endeavouring to make the new policy which was going to be laid down by 
the Prime-Minister's letter to Dr. Weizmann, differ from it as little 
as possible.
Discussions were going on then, between Government officials and
Jewish delegates about the Development Scheme.
He therefore suggested that Arab representatives should also be
invited to be present at these discussions in London, claiming that
such an invitation might help to diminish the growing suspicions of the
Arabs as to the intentions of the Government regarding the development 
25policy . And suspicions they were. In consequence of the Prime-Minister's 
letter to Dr. Weizmann, all their previous readiness to co-operate in the 
implementation of the recommendations of Passfield's White Paper changed.
They deduced that their share of the £2.5,000,000 development fund would 
be limited orily to (1) the expenditure required to resettle on the land 
Arabs who have been displaced through their land having passed into Jewish 
hands, and (II) to develop the land in the hill districts, while the wide 
remainder of the £2.5 million will be expanded in land development for 
settlement by the Jews.
"Was it really going to be so", Chancellor wrote, "the confidence
26of the Arabs in the British Government will be lost once and for all" 2456
24. See his long cables of 12.1.31 and 24.1.31 to the Colonial Secretary 
in which he commented on the draft of the P.M.'s letter to Weizmann.
C.O. 733/199/37072.
25. See his cable to the Secretary of State 19.3.31. C.O. 733/210/87402/1 
The discussions in London were agreed on by the Cabinet which also 
decided that "It being understood that these proposals (i.e. the 
Development Scheme) would also be discussed simultaneously with the 
Arabs by the High Commissioner in Palestine. Cab 13(31) 11.2.31.
26. In a private letter to Sir J. Shuckleburgh 1.3.36. C.O. 733/210/87402/1
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Chancellor sincerely wanted a second Arab Delegation to go to London,
but fearing the Government would be reluctant to consider such an idea,
he used another argument - besides that of diminishing the Arabs'
suspicions - to persuade the Government to agree to the Delegation's
coming. He suggested that it might furnish an opportunity for bringing
the leaders of the Jews and Arabs together.
In that connection, it would be useful to examine here Jewish
endeavours to contact Arab leaders. Weizmann, and other Zionist leaders,
were making at the time, quite an effort to meet Arab leaders. All though
1930, when the Arab Delegation was in London during April-May, and then
towards the end of the year, Arab leaders were invited to meet the Zionists
27at a round table conference and refused .
These efforts increased after the publication of the Prime-Minister's 
letter. The Arabic newspaper "Falastin" described it thus: "After 
achieving his victory by obtaining the Frime-Minister's letter, Dr. Weizmann
29plans now to 'consolidate it by reaching an understanding with the Arabs
At the beginning of February 1931, Weizmann announced to Lord Passfield
"his intention of visiting Palestine about Fehruary 26th, in order to try
29and come to terms with the Arab moderates" .
On 17.2.31, Sir S. Wilson - The permanent Under-Secretary at the
Colonial Office wrote to the II.C. Lord Chancellor "of Weizraann's visit.
His primary object, at this juncture, is to arrive at some kind of
understanding with the Arabs, which will form the basis for better
30relations in the future" . 27*930
27. Survey of International Affairs. 1930. p.287. See also Sy ks Or>-ctfc 
p.149.
23. "Falastin" 20.3.31. The paper went on to say that though Weizmann 
met 2-3 leaders of the Syro-Palestine congress in Egypt, no Arab 
would agree to meet him in Palestine with the exception of some known 
traitors.
29. Cab 11(31) 4.2.31.
30. C.O. 733/203/87139.
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Veizmatin's efforts to establish contacts with the Arabs in order
to reach a certain understanding were looked on with favour and encouraged
by the British Government in London. The Inter-Departmental Sub-Committee
of the Cabinet Committee on policy in Palestine recommended that "His
Majesty's Government might consider sympathetically any proposal for a
31round table conference with representative Jews and Arabs" .
32A big part of Dr. Weizmann's visit to Palestine - March 18th to
Earch 31st - was "devoted mainly to the examination of ways and means
33towards reconciliation with the Arabs" . On March 27th he attended a
Joint session of the Jewish Executive and the managing Committee of the
Vaad Leumi on the subject of Arab relations. "He spoke with deep feeling
and earnestness when pressing representatives of the Ylshuv to understand
34that an agreement with the Arabs must be sought and found.
35But all his efforts to contact Arab leaders failed. "The Arab 31245
31. In a memorandum to the Cabinet 7.2.31. C.O. 733/197/87050.V32. The security arrangements of which seemed to worry the British. On the 
25th February 1931, the Colonial Secretary cabled the H.C. in Palestine 
instructing him to take all necessary precautions. The H.C. in turn, 
passed the instruction to the Commandant of Police. C.O. 733/203/87139. 
In a letter of the 10th March 1931, the Air Ministry - which were then 
responsible for security of Palestine - informed the Colonial Office 
that they are "a little alarmed at report that Dr. Weizmann is to visit 
Palestine......It appears to us all the more Important just now in view
of the delicate position in Transjordan vis-a-vis Ibn Sand...... Ibid.
33. Kisch Op-Cit p.394.
34. Ibid p.396.
35. Weizmann intended also to visit Trans-Jordan. A month approximately 
earlier two Jewish leaders, Kol. Kisch the Chairman of the Palestine 
Zionist Executive, and Mr. D. Yellin, visited King Hussein who "sent 
for Abdallah and told him that he should always respect that kinship 
and should do his utmost towards establishing friendly relations between 
the two peoples". Ibid p.387 Arab papers attacked the Jews strongly 
about this visit. See "Falastin" 23.2.31.
Emir Abdallah sent a message that he would welcome Weizmann in Amman, 
but a combined opposition of the Palestine Government, using Weizmann's 
safety as the ground for its refusal to allow the visit - and the Mufti's 
pressure, succeeded in blocking the visit. Kisch Op-Cit P.396.
See also C.O. 733/203/87139.
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moderates", whom he told Lord Passfield, he would try to meet "were simply 
not there". It could be argued that maybe they were afraid, and had. not 
the courage of their convictions to come forward openly, but it seems more 
probable that following the Prime-Minister's letter the moderate camp 
vanished, for the time, at least. Col. Kisch, who was better acquainted 
with local conditions, "read" the situation better and knew that the time 
was ill-suited, he had therefore tried, without success to persuade Weizmann 
to postpone his visit.
Only in Beisan, on 22.5.31 was Weizmann welcomed by some local
3 6notables who brought on themselves the wrath of the Arab press.
However, from Arab reactions to these Jewish efforts, it can be 
deduced that the possibility of a positive response to them by one or more 
Arab leaders, was seriously considered and fought against. The Office of 
the Arab Executive met daily for 3 weeks - except Fridays and Sundays with
"their main business, was to watch Weizmann's movements and to see that he
* 37does not meet leading Arabs" .
The decision of the Executive Committee passed at its meeting of the 
382nd March ,"to refuse totally and completely any contact with the Zionists", 
was mentioned almost daily in the press. In another declaration to the Arab 
people, on the 24th March, the Executive forbade any contact with 
Dr. Weizmann, saying it would not hesitate to publish in public the name of 
any Arab whoever he may be, who would betray his people by meeting Weizmann. 3678
36. See "Al-Jamiah al Arabiyya" 25.3.31. 18 notables of Hebron wrote a
mazbata inviting Weizmann to visit Hebron and meet them. This move was 
initiated by the opposition elements. Because of the strong opposition 
to it, the visit did not takes.*>lace. Ibid 22.11.31.
37. A letter from Chancellor to Passfield 24.3.31. C.O. 733/203/87139.
See also "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" 24.3.31.
38. For account of the meeting see 3797:65 I.S.A. At that meeting the 
Arab Executive decided also to establish an "Arab National Fund"
(Sanduk al Fmraa) which was to serve as its financial organ with the 
aim of preserving Arab lands and keeping them in the hands of their 
Arab cultivators. For the activities of the Fund see Chapter 12 in my 
wider work Qp-Cit.
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The most active in this respect was "Al Jamiah A1 Arabiyya", the Mufti's
39paper. In a series of articles , it cautioned against Jewish evil devices
such as round table conference etc., the aim of which was to convince the
Arabs to give in to the "fait accompli" of the policy of the Prime-Minister's
letter, and to save the Zionist from the terrible crisis - financial and
general - in which they found themselves because of the Arab opposition.
"On March 13th the Mufti of Hebron, acting on a general instruction
from the Mufti of Jerusalem, delivered a sermon Insisting that no
negotiations with the Zionists should be undertaken"^0. Similar sermons,
no doubt, were preached all over Palestine.
The result - as expected - was that Weizmann did not meet any Arab 
i  ^ 41leader.
The half-hearted attempt of the H.C., who was asked by the Colonial
Secretary "to do all he could to help Weizmann establish friendly relations
42between Jews and Arabs" failed too. He - like Kisch - was of thé opinion
l
that Weizmann's visit was very ill-timed and he was very reluctant to 
arrange the meeting.
Having failed in arranging a meeting in Palestine he now proposed
sending an Arab Delegation to London where opportunities of bringing Arab
43and Jewish leaders together were better. 394012
39. "A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya" 13.3.31, 19.3.31, 20.3.31, 22.3.31, 25.3.31,
27.3.31.
40. Kisch On-Cit P.394
41. But when the fact that the Mufti left for Egypt on 16th March 1931, 
started a wave of all sorts of rumours and speculation by the opposition 
paper Al Carmel, there were people who "explained it by the Mufti's 
desire to be quite safe against any accusations that he secretly met 
Weizmann. Ibid p.393.
42. C.O. 733/203/87139.
43. Chancellor also cabled Passfield on 23.3.31 informing him that Weizmann 
Agreed to the proposal that Arab representatives should be invited to 
London to participate in the talks. Ibid.
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Accordingly, he was authorised by the Colonial Secretary to sound
Arab leaders as to whether an invitation to London would be acceptable 
44to them .
The Mufti's paper, "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" stated its belief that 
a delegation to London would not be of any use but would damage Arab 
interests^ .
The Executive Committee met on 14.4.31 under the presidency of Musa
Kazim and decided against sending a delegation to London. It agreed,
however, to participate in the discussions about the Development Scheme
46in Jerusalem but not together with Jewish delegates
All Arab papers, in differing degrees, welcomed the Executive
Committee's decision. MA1 Jamiah al Arabiyya" set the tone when it 
47stated that "acceptance of the Government's invitation to send a 
delegation to London would have meant an Insult to the nation's honour, 
and desertion from its principles and ideas. The discussions in London
l
would have constituted the second stage in which only the Development 
Scheme, would be discussed. The first stage, in which the political 
issues - on basis of which the development policy would be decided - were 
discussed, was won by the Jews with the Prime-Minister's black letter to 
Dr. Weizmann, so no good would come to the Arabs from accepting the 
Government's invitation".
43On the 16th April 1931, the H.C. met Arab leaders . They submitted 
to him the resolution adopted by the Executive Committee meeting of the 
14th April and requested that a copy of it dated 15.4.31 would be transmitted 
to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 45678
44. In a cable 31.3.31. C.O. 733/210/87402/1.
45. "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" 12.4.31.
46. For a full secord of the meeting and a full text of the decisions, see 
file 3797:65 I.S.A. See also "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" 15.9.31.
47. "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" 15.4.31.
48. Those present were the members of the Arab delegation to London in 
1930 - except A. Rock. For a description of the meeting see C.O. 
733/210/87402/1.
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The H.C. tried to persuade them to change their resolution but
failed. The Mufti himself did not express his opinion during the meeting
but it should he noted that 3 out of the 5 members of this delegation
which met the H.C., were during the Executive Committee meeting in favour
49of sending the delegation to London . The fact that they followed a more
firm line during the meeting testifies to their belief that the general
Arab mood at the time, was on the whole - in favour of such a hard line.
Feelings still ran high and the temper of the Arab population was bitter
and excited, with lots of rumours circulating about the Jews buying big
50plots of land and of further evictions of Arab tenants.
The position taken by the Arab leaders in this meeting was widely
praised by the Arab press. "Al Jamiah A1 Arabiyya", the most critical -
at the time - of the Arab Executive wrote "Not since its election in the
Seventh Arab Congress, was the posture and the status of the Arab Executive
so honourable as at its last meeting with the H.C. when it refused to
concede to him and accept his suggestion to send a delegation to London.
This refusal is a big victory to the national cause"5*-.
Emir Abdallah of Trans-Jordan wa3 then visiting Jerusalem and it was
rumoured that he was summoned by the H.C. in an effort to try and influence
the Executive to change its mind regarding the delegation. Even were it so,
52the Palestinians were not in a mood to be influenced by him. 495012
49. Mousa Kazim al Husseini, Jamal al Husseini and Auni abd el Hadi. Also 
Y. Farraj from among the officers of the Executive was for it. Only
I.Darwaza the fifth member of the office voted for the other resolution, 
which he himself proposed. The Mufti and R. Nashashibi the other 2 
leaders who saw the H.C. were not members of the Executive.
50. For Arab views of the land problem at the time and Arab resentment 
against further Jewish purchase of lands, see the article "Wadi Kaabani 
after Wadi Hawaret '. "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" 22.4.31.
51. Ibid 23.4.31. See also issue of 19.4.31.
52. "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" went even so far as to caution the Emir by 
praLsing him as a clever and experienced leader who would certainly not 
embark on such a venture as trying to influence a people against a 
fateful resolution of the Executive - its recognized leadership - as 
such a foolish step would be strongly resented by the people themselves.
20.4.31.
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On the 21st April, the H.C. communicated to the Secretariat of the
Arab Executive an outline of the Development Scheme. An urgent meeting 
53was convened that night at the house of Musa Kazim the President of the 
Executive. Besides him it was attended by the three joint secretaries of 
the Executive, Auni Abd El Hadi, Jamal al Husseini and Mugannam Mugannam, 
and the 2 national leaders outside the Executive, the Mufti, Haj Amin, 
the President of the S.M.C. and Ragheb Nashashibi the Mayor of Jerusalem. 
The general view was that the Development Scheme in the form presented by 
Government, would not be in favour of the Arabs, and therefore there should 
not be any official discussion. But at the same time it was agreed that 
the three secretaries of the Executive should meet the next day the H.C. 
and speak with him in their personal capacity. The Mufti did not oppose 
this decision.
This meeting during which the Arab leaders offered their comments on
54the outline of the Development Scheme, took place on 22.4.31, but when 
a communique"^ was published on 24.4.31 on the discussions, about the 534
53. The invitations were sent through the telephone. For 'record' of the 
meeting see what was said about it by the three joint secretaries at 
the Executive Committee's meeting of 16.8.31, 3797:65 I.S.A. See also 
the interview given by the Mufti and published in "Al Jamiah al 
Arabiyya" 21.8.31. The Mufti gave this interview in order to deny the 
hints published in "Al Carmel" of 19.8.31 to the effect that he agreed 
to hold the discussions with the Government. But he did not comment
on what Mugannam said during the Executive Committee that the Mufti did 
not oppose their going to speak with the H.C. in their personal capacity.
54. Arab papers did not report then on the contents of the meeting. For a 
full description of the meeting see Chancellor's cable to the Col.Sec.
22.4.31, C.O. 733/210/87402/1 and the record of the Executive 
Committee's meeting of 16.8.31. File 3797:65 I.S.A. It is significant 
that these discussions were kept secret even from the members of Arab 
Executive Committee who were informed of them only about 4 months later.
55. For text of the communique, see C.O. 733/210/87402/2. The communique 
was published as a result of Jewish insistence. The representatives of 
the Colonial Office In the Inter-Departmental Committee which directed 
the discussions with the Jews, objected to it but had to give in. See 
minute by J. Shackburgh, 28.4.31 Ibid.
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Development Scheme, with Arab delegates In Jerusalem and Jewish delegates
in London, the Executive bureau fearing an outcry immediately retreated
5 6and published a statement in which it denied having any official 
discussions with the Government.
From the above it could be seen that the extreme line adopted by the 
Mufti, even though expressed indirectly in his mouth-piece "A1 Jamiah A1 
Arabiyya" (as he did not pronounce himself openly in this matter), prevailed 
against the views of the Secretariat of the Arab Executive with Musa Kazim, 
Jamal Husseini and Auni Abd el Hadi aided perhaps by, the behind the scenes 
influence of Emir Abdallah and the open efforts of the H.C. But perhaps 
on this occasion his hard line proved to be the right one, and the sober 
and moderate views of the Executive Secretariat, had they been followed, 
would have not brought the Arabs any real fruit. Because, in the meantime, 
the Jews in London were using all their influence and able diplomacy to 
achieve what was described by the H.C. Chancellor in the following words: 
"The policy of the Jewish Agency has all thetimt been to postpone the 
operations of the Development Commission, until the Jews are in a position 36*
36 " F a l a s t i n "  2 5 . 4 . 3 1 .  The Executive bureau repeated its denial in
a special interview which they had for that reason with the H.C. on
26.11.31 even though it was a Sunday. They protested strongly
against the publication of the communique which made it appear as
if official negotiations were then in progress with the Arab
Executive while they emphasized - "during the previous contacts they
had expressed their personal opinion only and had not spoken in their
official capacity.
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to take advantage of them and to prevent the settlement of any Arabs on
57any land that may be available" . The Agency succeeded also in blocking
the appointment of Sir John Hope-Simpson as the director of the Development
58Scheme though he was strongly backed by the H.C. Sir John Chancellor,
egand was regarded as the best available man by the Colonial Secretary.^
In his place, Lord Pasifield selected Lewis French, formerly
Chief Secretary in the Punjab, who was appointed as the Director of
Development and left for Palestine in August 1931. His duties were
described in a lengthy dispatch.^
The Arab Executive met on the 16th and 17th August, following the
61strike which was declared by the Arab Congress of Nablus , all over 
Palestine, on the 15th, as a protest against the Government's arming of 
the Jewish Colonies.
The meeting was presided over by Musa Kazlm and attended by 32 members
62with 2 additional persons representing the Nablus Congress. The discussions 
were excited and heated and all along the extremist opinion prevailed. 57896012
57. In a letter to Williams of the Colonial Office 10.5.31 C.O. 733/210/ 
87402/2. For other manifestations of the Jewish influence in action see 
letter by Malcolm MacDonald member of the Inter-Departmental Committee 
to Sir S. Wilson of the 10th July 1931 where he writes "This is simply 
an expression of my alarm at what had happened" (i.e. the publication
of the development scheme before the Zionist Congress, thus weakening 
the position of Weizmann. Because of that, the publication was actually 
delayed until after the Congress) "and of my belief that the situation 
will never improve as long as the administration in Jerusalem so 
consistently ignores Jewish susceptibilities", and another letter by the 
Prime Minister Ramsey MacDonald to the Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield 
of the 30th July 1931. Very revealing in that respect are also the 
Minutes written in that file by Shuckburgh and Williams. Commenting on 
the fact that the Jews put pressure - using him the P.M. Shackburgh 
wrote In a minute to Sir S. Wilson on 25.9.31 "it is embarrassing to say 
the least of it, that we should be obliged.... to send another message 
to the Acting HightCommissioner saying (in effect) that we dare not do 
something because the Jews don't like it. But I hardly see how it is to 
be helped." Bbid.
58. See record of his conversation with the Secretary of State. 7.5.31.
59. See his letter to the Prime Minister C.O. 739/87050/2. 30.4.31. Ibid.
60. See despatch of Secretary of States for the colonials to the High 
Commissioner of Palestine No.487 of 26th June 1931, C.O. 733/211/87402. 
The dispatch was incorporated in the Hansard, House of Commons. Co. 1060:
64. 20.7.31.
61. For the Arab Congress of Nablus see Chapter 15.
62. For record of the discussions and the resolutions see file 3797:65 I.S.A. 
See also "Al-Hayat" 18.8.31 and "A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya" 18.8.31.
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The 3 joint secretaries of the Executive who met at the time the H.C. 
came under very strong fire, and all their explanations that no official 
discussions were held, were of no avail. They were even criticised - 
which was not usual in Arab circles, by some of their close associates. 
Sheikh Muzaffar even demanded the resignation of the Secretariat of the 
Arab Executive. The meeting rejected the Development Scheme.
The second session also was governed by a spirit of bitter discontent 
with the Government's policy of arming some of the Jewish colonies. The 
speakers' general tenor was distrust of the Government and a demand for a 
vigorous measure of opposition to its policy, even to the extent of civil 
disobedience. Jamal Husseini proposed that the Executive should publish a 
manifesto to the people calling on them to arm in order to defend themselves. 
The meeting then passed several political resolutions of an extrema nature.
The problem of the Development Scheme continued to be discussed by Arab 
leaders among themselves and in formal and informal contacts with the
Vauthorities.
On 18th September 1931, Musa Kazim sent to the Officer administering
the Gove5nment a long memorandum presenting the Arab Executive's answer to
64the Development Scheme.
The new H.C., Sir A. VJanchope met the officers of the Executive 
Secretariat and dismissed with them the Scheme.^
o3. Jamal al Husseini's appearance that day at the Executive Committee's 
meeting marks actually a turning point in his political views. Until 
then he was perhaps one of the strongest advocates, among Arab leaders, 
for co-operation with the British. After that he started to follow a 
more extreme line until he reached tie stage when the H.C. Sir A. IJanchape 
described him as "the most honest but mo3t fanatical among all Arab 
leaders. C.O. 733/236/17313. Perhaps the issue of the arming of the 
Jews really moved him, but it can be safely assumed that the strong 
criticism directed against him one day earlier, for his readiness to 
co-operate with the Government played an Important role in this change.
64. For a full text see C.O. 733/211/87402.
65. For a description of the meeting see C.O. 733/214/97049/Pt.2.
199
The Arab Executive Committee discussed the subject again in its 
meeting on 6.3.32 and decided to reject the Government proposal to- 
form an ad hoc Committee to consider and attempt to settle the problem 
of finding other lands for the settlement of the Wadi Hawareth Arabs.
Actually, the problem of settling the Wadi Hawareth Arabs was the 
most pressing one facing the Director of Development. Being the most 
striking case - and perhaps one of the very few real ones * of dispossessed 
landless Arabs, their re-settlement, minutely planned, was to be the 
striking proof of the sincerity of the Government's intentions.
Schemes of re-settlement costing, with the land, more than £62,000 
were prepared at Tell-esh-Shauk and adjoining lands in the Beisan area.
In addition the H.C. authorised special expenditure for preliminary 
tractor ploughing and land improvement. Work was commenced on 1st April, 
1933, and by 31st August 1933, the major portion of the area was ready 
for occupation. In order that the Arabs (the Wadi Hawareth Arabs) would 
have food for their subsistence and fodder for their animals during the 
winter of 1933/34, a quantity of millet and dura was grown on the 
Tel-esh-Shauk Estate, to be harvested by them on their arrival. But they 
never - arrived there. Preferring to stay near their original habitat, they 
refused to take up the land and be re-settled. And though they were 
encouraged in this by extremist agitators both from the Istiqlal party and 
the Communists^, it can be safely assumed that the real reason was, that 
they obtained there a living, many of them by being employed in the 
neighbouring Jewish colonies. 67
66. For a report of the meeting see 3797:65 I.S.A.
67. See the C.I.D. Periodical Appreciation Summaries No.17/33 of
20.6.33, No.18/33 of 7.7.33 and No.19/33 of 21.7.33. F.O 371/66926.
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After Mr. French submitted his reports to the Government copies
of them were given on 13.6.72 both to the Arab Executive and the Jewish
69Agency which were asked to offer their observations to the H.C.
A Jewish intelligence report^ states that the French reports were 
discussed shortly after in an informal gathering of Arab leaders in the 
Mufti's house. The Mufti expressed his view that the Arabs should oppose 
the reports even only 33 a tactical move as it would compel the Government 
to propose to them better conditions.
The Arab Executive Committee met on 9.9.32 and again on 28.9.32^.
All the speakers who discussed the French reports opposed them strongly 
and the meeting - on Izzat Darwazafs proposal decided:
(I) to reject the Development Scheme because of its 
detrimental effects oi the Arabs.
(II) to ask the authorities to prohibit the sale of land 
to Jews. 689701
68
68. The fir3t on 23.12.31 and a supplementary one of April 20th 1932. See 
C.O. 733/211/87402. The reports on the whole were pro-Arab. For a 
pro-Arab evaluation of them, see Jeffries Or>-Cit pp.367-8. The Jews 
did their best to try and prevent the publication of the French reports 
or at least "those parts which expressed views on policy incompatible 
with the P.M.*s letter to Dr, Weizmann and which went beyond
Mr. French's terms of reference". See letter from M. Macdonald to 
the Col. Sec. P. Cunliffe-Lister 22.4.32, record of Interview between 
Cunliffe-Lister and Dr. Brodesky 29.4.32, Sokolov's cable to 
Cunliffe-Lister 8.5.32 and Brodesky's letter to Parkinson 13.5.32.
C.O. 733/214/97049/2. However, "the French investigations, if they 
did not quite, as is sometimes suggested, dispose of the "landless 
Arab" as a myth, certainly established that far fewer Arabs had been 
dispossessed than had been suggested". Great Britain and Palestine 
1915-1945 Information Paper No.20. R.I.I.A. London 1964. The real 
contribution of the French reports to future developments was negligible.
69. They were also asked to treat the reports in the meantime, as strictly 
confidential.
70. See report dated 27.6.32, File 6/32 the H.A. No other source, however, 
mentions this meeting.
71. For record of the meetings see file 3797:65 I.S.A.
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(III) To ask the authorities to stop Jewish immigration entirely.
(IV) To declare a general strike on November 2nd (the anniversary 
of the Balfour Declaration), and to protest on that day 
against Jewish immigration and sale of lands to Jews.
But then the meeting discussed hotly for more than 2 hours those 
passages in the French Report, which stated that members of the Arab 
Executive and Supreme Moslem Council sold land or acted as agents. All 
speakers demanded that the Executive Committee should purge itself of the 
traitors, and called for the convening of the Eight Congre&s. The meeting 
then elected a committee consisting of Auni Abd El Hadi, Sheikh Muzaffar 
and Izzat Darwaza to investigate the allegation that members of Arab
72Institutions sold land to Jews and to submit a report within three months.
The observations of the Arab Executive Committee on the French Report
73were submitted on 10.3.33. The memorandum written by Auni Abdal Hadi 
concluded "It is considered that the fundamental object of the Development
l
Scheme will be to allot additional lands to Jewish immigrants and to continue 
the present "direct rule" for tens of years. In these circumstances the 
Arab Executive Committee feels it incumbent upon itself to reject the 
proposed scheme".
The Jews, for their own reasons, rejected the scheme too, so the H.C.
wrote to the Colonial Secretary on 15.4.33 what actually amounted to a
recommendation to shelve the scheme because of its rejection by both Arabs
and Jews, and because of financial considerations.
On 22.6.35 the Development Scheme - achieving very little* was finally 
74terminated . Before we complete our study of the Development Scheme we 
should examine the Mufti's role in it. Though he was not involved in this 7234
72. This decision could perhaps count partly for the fact that the Executive 
Committee did not meet for another year and then it met for the last time 
on 8.10.33. As for the investigation and the report I never came across 
any further mention of them.
73. For a full text see C.O. 733/231/17249.
74. See letter of the Col. Office to the Treasury 22.6.35 Ibid.
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matter directly his paper A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya, reflecting his line and 
expressing, no doubt, his views was leading the fight against it since 
its initiation through all its stages. The paper fought against any 
contact with Dr. Weizmann and the Jaws, it opposed strongly sending a 
delegation, to London and it was against accepting the Development Scheme.
Later, the publication of those passages in the French report concerning 
the complicity of certain Arab personalities in Jewish purchases of land 
supplied the Mufti's camp with good arguments against the opposition.
All through that period, the Arab Executive led and directed Arab 
moves with regard to the 3 other issues. Little by little, however, the 
Mufti, who was mainly active until then behind the scenes, started to 
act openly.
The economic position of the fellahin continued in the meantime to be 
deplorable and Arab papers complained of the worsening situation^**. The 
High Commissioner described how his visits through the country made him
X
realise the extreme poverty of the fellahin where many lost half their 
flocks through starvation, and he spoke of the general hopelessness which 
prevailed in each community. And remarking about the relation of politics 
and the economic situation the H.C. said that the plea that Government had 
done little for the fellahin was widely held, and that it was inevitable 
under such circumstances that the fellahin should be ready to believe anyone 
who told them that the Government wa3 to blame for their unhappy situation.
The H.C. then commented dryly "Well does Haj Amin know the Arabic proverb 
that the Sultan's worst enemy is the empty belly of the Fellah"^. 756
75. See article on the economic situation of the fellah "al Yarmuq"
10.10.32.
76. In a letter to the Colonial Secretary. 5.3.32. C.O. 733/217-97072.
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The Mufti asked to see the High Commissioner before the letter's 
going to Geneva and was granted an interview on 1st October 1932^. He 
opened by saying that the two main questions about which the Arabs were 
exercised were immigration and the sale of land, and in view of the 
Government's negative attitude on these two questions, the Arabs would not 
collaborate with the Government. The Arabs maintain, he said, that by the 
entrance of 200,000 Jews and by the purchase of 1.5 million dunums of the 
most fe rtile  land in the country, the Jewish National Home had already 
been achieved. He suggested a law on the lines of the 5 feddan law in 
Egypt, which would conserve 150 dunums for each tenant in the h ill country 
or 20 dunums in the Citrus area.
He complained that there were many villages, where formerly the 
people had plenty of land, but which had become dispossessed to great 
extent, mentioning as example Umm Khaled and Ghor Zeldan near Tulkarm.
He cautioned the H.C. about the growing strength of the extreme 
"Independence" party which was gaining ground daily, because of the 
continued immigration and sale of land. In confidence and shame he 
admitted to the H.C. that even a member of the S.M.C. was acting as 
broker in land sale to Jews.
Well could the Mufti complain of the increasing Influence of the
78Istlq lal Party. Ever since i t  was formed in August 1932 , i t  had
been making diligent preparations to Increase its activity and popularise
its cause using the issues of land sales and immigration. In each of
79its public declaration it  strongly emphasized "the terrible danger of 
annihilation facing the Arab nation in Palestine by the continuing 
process of the alienation of its land". 789
77. C.0.733/217/97072 pt.2.
78. Darwaza Op-Cit p.103.
79. See its declaration for the Nablus conference on the occasion of 
2nd November the anniversary of the Balfour declaration, Darwaza 
Op-Cit pp.311-314. See also its comments on the H.C. report to 
the P.M.C. in Geneva. "A1 Jamiah al Arablyya" 17/1/1933.
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With the advent of Hitler to power in January 1933, Zionist ismigration
policy grew more extreme and Zionist propaganda became more urgent and
insistent, appealing almost irresistibly to the humanltarlanlsm of English 
80people . Though the fu ll terrifying results of the anti-Jewish Nazi
policy became apparent only years later, there was an immediate effect of
81an increased pressure of Jews to immigrate to Palestine .
The Arab agitation, therefore, against immigration and sale of lands
became more and more acute, and under its pressure, Musa Kazim convened
a non-party assembly in Jerusalem on 24.2.1933. It was attended by 
82approximately 60 leaders - a ll the "Who's Who" in Palestine Arab 
83 84politics . The assembly was marked by the extremism of its 
pronouncements. The influence of extremist opinions was so strong 
throughout the meeting that even the members of the opposition who were 
regarded as moderate, advocated non-payment of taxes and c iv il disobedience 
with Fahrl Nashablshl making one of the most violent speeches, calling for 
non-cooperation and c iv il disobedience and the issue of a warning to the 
Government. ' 801234
80. As was clearly evident by the spirit and tone of the debates in the 
House of Commons on 3.4.1933 and 13.4.1933.
81. According to a telegram from Sir H. Rumbold (British Ambassador in 
Berlin and later Vice-Chairman of the Peel Commission) dated 5th April 
1933, between 1st March and 4th April the Passport Office at Berlin 
received about 2500 applications for visas for Palestine (See C.O. f i le  - 
Immigration from Germany C.O. 733/236/17313/3 P t.I) as against a previous 
annual average of about 500. Arab writers, however, claimed that the 
relationship between the establishment of the Nazi regime in Germany
and the increase In the number of Jewish Immigrants into Palestine was 
not perhaps as simple as has been generally believed. They pointed 
to the fact that in 1933 the number of immigrants from Germany was only 
5,392 as against 13,125 from Poland. (The Peel Report p.82) and that 
Poland continued to be the main source of Jewish immigration until 1937. 
See material presented to the Anglo-American Commission Op Clt Chap. 
Immigration. See also John al Hadawl Op Clt p.242
82. The organizers claimed that 150 attended.
83. With the exception of Ragreb Nashabishi who had, it  seems, a 
political illness.
84. For a fu ll description of the assembly see "al Jamlah al Arabiyya 
25.2.33". See also Daily Intelligence Sumaary No. 39/33 of 25.2.1933 
C,0. 733/234/17272 and C.I.D. Periodical Appreciation Report
No. 7/33 of 28.2.1933 F.O. 371/16926.
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The morning session, however, resulted in a division, not on
principles about which a ll agreed - and i f  there was (me who differed he
kept i t  to himself * but on a technical point. A few days before the
assembly was held, the H.C. had accepted the request of Musa Karim to
grant an Interview to a deputation of the assembly. But during the
morning session, most of the Husseinis led by Jamil Husseini opposed the
suggestion to send a deputation to see the H.C. as i t  would be fruitless.
A strange coalition, however, composed of Musa Kazlm, the Nashablshls
85and the Istlqlalists assisted perhaps by the Mufti himself, won the
day and during the lunch break the deputation under the Chairmanship of 
86Musa Kazim went to see the H.C.
87The deputation expounded to the H.C. the views of the assembly 
on the problems of the sale of lands and on immigration. 8567
85. See semiofficial letter from Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister
25.2.1933 in which, after mentioning the strong opposition of 
the assembly to send a deputation, he wrote "However, the views 
of Muza Kazlm and the Mufti prevailed that it  would be unwise to 
sever connection with the Government" C.O. 733/234/17272.
86. With aunt aled al Hadl, Mughannam Mughannam, Omar Bitar, Rashid 
Hij Ibrahim, Fahml Abboushl, Issa Bandack and Hamdi Nabulsi as 
members. It  should be noted that 3 out of the seven were 
members of the Istlqlal part which was very active In the 
assembly as a whole and in particular in the division about 
the deputation. See Darwaza 0i> Clt p .lll .
87. For a fu ll description of the interview and the text of 
the Assembly’ s resolution, see the H.C.*8 letter to the 
Colonial Secretary 4.3.1933 C.O. 733/234/17272.
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The H.C. was very firm in his answer and stated definitely that he 
did not contemplate prohibiting the sale of lands to the Jews and Jewish 
immigration« at the same time he promised that every effort was being 
made to put a stop to illegal immigration.
The H.C.'s answer was bitterly resented at the afternoon session 
(in which the Mufti did not participate having retired for the Friday 
prayers). It  was decided to cancel certain parts of the resolution 
passed in the morning and also the declaration of a strike on 5th March« 
considering these to be inadequate means of expressing the disapproval 
of the Arabs.
89The assembly also resolved to hold another meeting at Jaffa on
26 March in which the attitude to be adopted by the Arabs towards the
Government would be decided.
90The Arabic papers praised the assembly and its resolutions and
criticized the o ffic ia l communique, giving the text of the H.C.'s
reply which was issued on 25th February.
As the assembly in Jaffa was going to discuss the decisive question
of adopting a policy of non-cooperation with the Government, it  was to
be an Important occasion in the political l i fe  of Arab Palestine and was
91even referred to as the "Eighth Congress" *
It  was preceded by some precautionary Government steps. The H.C.
92 93asked and received authority to enact certain provisions to enable 
him to deal with instigation not to pay taxes. 890123
88. In a letter to Parkinson dated 4.3.1933, the H.C. stated that he 
did not anticipate anything very dreadful resulting from the 
intended assembly on 26.3*1933, and that though the inclination
to refuse a ll cooperation with Government was gradually strengthening, 
he did think that the Arabs were sufficiently united to adopt a 
successful policy of disobedience or refusal to pay taxes. Ibid.
It should be noted that the Colonial Secretary informed the H.C. 
twice that he approved of the firm language used by the H.C. during 
this interview in a semi-official letter dated 13.3.1933 and in an 
o ffic ia l one 23.3.1933.
89. See "Al Jamlah al Arabiyya" 26.2.1933.
90. See Arab papers 26-28.2.1933.
91. See The Palestine Rebellion 1936 (Tawrat Falastin 1936) compiled by
the "Al Jamiah al Islamiyya" Jaffa 1936 p .li.
92. See Cable to Colonial Secretary 25.3.1933 C.O. 733/234/17272.
93. See Cable from O&lftnlal Secretary No. 62 27.3.1933 Ibid.
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During the second week of March, the Army, R.A.F. and Police carried
out some operations in the North of Palestine which were referred by the 
94Arabs as being precautions against any trouble occurring during or after 
the meeting of 26th March.
It was also preceded by some Arab efforts, mainly by Haj Taufic Hammad 
from liablus to remove differences between the Arab parties and to re-unite 
the political forces.
These efforts failed, apparently because the Husselnis being sure 
of being supported by the Arab public, refused to accede to the Nashablshi 
demands, and Insisted on participation in the Eighth Congress only on the 
basis of elections.
95Another reason was because both sides believed that Haj Taufic Hammad's 
object was to regain his lost prestige and to try to transfer the centre of 
the National activities to Nablus.
Some preliminary meetings were held, some in secret, at Haifa, Nablus,
' 96
Jenin, Jaffa dnd Jerusalem and on 21.3.33 the Arab Executive published a 
statement to the nation stating ” the general tendency by Jews to take 
possession of the lands of this Holy country and their streaming into it  
by hundreds and thousands through legal and illegal means has terrified the 
country” and ending ” the country calls on its sons for action and sacrifice 
in these hard times. Anyone who disregards its call is a deserter and he 
who does not work with his nation is not one of i t ” .
The invitations to the assembly were sent out by the Arab Executive. 9456
94. See C.I.D. Summary Report No.10/33 of 25.3.33 F.O. 371/16926.
95. See C.I.D. Summary Report No.11/33 of 1.4.33 Ibid.
96. "A1 Jamiah al Islamiyya” 22.3.33
208
The assembly was attended by about six hundred persons, townsmen and
villagers of a ll classes and parties. A ll of them identified - more or
less * with the three main parties, the largest one being supporters of
the Mufti, the Nashashibis and the Istiqlal party.
97Jamal al HAsseini opened the assembly in the name of the Chairman 
Musa Kasim and explained the objects as being to discuss non-co-operation, 
Jewish immigration and sale of lands. However, these questions became 
of secondary importance and the assembly was turned into a scene of 
undignified party conflict with delegates and speakers insulting each other 
aid almost exchanging blows.
The Istiqlal party, who perhaps cared more for the political issues, 
confined themselves to their proposals which were submitted by Auni abd
al Hadi but they delivered no speeches and took no part in the discussions,
98attracting l it t le  attention. The opposition, headed by Fahrl Nashabishi, 
appreciating that the Mufti - in his desire to maintain his good relations
l
with the H.C. and the Government, was unlikely to agree to non-co-operation, 
and wishing to embarrass him by exposing him to the public as a Government 
supporter unfit to be a leader, came out strongly in support of non- 
co-operative measures as a means of uniting with the Istiqlal party against 
the Mufti. With the policy itse lf, i t  can clearly be assumed, they in fact, 
were not concerned.
Already the second speaker, Abdul Ghani Sinan from Jenin asked that 
both the Mufti and Ragheb Nashabishi should commence the campaign of non- 
co-operation by tendering their resignation from their respective posts. 978
97. For a fu ll description of the assembly see "Al Jamlah al Arabiyya"
27.3.33, 29.3.33 and "Al Jamiah al Islamiyya" 23.3.33. See also 
Darwaza Op Cit pp.111-112. See also Enclosure I I I  to the H.C.'s 
letter to the Colonial Secretary 1.4.33. C.O. 733/234/17272 and the 
C.I.D. Periodical Appreciation summaries No.10/33 dated 25.3.33 and 
No.11/33 dated 1.4.33 F.O. 371/16929.
98. With Raghab Nashabishi again having one of his political sicknesses.
So apparently had Hassan Shukri, the Mayor of Haifa, but they both 
telegraphed their agreement with the deliberations of the meeting.
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Sheikh Sabri Abdin declared that he favoured non-co-operation, on 
condition that the whole nation should take part in its execution.
However, he pointed out that religious bodies had nothing to do with 
non-co-operation. No Moslem he said would agree to his religious leaders 
withdrawing from their religious posts.
After some speakers who did not touch this subject, Ahmed al Shukairi,
99who like his father Asiad Shukair hated the Mufti, but unlike him was not 
a moderate at a ll, returned to the subject of resignations. He emphasized 
the inactivity of the leaders and their lack of sacrifice, quoting the 
examples of Ghandi and Mustafa Nahas. He spoke in favour of non-co-operation 
and asked that the two leaders of the nation Haj Amin Husseini and Ragheb 
Nashablshi should then and there declare their resignation. At this 
juncture, Assem al Said, the Mayor of Jaffa and one of the opposition leaders, 
reported a telephone message from Ragheb Nashabishi in which he agreed to 
any decision agreed by the nation and al Said said that he himself agreed
V
to do likewise.
An uproar arose lasting some time. With the opposition delegates 
calling on the Mufti to make a similar declaration and his supporters 
shouting at the tops of their voices "Haj Amin is the representative of the 
nation. He should not resign because the nation does not want him to 
resign, and anyway he is not an o ffic ia l who may resign. He was elected 
and the nation granted him its confidence. We want to listen to Haj Amin."
Some of the Mufti's younger followers even assailed the opposition and 
as a result several of its leaders*0^ 1 withdrew from the assembly returning 
after a while with the exception of Assem al Said. 910
99. As seemed evident from his words, their mutual hatred continues until 
today.
100. Assem al Said, Shukri and Abdul Rahman al Taji, Fahri Nashabishi 
Abdul Fattah Darwlsh etc.
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The Mufti then spoke and said "Before coming here today I was advised 
by some people not to attend as there would be an attempt to embarrass me 
and these friends informed me of the resolution calling upon me to resign.
1 told them "donft you worry, I  am not going to be put into an awkward 
predicament (fana lastu miman yatawaratun)". He went on to say that he 
was not a stranger to the nationalist movement in which he worked ever since 
its inception before the war (W.W.l). The post was a secondary matter and 
did not prevent him and would never prevent him from activity and sacrifice. 
Were he an o ffic ia l he would not have been present amongst them and would have 
been unable to take part, in political affairs. I f  the success of his 
country depended on his resignation, resignation was an easy task. Whenever 
it  was considered that resignation from posts such as his was of any 
benefit, he was ready to resign not only from this office but even from his 
life . After a break during which Abdul Latif Salah and Mughannan spoke, 
the Mufti spoke again and asked that nothing should be caused to bring aboutr
the failure of the assembly, and that personal Interests should be put aside. 
He was prepared to receive any criticism but they should not disappoint 
the nation and should adopt decisions which would do them honour. The 
nation was like a body which fe lt with a ll its members. Ho great value 
should be attached to posts or even to life . They should not waste their 
time on personalities. He was at the head of the nationalist movement and 
would continue to be so, and his post he utilized only for the good of the 
people. The Mufti finished by emphasizing the importance of unity.
Several speakers then followed mainly on the land issue and when the 
turn of Jamal al Hussein! arrived, he said he was unable to understand in 
what respect non-co-operation depended on the resignation of the Mayors and 
the President of the Supreme Moslem Council. These were at the head of 
National Institutions, and were elected by the nation. He mentioned his 
v is it to India and meeting Ghandi in 1925 where he learned that i t  took 
years to put into effect a scheme of non-co-operation. It was impossible
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to apply such a scheme in one hour one day.
After long and heated discussions with many opposition delegates 
withdrawing during the afternoon session and the Istiqlalists keeping 
quiet, the Husseini majority asserted itse lf and practically shelved the 
non-co-operation scheme by deciding to appoint a committee to study the 
question and to submit a report to a further meeting to be held in two 
months time,^* to discuss ways and means of adopting a wide form of 
non-co-operation.
Other resolutions were passed by the assembly, the first of which
4 -u 102 read thus;
1. The adoption of the principle of non-co-operation and the 
immediate execution of its first steps forthwith such as 
boycotting ( i )  receptions and exchange of courteous relations 
with Government ( l i )  Government Boards and ( i l l )  British and 
Zionist goods, products and commercial premises^l
103The following entry in a C.I.D. periodical appreciation summary 
is very interesting as i t  is a comparison between ( i )  How the political 
parties considered their "achievements'* in thi asserauly. and ( i l )  the 
views of a neutral observer. "The anti-Muftl faction believes that i t  did 
actually place Haj Amin in a difficu lt position and exposed him as a self 
seeker. The Istlqlal party considers that their non-interference with 
personal affairs was to their credit, while the Husseini party think that 
they have attained a victory. It  is the opinion of certain of their 
leaders that the question of the success or failure of the assembly was not 
of great intent and thatteving defeated the opposition, i t  w ill now organize 
the Nationalist Movement on a proper basis, and possibly call for the 
convention of the 8th Congress and the election of a strong Executive Committee.. 1023
101. The Committee never met.
102. For a fu ll text of the resolutions see the "Al Jamiah al Ialamiyya"
28.3.33.
103. C.I.D. Summary No.il/33 of 1.4.33 F.O./371/16926.
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Zt 1« worth « 0 0 ( 1 0 0 1 0 2  that, according to * well-informed politician, 
*11 parti«* m f i ir i l  a* a result of th* assembly, th* Nashabtshl faction 
for exploiting th« assembly to fight Ha} Amin, the Husseial party for 
subordinating the general Issue to personal Interests to defend Haj Amin, 
and the Independence Party for their weak stand".
The mala result, therefore, of the assembly was that the breach 
between the principal factions had widened, and it  became very doubtful 
i f  any general national policy could be attempted as long as these 
factions were not reedy to eubordlnate their personal interests to the 
general cause, which they were not.
As to the policy of non-co-operation and the resolutions of the 
assembly, i t  could be stated that with the exception of th* temporary 
refusal of invitations by non-officials to Government functions, and some 
resignations of non-offtelala from Boards or Conmlttees, they remained on 
paper only.
' 104As stated sarcastically by the paper Fataatln "For the most part
those who advocate non-payment of taxes ere not taxpayers} those who 
demand the resignation of officia ls ere not office holders, nor are they 
likely to he} and those who lnalst on non-attendance of Government functions 
are never invited to such occasions".
Zt should he noted, however, that although the policy of non- 
co-operation failed on the whole, mainly because of lack of support by the 
liufei, the most influential leader in Arab Palestine, th* resolution adopted 
was significant inasmuch as it  indicated the trend of political feeling 
in the country.
Th* failure of the policy influenced, no doubt, several people to 
abandon the principle of a political struggle using only peaceful end legal 
moans and converted them to the idea of an armed struggle 104
104. Falaatin 21.3.22. See also Parwaza Oa_ Clt p.112.
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One aspect should be noted further. In his speech, Sheikh Sabrl
Abdin spoke on the sale of lands as an act against the Islamic law. He
cited Fatwas and texts from the Quran. He repeated his proposal made at
the previous assembly of 24th February, that sellers of land should be
treated like Infidels and boycotted, and that when they die they should not
be prayed over or burled In Moslem cemetrles, and he asked the Moslem
Supreme Council to put this proposal Into effect.
It should be noted that Sheikh Sabrl Abdin was a strong supporter of
the Mufti. It  can be safely assumed that his proposal regarding the
participation of the Supreme Moslem Council in the fight against sale of
lands, was ’’cleared'* and agreed beforehand by the Mufti. And In fact,
there was thereafter, an Increasing participation of the Mufti personally,
and the S.M.C. in general, in that fight.
On 1st December 1934, a deputation of the Arab Executive called on the 
105High Commissioner and submitted to him a memorandum on the subjects ofV
land and Immigration In which they said that "they believe that the present
policy of Government with regard to the question of land and Jewish
immigration means, i f  It has any meaning at a ll, the extermination of the
Arabs and the establishment of an entity for the Jews in their place” .
More important perhaps,was the letter which the Mufti sent to the H.C.
on 27th December 1934 on behalf of the Supreme Moslem Council, on the sale
of land by the Arabs to the Jews. In addition to requesting the enactment
of a law which would prevent sale of land by Arabs to Jews, the Mufti also
requested an enactment of a law which would prohibit the transfer of any
plot of land to any person whatsoever, i f  the owner thereof did not retain
for himself a lot viable. Remarking about the increased Jewish efforts to
buy land the Mufti wrote that it was "liable to lead the Arabs to despair 
106and despondency” 1056
105. For a fu ll description of the meeting and a fu ll text of the 
memorandum, see C.O. 733/257/37356. See also ”A1 Dlfa” 2.12.34 and 
the o ffic ia l Communique No.39/34 1.12.34 Ibid.
106. See C.O. 733/272/75072.
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The Muftl'a letter followed an attempt by the police on the 24.12.34
to evict the Zubeldah tribe from the Hartleh lands In the Haifa district.
107The attempt failed because the police force which was sent to execute 
It was considered Insufficient to overcome the Arabs violent resistance.
The Arabs told the evicting power that "the lands which were handed 
to the Jews were theirs, taken as Inheritance from their fathers and 
grandfathers and that i t  was impossible for them to hand them over to the 
Jews even though they should be filled ".
The Mufti's letter to the H.C. was a part of a campaign he had 
initiated sane months earlier and to which he devoted considerable attention 
and energy. He himself and his subordinate Sheikhs« toured towns and rural 
areas« preaching sermons and giving speeches in Mosques and at public 
gatherings« and by the issuing of fatwas and giving religious instructions. 
The campaign« purposely« had taken on a decidedly religious aspect« as the 
Mufti considered« and rightly so« that it  would be easier to arouse ther
people by religious propaganda.
On 29th December 1934 a meeting was held in Jerusalem attended by 
about 400 Sheikhs« Mukhtars and eleders of villages, near Jerusalem.
The Mufti spoke and said that the land belonged to God and should not be
103sold. Other Sheikhs read then the famous "fatwa" of the Mufti on this 
subject.
Copies of the pamphlets containing it ,  continued to be distributed 
among villagers. On 25th January 1935 the Mufti convened a religious meeting 
of some 500 notables, mostly Qadls, Sheikhs and Ulamas from a ll parts of the 
country, to discuss the sale of land to Jews, brokerage and Jewish 
immigration. 1078
107. C.O. 733/257/75156. The eviction was accomplished on 30.1.35 when a 
bigger police force was sent to Hartleh and after one Arab was killed 
by a r if le  shot. Ibid.
108. Amin al Husseini. The Fatwa of his Eminence the Grand Mufti concerning 
Sale of Lands In Palestine to Zionists. (Fatwat Samahat al Mufti al 
Akbar blshan Bte al Aradi bl Falastln Lilsihionlyin) Jerusalem 1935.
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la aa impressive opening speech in which he said "we are being 
now attacked in our beliefs» religion, country, lands, traditions, morals 
and language", he called on his listeners not to despair and urged them to 
fight against land sales with a ll their might and faith. His finishing 
remarks were directed to Arabs and Moslems outside Palestine. " I f  you 
remain indifferent watching this catastrophe, the second catastrophe of 
Andalusia, you will not be pleasing God, his Prophet and the history of 
Islam which made a ll Moslem brethren. You must learn that the catastrophe 
to which the bad fortune of Palestine has brought it ,  is not limited to
109Palestine but w ill extend to the other countries and Holy Places of Islam"
The meeting then endorsed the "Fatwa" of the Mufti and a similar one
110issued by Kashf al Ghata the noted Iraqi Shia leader in their fatwa 
they said: "having noted the alms of the Jews to Judaise the holy country 
and to evict its inhabitants and to erase the traces of Islam from it  
through the destruction of Mosques and Holy Moslem Places....we regard
V
every Palestinian who does any of these things (i.e . sale of lands...) as 
a heretic." In the letter**1, which the meeting sent to the H.C. the Ulama 
said that they fe lt convinced that the matter (l.e . sale of land and 
immigration) has reached such an extent which could not be tolerated or 
ignored from a Sharia point of view". " It  has become the religious duty 
of every Moslem.... to stand in the way of, and resist this danger with 
a ll possible means, in order to safeguard their existence, their religion 
and their religious places in the Holy Land".
Other parties, not wishing to be outdistanced, joined this campaign. 109
109. "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" 27.1.35.
110. Ibid 28.1.35.
111. 4.2.35. C.0.377/257/75156.
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The preparatory congress of the National Defence Party (the Nashashibts) 
sent on 28.1.35 a long memorandum to H.C. As the campaign was dominated 
by its religious character, the Defence Party used Sheikh Sullraan al 
Farouki who went on the pilgrimage, to spread propaganda in support of the 
Palestine Arabs.
The opposition tried to discredit the religious conference and to
minimise its importance, and in order to embarrass the Mufti, whom they
used to present at the time as the tool in the hands of the British, they
declared that it  was necessary to treat British rule in Palestine in the
same way as brokers and land sellers, as i t  was the policy of this British
rule which facilitated the purchase of land by Jews. In its meeting on
11217th May 1935, the party decided to organise s company with a capital
of £25,000 to be increased to £50,000 for the deliverance of lands.
Some members promised to purchase shares to the amount of over £11,000.
In the campaign initiated by the Mufti against sale of lands, the
issue of immigration held a secondary,but s t i l l  a very important place.
' 113
The large volume of Jewish Immigrants together with the many
114rumours about the flood of illegal immigrants convinced the Arabs that 
the number of Jews in Palestine was much bigger than it  was in fact.
Towards the end of 1934, the Arabs claimed that the number of Jews in 
Palestine had reached more than 40C,Q0012 3415 about 427. higher than the real 
number of 232,975116.
112. F.O. 371/18957. Nothing more was ever heard of this company. The 
Youth Congress party organised such a company. See Issa Safari Qp-Cit 
pp.197-201. Nothing more was ever heard of this company either.
113. During 1933 there were 30,327 Jewish immigrants, during 1934- 42,359 
see the Peel Report p.279.
114. During 1932-33 about 22,400 Jews entered Palestine illegally, see 
C.O. Palestine Report 1933. Col. No.94, p.15.
115. See the Article "The memory of S’.detestedi day". "al Difa" 2.11.34. 
See also the Article "The memory of the ominous day". "Al Jamiah al 
Arabiyya 2.11.34.
11$. See table "Estimated Oopulatioa of Palestine" Statistical Abstract 
of Palestine 1943, p.2.
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Much nearer to the truth was the Mufti who, during an interview*^ 
with the High Comnissioner on 20.8.34 claimed that the number of Jews in 
Palestine had reached 300,000.
Most of the talk during the Interview was about the Legislative
Council but the H.C. referred to the i l l i c i t  immigration and said that he
was taking a ll possible measures to stop it  either by sea or by land, he
mentioned the possible danger of clashes occurring as a result of the
activities of non-official bodies organized to stop such immigration.
118The Mufti regretted the Nethanya incident and added that the 
immigration of Jews in such masses created a tension amongst the Arabs who 
feared for their future and for their race. He could not exaggerate the 
feeling of dismay and even anger in a ll countries caused by the continuance 
of illegal immigration and the failure of the Government to take measures 
against it . He pointed out that on the occupation of Palestine, the Jews 
were only 46,000 while in 1934 they had reached about 300,000 in number.r
Were this increase to continue, every Arab fe lt that the inevitable result
would be the destruction of the Arab race in Palestine.
The H.C.'s remark about non-official bodies organised to stop illegal
119immigration referred to the Arabs decision to form unofficial patrols 
to watch and picket the sea coast. This move was initiated by the leaders 
of the Arab Young Men's Executive, and indeed, owing to Arab watch and
police patrol, attempts to land immigrants ashore on the night of 30th July
* * , 120 were frustrated.
However, following the Nethanya Incident the Palestine Arab party of 
the Husseinis tried to "adopt" the "patrol movement". 1789
117. For a fu ll record of the interview see Enclosure No.2 to Wauchope's 
letter to Cunliffe-Lister 25.8.34 C.O. 733/265/37502.
118. On the night of 15.8.34, a group of Arab scouts watching the coastal 
area near Nethanya in order to intercept Jewish illegal Immigrants, 
were attacked by a number of Jews and two of them were wounded.
"A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya" 16.8.34.
119. This decision was given p ro m in e n c e  in the Arab press. See Arab paper 
issues for the firs t two weeks of August 1934.
See C.I.D. summary report No.11/34 of 6.8,34 F.O. 371/17878.120.
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Jamal al Husselni, together with Emile Ghory, attempted to organise
a wider movement of unofficial coast patrolling. Recruits were canvassed
and contributions solicited throughout the country with an active
campaign of propaganda undertakAn in the villages.
121On 19.8.34, they published a manifesto under the tit le  "To Work".
Declaration to the Arab nation for the widening of the scope for Frontier
Patrolling. The manifesto called on "every loyal young Arab" to enrol as
"guards" along the frontiers in a programme which would start on 5.9.34.
122The newspaper itse lf published a strongly worded editorial bitterly
complaining against the unlawful entry of Jews to Palestine, condemning
the indifference and inactivity of the Government in the matter and praised
the initiative of unofficial patrols guarding "the frontiers of Palestine".
123The H.C. suspended forthwith the paper for a period of one month 
Jamal Husselni, however, continued with his plan to mobilize 150 
Arab scouts in Jerusalem and transport them on 5.9.34 by way of TulkarmV
and Jenin to the coast at Nethanya. Nothing, however, came out of it , as
the Arab Youth's Congress objected to Jamal Husseinl and Emile Ghory
exploiting the situation for their own and for their party's ends and after
the Government published its preventive measures*^ against the illegal
125immigration, they seized the opportunity and published an announcement 
on 2.9.34 saying that as the Government took effective steps to prevent 
the illegal immigration, there was no need for them to act.
By the middle of 1935, there appeared 2 factors which influenced the 
future trend of events.
121. "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" 19.8.34.
122. Ibid.
123. C.O. 733/255/37313.
124. For these measures see Official Communique No.32/34. Falastin 1.9.34.
125. "Falastin" 2.9.34.
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(1) The firs t signs of an impending recession were already seen with 
swelling unemployment, smaller investments and runs on the smaller banks.
The economy though it  generally continued to expand, suffered a marked 
setback.
(2) The growing tension which preceded and continued during the Abyssinian 
War.
The Influence of this tension on Palestine politics w ill be discussed
later but the H.C.'s view was that in the current local conditions, the
Government could afford to ignore Jewish representations, but must placate
127the Arabs. The Government , he wrote, must give "some satisfaction to
128the Arab leaders". And of immigration, he wrote: "Immigration must be
129decreased, not inereaded", and so it was.
He also proposed to the Colonial Secretary the enactment of measures
130restricting land sales.
However, to the Arabs who were demanding the total prohibition by law
of the transfer of Arab lands to Jews and the total cessation of Jewish
immigration these concessions, seemed both too l it t le  and too late.
Of special importance was the role played by the Mufti with regard to 
*
the subject of the Legislative Council. This was caused as well as 
reflected by the "Special relationship" which developed between him and 
the H.C., Sir A. Wauchope to whom the Council came to be an important part 
of his policy in Palestine.
126. See Palestine Annual Report 1935 Col. No.112 1936 p.22. See also the 
Survey 1936 pp.702-706 and D. Horowitz and R. Hinden Economic Survey 
of Palestine Tel Aviv 1938 p.14.
127. Wauchope to Colonial Secretary 7.12.35. C.O. 733/278/75756/2 Part II.
128. Wauchope to Parkinson 6.12.35. C.O. 733/271/75054 Pt I.
129. The Labour Schedule for October 1935-March 1936 was drastically reduced 
to 3250 as against 8000 for April-October 1935. See C.O. 733/276/
75113 Pt. II.
130. See his letter to the Col. Sec. 22.2.35. C.O. 733/272/75072 and his 
statement to the Arab leaders 29.1.36. C.O. 733/290/75072.
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When the P.M.*s letter to Dr. Weizmann was published, It was noted
that some of the Important Issues raised by the Passfleld White Paper
such as the proposed establishment of a Legislative Council, the creation
of a Development Fund etc., were not mentioned in the letter and must,
therefore, be presumed to retain the spirit and intention given them by
the White Paper without any re-interpretation. Chancellor, anyv«y,
131continuously kept the issue alive.
However Cunliffe-Lister, the new Colonial Secretary, and the permanent
staff at the Colonial Office were basically opposed to the creation of a 
132Council and were inclined to seek ways to depart from the previous
133Government's pledges or at least £o delay their implementation.
The Colonial Office therefore, elaborated a plan of "delaying tactics"
and considered the idea of having a round table conference between Arabs and
134Jews which was found unpracticable.
In the meantime, Wauchope, the new High Commissioner who agreed with 
the Colonial Office's line, adhering to his policy of working through the 
notables, was holding separate informal and confidential talks with Arab and 
Jewish leaders. He then asked the Colonial Office a direct question:
"Should the Arabs unitedly accept the form of Legislative Council which we 
can offer and should the Jews unitedly refuse, would the policy be to 
proceed with the granting of a Legislative Council or to give up the effort?
131. See his letter to Shuckburgh 12.12.30 and to Passfield 15.8.31,
C.O. 733/202/87103.
132. Berger says that the Arabs had made of the Legislative Councils, "a 
focus of native opposition to foreign rule". See The Arab World Today 
New York 1964 p.285.
133. See Minutes by Wilson 13.2.32, Parkinson and Cunliffe-Lister 26.2.32 
C.O. 733/217/97072.
134. See statement by Musa Kazem al Hussein! in the name of the Arab 
Executive published in al Jamiah al Arabiyya of 18.2.32 and the 
statement of the Secretary of the Supreme Moslem Council in the name 
of the Mufti published in the paper of 19.3.32 in which they denied 
their alleged agreement to participate in such a conference.
135. Wauchope to Wilson 13.2.32. C.O. 733/217/97072.
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The Permanent Secretary wrote on the margin "I should hope to give it  up”
and Cunliffe-Lister added to it  with his red ink, ”Yes". In the same
136manner, Cunliffe-Lister addressed his colleagues saying ”1 cannot 
advise the Cabinet to force upon the Jews a Legislature to which they would 
be bitterly opposed and which I do not believe would work satisfactorily 
at the present time” .
However, Wauchope's view in that respect totally opposed that of his
superiors in London. As a result of his private conversations he reached
the definite conclusion ” that to make any sort of offer of a Legislative
Council now, and withdraw it  on the ground that the Jews would not
participate, would have a deplorable effect on a ll Arab leaders in the
country. It  would be much less injurious to the prestige of this Government
137to make no offer at present rather than risk such an eventuality" .
In another letter he wrote: " I f  we make an offer now and withdraw 
i t  owing to Jewish opposition, the existing lack of confidence or the Arabsl
towards our Government would be increased a hundred fold........HaJ Amin
(the Mufti) told a close friend of his that I treated him as an honest man,
and as I put trust in him, so he puts trust in me. The N a s h a b i s h i s .
believe in my honesty of purpose, a ll that w ill go in the twinkle of an eye
138i f  we make an offer and withdraw it  owing to Jewish opposition"
By now, Wauchope became personally involved in the matter of the
Legislative Council. Thinking, as stated above, that withdrawal of the
scheme would be injurious to the prestige of the Mandatory Government as
139well as to his own standing, he also came to believe that by establishing 
a Legislative Council, he would be able to retain the co-operation of the 
Arab moderates and ward o ff the clamour of the extremists for independence.
136. See his memorandum to the Cabinet C.P. 124(32) April 1932.
137. See his letter to Cunliffe-Lister 23.3.32 Ibid.
138. See his letter to Wilson 26.3.32 Ibid.
139. See record of his talk with the Colonial Secretary 26.10.32 Ibid. .
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Be hoped also that through a Legislative Council he would be able to 
achieve his long-range plan of Arab-Jewish co-operation within a multi­
national state.
At the same time, accustomed as he was to the Western type of democracy 
and considering therefore "that a form of self-government should spring 
rather from the bottom than the top"*^, learning of the total Jewish 
objection to any Legislative Council, and wishing - no doubt - to accommodate 
the reluctance of the Colonial Office for any real progress towards the 
establishment of the Council, he envisaged a plan whereby the issue would 
remain alive but "on a low fire". He promised Arab leaders that the 
Government would adhere to its pledges, but that it  would prefer first of 
a ll to launch schemes for Palestinian participation in the administrative 
and advisory boards and to introduce a local self-government Act which would 
give freely elected members the opportunity of managing their local affairs.
At the time he even considered holding the elections to the Supreme Moslem1
Council, and only later to establish a Legislative Council. As this
course of action would have achieved the same results which he wished, he
was backed by the Colonial Secretary. The Cabinet at its meeting of 
1416.4.32 decided to compose a committee to consider the matter and decided 
not to issue any definite statement until the forthcoming meeting of the
F.M.C. at the end of 1932.
Wauchope considered that the setting up of the Council could be 
postponed for a further period of 18 months, namely the-end of 1933. By 
then, he hoped, he would be able to persuade a ll concerned as to the 
desirability of having the Council. Though he fully appreciated the 
difficulties, he knew well that as long as the Jews thought that the 
Government was unable to devise a means whereby an Arab majority in
140. See his letter to Wilson 13.2.32 C.O. 733/217/97072.
141. Cabinet 20(32) 6.4.32.
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Legislative Council would not, by indirect means, delay or hinder the
advancement of a National Home, they would not object to it. As for the
Arabs, he estimated that "apart from the above (reason) Arab leaders wish
for a Legislative Council not so much for the public good but in order to
serve their own party needs." Party feeling was at that time extremely
bitter. "The Fellaheen", he thought, "are so much concerned over their
increased crop failures and indebtedness that they are not interested in
any ideas of a Legislative Council."^?
Forecasts in regard to the formation of a Legislative Council
continued to appear in Arabic (and Hebrew) papers from the middle of
143March 1932 onwards. The Jaffa correspondent of the Beirut daily "al 
Ahrar" (himself a member of the staff of Falastin) wrote in the issue 
of 26th June under the heading "The Legislative Council w ill soon be 
constituted" saying that the elections would be held during 1932 and he 
went on to describe the three schools of thought among Arab Palestiniansl
on the matter. Those who favour elections, those who favour nominations
and those to whom the essential consideration was the extent of the powers
vested in the Council. This last group believed that unless the Council
would have jurisdiction over the questions of the sale of lands and
144immigration, the Arabs would not be better off.
During May 1932, the High Commissioner had separate and confidential 
meetings with the Mufti, Rageb Nashabishi and Musa Kazim in which he 
explained to them his plans with regard to the elections to the Supreme 
Moslem Council. Nashabishi leaked the information and on the 4th June, 
"Miraat al Sharq" observed that the elections to the S.M.C. would take 
place shortly, to be followed by elections to the Municipalities, and 
finally by elections to the Legislative Council. And as the H.C.
142. See his cable to Cunliffe-Lister 9.4.32 C.O. 733/219/97105/2.
143. "Falastin" 19.3.32, 23.3.32, 26.3.32. "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" 21.3.32,
25.3.32.
144. "Al Ahrar" 26.3.32 as reported in C.O. 733/219/97105/2.
145. Miraat al Sharq 4.6.32.
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expected, a few days later, the paper criticized the H.C. for holding
the elections to the S.M.C., thus diverting public attention from the
146more important issue of elections to the Legislative Council.
Turning to the implementation of his plan, the H.C. appointed non9*
147official Arab and Jewish members to several administrative boards. At
the start the result of these appointments was most successful and the H.C.
informed the Colonial Secretary that "the advice given by non-official
,148members has been of definite value to Government"
In the long run, however, this step proved to be counter-productive.
The Arabs could not but feel the political undertones of their participation 
in these boards much more so as the H.C. appointed to these boards several 
known leaders (such as Aunt abd al Hadi for the Labour Legislation Committee, 
Jamal Husseini and Jacoub Farraj for the Road Board, Shukri al Taji for the 
Standing Committee for Commerce and Industry) members of the Arab 
Executive and even of its bureau.I
Later the Government even addressed, apparently similar letters to 
the Arab Executive and to the Jewish Agency asking them to propose each a 
member for the Income Tax Committee and actually suggested Auni Abd al Hadi. 
The Istiqlal party - preaching non-co-operation * raised the issue. The 
Arab Executive, during its meeting of 9.9.32 and after long discussions in 
which Jamal Husseini indirectly, defended strongly the continuing membership 
of Arabs In these Boards and said that he himself had accepted his 
nomination as a member for the Road Board only after consultations with some 
of his closest friends (presumably among them the Mufti - though Jamal did 
not say so) resolved by a majority vote on Izzat Darwaza's proposal that 
persons holding representative posts in the Arab Executive could not be 14678
146. Ibid 20.6.32.
147. These were: Labour Legislation Committee, Road,Board, Railway Board 
and the Standing Committee for Commerce and Industry. Later there
were added the General Agricultural Board and the Citrus Fruit Committee.
148. Wauchope to the Col. Sec. 4.10.32. C.O. 733/218/97105/2.
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members of Governmental Boards and called on them to resign, which they 
149did. To show his dissatisfaction Jamal al Hussein! resigned both from
the Secretariat and from his membership of the Arab Executive.
And as Arab participation in the boards turned out to be an issue
both in intra-communal strife and inter-Arab politics, forcing the more
moderate traditional factions to follow a more militant line in order to
151vie with the Istiqlalists and the more radical young men, the H.C. did
not follow his plan to appoint Palestinians (Arabs and Jews) to the 
152Advisory Council.
Arab resignations from the Government's boards were discussed between
153the H.C. and the Mufti during their interview on 1.10.32. Following 
the negative resolution of the Arab Executive in that respect, the Mufti 
was not prepared to advise anyone to accept nominations to the boards. When 
the H.C. asked him if proposals for the Legislative Councils should be made
at an early date, he answered * without any great enthusiasm - that he
\
hoped so but again emphasized the issues of immigration and land sales.
This signified the change of emphasis in Arab demands. Until the Autumn of 
1932 the one demand constantly put forward by the Arabs was for the early 
formation of a Legislative Council. However, they started then to realise 
that even after the establishment of a Legislative Council the Government
would remain determined "to prevent interference with the rights of the
1 5 4Jews to maintain a National Home"
And indeed during 1933, Arab demands concentrated mainly on stoppage 
of immigration and land sales. 1495023
149. For the record of the meeting see 3797:65 I.S.A.
150. On the Husseinis efforts to "make peace" between Jamal and Musa Kaxira 
who voted for the resignations from the Government boards thus 
angering Jamal. See Intelligence Report 14.9.32 3/8. The H.A.
151. See C.I.D. report 49/32 16.12.32 F.O. 371/16926. See also C.P. 374 
(32) 3.11.32.
152. See his letter to Cunliffe-Lister 4.10.32 C.O. 733/219/97105/2.
153. For full record of the meeting see C.O. 733/218/97113.
154. Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister 1.4.33. C.O. 733/235/17305.
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The H.C. for reasons of political expediency, and believing that
this would be the only way to "hold the Arabs”, pressed for explicit
declaration about the intention to set up a Legislative Council.
During a meeting with the Colonial Secretary in London and a further
one which they both had with the Prime Minister, it was agreed that the
Government would make such a statement as otherwise "the extremists would
obtain complete ascendancy and Arab co-operation would become increasingly
155difficult and ultimately impossible. The Colonial Secretary proposed
156this line of policy to the Cabinet which approved it at its meeting on 
1579.11.32.
Accordingly, on 10.11.32, the H.C. told the Permanent Mandates 
158Commission that the intention of the British Government as regards the 
establishment of Legislative Council remained unchanged but that necessary 
steps would be taken after the local Government Ordinance - then in 
preparation - had been brought into working order. The object of this 
Ordinance was to extend still further the participation of local 
representatives in Municipal Government. Wauchope was hopeful that "moderate 
opinion will prevail" and that the new constitutional plan would be accepted 
by both parties. He further emphasized that definite safeguards would be 
embodied in the new proposals "so that under no circumstances could the 
peace and security of the country be endangered or the carrying out of the 
Mandate hampered". When members of the Commission expressed their doubts as 
to whether the Arabs would co-operate in the establishment of the proposed 
Legislative Council, the H.C. stated that "when the Arabs were convinced 
that His Majesty's Government would fulfil its promises at a reasonably early 
date to set up a Legislative Council, they would be far more willing to 15678
155. See Minutes of meeting 27.10.32 C.O. 733/219/97105/2.
156. C.P. 374 (32) November 1932.
157. Cabinet 60(32) 9.11.32.
158. P.M.C. Minutes of the XXIX session, Geneva 1932 p.82.
227
co-operate with it", and referring to his long cherished plan of Arab* 
Jewish co-operation, he repeated his belief "that, with the passage of time,
the Arabs and Jews would see that it was to their mutual advantage to work
„ „ 159together".
However, when the Local Government Bill was published in November 1932, 
it was denounced strongly in the Arabic - as well as in the Hebrew - papers, 
principally on the ground that it tended to restrict the powers of local 
authorities, and to concentrate all effective control over their actions in
the hands of the High Commissioner.
160In a long editorial "Falastin" drew the attention of the Arab 
leaders and Mayors to the fact that protests would serve no good purpose 
and observed that the people expected their representatives to take hold 
and effective measures to defend their dignity and autonomy.
As stated above, there were not many developments in Palestine during 
1933 on the Legislative Council issue. The H.C. and the Colonial Office,r
however, were studying the practical problems with regard to the Council 
such as its composition, election versus nomination, method of election, 
qualifications for electors, qualifications for membership of the Council,
the extent cf its authority and the very important problem of safeguards.
X 6 2These problems were hammered out in a discussion held at the House 
of Commons on 24.5.33 attended by Cunliffe-Lister, Wauchope and others.
It should be r.oted that the general spirit of Wauchope's proposals, 
especially concerning the provision for a small number of appointed non­
officials and a larger number of elected members, seems to have been 
favourable to the Husseinis who, being certain of their popular support, 
preferred elections to nomination. 159602
159. Ibid p.86.
160. "Falastin" 26.11.32.
161. See File "New Palestine Constitution" C.O. 733/235/17405.
162. For record of the discussion see Ibid.
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It was agreed, however, to postpone further actions and discussions 
for several months until after the forthcoming elections.
During the 1933 Autumn riots, the H.C. twice saw the members of the
s / A
Arab Executive - on 25.10.33 and on 28.10.33. The Arab demands were 
to stop Immigration and Jewish land purchases and to form a Legislative 
Council. As regards the latter demand, the H.C. had little difficulty in 
showing that the delay was due largely to the unhelpful attitude of the 
Arab leaders themselves and he went on to say: "I made a statement to 
this effect” (about establishing a Legislative Council) "at Geneva and I 
am not going to recede from it. But I must say one word of warning: if 
disturbances like those of the last 2 days take place, they make my task 
no easier. The more people work with Government the easier it is to make 
progress."
164On 20th August 1934, the H.C. had a long conversation with the Mufti. 
After mentioning that they had had a talk about the Legislative Council some 
18 months earlier (the one on 1.10.32 mentioned above), the H.C. stated his 
intention to decrease the number of official members as compared to the 
1922 proposal. The Mufti answered that the Arabs were looking forward to 
a Parliament with full powers and not a Legislative Council with limited 
powers. He said further that he hoped that the H.C. would endeavour to 
obtain for the Legislative Council as wide powers as possible and he 
desired to point out that under the mandatory policy the interests of Jews 
in Palestine were safeguarded but not those of the Arabs. The Mufti said 
that he preferred direct election since in his opinion, improper influence 
might be exercised over voters in the case of indirect elections. He then 
stated that most Arab leaders considered it a matter of principle that the 
majority of the members of any Legislative Council should be freely elected 1634
163. See Chapter 13.
164. For a full record of the conversation, see C.O. 733/265/37502.
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and not nominated. Rightly or wrongly, nominated members would be looked
l i e
on as members subservient to Government influence.
The High Commissioner then expressed his hope - and we can assume - 
his wish as well - that the Mufti would help him in preparing the ground 
for the acceptance of a Legislative Council with moderate powers by the 
Arab population, since if that Council was again refused, a similar 
opportunity might not present itself for another twenty years. The Jews, 
said the H.C. who in any case might refuse to co-operate in a Legislative 
Council, would take, no doubt, the Arab refusal as an argument to show that 
the Arabs were not yet fit for a Council or for any constitutional change.
The Mufti explained that the Council which was proposed in 1922 was refused 
by the Arabs. Although he had not himself been the cause of that refusal, 
he was convinced that a Council such as that offered in 1922 would not be 
of use to the Arabs nor would it satisfy their aspirations. He assured the
H.C. that the acceptance of a Legislative Council by the Arabs depended on
X
the amount of benefit which they would derive from, and the power they would 
have in that Council. He added that the opposition party had spread the 
rumour that he was not personally in favour of the establishment of a 
Legislative Council for fear that such a Council would have jurisdiction 
over the S.M.C. He said that it was unlikely that he should fear any 
such thing since in all past elections, public opinion had been strongly 
in his favour, but that what mattered to him was not the effect of a 
Legislative Council on his own personal authority but the amount of benefit 
which Arabs would derive from such a Council. Ha enquired further regarding 165
165. On the other hand, Ragheb Nashabishi said that he would welcome a
nominated Council. When askedabout the subject by the H.C. he admitted 
that a large portion of the Arab community would probably refuse to 
participate in a nominated Council and finally suggested that half 
the members of the Council should be elected and half nominated. See 
Wauchope's letter to Cunliffe-Lister 26.8.35 Ibid.
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the position, if the Legislative Council was not accepted by the Jews,
and was satisfied to hear the H.C.'s answer that in these circumstances,
and if the Arabs were reasonable in their demands, he would strongly
advise the Colonial Secretary to approve the establishment of the Council.
When asked if his opinion as to the appointment of non-official members
to the Executive Council, he agreed that such an appointment would be a
good step forward and useful to the country.
On the basis of his talks and discussions, the H.C. dispatched his
166recommendations towards the end of August 1934 which - on the whole - 
were approved by the Cabinet.
1However, further delay occurred for almost a year. Ey then,
Arab leaders, including the Mufti, were pressing for an early start of the
djs cussions about the Council. On 6.6.35 the H.C. received a deputation
of the new "Kitional Defence" party headed by R. Nashabishi who urged him
169"to end delays and go ahead" in starting the negotiations.
Articles appeared in the Arab press^“^  stating that it was generally
believed that the Arabs on the whole favoured the establishment of a
Legislative Council and that with the exception of the Istiqlal, all Arab
parties would participate in the elections, and the C.I.D. appreciation 
171summary reported: "In the meanwhile several leaders commence to think
of standing as candidates at the elections." Commenting on the Mufti's 
view the report said: "There is a suggestion that Haj Amin Husseini and 
his followers would appose it were Government of the intention to appoint 
to the Chairmanship Ragheb Bey who would than be able to exercise influence 
for party interests on the Moslem Supreme Council". 165*970
165. See his two letters to Cunliffe-Lister of 25.8.34 Ibid.
167. See Cab Con. 43(34) 23.11.34.
168. Because of changes in the Colonial Office, and because of the
Government's wish to delay the start of the discussions until after 
the 19th Zionist Congress. See C.0.733/275/75102/1.
169. See letter of Wauchope to Col. Sec. 7.6.35 Ibid.
170. "Falastin" 13.6.35, 21.6.35. "A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya" 23.6.35.
171. C.I.D. Summary No.11/35 of 27.6.35 F.O. 371/18957.
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The Nashabishi leaders, however, believed that the talk of the
institution of the Legislative Council was purposely spread by the
Husseini faction in order to gain public support.
One factor which considerably influenced the Arabs* acceptance of
the Legislative Council scheme was the acute differences between the two
main parties following the publication of the alleged letter of S. Anslan 
172to the Mufti. Efforts had been made to allay these differences and it
was hoped that if these efforts proved successful there would be less
chance of rejection since each party would not be so fearful of the
173criticisms of the other. Eut personal jealousies and antipathies 
were still very strong.
The first informal talk of the H.C. with the Arab leaders was with the
174Mufti and Jamal al Kusseini on 22.7.35. They stated that, knowing of 
the Jewish refusal to participate in the Legislative Council "makes them all 
the more eager to do so". They went on to say that they were anxious to 
come to an agreement with General Uauchope as High Commissioner and take 
part in the proposed Legislative Council, but that the objections to the 
Council appeared to them to be insuperable: (1) the proportion of Jewish 
members in the Council (they objected to the fact that the basis of 
population was not Palestine citizenship, and to the number of nominated 
members to be allotted to Jews), and (2) the limitation of the powers of 
the Legislative Council (they objected to the restrictions as to the 
Mandate and to the powers of the High Commissioner to restrict the Council). 
They also argued that the Council should be permitted to debate "Subjects 
repugnant to the Mandate" e.g. that members should be free to move a 
resolution to put an end to the Balfour Declaration. They also commented 17234
172. See infra p.
173. See C.I.D. reports No.10/35 of 31.5.35 and 12/35 of 5.8.35. F.O./ 
371/18957.
174. Wauchope to Parkinson 22.7.35. C.O. 377/275/75102. For a more 
detailed description of the meeting see Wauchope's letters to 
Macdonald 25.7.35 and 9.8.35 Ibid. See also the Paper "Points raised 
at an interview with Haj Amin al Husseini and Jamal Effendi al Husseini 
22.7.35".
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that "subjects liable to promote ill-feeling bet\?een the communities" was 
so wide a phrase as to include any subject touching the Jews. The H.C. 
then invited Jamal Husseini to re-draft the phrase in a form which would
be acceptable to H.M.G. and to the Moslem community.
175The next day, the H.C. received Ragheb Nashabishi who informed the 
H.C. that he would prefer a purely nominated Council for two years and 
would let that nominated Council put forward proposals for a Legislative 
Assembly. He went on to say that he would prefer indirect elections. He 
thought that both the direct and indirect method would be corrupt but that 
the difficulties of direct election for Government would be very great.
He felt even more that the Government should decide as Moslems would never 
agree among themselves.
He also agreed with the veto and that the H.C. should retain wide 
powers. He did not think, however, that Arab leaders would accept a 
condition 'prfcventing them from discussion of the Jewish National Home.
As the Arab Executive had lost so much prestige that it no longer 
represented Arab opinion, the H.C., therefore, told both the Mufti and 
R. Nashabishi that the Arabs must form, before his return in November, a 
Committee of six to represent all Arab parties. They said that they 
thought this could be done and promised to include a representative of the 
Christian community.
176The Mufti and Jamal Husseini had a second talk with the H.C. 1756
175. See Wauchope's letter to MacDonald 25.7.35 and 9.8.35 Ibid. See also
the paper "Points raised in interview with R. Nashashibi, 23.7.35 Ibid.
176. Points raided in a second talk with Haj Amin and Jamal Effendi 
Husseini 30.7.35 Ibid. In the meantime, the H.C. interviewed also 
representatives of the Christian Communities. See "Interview of H.C. 
with Yacoub Eff. Farraj of the Greek Orthodox Community" 26.7.31 Ibid 
and "Interview of H.C. with Judge Francis Khayat of theRoman Catholic 
Community" 27.7.35 Ibid.
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The Mufti opened by stating that the neighbouring Arab countries had 
fuller powers of legislation than those offered to the Palestinians 
as well as wider representation of the people; because of that, a certain 
section of Arab opinion might refuse the terms offered by the Government 
so that one section of Arabs would be in favour of a Legislative Council 
and one against it.
The creation of such a situation, Jamal Kusseini added, "might x^ ell 
ruin the carrying out of the whole scheme of the Legislative Council which 
the country so much needed and demanded". They also urged that all members 
should be elected and none nominated because the public would look on the 
nominated members as Government servants.
They informed the H.C. that they would prefer the Government to 
decide - adding that they hoped it would be in favour - the problem of 
direct election rather than leave it to be discussed by the community as 
the latter course would only lead to dissension.I
And contrary to what they had stated in their previous meeting, they 
considered that it would be most difficult to form a representative committee 
as each party would claim more representatives than the others. Only after 
the H.C. repeated his wish that such a committee should be formed before 
November so that it could decide whether the Arabs accepted or rejected the 
plan, did they promise to try to do it, emphasizing however that the 
difficulties were great. They suggested that the executive power of the 
people should be Increased by the addition of non-official members to the 
Executive Council. And finally they begged the H.C. to consider the 
difficulties in their position. If they would be in a position to prove 
to the people that the 1935 proposals were a real step in advance of the 
1922 proposals, then "moderates like themselves" would unite in carrying 
out the Government's final proposals. But if these proposals were narrowed 
down and gave no real pox^ er to a Legislative Council, then the extremists 
would become violent and would make everything difficult for the Government 
and would disturb the peace of the country.
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They added that although the Jews had decided to boycott the election, 
they felt that the Jews would not abstain from trying to Influence the result. 
The Jews, they said would endeavour to cause dissensions among various Arab 
parties as they did during the Municipal e l e c t i o n sa n d  make the position 
of all those "who were willing to co-operate with the Government more and 
more difficult".
Shortly before his departure for E n g l a n d , t h e  H.C. saw the Mufti 
for the third talk, this time alone.
The H.C. stated that he had not given any pledge as to any changes 
suggested by the Mufti or Jamal Husseini such as the reduction of the number 
of Jewish nominated members from 5 to 4. The Mufti's answer was that he 
knew he could rely on the H.C. to do his best to help. Reporting on the
179Husseini's views in early August, the C.I.D. appreciation summary stated:
"In regard to the Council, it appears that the Husseini leaders are now
inclined t,o participate and not to boycott the elections".
It seems that during these discussions, Wauchope felt that by pursuing
the policy of a Legislative Council he became more and more vulnerable to
Arab pressures. At one stage he wrote to the Colonial Secretary: "I am
sure you agree that the fewer commitments that bind our hands the better.
The pledge as to the Legislative Council without further delay is one
180example, the life appointment of the Mufti is another."
However, he had already advanced too far, in that course and no 
retreat was possible. 17890
177. In the mixed parts of the towns which were represented by an Arab 
member of the municipality, the Jews used to vote en bloc for one of 
the two opposing Arab candidates, this being in most cases, the 
decisive factor.
178. See interview between His Excellency and Haj Amin on 5.8.35 Ibid.
179. Periodical Appreciation Summary No.12/35 of 5.8.35 F.O. 371/18957.
180. Wauchope to MacDonald 25.7.35. C.O. 377/275/75102.
235
An important discussion was held in mid-October at the Colonial 
Office attended by the Colonial Secretary, the High Cotnmi9sloner and others
lOI
in which all the important questions were examined and resolved one by one.
It was agreed that on his return to Palestine, the H.C. was committed to 
initiate formal discussions with Jewish and Arab representatives and that 
he was fully committed to going forward even if only one side should accept 
the proposals.
However, cn 25.11.35, the Arab leaders, representing the Inter-party
132Committee (Lujuat al Alizal), met the H.C. and presented him with a 
183joint memorandum, in which they submitted their political demands:
(i) The early establishment of democratic government, (ii) The total 
prohibition by law of the transfer of Arab lands to Jews and (iii) The 
Total cessation of Jewish immigration. They also informed him that they 
expected an answer within 3 months and that a meeting would be called at 
Nablus to,discuss the course of action to be taken by the Arabs in case 
their demands would be rejected.
The new Legislative Council Scheme was finally formally communicated 
to Arab and Jewish leaders on December 21/22 1935 respectively. The 
proposals were published in an official communique on December 23rd together 
with a statement by the High Commissioner which dwelt on the aims of the 
new plan. *1834
131. See Notes of a discussion held at the Colonial Office on Friday,
18th October 1935.... regarding proposals for the establishment of u 
Legislative Council in Palestine. Ibid Pt. II.
132. Towards the end of 1935, the Arab political parties in Palestine with 
the exception of the "Istiqlal" decided on a joint political action 
and organised themselves in an Inter-party Committee. The "Istiqlal"
party advocating the more extreme policy of total non-co-operation with the 
Government stayed out.
183. For the meeting and the memorandum, see C.O. 733/293/75102.
184. Official Communicua No.43/35 of 22.12.35 "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya"
23.12.35. See also Col. 133 p.86 and C.O. 733/293/75102/1.
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"The intention of His Majesty's Government in amending the
Constitution of Palestine by introducing a Législative Council is, in
accordance with its long established tradition and common practice, to
secure the advice and assistance of the people of the country in carrying
on the Government of the country".
The meeting on 21.12.35 with the Arab leaders was attended by
representatives of all political parties with the exception of the 
185Istiqlal. The scheme was received by them in a critical spirit and 
they showed that they did not consider that the proposals went far enough 
in the direction of self-government and they requested to be given time to 
study the proposals.
The Arabic press displayed interest tinged with disappointment with 
"A1 Jaraiah al Arabiyya" and "al-Liwa" showing their tendencies by bringing
into light the disadvantages of the proposals to the Arabs, and "Falastin"
. 186 trying to,point out its good points.
An all-party meeting was held in Jerusalem on 7.1.36 to discuss the
187answer to be given with respect to the Legislative Council. Abdul 
Latif Salah the head of the National Block party insisted that the answer 
should be withheld until the Government would answer the Arab memorandum 
previously submitted, but the other four parties disagreed with him. A 
further meeting took place on 17.1.36 but there were differences of opinion 
as regards to the extent of modifications which the Arabs should ask\the 
Government to introduce in the plan before they would accept it. ) *1356
i
135. See "Legislative Council, Summary Record of Meeting in the High
Commissioner's Office on 21st December 1935 Ibid. ^
136. "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" 23.12.35, 24.12.33, 27.12.35 
"Falastin" 23.12.35, 24.12.35, 25.12.35, 23.12.35.
"Al-Liwa" 23.12.35, 26.12.35.
187. "Falastin" 8.1.36.
183. "Falastin" 18.1.36.
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Bsgheb Bashablahi and Ishaq ftuielrt lor the geform Party favoured
»an
moderate amendments with Jamal Huaaeial requiring m o m  ewmpLng one» 
which th# other leaders considsred vers c«rta la to b# r#j«et«dl by th# 
CovirnMat. It  was u U iu ttly  agreed that ««eh party should submit «  
reply separately aadtthat th«y should na*t subsequently to consider their 
final attitude.
Tbs l*ader% shoving thsir hopefulness. also agree! to postpone 
indefinitely the meeting vhlcb vas fixed at Kahlua on lHh January to 
discuss tbs course of action to he taken by the Arab# in case their 
political demand# as stated in the leader#* memorandum would be rejected.
The four partite then submitted their comments. Hone rejected the 
proposals but s l l  criticised them ss not satisfying Arab aspirations.
The Palestine Arab party made the strongest criticism. neverthaleaa their 
President Jamal e l Buaaelni gave e private assurance to the H.C. that
1*50nothing that he had said should be regarded ee e rejection of the proposals.
An opposition leader gave at the time hie opinion that the Haiti feared
that the establishment of the Legislative Council would reduce hie poser.
131The C.I.D.*e evaluation was that* "The opinion of Baj Amin ia that the 
Council does not resits# national aspirations end should he strongly 
rejected. I f  Covernaeat perceives s unanimous refusal by s ll parties sad 
newspapers. It would bs forced to introduce some improvements. Should 
Cpvernaent eot do so sad proceed with th# establishment of the Council.
Arabs should participats ia thsir privats capacities. In this case, it  
sedfc it  is the intention of Baj Amin that the majority of nominated member# 
should belong to his own party ss he is deeiroue that the interests el the *I.
133. The C .I.». remarked that in those days there was closer rapprochment 
between the Independent young men groups and the Is f i l ia l and the 
Paleatine Arab party who e ll fe l l  tn Hoe vith these criticising the 
Legislative Council*
130. See V*uchope*s cable to Thomas 22.3.36. C.O, 733/233/75102,
I II .  C.1,0. Sutaasry report Bo. 1/36 of 22,1.36, F.0. 371/20013.
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S.M.C. and his own interests should be well defended."
The Chief Secretary sent identical letters to the leaders of the 
four parties in which he clarified and answered some of their criticism 
and added: "I am to say that His Excellency is confident that in the 
light of the explanations furnished in this letter you w ill find yourself
able to co-operate with His Excellency in the establishment of a
192Legislative Council in Palestine".
In the meantime the Arab press in different shades had been critical 
of the restricted powers of the Legislative Council and had minimised the 
importance of the Government's offer without however, recommending outright 
rejection.
The authorities, however, were satisfied "that the tide of opinion is
flowing steadily in favour of the Legislative Council".
The Acting District Commissioner of the Northern District, the very
experienced Mr. Bailey, reported on the basis of considerable consultations
with leading Moslems that in his view 807. of the Moslem population of the
Northern District desired that the Legislative Council should be brought into
being. Only in Haifa town - where the Istiqlal party had some following -
193it  was estimated that about 70% were in favour.
Similar reports had been received from other District Commissioners.
The representatives of the Christian Arabs informed the H.C. "that the
consensus of Arab Christian opinion was unanimously in favour of accepting
the Legislative Council, it  being understood that the Arab population
should have the right to claim wider powers for the Council and stronger
194Arab and Christian representation". 19234
192. See Letters by Hathorn Hall 9.3.36. C.O. 733/293/75102.
193. See his Memorandum to the Chief Secretary 16.2.36 Ibid Pt. II.
194. See letter of Y. Farraj and Alfred Rock to the H.C. 3.3.36 Ibid.
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In the meantime, pro-Zionist circles in London raised the issue of
195the Legislative Council in Parliament.
On 26.2.36, Lord Snell initiated in the House of Lords a debate 
during which the Legislative Council proposal was attacked by members of 
a ll parties who urged that the scheme should either "be abandoned or 
suspended while a Royal Commission Inquired into the question on the
A month later the debate took place in the Commons on 24.3.36 with a
similar result. Host of the speeches asked for the suspension or drastic
modification of the scheme and Thomas himself was attacked from all sides
bringing him to the conclusion described thus: "I am sure there is serious
doubt in a ll parts of the House as to the desirability of proceeding with 
197the proposals".
The debates on the Legislative Council in the House of Lords until 
then usually considered friendly towards the Arabs, and then in the House 
of Commons, had a considerable effect on the Arabs. It  had made them 
realize more than ever what they described as 'the strength of Jewish 
influence in England'. The Arabs became definitely apprehensive that the 
Jews had succeeded in their efforts to prevent the establishment of the Council. 19567
195. Welzmann arrived then in London to direct the Zionist political efforts 
See Sharett Qp-Clt 37-38. Weizmann himself considered the British 
policy of a Legislative Council with Arabs in the majority,as part
of England's policy of appeasement towards the aggressive powers and 
their possible satellites among whom the Foreign Office placed the 
Arabs, a policy accentuated by the outbreak of the Abyssinian War in 
1935. For his view of the Legislative Council see Weizmann Qp-Cit 
pp. 379-381.
196. See Hansard Lords Vol.99 Cols. 750-795. See also The Peel Report 
p.91 and Thomas cable to Wauchope 20.2.36 and his despatch to Wauchope
2.3.36. C.O. 733/293/75102. Pt. II.
197. Hansard Commons Vol.310 Cols. 1079-1210. See also the Peel Report 
p.91 and Thomas letter to Wauchope 25.3.36 Ibid.
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What increased their bitterness and their fear of Jewish strength was 
the fact that the establishment of the proposed Council was a sort of 
test case. They were given to understand many times that i f  one section 
of the population* in this case the Jews * was not going to participate 
in the elections, the Government was adamant to nominate members for the 
empty seats. Now they saw that Parliamentary opinion in "obedience" to 
Zionist pressure rejected the Council and they wanted to see whether the 
Government would s t i l l  keep its pledge.
The fact that two former Colonial Secretaries (Mr. Churchill and 
Mr. Amery) both of whom were concerned in negotiations of a similar nature, 
during their terms of office when they then endeavoured to persuade the 
Arabs to accept somewhat similar and i f  anything more advantageous 
proposals, expressed themselves against the Council was commented upon 
with considerable bitterness and attributed to corruption. The Arabs were 
sure that had the British Government really wanted the Legislative Council,
i t  would have easily secured parliamentary approval by making the matter
198one of confidence. The fact that it  did not, proved beyond doubt that
it  did not want the Legislative Council and as was described by the Peel
Commission: "Nobody in Palestine doubted that Parliament had killed
the scheme....... inevitably their (the Arabs') old hostility to the Mandate
and a ll it  stood for was reinforced. More than that, their old fear that
the Mandate might ultimately lead to their subjugation to the Jews became
more concrete and more urgent. They were really to be'bwamped", it  seemdd,
and that in "no long time"; Following the debates, the Colonial Office
hesitating and not knowing exactly how to proceed consulted the H.C. as to
the alternative possibilities which had been mentioned in Parliament, namely
, . , 200to appoint a Commission of Enquiry or to convene a round table. 19820
198. For Arab views of the Parliamentary Debates see A. Husseini Haqaiq 
Op-Cit pp.36-37. Y. Baikal Qp-Cit p.102, S. Besisi Op-Cit p.179
R. John and S. Hadaur Op-Cit p.256 and Arab papers of thelast week of 
March 1936.
199. The Peel Report p.92.
200. Thomas to Wauchope 25.3.36 C.O. 733/293/75102.
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Wauchope suggested a third way out of the impasse* that of Inviting
an Arab delegation to vis it London believing that this alone could restore
a balance of confidence as the Arabs would be able to put their case as
201the Jews had in London.
The H.C., in his suggestion actually adopted a view put forward by
the Husseinis. 'al-Liwa' the organ of the Husseinis "Palestine Arab Party"
had been pressing for many months for proper Arab representation in London
and following the Commons debate, urged the necessity of the presence of
202an Arab delegation in London.
On 1.4.36, during an interview requested by him, the Mufti informed 
the H.C. that the recent debates in Parliament on the Legislative Council 
and land sales had aroused much angry feeling and suggested that in view 
of the Jewish propaganda it  would be necessary to send Arab representatives 
to London to present the Arab case, and that he had already suggested i t  to 
the S.M.C.201 03
The suggestions of the H.C. together with a Memorandum of the 
Colonial Office20^  were laid before the Cabinet which agreed to adopt 
them.205
It  should be noted that the wording of the Cabinet's decisions denotes 
clearly that the Council was not thought to be dead and that the Government 
was ready to negotiate on it.
201. Wauchope to Thomas 28.3.36 Ibid.
202. 'Al-Liwa* 29.3.36. See also in that respect the C.I.D. summary report 
of No.5/36 of 17.3.36 F.O. 371/20018 according to which the Arabs 
contemplated sending delegation to London after the Lords debate.
203. See Wauchope's letter to the Colonial Secretary 1.4.36 C.O. 733/307/ 
75438/1.
204. See C.P. 95(36) and C.P. 99(36) March 1936.
205. Cab Con. 25(36) 1.4.36.
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Accordingly, on 2.4.36, at a meeting with the 5 party leaders, the 
H.C. extended an Invitation to an Arab delegation to discuss with the 
Colonial Secretary in London the Legislative Council, as well as to 
submit to him its views regarding land sales and immigration. After a
short discussion, the Arab leaders informed the H.C. that it  was their
206unanimous wish to accept the invitation.
Arabs on the whole welcomed the invitation* and the immediate
result was the tension was reduced and there was a considerable improvement
in the Arab political atmosphere which had deteriorated as a result of the
Commons debate. Soon however, things changed, the leaders who had accepted
208the invitation were attacked by the extremists . Events moved fast and
because of the outbreak of the c iv il disturbances, the coalition of the
five parties, in its regular meeting on 22.4.36, were of the opinion that
"although they agree as a matter of principle, to the necessity of sending
a delegation to London, i t  is not in the public Interest that such a
delegation should go at the present moment in compliance with the expressed
desire of the nation and in view of the state of anxiety and disorder which
209now prevails in the country."
To go back to the subject of the Legislative Council.
On 1.4.36, Ragheb Nashabishi on behalf of his party addressed the H.C.
a long letter in which he wrote: "The National Defence Party......  has
accepted the scheme of the Legislative Council.......  although the Party
is aware that this scheme falls short of the aspiration of the country, 
and of the aims of the Arab people hoping that this scheme w ill be the firs t 
ste£ towards the attainment of the basic demands of the Arab nation, namely 
fu ll self-government." The party then called on the H.C. to enact the 206789
206. See Official Communique 2.4.36 "Falastin" 3.4.36. See also C.0.733/ 
307/75438/1.
207. See "Al-Liwa" 3.4.36. See also C.I.D. Report No.8/36 of 11.4.36
F.O. 371/20018.
208. See C.I.D. report Ibid. See also "Falastin" 9.4.36.
209. See letter of 5 leaders to the H.C. 22.4.36 C.O. 733/307/75438/1.
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necessary legislative act and to proceed with the election in order
that the agitation and the disturbed feelings be pacified".
Actually, Hassan Sidki Dajani, the Party's Secretary, published a
day earlier a declaration informing the Arab public that the party had
decided to accept the proposals of the Legislative Council as a first
211step towards self-government.
A few days later, Abdul Latlf Salah, on behalf of the National Block
of Nablus, Informed the H.C. that "the National Block" had resolved to
participate in the elections of the Legislative Council......  irrespective
of the fact that the scheme.... does not satisfy any of the demands of
the nation and oncthe understanding that our participation......  is actuated
212by our desire to achieve the objects of the nation."
During an interview granted by the H.C. on 16.4.36 to Ragheb Nashabishi 
and Jamal Husseini, they explained to him that of the five Arab parties, four 
were prepared to accept the Legislative Council proposals in the form which
K.
they were presented, even i f  they could not obtain further concessions.
The Palestine Arab party held the view that the proposals as presented
213were unacceptable.
In view of this last sentence, in view of the fact that "his" party 
refused the scheme as presented, the question presents itse lf: What was 
the position of the Mufti vis-a-vis the Legislative Council? Based on a ll 2103
210. Ragheb Nashabishi to Wauchope 1.4.36. C.O. 733/293/75102 Pt. I l l  
See also "Falastin" 3.4.36.
211. "Fahstin" 31.3.36.
212. See A.L. Salah to the H.C. 10.4.36. C.O. 733/293/75102/Pt. I l l
213. For a fu ll description of the interview see C.O. 733/307/754381/1. 
Nashabishi and Jamal wanted to consult the H.C. as to whether, in 
view of the fact that the Arab party refused the scheme as presented, 
it  should participate in the delegation to London. They then 
explained the difficulties which were being experienced in arriving 
at an agreement as to the membership of the delegation and Jamal 
even went so far as to suggest that the H.C. should nominate the 
delegates.
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his pronouncements which I have tried to bring forth in detail, and on 
other sources of information which I have mentioned, I think we can reach 
the definite conflusion that the Mufti - though in return for his support 
tried to get a "higher price" (namely better provisions for Arabs) as was 
possible - was ready to accept it.
We have seen that when Wauchope re-initiated the scheme to establish 
a Legislative Council, in his letters to the Colonial Secretary of
25.8.34, he did it  only after an Important and long discussions he had on 
the subject with the Mufti on 20.8.34.
During that discussion, the H.C. expressed his hope that the Mufti 
would help him in preparing the ground for the acceptance of a Legislative 
Council wtfrth moderate powers by the Arabs to which the Mufti reiterated 
that the acceptance of a Legislative Council by the Arabs depended on the 
amount of benefit which they would derive from and the power they would 
have in the Council. In other words, both sides agreed as to the principle. 
The bargaining about details remained open.
In early June 1935, it  was the Mufti, together with the other Arab 
leaders who pressed the H.C. for an early start to the discussions.
During the interview which he had together with Jamal al Husselnl with the 
H.C. they declared that they were anxious to come to an agreement with 
General Wauchope as High Commissioner and take part in the proposed 
Legislative Council, but they objected to its limited powers and to the 
proportion of Jewish membership. Again - agreement in principle, difference 
of opinion as to particulars.
And the same was repeated in their second and the Mufti's third 
meeting with the H.C.
We should also note that when the C.I.D. appreciation summaries 
reported the Mufti's opposition to the Council, it. was either because of the 
rumours about &. Nashabishi's appointment as its head or as a tactical move 
in order to achieve for it  wider powers, but they never reported on 
opposition per se.
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In a later chapter, we shall see how the fundamental concept of 
"political struggle" using peaceful and legal means, which was held by the 
o ffic ia i and recognized Arab leadership, was challenged and finally 
defeated by the concept of "Armed struggle".
The Legislative Council scheme was perhaps (though nobody apparently 
knew it  at the time) the last chance of the concept of "Political struggle" 
of which the Mufti - as this study tries to prove - was a faithful!follower 
during the thirties, to repulse the challenge of the "Armed struggle" 
concept.
As stated, rather simply, by Wauchope: "The establishment of a
Legislative Council would have the effect......  by affording the Arabs
opportunity to give expression to their opinions without recourse to
215demonstration and riots".
216And re-stated years later by J. Marlow who wrote: The Legislative
Council proposals "did have the merit, unrecognized by those who criticized
them and who did not recognize how near Palestine was to the edge c6
serious violence, of giving the Arabs an opportunity which they were
apparently prepared to accept, of talking Instead of fighting."
The Mufti wanted to talk and not to fight as can be further proved by
his advocacy, of despatching the delegation to London and by his behaviour
prior to and during the first days of the disturbances.
In conclusion, the Mufti was ready to accept the Legislative Council
scheme. The same, however, could not be said about many of his followers
217in the Palestine Arab Party. The paper "al-Liwa" tried to cover this 
divergence but i t  was pointed out by the opposition paper "Falastin",^®which 
wrote most specifically " I t  seems that while His Eminence the Mufti is in 
favour of the Council, an important section of the Arab party is against it". 2145678
214. See infra Chapter 15.
215. See his letter to Thomas 18.4.36 (the same date on which according to 
the Arabs, started the disturbances again with no one knowing i t  at 
the time) C.O. 733/297/75156 Pt.II.
216. J. Marlow Op-Cit p.136 My Italics.
217. "Al Liwas 8.4.36.
218. "Falastin" 7.4.36.
n..^tern
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T*iw 1 i n  I'/ihi tu ti.an ccft
i)u 13 C'ctohcr lb*33 there started in Jarmaalta a staries of 
disturbances, lasting until 3 ‘lovet.bcr, which spread to Jaffa, i <u£«, 
i: shine and widen recurred «gain in Jerusalem.
Two min factor.1! which ceased Chose disturbance* were ( I )  the 
issa! ;;r at Sou profile« and ( I I )  the growing euti-drlti¿h feeling of the 
Arab Palestlniana» Another two awcomkry factors wore ( I )  the increai*
in;; iaportance of the oxtmdUt youth organisation anti ( I I )  trio will of 
the Arab Executive to re-assert itse lf anti win lad  »enm of its dwindling 
influence»
Tin* groat increase in Jewish had ¡«ration from the latter part of 
li>32,* together with e 3sle of lands to Jews, had resulted in a groviog 
feeling off unrest among th# Arabs of Palestine»
Pol lowing; the publication of the Imaigration J ill IVJJ“* tU  prw ii*
r
itma of which they considered» would enable further iar«i£r.ttion on a 
bigger and larger scale, Arab ;>oiicie£.-u;.i and the Arab pres a directed a 
caujifuga against the Jewish immigration, with bitterness and growing 
intensity.
They couplalued that the Government was flooding Palestine with 
J o » with total disregard off their own existence off its .reraises and the 
opinions off its best exjxirta. They said that "waves" off (migrants were 
reaching Palestine vegnrdlesa of the absorptive capacity of the country, 
with the object of Judaislng the country, displacing the Arabs from the
land mid depriving then off their enployneat, a.vl that they were destined 
to extermination, exf&ision, and coraplote domination by the Jews. They 
also stated that the mss iwuigration of Jews vas being allowed and indeed 
encouraged by the Covernmnt»
l .  ffeu Chapter 12.
2» bee Palestine Caxctte hx t ran rdi nary 3l.fi.1933
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(a) as a reply to the movement of the Arabs for unity and
(b) so that vhen the Legislative Council was introduced the Jews 
would be in a Majority.
On the occasion of the lloslem Festival of Kebi~huLin on the 
4 September, which was organised by the Young hen's Executive led by 
Y. Ghusseizt, îlusa Kasim in a speech  ^ against immigration asked the 
audience not to lose hope, and addressed a telegram to the h.C. 
demanding the immediate stopping of immigration and protesting against 
the "british policy which aima at converting Palestine into a Jewish 
country, and at the annihilation of the original Arab inhabitants".
Public meetings of protest were held in haifa Jerusalem and 
Jaffa by the Istiqlal Party, the Young hen's Association and the moslem - 
Christian Association.
Two written protests were sent by Amin al Tauiud the acting
President of the S.d.C..^ and on the occasion of the v is it to Nablus of
»
the Officer Administering the Government on the 30 Sept ember, laufic 
Uaumd and other notables presented him with a petition to be transmitted 
to the League of hâtions.
itaterial for agitation was not lacking. The Jews, for tueir own 
reasons boasted of the resolutions adopted at the I8tu Zionist Congress 
held at Prague in August 1933 calling for opening the gates of Palestine 
for unrestricted Jewish Immigration. The Jewish Press was filled  with 
reports aoout immigration of German and otner Jews into Palestine. This 
was published by the Arab Press, which reported daily tne arrival of 
immigrants in large numbers at Haifa and Jaffa. It  was even alleged that 
Zionist bodies contracted for the transfer of 80.000 Jews into Palestine 
in a period of 3 mouths.*'
3. Falaatin 5.¿.1933
4. On 19.8.1933 and 5.9.1333 C.O. 733/239/17356/1
5. "Falastin" early October. 1 could not locate the issue.
'¿HUH t f  &3l8 :K 3! . f t f i i 3 i /l6*26 aad
C.O.239/17356/1.
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Iu particular, the tone of the Mufti's paper "A1 Jamiah al 
Arabiyya" was strong and betrayed the bitterness and acute vexation 
which tiie Arabs felt because of Jewish immigration.
Ihe second factor leading to the 1933 disturbances was the 
growing Anti-British feeling amongst the balesiuians. following
Macdonald's ''black letter* to .voizmuim and the manner in which it 
abolished all the concessions granted to them by the Fassfield White 
paper, this Anti-British feeling manifested itself, and started to 
spread slowly. It was mainly propagated by those elements, which 
later formed themselves in the Istiqlal party. On the occasion of 
a popular meeting, to commemorate the Independence of Syria held in 
Nablus in 8.3.1231, I. Larwaza and other speakers pointed openly to 
Britain as the main enemy of the Falcstinians.® This v. as also 
elaborated in an article, called "The heath of Suame"^ by llisan al 
Jaabari in which he discussed the X'rime Minister's letter.
I
From then onwards, the leaders of the Istiqlal party proceeded 
with a systematic policy of engendering in the mines of the population 
hatred of tue nritish ¿mnuatory Anministration, alleging that besides 
preventing the ..runs from exercising their rigut of freedom and independ­
ence, Britain was the chief means of Arab 6ujjugaticn to the Jews. The 
All-party Grand National Assembly wnicn wTas neld in Jaffa on 26.3.1933 
resolved in principle on non-co-operation with the Government® and decided 
to put unto icaneciiate effect the first stage (i.e. to boycott Government 
as far as receptions and diplomatic acts of courtesy were concerned, to 
boycott Government committees, and to boycott British and Zionist goods, 
manufacturers and firms). 6*8
6. 'A1 Jamiali al Arabiyya' 11.3.1931. I. Darwaza mentions also in that 
respect the speech given by Islaf al Nashashibi on the occasion of 
the commemoration of the Battle of bitin vhen Salan al Bin won against 
the Crusaders, and an Article written by Subhi al Khadra "Britain the 
source of trouble and the root of evil", and anotiaer article written by 
himself "where are we with regard to our national beliefs and aspirations 
for independence", both of which appeared in "Al-Jamiau al Arabiyya".
See Darwaza Op-Cit pp.102-103. 7. "Al Jazniah al Arabiyya" 23.3.1931.
8. See p.
211
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Tne iclua tnat the Brit is a t/ere a kind of disincereuted referee, 
trying to hold even balance ootueen tee Arnos and Jews V/iiS 3.t> SildoilGci #
An article entitled^ "A Covemaent wuich is openly partial" while 
discussing the murder or a Jewisa guard by tne neduins in uadi hawaretii, 
snowed the total partiality and identification of the Ccv-rr. .ant with 
the Jews.
In a discussion between the Colonial Secretary and his chief 
advisers in tiie Colonial Office on 1.5.19339 10 he remarked that Arab
feeling vas more bitter than he had realised, and that it was directed 
not only against the Jew3, but against the Government. be also pointed 
out that if there should be further outbreaks of Arab hostilities in the 
future, it would be directed against the Government.
In their annual report on Palestine for the year 1933 tae Admin­
istration not ed11 that "the Arab leaders have oeen mere outspoken and 
less compremising in their hostility; their attitude appears tc have
l
crystallized in the concept that the so-called Jewish policy of the 
Mandatory is but a screen for oppressive imperialism and an. excuse for 
withholding from the people of Palestine their elementary right of indep­
endence".
Ti e "Jar¿all al Arabiyya" expressed this Anti-Jritiah line in 2 strong 
articles. Celebrating the anniversary of the Battle of liittin it wrote1  ^
"uu you Palestinian», the ancestor» of your present rulers occupied your 
country for ICO years, but were driven out of it, as you know. We want 
now and wo need another battle of kittin" and following tee big demonstrat­
ion in Junoalert on 13.10.1933 in an article entitled "Our critical Movement
in its now direction"13 in which it discussed the new anti-british direction
9. Al Jamah al Islaniiy/ah" - 28.2.1933
10. dee note of Discussion C.O. 733/239/173ao
11. Report on Palestine 8 Trana-Joruan 1933. Colonial office No.94,London 1934,
12. "Al Jamiau al Arabiyya" 23.8.1933.
13.Ibid 17.10.1933.
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it said 1 i\icK this Ziouisu with your feet, and stand face to face with
ntain • It is ifiore uort1V  to ^tru : gle a;;ainst. Zionism is
nut a C T T * * . i i i . î ml enter ■ '• r . i  n  (ì c:nconraee ' l  1 - r L f  a i  p . and .••/rotected
■ayonnt s 9 be:kind W; tic'h  it a  ir» f i  at o ; ì arc i  i.ag tne Araba and
; them U l l d er its dire'et ■ ce. w -  . . ^ 1  «1 . 1 L .  i .  ' i  •
'fine anti-dritirh policy v/eu v/ell linen arc auoi.teu by tac Arab
you tu, whose participation in ana influence, on idk-.ALe politics
1 Lwas i n c r e a s in g. Ar a o xoutn organizations, tue m j  j c w U, tiie Young 
ilea’s Congress and the Young i leu’s nos lea Association (x,A..i,A.) all took 
part in the national activities, in agitation against ¡.ala or lands and 
itrugration, in enforcing ti e noycott, in keeping craei a m  directing the 
national festivals such as i;ebi Musa, deal i.uoin etc.
They were tired and dissatisfied with what was Know..» as the "policy 
of political assemblies, futile spec clitiSp and &mpty ptititioiio ana protests*^ 
and favoured and advised more drastic ana extreme tuethods or action. They - 
as wall as the Istiqlal party and uany otuera, bitterly attacked the Arab 
Executive for their apathy aud inertia. Xue Executive, vuich had been 
worn out by the passage of tine, torn by internal divisions and party 
friction, blackened by tne fact tnat some of its mummers were mixed up in 
land transactions with Jens and practically leaderless because of the 
advanced age of its president ilusa ICaziia, lost almost all its influence.
Its members from the Istiqlal party^ withdrew from ail activities in it
and the crovra of national leadership passed from l92y into the hands of 
tne nuiti.
After a lull of political inactivity wnicu lasted almost a year, 
the Executive Committee met on 3.10.1933^° with only 21 out of the 43
me.uL.ers attending the meeting. *15
In. utL cuip ter 14.
15. Auni /2b d Al lîadi, Izzat liarvaza, Main al Ha’adi, Rashid haj Ibrahim
and Faiuni Aoousni. See Onrvaza 0p~0it p.112
15. Tue meeting before that vas held on 2b*la.1952, sit J7a7:G5 I.s.A
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Several speakers (Otaar al biter, Allred liock and others) proposed 
that the ¿Executive Committee snould dissolve itself* *7 tr»us admitting its 
bankruptcy. Utters uxufctl t^ut unless the Executive decided bn some 
positive active steps, suen as demonstrations etc. it would lose all the 
remnants of its influence. It was felt that unless tne executive 
Coia/iittee adopted such a decision, the Youua hen’s Congress(Lugnat 
uuiutauer ai ihmbab) supported by the Isti^lal and other extremists 
would uo count, advance to assume leadership and organize dex *oustrations 
by themselves.
On Jamal uusseiui's proposal, a resolution was passed, t> declure a 
general striae on Friday tee 13tn October 1333, and to demonstrate on 
the same day against the Government's policy in the matter of immigration 
by means of a procession from the Luram el Sharif to the Goverraaent Offices. 
Xne resolution read thus**8 "In expression of the wrath of the Palestinian 
Aran nation... against tae britisu Government's tampering with the rights 
of the owners of the country...the Executive Committee has decided to 
observe a general strike”.•••and to hold a large demonstration.
both nusa kaziu»*9 and Jamal husseini80 stated that it was not so much 
that they wuo wanted tne demonstration as forced on them by popular demand. 
One cannot, however, escape the impression that they, and specially Musa 
idaziu considered tnis demonstration, * as a bid to win bach for himself 
the influence he had lost, the lore so that the Uufti was outside Palestine8-*- 
and all the credit - if credit it was going to be - would be his and the 
Arau executive's. 178920
17. lor record of the matting see 3757:65 l.L.A.
18. "Al JarJ.au el Arabiyya" 9.10.1933.
19. "If it were in my power I would try to 3top it, but it was the people
who decided it*1 u3lx words to uatiicm cue G..t.G. ou 9.10.1933
C.O. 733/239/17356/1 Ft.II.
20. "he have Lean pushed to it by the people themselves. In an interview 
with the ii.C. 25.10.1931. Ibid.
21. He was heading then the delegation of the Islamic Congress to India. 
See Chapter II.
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These, then, were the factors leading to the disturbances. On 
learning of the intended demonstration, the Government, in accordance 
w*-th its practice since 1929, and in the interest of public security, 
decided to prohibit it .
The O.A.G.22 informed Musa Kazim and Jamal Husseini, each seperately, 
that permission would not be granted for the demonstration, and advised 
them to abandon the resolution. Musa Kazim, defended vigoursly the 
Executive's resolution and bitterly criticised the Government's immig­
ration policy. Noticing, however, the firm stand by the O.A.G., he agreed 
to try and reassemble the Executive Committee, and persuade them to send a 
delegation for further discussions with the O.A.G., but on its meeting of 
the 12.10.1933 the Committee decided again to hold the demonstration.
The decision to hold the demonstration was received with great satis­
faction amongst all classes of the Arab population.
It is safe to assume that the Executive Committee, or at least the
1
moderates within it ,  were forced, to adopt the decision by public opinion.
Had they desired to cancel their previous decision, they would not have 
been able to do so without having to quit their position and cause their own 
and the Executive's downfall.
The Government had already warned formally the Arab Executive^ and 
published in all papers an offic ia l communique^  warning "the members of 
the public...that any person who participates in any demonstration or 
procession, w ill render himself liable to the penalties of the law".
It also took all the necessary security precautions. 234
22. One cannot but compare, the strong resolution and firm line, adopted by 
Mr.Hatorn-Hall in the Autumn of 1933 with the hesitations and delaying 
tactics of Sir A. Wauchope in April 1936.
23. In a letter to the President Musa Kazim 11.10.1933 C.O. 733/239/17356/1.
24. Official Communique No.38/33 11.10.1933 "A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya" 11.10.1933,
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For a few days before the demonstration in Jerusalem, excitement was 
high, verging on sedition. It was general and pervaded all classes, though 
perhaps in a lesser form in villages, and the anti-British feeling was 
extremely strong.
Though the Government took strong precautions, Jews living in mixed 
quarters moved temporarily.
On the morning of Friday 13 October, the Arabs entering Jerusalem, 
were deprived of their sticks. Around 12.30 p.m. following the Friday 
prayers at al-Aqsa Mosque, during which Sheikh Said al Khatib delivered a 
moderate speech on immigration. The demonstration^ started, with several 
thousand people participating^.
Only after several clashes with baton charges from the police and the 
crowd resisting by throwing stones rocks and other "missiles",was it  dis­
persed.
Several points are notworthy.
Thei readiness of the majority of members of the Executive to part­
icipate in the demonstration, realising that they were likely to be beaten 
and imprisoned, points perhaps to the force of public opinion in favour of 
the demonstration. The participation of Musa Kazim, despite his very 
advanced age was much admired by the Arabs, as well as by the British.
An attempt by the District Commissioner to induce him and other leaders to 
leave the crowd, failed, as they were prevented from doing so on account of 
the people around them. A later attempt to bring him out of the crowd, 
however, succeeded. 256
25. For fu ll description of the demonstration, as well as those which 
followed see the Murison Report C.O. 733/239/17356/1 pt 4 see also 
Police Appreciation Summary No.25/33 of 23.10.1933 and No.26/33 of
15.11.1933 F.O. 371/16926.
26. There were different estimates of the number of participants. The 
Murison report cites the evidence of an eye witness estimating the 
crowd at the start of the demonstration as between 6-7 thousand 
people. Other police reports describing the clashes which happened 
at a later stage estimate the crowd to be 3,000 people. Perhaps 
the remainder had dispersed in the meantime.
He was the soulA most active part was played by Jamal Kusseini. 
of the agitation at the first stages of the demonstration and of the strike, 
having supervised the closure of shops in Jerusalem. He himself was 
lightly wounded. The participation of women, both Moslem and Christians 
led by the Arab Ladies Association, was conspicuous. They even became 
troublesome to the police, screaming kicking and waving handkerchiefs at 
the police, and the clash close to Damascus gate was actually caused by 
their enco uragement of the crowd to stone the police and urging them to 
further efforts.
Not less conspicuous was the absence of villagers, very few of whom 
participated, with the crowd consisting almost wholly of townsmen. This 
perhaps was the result of efforts by Ragheb Nashashibi and Fakhri Nashashibi 
to dissuade villagers from participating in the demonstration failure of 
which they tried to bring about. Other leaders of the opposition resented 
this and themselves participated in the demonstration. Pro-Executive 
leaders claimed that the small attendance of the villagers was not so much 
because of the Nashashibis' efforts as a result of the lack of propaganda 
on their part to induce attendance, of the commencement of the winter sowing, 
and especially of the efforts of the District Officers to discourage the 
fellaheen from participating*
Though deprived of sticks and other weapons the demonstrators including 
certain leaders, desired and were intent on a clash with the Government forces, 
welcoming any disturbance which might have followed.
In order to emphasise the Anti-British character of the demonstration, 
the cries were "Down with the English" and "Down with the Colonisers". There 
were almost no shouts against Jews and Zionism.
By 4 p.m. that day, the situation became normal, though tense, and no 
incidents of any kind occurred.
No demonstrations were attempted elsewhere, but the strike was complete 
at Nablus, Jaffa and Ramleh and was partial elsewhere. In Jerusalem the 
strike included also the means of transport as well.
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On the same Friday evening, the Arab Executive met, feeling satisfied 
that the greatest part of the programme of the demonstration was fu lfilled , 
that the intentions of the Nashashibis had failed, and most of a ll, that the 
response and political spirit were most encouraging. With this feeling of 
elation and contentment in setting an example of "National sacrifice", the 
Executive, in accordance of its resolution of 8.10 resolved to organize 
further demonstrations.27
This announcement was enthusiastically welcomed by Arab press.
It was suggested that the second demonstration should be held in Haifa 
either on 31 October, the date upon which the H.C. was going to open offic­
ia lly  the Haifa port or on Friday 3 November, following the Balfour Declare 
ation anniversary.^® But the Haifa leaders were not enthusiastic, and it  
was decided to hold the demonstration in Jaffa, the second port of entry of 
Jewish immigrants, on Friday 27 Octvber.29
On 24.10.1933 the Jaffa District Commissioner interviewed the Jaffa 
leaders of the Moslem Christian Association, and of the Arab Youth Congress, 
informing them that he would not allow a demonstration, but intimating that 
he would agree to a milder gesture, such as presenting a written protest to 
himself, after a procession from the Mosque to his Office, which was a shorter 
route than the one originally intended for the demonstration* This concess­
ion by the District Commissioner was in line with a policy laid down by the 
H.C. in his meeting with the District Commissioners on 23.10.1933 to the effect 
that every forebearance, consistent with the maintenance of security should be 
shown to the demonstrators.®® 278930
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27. See "A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya"and "Falastin" 14.10.1933.
28. C.I.D. report No.26/33 of 15.11.1933 F.O. 371/16926
29. Friday is the favoured day for demonstrations owing to Moslem attendance 
at Mosques. The date originally fixed for the demonstration was a week 
earlier, i.e . Friday the 20 October but i t  happened that the Jaffa Lawn 
Tennis Tournament, in which the Jaffa leader Edmond Rock was very inter­
ested, was fixed for the same date, so the demonstration was delayed for 
a week. See the Murison Report p.10. C.0.733/239/17356/1 Pt.4. See
also report by the Jaffa District Conmissioner 7.11.1933 C.0.733/239/17356/1 
Pt.3.
30. Ibid
The high Conniasioner viw had returned in the meantime to Palestine 
asked the Arab Executive O f f i c e , t o  see him on 25 October. lie spoke 
sternly to them and told them that the demonstration of 27.10 in Jaffa 
vould cot be allowed suggesting to then to hold the protest meeting at the 
Mosque with the protest text to he presented by the leaders to the District 
Commissioner in his office directly afterwards.
Musa Kasim emphasised that the Arabs aimed at a peaceful demonstration, 
saying "witness the fact that in our demonstration in Jerusalem (i.e. on 13 
October) we carried nothing in our hands, but had simply something in our 
hearts that ve felt bound to express".
Much more agreaaive in his words was J.Uusseini who criticised the 
"pro-Jeviah activity of the H.C." which had not been equalled since the days 
of Sir 11. Samuel v ;k> himself was a Zionist. Speaking of the demonstration 
he said that it was to the benefit of the country as it enabled the people 
to give vent to their feelings. "If demonstrations are not permitted" he 
said "I fear there will finally be an explosion". With an indication of 
things to come he continued "We, as leaders, confess that ve have not done 
our duty in the past, to the people, because ve have never adopted other 
than peaceful meana« ^
Auni Abd al Uadi described the situation of the Arabs in face of the 
growing flow of immigrants and continual sale of lands thus "we are like a 
sick man whose doctors tell him that he is dying. In these circumstances 
ue are asked to do nothing". And Musa Kasim continued "you tell us to do 
nothing, to wait as we have waited in the past, to wait to be slaughtered".
The Arab leaders'^ begged the li.C. to allow the demonstration. They 
beseetched him and entreated him. One gets the impression that they felt 
as if all their problems would be solved, if the demonstration vould be allowed 312
31. Musa Kasim the President, Y.Karraj, the Vice-President, and the three joi^t 
secretaries, J.Hussein, Auni Abd al dadi and Mugbannam Mughanaaa
C.O. 733/233/17356/1 Pt.2.
32. My Italics.
33. Specially Musa Kasim and Y.Farraj less so the others, Jamal Husseini nor 
at all.
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The H.C. repeating his conviction that such demonstrations were much 
more likely to stir up feeling and to lead to trouble, made it clear that he 
would not allow it*
The Jaffa moderate leaders led by Omar Bitar, were inclined to accept 
the District Commissioner's compromise proposal. Eventually, Musa Kazim 
stated that he accepted it as well, and the extremists who opposed it were 
silenced, but when the rest of the Executive Committee's members reached 
Jaffa on the morning of 27.10.1933 it turned out that the majority amongst 
them and specially Jamal Husseini opposed it, and actually until the leaders 
entered the Mosque for prayers no decision had been reached.
A little earlier, a deputation of ladies arrived from Jerusalem and 
Mrs. Mughannam made a speech which excited the public.
Before the congregation left the Mosque, an appeal which was made by 
Sheikh Fawzi Imam for the crowd to disperse peacefully, met with angry cries.
It was rumoured that the moderates wished to take the shorter route, 
and eye witnesses Btated that Musa Kazim appeared to be trying to take it, 
but it was blocked by a human hedge and he was carried by the surrounding 
crowd towards the longer one, which meant clashed with the police, and 
clashes did occur.^ The police claimed that shots were fired at them, and 
that they fired only v?hen the situation became threatening and dangerous, 
the Arabs counter-claim that only the police fired. The result however was, 
that by the end of the day or rather by the end of the riot which was over 
by 13.00 p.m., there were 15 killed including a Palestinian constable, and 
39 seriously wounded by gunshot. 34
34. For a full report of the disturbances in Jaffa see C.I.D. summary 
report No.26/33 of 15.11.1933 F.O. 371/16926. Report of the Jaffa 
District Commissioner 8.11.1933 C.O. 733/239/17356/1 PT. 3.
The Murison Report pp. 9-24. Ibid Pt.4
One thing is clear. The demonstration was much more violent than 
the previous one in Jerusalem. In that case also the desire to clash 
with the Government forces wa3 evident. Eye witnesses describing the 
riots said that the viexy of the armed body of the procession, consisting 
of many thousands-*-’ with above them a "perfect forest of sticks" and iron 
bars, advancing at a rapid pace towards the police, shouting, waving and 
threatening with their clubs, cursing other religion and shouting "Alleihum",
(at them) was frightening and terrifying.
As in the demonstration of Jerusalem, the majority of the demonstrators 
were town people, but the percentage of villagers was much higher. They 
also i>articipated more actively in the clashes with the police as shown by 
the proportionally high number of villagers among the killed and wounded.
The accepted idea at the time, that the boatmen, as a class, formed the back­
bone of the rioters was unjustified.* 36 It is significant that although the 
Arab Women came from Jerusalem to Jaffa they did not take part in the procession, 
perhaps because they knew of it's violent nature. As in Jerusalem, Musa Kazem 
was hurried by police unto a nearby building and he thus escaped harm.
The military units remained in reserve. Armoured cars, however, did 
useful : atrol work.
After the riots were over, the Jaffa District Commissioner asked, and 
obtained authority from the H.C., for the , olice to raid the offices of the 
lioslem-Christian Association. This was done at about 14.30 and Jamal 
Uusseini, Izzat Darwaza, Sheikh Muzaffar, Yaaqub Ghusein, Edmond Rock and 
otner leaders who were iii the act of drafting orders for a further demon­
stration to be held in Nablus on 10 November, were arrested. Auni Abd A1 
kadi and Salim Abd al Rahman were arrested also.
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3s. Estimates vary uetween 4 to 10 thousand. See Murison Report Ibid.
36. See report of the Jaffa District Oommissxoner. C.O.733/239/17356/1 Pt.3.
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A curtmi van in. oaod in Jaffa fro« 18.00 to 05.00. 
inuring tint afternoon, the Jaffa neve began to reacu the o. ulation 
u£ iiaif* and u im a  at ii#.15 tnu train arrived, bringing vita it .ersona 
vat) bad been iu Jail* during fc.*m dciAOitstration, they vere ta: ?a to the 
Uaifa rioiqtts, vnere their uxagguratud accounts of the Jaffa riots, 0reatly 
excxtec tnc uo. la who loft ti.a . usque ana attacked the Haifa ualn , cilice 
Scation vita atonus, obliging the tolive to o, on lire.
ihe halfa District Casuals sioaer ,4ub «c aidui^nt on J7 October a 
¡meeting with tua .aoi.iou notaries of bail's, wuo assured hi,a that they dis- 
iissuciuCuU Luuuvuivus iron cue disturoaucu# and . ronieed hii ■ coat tkoy would 
do their utv.04»L to reveal further dedust ration the folioviu.; nay*
i««wevtir# chu following woraxng a second attaca was oxrccfced against 
cue u*uu Police diction and the adjacent HtUwiy Station. Thu Police usd 
again to o, en fire iu order to restore order.
ho funner trouble# occurrud in Haifa, and a curfew was enforced 
i.iweu t,*ni ¿lours of 18.00 .u. and 05.00 a.u.
ho dwmouutration took ,lace in Acre, thia was a result of the efforts 
of the District Officer who was assist. d by the influence of Shaikh A«*ud 
hauqairi.
At kabluu too, when the turns arrived of tae Jaffa demonstration, riots
orotic ou tne afternoon of 27 October. A ,olice uttic Which was attacked with 
stouca ut the Post UJtficu at the centre of twe cowu, o. enec fire. Reinforce* 
ueuts arrived and order was established.
There was a second wave of disturbances iu Jerusalei. ea the afternoon 
of 27 October, and ou the following uoruing.
in tut Mantissa th* strike coiitxuuea ail over the country, out no wore 
serious incident* occurrud. odd whots were fired in different ; laces, mainly 
in Jerusalfcia, on the Cove moan t Offices» and the rolled Training l)c. ot at
Mount bco.uc. Uoau* in Jerusalem were strewn with nails, and telegra h and 
telephone wires were out between Jerusalem and Bethlehem and between Tulkarm
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and Kalkilia. There were rumours of demonstrations in several Arab towns, 
and of intended attacks on Jewish settlements, but none materialized.
The anniversary of the Balfour Declaration on 2 November, passed on 
the whole quietly, but precautions were taken in Gaza following rumours of 
a threatened big demonstration, and a large number of the "Arab al Hawareth" 
proceeding towards Tulkarm to demonstrate, were stopped by the District 
Officer who with assistance from a low flying R.A.F. plane, convinced them 
to return.
The remaining members of the Arab Executive met on the morning of 
28 October and decided to protest to the Government over the Police action, 
and also to arrange relief measures for the Arab casualties.
A deputation^ of the Executive asked to see and was received by the 
H.C. and submitted to him a written memorandum.
Rashid Ilaj Ibrahim, who stoke on behalf of the deputation said that 
"in the events of the last 2 days, there was no intention of crime or riot.
It was only intended to express the feeling of the people against the 
Government*s policy". lie emphasized that the events were not organized or
prepared, but were a genuine expression of feeling, and if in the past the 
leaders had been able to appease the people, they could not do it any more, 
as they had lost their influence, and the Arab Executive was no longer able 
to persuade the people to be patient.
Husa Kazim claimed that actually the procession was going to take the 
short route as agreed with Crosbie, the Jaffa District Commissioner, but that 
the Police had attacked them from behind and it was then that disorders started. 37
37. Only the President Kusa Kazim attended also the previous interview of 
25th October. The deputation included besides him, Sheikh Mahmoud 
Dajani, Rashid llaj Ibrahim, Zaki Nuseiba, Dr. Freij and Dr. Izzat Tannus. 
Ibid.
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lie also insisted on his view that it was the British who had o ened fire 
first, maintaining that the Arabs had no firearms in the demonstration.
Tiie deputation also showed a greatinterest in the prisoners at Acre.
The II.C. expressed his sorrov; at what had hairened and said that 
such disturbance uiglit delay the progress towards a Legislative Council 
in which theyaall were so very interested.
lluch wore outspoken was a de; utation^ Gf Arab ladies who were 
granted an interview with the II.C. on 30 October. S, ecially the Christian 
ladies among then, Ilrs. Eioghannan and Hiss Sakakini, who ex, rcssed their 
feelings in a strong language which none of their male compatriots had ever 
used in s; caking with the II.C. They accused the police of committing murder^, 
llcuinding bin that a deputation of ladies called cn the Ii.C. after the riots 
cf 1020 they said "How again we call on your Excellency because the circum­
stances arc similar to 1929".
Knowing how sensitive was the II.C. to the situation and hardships of 
the fellaheen, and wishing j erha, a to hurt him personally, Ilrs. iloghannam 
said "Your Excellency says that you arc the friend of the ,eopie and of the 
fellah. But your Excellency should know what rcople have been saying. They 
say that you go about the country and you meet the fellah and give him ten 
shillings here and a pound there, but you come back to your office and give 
decisions and issue proclamations and laws of such a kind that you take away 
with one hand what you give with the other". Hiss Abd al Uadi said "Ue 
have never loved tiie Jews. Now reluctantly we are driven to feel hatred 
towards the English. Every Arab feels the sane". *
JC.Crosbie, the Jaffa District Commissioner writing in his re,ort about the 
the deputation which visited him, commented dryly "though attempting to 
,ut questions of policy in the foreground, the deputation was clearly 
most interested in the prisoners at Acre". Ibid. The same could be 
said of other de, utations as well.
39.For record of the interview, see C.O. 733/239/17356/1 Pt.2
40.In the memorandum which they presented him they wrote: "our men and our 
boys who are being murdered in cold blood by irresponsible Police, under 
the pretence of self defence". Ibid.
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There too, most of the ladies^* were asking for the prisoners• release. 
The H.C. assured them that each case would be fairly investigated and if 
nothing was proved the prisoner would be released, and he begged them to use 
their powerful influence towards the restoration of peace and good order in 
Palestine.
On 30 October, emergency regulations were published under Defence Order 
in Council, in order to vest the II.C. with the necessary additional powers.
Owing to censorship imposed by these regulations, the Arab newspapers 
went on strike, and were not published.
The Arab Executive Committee met on 2 November at the house of Musa 
Kazim to discuss the continuation of the strike. A small majority was in 
favour of calling it off, and it was decided to publish the decision the 
foil wing day.
This information, however leaked out, several shops were opened 
immediately, but they were forced to close again by young men.
On 3 November all the shops were opened. The strike, from 27 October 
to 3 November was longer than any previous one held in Palestine.
It should be noted that the manifesto^ issued by the Arab Executive 
on 3 November, after praising the people for observing the strike, ordered 
its cessation "for an interval until further notice of demonstrations and 
strike". 412
41. Mrs. Moghannam however said: "Our object is not to beg you to set free 
those in prison. That is only a Elinor question". But she was the 
exception.
42. "A1 Jamia al Arabiyya" 3.11»1933
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With the end of the strike the authorities removed also the curfew 
restrictions on Haifa and Jaffa,
Altogether the casualties4^ were 27 killed including 1 Arab policeman, 
with 56 police injured, 13 of them seriously, and 187 civilians injured, 33 
of whoa seriously wounded. All the civilians were killed, as well as 73 
injured as result of gunfire. None of the police were hurt by gunfire.
On 6 November, the representatives of the Arab Press43 4 were summoned 
to meet the 1I.C. lie Spoke with them about the responsibility of the press, 
explaining that he enforced censorship because a number of untrue statements 
had been made which aisled the people in a dangerous way and in a dan0erous 
direction. They claimed the right of the public to know the facts, and 
their duty to print and publish these news which the public should know.
They presented the Arab point of view, with regard to the disturbances in 
general, and theirs as pressmen in particular, A suggestion to appoint a 
Committee of enquiry "in order to set criticism at rest and in order 
Government might be able to gain experience from these troubles in dealing 
with any future troubles" was put by Daud al Issa of Falastin
Amin al Tonirni, the acting President of the Supreme Moslem Council 
had also approached the U.C. and asked for the appointment of a Parliamentary 
Commission to enquire into the disturbances and unto the "just demands of the 
Arabs",45 The Il.C. supported the idea of having an enquiry specially in 
order to clear the police from "malicious charges or illinformed crit'c’ ,
figures give credence to Arab claims43. See the liurisou Report Tlic o ?Lrini: the demonstrations inthat the Arabs did not have firearm ,
Jerusalem and Jaffa,
44. Munif al IIusseini-Al Jamiah al Arabiyya, Daud al Issa-Falastin, Issa al 
Bandak - Saut al Shaab, Najib Nassar-al Camel, Ajjaj Nbwayhiti-al Arab, 
and Dr. Abu al Afia. For record of the meeting, see C.O,733/239/17356/lPt.;
. c the Arabs - as well as the Jews -45. Ibid. Pt.4. It seems that at the e3itraordinary session of the P.M.C.
were putting pressure for summoning ^ letter by Eric Drummond to the^
in order to consider the situation-^ 13.12,1933» on his talk with Marquis 
Foreign Secretary, Sir J.Simon a e igeague of Nations.
Theodoli, the President of the *
C.O. 733/248/17688.
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àuc he did not like a Parliauentary Couaiasion because it would give 
«Mggeratsd idea of the ia orCanee and the extant of the disturbances 
and because - resuuably - it would have not beau ossihle to limit the 
task of auch a commission to axtablishing facta and sequence of events*
It was therefor« decided to hav« a Judicial Cottesi #s ion consisting 
of Sir Willie» Murison, vho was formerly the Chief Justice of the Straits 
Settlements, aa CUairuan, and h.Truated, the Attorny Conarai as a member, 
with the following terns of reference^ "to enquire into, and re ore u on 
tne event« immediately receding the disturbances which took lac« in 
Palestine between the 13th October end the 3rd Hovmwler 1933, tue .recise 
sequence and nature of events within that ,eriod, ano the resultant 
casualties and donate to . ro erty".
To inform tuo , ubile of the a ointment of this commission of 
Enquiry, the H.C. used au hiu channel of communication a da utation of 
six leading Arab Mayor«*7 r« resenting all the Arab Mayors of the country, 
who were granted at their request, an interview with the u.C. on 13*11*1933*
Taese «ayors had exercised a restraining influence during the riots 
and he thought it well to do it in this wanner, iu order to increase their 
rsstige.
After handing the il.C. a nooorandun, kughab Haohashibi s oke on 
behalf of the do utation, and said that they wished to see niia, because 
they feared lust the riots which by themselves were very serious, might be 
the rolude to «onething more serious utili. he mentioned to the H.C. their
revioua assurances of williu&nass to work and co-o erst« viti the Oovernsieut, 
and he ex reused cita no e that once the Coveruueut granted the Arab's 
requests they would he found useful and good friends to tne British*
46* Palestine Casette 16th Moveiaber 1933.
-.^ 7
47* RsKheb Nasiutshibi-Jerusalea. Asseti Said -  Jaffa, hussanS.hukri-
haifa, hulixian Tank an - hablus, Sheikh Hus taf a al Kheiri~jtaule aud
A i c o l a .Shahiu-bethlehen. For the record of the interview see 
Official Communique iio.62/33 13.11.1933 ’Falaatin’1 14.11.1933.
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R. Nashashibi also raised the question of granti ig a greater measure of 
self-government. The other mayors spoke too, Hasan Shukri remarking 
that the time had arrived for the Government to consider its obligation 
to facilitate the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, 
as fulfilled, and that therefore, further immigration should be stored. 
The H.C, in his answer, assured them that he would do all that he could, 
so that the Arabs and British would remain good friends. Discussing the 
immigration problem he gave them definite assurances on 2 points: (1) that 
when assessing the numbers for the labour Schedule he would consider the 
future as well as the immediate situation, and (2) that he would also 
consider among other factors, the factor of unemployment, whether among 
Arabs or Jews, He also told them of further measures to prevent illicit 
immigration and informed them of the appointment of the Commission of 
enquiry.
When the full particulars of the interview were published, the 
Mayors were severely attacked and criticized for the moderation of their 
attitude, and their apparent willingness to work with the Government^, 
Sensing that the public and the press were still in an extremist mood the 
Arab Executive decided on 9 December to boycott the Murison Commission,
Accordingly only one Arab^O — at art from those connected with the 
Government or the Services - gave evidence. 489
48. The H.C. wrote to the S. of S. for the colonies in his letter of 23.11.1933 
that when making this assurance he had in mind the terms of the Prime 
Minister's letter to Dr.Weizman. The Jews later protested with some 
justice it seems, that these concessions went against these terms. See 
paper written in the Colonial Office. 4.12.1933. C.O. 733/236/17313 Pt. 4.
49. See “Al Jamiak al Araibyya” 14.11,1933 “Saut al Shaeb1' 15,11.1933.
50 I could not find who this Arab was.
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The Commission, stuck to their limited terms of appointment. Their 
report 51 presented on 4.1.1934 reads as a chronology of the events, nothing 
more, nothing less. Indeed, with the exception of the following remark 
"It is clear that an Arab crowd in Palestine is mercurial and excitable and 
when excited, dangerous" I could not find' in the whole report one sentence 
which could be considered a comment of a more general nature.
In the meantime the 18 leaders arrested, following the Jaffa riots 
were released on bail one week after their arrest52. There had been some 
difference amongst them as to the plea to be made at the trials. Jamal al 
Husseini and Izzat Darwaza were opposed to any defence and prepared to 
expound their political views and receive punishment, while others, prominent 
among whom were Yaaqub Ghussain and Edmond Rock, appeared frightened. After 
considerable internal discussions the pleas entered were Not Guilty • On 
19.3.1934 they were sentenced to different periods of imprisonment, the 
longest of which was 10 months. Eventually on 3.7.1934 the court offered 
them the alternative of going to jail or accept release on promise of good 
behaviour, not entailing, however, prohibition from taking part in any legal 
political activities for a period of three years, which they agreed to do, 
with the exception of Sheikh Muzaffar who defied the Government and went to 
Jail for six months.
The opposition papers described them as deserters who had disowned 
responsibility for the 1933 national demonstrations and who had so easily 
complied with the court*s demand to refrain from political activities.
51. Report of the Commission in
Commissioner for Palestine by notifi Roth the H.C. andthe Palestine Gaiette dated 16 November 1933. Both the K.c.^na
the Colonial Office commented favourably on t l •
C.O. 733/239/17356/1.
52 They alleged that they were roughly treated b y J^^admittedly
leaat in the case of ^ a b ù  fr^ thÌ!“ ! tobeaten by a superior British Officer. px 2the Colonial Secretary 2.11.1933. C.O. 733/239/17356/1 PX.2.
I Darwaza, who himself signed the undertaking, criticised years 
later,"*'* this decision to sign, stating that the movement which led to their 
trial was a revolutionary one, challenging the Government with the full 
su.,ort of the , eo, le. Giving their , romise to abstain from , artici. ation 
in politics reduced the movement’s ideals and weakened the : eo .le's enthus­
iasm, however, he goes on to attack the o. . osition, saying that its stand 
in this affair, in which they were encouraged by the British, was aimed at 
weakening further the national movement.
The news of the riots in Palestine caused excitement and reactions in 
the Arab and Moslem countries. Inflammatory articles were published in the 
ress and demonstrations were held in all important cities.54
Once again, as in 1929, fu ll moral su, port, but with very l it t le  
financial sui, ort, was given to the Palestinian Arabs.
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53. In his book the Palestine Problem. 0;-Cit .116. It must be stated, 
however, that one leader, who though signing the undertaking, still 
came out, much resected for his stand during the disturbances and 
the trial, was Jamal al Kusseini. Even Judge Bodilly the Chief 
Magistrate of Jaffa wrote in his judgment; "I would comment most 
favourably on the truth of this defendent when giving evidence.••
If he has made mistakes they had been honest mistakes...1 entirely 
accent that (his claims) is his genuine belief". Page 7 of Judgment 
given in the Chief Magistrate's Court Jaffa 29.3.1934. C.O. 733/258/ 
37357. Commenting on the relative strength of the Ilusseinis and the 
Istiqlali8ts the Police report said: It is declared that "Jamal al 
liusseini, by his demeanour at the demonstrations and firm stand durin g 
the trial has raised his , restige and dealt a blow to the Istiqlal".., 
C.I.D. periodical Appreciation Summary Ho.3/34 of 30.1.1934. F.0.371/ 
17873. Being sure of his stand and .osition Jamal al liusseini gave a 
rroud statement in connection with the judgment against him which he 
concluded: "Hence, I wait imprisonment with quietude". "Al Jamial al 
Arabiyya" 18.12.1933.
j4. For reactions in Syria see letter from Consul Mackereth to the Foreian 
Secretary Sir John Simon 9.11.1933, for reactions in Egy, t - see letter 
from the E.C. in Cairo Percy Loraine to the il.C. ia Jerusalem 9.11.1933 
together with the memorandum "Egyptian reactions to the recent Palestine 
disturbances" C.O. 733/239/17356/1 Pt.3. For reactions in India see 
telegram from Viceroy to the S. of S. for India 15.11.1933. See also 
different protests from Iraq, Morrocco etc. C.O. 733/231/17250. For 
reactions in Trans-Jordan see letter from Emir Abdallah to tha*H c
18.11.1933 C.O. 733/239/17356/1 Tt.2. d,C#
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These outside reactions, but Mainly the events in bales tine had 
their accumulative effect on tne views of iiu ortant , eo le in the Palestinian 
and British administrations•
The h.C., in addition to the two A oints vnich ho . remised the Arab.
! lay or s, was considering issuing instructional:) uttin^ a limit to the number 
of tersans entering under the category of ca. italicts (i.e. , eo. le coainj.; in 
with £ 1 ,0 C ‘J  or tiore) which u. to then was not limited, he also cut down 
later t.iG half-yearly Jewish Agency's estimate of labour certificates from 
2 0 ,1 0 0  to 5 , COO, I lore than that. Knowing the views of the 5 ,  of b ,  for the 
Colonies, and ;,erha..s not beinj sure himself, he did not a° so far as to 
,-ro. ose a forward straight change of ,olicy, dtill sentences such ns 56 
'unless we ware•to declare that in view of the changed conditions of to-day with 
those of 1 9 2 3 , the .resent fom of tha Calfour Declaration should be recon­
sidered1',,, and "it does not sous ossiblo to i-w that the (recent hostility 
raid widening breach between the Arabs and the britisn rulers can remain as
i
they are to-day, either wo find mans to briiib ruler and ruled more in 
sym a t h y s h o w  quite clearly that ha con t era .la ted such a change. This 
links u;; with his many references to the Arab_ h.itional £oalinb57 as the root' 
of the riots.
At a . roxinatoly that tine he also .ro.osed to restrain „ artly lend 
calcs to Jcw?s,^^
55, bee his rivatc letter Co the S, of 5, for the Colonies 23,11,1933, 
C.O. 733/236/17313 Tt.4,
56, hoe his letter to the 6, of 8, for the Colonies dated lo,12,1333 whicu 
i;as circulated later as 4 art of Cabinet ; a er. C.P. 2(34) Jan. 1934 
C.O. 733/248/17700. finilar ideas ;;ere ex reased in others of his 
letters at the tire,
57, f>ae his telegram to the Colonial Secretary 6.1.1934. C.O./733/239/
17356/1 VtSi
50, Sec sut ra 219.
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Hucii i*or«i direct was A.12.C. Parkinson, the Asaistaot Fermnant 
Under-becrecary in the Colonial Office, who on 12 December 193359 after 
he had a visit to Palestine vrhero ha had had several discussions with 
the H.C. and various other Government Officers, stated indirectly that 
he agreed with the Arabs' asaua cion that the two obligations in the 
Mandate were irreconcilable, and .ro.osed, in fact, to issue what amounted 
to a statement as to the inter rotation of the Kanaate, saying that His 
Majesty's Government hold that under the iiandato, the second obligation
(i*o*. that the rights and position of tue Arabs) conditions the first
» . •
(i«u. cho measures facilitating the establishment of the dewiftk National 
Hone)«
Who knows how tilings would have developed^ if not for the Colonial 
Secretary with Uia strong views wlio ourod cold water on this idea with his 
reuark ”1 would de recate now ua lanatory declaration unices absolutely 
neceasarry*
Several times in this cha tor I have eo aasi<«Ki the nnti-~riti*h 
character of the riots« hut the fact is noteworthy chat throughout the 
disorders no attack was made on Jaws with the sola excc. tion of baifa where 
10 ; eo( la only 3 of wltou wore ho«; ital cases, were injured when tneir lorry 
had sto,?» ed, owing to a puncture«
kvwn iu Chat case, i t  should bo noted chat sons Arabs cane to the 
assistance of the occu ants of tito lorry atid took them to a lace of safety«<>2
59. bee hi« long »imito 12.12.1933 Ibid. Hy Italics.
» -»i "nírad at the tins at the Colonial60. Several pasible "solution* were ai eo e n o w
Office for the solution of the Fai^tine roble». Se* 733/248/17656. *'Cantoni*ing:‘ of Palestine between Jaws and Arabs . C.Ü.733/2WWQ
61. Minute by 8 . of 8 . oí 13.12.1933. Ibid.
62* See Murison report p.27 Ibid Pt«**
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It seems that definite orders were given by the Arab leaders, that 
Jews were not to be attacked. The Arabs were so intent on this ¡oint 
that when it was rumoured that Revisionist extremist Jews would organise a 
demonstration, instructions were sent that if this demonstration took place, 
it should be allowed to proceed unmolsted by the Arabs. The Jewish press 
on its side was careful, not unduly to provoke the Arabs.
Before finishing this clia ter, we should examine the role , layed by 
the Mufti in the 1933 riots.
All res, onsible officials6^ when summing up, agree that the religious 
cry was not raised in the 1933 Autumn riots. All were also s eculating, 
what situation might be created if, to the secular political and economic 
grievances, the Mufti would have added the influence of a powerful religious 
issue. The Mufti himself, left Palestine several months63 45 earlier for a 
fund-raising trip to India Iraq and other Islamic states.
Still, Ch. Sykes66 67and to a lesser degree J. Marlowe67 and other 
British'writers, consider the Mufti as the main initiator, directly respon­
sible for the 1933 riots.
63
63. See C.I.D. Summary Report No.26/33 of 15.11.1933 ^ 37^ i ^ ^ * oueThere 
could be two ex. lanations to this policy. T ie ®° £ leaders
according to M. Sharett of the Jewish Agency, was ... inion
wanted to present their national movement to t ie reasons1 and
as a sincere one, fighting the Government or , o riven*by
not as a mob intent on pogrom s. Another possible reason g v «  Jy
Siicdr, the Police Commandant, was that the a ® 1929 d
strength of the Jews had increased since the disturbance, of 1929. and^ 
that they would defend themselves more effectively. See The History 
of the liagana (Sefer Tuldut llahagana). Tel-Aviv 1959 Vol.2 p.459.
64. The District Commissioners in theirre report,
letters and des atched to the Colonial becrecary,
65. See Su. ra . I78
66. Ch. Sykes Op-Cit pp.175-6.
67. J. Marlow Rebellion Op-Cit p.133.
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As shoT.n above, his henchman Jamal Russeini^® ;layed a most active 
role during all the riots, !,Al Jaraiah al Arabiyya", his , a er, also
su ¡ orted strongly the extreme line. An entry in a C.I.D. re.ort says:^
"Thera is considerable evidence to show that the Su reme Moslem Council,
of which the Mufti is the President, has had a great deal to do with
stimulating anti-British feeling during the recent disorders".
On the other hand, already in his first letter in which he summed
u the riots of 13 October the K.C. wrote70: "Thanks mainly to our good
relations with the Mufti the Supreme tfoslem Council gave no encouragement 
to the demonstration of the 13 October1'..•
71He repeated this theme in other communications and in his letter 
which was later circulated as a ,art of a Cabinet a er on "the situation 
in Palestine", commenting on the fact that the religious issue did not .lay 
a role in the 1933 riots the H.C. wrote: "This is an extremely important 
ste, in advance, because riots would double both, in number and in intensity
were th&y backed by religious leaders and su, . orted in the mind of the
. ,, , , , , ' C fhpir religion v;as threatened. Inis satis-fellaheen, by the belief teat tneir reng
factory .oaition i. due mainly to tne Uovcrumat made last year
„it:, t.,e Su, r«nu Moslem Couueil72 end to my a m  ( «  » » - “ > « > «  *■"* 
relations „it., ti.e Mufti and other members of the Su..«- Moslem Council".
bS. As well as the rest of the Uusseinis led by Musa Kazim 
69. C.I.D. ; eriodical A,; reciation Summary No.26/33 of 15.11.1933 
P.0. 371/16926.
70 See hie letter to the Colonial Secretary 2J.10.1M3 C.O.733/239/ 
17356/1. My Italics.T „ . • , .v,cretary 18.12.1933, annexed to Cabinet Pa. er71. Letter to tne Colonial ^cret Tanu-irv 1934."The situation in Palestine' C.I.2 (34) January 1934.
72 See Infra 4>.
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I «hall not go so far as Co accent the h.C.'s view when he wrotet 
" I  told hist" (i.e . the Mufti) " I  fe lt sure had he been in Palestino he 
would have been able to sco¿. the t eople from being so foolish as to attempt 
to defy the Government7^ '. however, in this argument about the role of 
the Mufti in the 1933 riots, 1 sa inclined to accent the view that his share 
in the riots was, i f  at a ll, small and indirect, and that on the whole, he 
would have used his influence, on the side of moderation, had he been in 
Palestine at the time.
There is enough circuíastancial evidence, in ey opinion, to make tais
clear.
The fact admitted by C.I.U. reports, that the ». each, of Sheikh Said 
al Khatib, a Mufti follower and employee, at al-Aqsa Mosque just before the 
«tart of the 13 October Jerusalem demonstration, was a moderate one, and 
that Sheikh Fawazi loan, another Mufti follower and employee, made, in the 
Jaffa Mosque before the start of the 27 October Jaffa demonstration, anl
appeal to the crowd to disperse peacefully.
The fact that it  was Amin al Tataim i ,  who during the Mufti*« absence 
ccted as the President of the S.M.C. who, as a conciliatory measure, asked 
fo r the appointment of the Commission of Enquiry, which was later boycotted 
by the Arab Executive.
The Mufti's subsequent behaviour after his return and his furtaer 
co-operation with the U.C. during the demonstration of Id al Fitr on 16,1.1934.
The fact that at the tima» the general trend of his policy was s t i l l  
airected against the Jews and not against the Government.
his statement7 3  74 that "apart from any question of right aud wrong, he 
jtnew active opposition against Government was homeless" was in line with his 
general appreciation of the then prevailing situation, and would have guarded 
l>im from embarking on an active anti-Covernmeat policy.
73. In an interview on 20.11.1933. See U.C.'s letter to Colonial Secretary
23.11.1933 C.O. 733/23S/l7313/Pt.4.
7 4 . See the ii.C.'a letter to the Colonial Secretary 5.1.1934 annexed to Cabinet
Pa,er. "The Situation in Palestine" C.P.7(34) 73. To the U.C. during their
interview on 20.11.1933. See H.C.'s letter to Col.Secretary 23.11.1933. C.O.
733/236/17313 ?*-A
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And nor* ia.ortäut of a ll, both Jewish aourcaa?*1 aad «nialy grab 
sources^, discussing the 1933 riot* «a. has iso th* roia , layed by the Arab 
Executive and do not isntioa the Mufti and the S.u.C.
Furthermore, the ü,position ( a era criticised tUa Mufti directly 
and strongly for not ; roteating against british Folic* cruelties during 
the riot* of 1933, and for not visiting the vomited iu hospital, after Ida 
return froa India, as such a v is it oight a, , oar to be "uafrieudly” to the 
british, and for bis "negativa*4 stand towards the 1933 national daraustret* 
lona in general^
however, I  do agree that on the basis of the available evidence, no 
final conclusion can be r«ached. Indued, the head of the C.I.D. in ea
in,ortant re,ore written shortly before the outbreak of the riots, .ointed 
to the different slunka and expressions of the Haiti's Hi arsons!" . olicy as 
against the policy of the "Mufti's faction" when be wrote! **Xf taken accord* 
ing to their political divisions, one finds that the Kufti Faction la defin­
ite ly , despite stanif«stations and tha Mufti’'* effort» to ; lacate Government 
in order to preserve bis chair against Covomacnt. "Al Jaulchsl Arabia" 
the eoutii, iece of the Mufti is the test j roof of this attitude.“ ^
It  could be, therefore, concludud that the Mufti's , osition with 
regard to die 1933 riots vua au additional case of the two-faccd .olicy, 
with the Mufti a, ,caring to play the ¿ro-Guvarnucut role, and bis , arty, 
definitely playing the anti-Covemnumt tma.
7i>. Tb« Magana history hook h; —Cit p,-» 43«—3 Assaf Op-.Cit >»12E.
77. I .  Darwasu 0 , K ilt ,, .112-117. b.-odaq* 0 , -Clt ,, • lbu-7■
7«. “FaUatin" 26.4.1935.
73. So« re.ort of lt.F. Eica to the Chief Secretary on *'A vreciation of 
Arab fooling as affecting Falestiu«. 8.7.1933 C.O. 733/237/37355/1.
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A few uoutha after the 1933 riots, Uusa Kuaiu, tuu i'rasioont of 
the Arab Executive died 00 £u iiarcu 1934. witu bis deatu, tuu iorual 
leadership of thu <urab National iioveuent iu i'aieutiue tell ou tuu ltu£ti 
an well. The du facto loadorubi, bud already oeuu in bis uandu lolloping 
the 1929 disturbances.
80 Aruba allege cunt tlie death waa caused by tu« rougn treatment bo got 
irou the olice during the denonstrationa in Jaffa and Jerusaluu. 
71iis uost . robobly la not so. Xiwi authorities took, a ll oesibla 
tftuj s und ■ rueuution» to shelter him. Anyway, he was over 80 at the
tiuu of his death.
n
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Chapter 14
The Mufti's Relations with the British
We have examined already^ * the continuous opposition campaign against 
the Mufti, deprecating his appointment as President of the S.M.C. for life , 
demanding the removal of the Sharia Courts from the influence of the S.M.C. 
and pressing for Government's supervision of the Council's expenditure of 
the Awqaf funds.
The 1929 disturbances reduced a litt le , and for a while, the inter-
2Arab conflict, at least on the surface.
But the Mufti well knew that a certain body of Moslem opinion, which 
though not considerable in numbers, was nevertheless influential, was 
ready to co-operate with the Government should it  resolve to curtail his 
powers and influence.
The decisive factor was therefore the Government's intentions.
During August 1930, Mr. E. Mills, who was acting as Chief Secretary 
in Palestine, came on sick leave to London. During talks in the Colonial 
Office, he suggested that the Government should aim at reducing the Mufti's 
prestige and influence as soon as possible, as he was the principal obstacle 
to any compromise or rapprochment between Jews and Arabs. Another important 
point which Mr. Mills made was that there was urgent need for a reform of 
the then prevailing very unsatisfactory arrangements in regard to the 
Sharia Courts and the administration of Waqf funds.
The line which the Government had taken until then, was that as the 
law had practically made the S.M.C self-governing, the only way in which 
reforms could be introduced would be by action from within.. But this had 
proved impracticable.
1. See Chapter 4.
2. Though not completely, on the 28th October 1929 the paper "al Sirat 
al Mustakim" came out with a strong attack against the Mufti for 
misappropriating certain sums of money belonging to the "Relief Committee 
of Sufferers" and demanded the accounts of the Fund for repairs of the 
Al-Aqsa Mosque, should be published.
3. See f i le  "Reform of Administration Sharia Courts & Waqf Funds.
C.O. 733/193/77364.
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Mr. Mills therefore suggested to take advantage of a request that 
had been made to the H.C. to grant pensions to the Sharia Court's Judges, 
in order to remove the Sharia Court from the control of the S.M.C. and 
subordinate them to the Chief Justice. He also suggested that the 
administration of the Waqf funds should be made into a Government 
Department, consisting - i f  necessary - entirely of Moslem members. The 
H.C., Sir J. Chancellor, who was then in London, was also consulted on 
this subject and he generally agreed with Mr. M ills' proposals, as he 
himself considered already and prepared notes on how the reforms of the 
Sharia Courts and the administration of the Waqf, might be instituted.
Accordingly, a telegram,^ termed "important” , was sent to Sir. S. Davis, 
the O.A.G. on 30.8.30, telling him of the discussions.in the C.O. and 
asking him to submit detailed proposals with regard to the two suggestions 
of Mr. Mills, "The High Commissioner considers" the telegram said "that 
quite apart from any political advantages which might result from the 
restriction of the powers remaining in hands of the Mufti, action on 
these lines could bejustifled in general Interests of Moslem community.
It is possible that such restriction might facilitate acceptance by Arabs 
of Walling Wall decisions, and that it  might render local political 
atmosphere less lmpropitious for reception by Arabs of general policy of 
H.M. Government when announced".^
Sir S. Davis answered on 4.9.30 in a telegram4 56 saying that though 
in agreement that early reforms - which would be in general interest of 
Moslem Community - were certainly needed, he was "however convinced that 
any declarations of Intention by H.M. Government at present, w ill be 
opposed as being designed to place Moslem community in invidious ¡position
4. IBid.
5. The Pa8sfield White Paper which was published on 20.10.30.
6. Ibid.
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la regard to management of its affairs as compared with other communities 
and w ill only strengthen popular allegiance to the Mufti".
It  was agreed that the "question of reforms"7 8should wait the return 
of the H.C. to Palestine and the issue was delayed.
When Said Shawa, one of the strongest supporters of the Mufti in the 
S.M.C. died, the H.C. used the opportunity and appointed, on 28.10.30
g
Sheikh Muhi A1 Din Abd al Shafi as a member of the S.M.C. in his place.
Sheikh Muhi al Din Shafi was recommended to the H.C. by Ragheb Nashashibi
and thereafter he headed the opposition to the Mufti within the S.M.C.
On 30th December 1931, the Colonial Secretary asked to be informed,
what the position was with regard to the proposed revision of the
constitution of the Supreme Moslem Council9 10and of the reform of the Shari
10Courts and administration of Waqf funds.
Sir A. Wauchope answered11 that since hie arrival in Palestine, he
had given these matters continuous and careful thought. He then directed 
to draft the necessary instruments for effecting changes in the existing 
legislation in two directions.
(I) the placing of the administration of Awqaf funds under 
strict financial control and audit; and
( I I )  the removal of the Sharia Courts from the control of the
Supreme Moslem Council.
The Mufti, well knowing the role he played 1» the 1929 disturbance,, 
we. presumably expecting .uch developments and was thinking of measures to 
prevent, or at least to minimise their effects. In line with his policy 
towards the euthorltl.e, which I shall describe as vacillating In between
7. Which in the jargon of the C.O. meant curtailing the Mufti's powers.
8 . Palestin 29.10.30.
9. C.O. 733/211/87405.
10. C.O. 733/193/77364.
11. In a letter to the Colonial Secretary 12.3.32. C.O. 733/222/97208 
Pt. I.
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the extreme one * as long as ha thought he could get away with it  - to 
the moderate one, when he felt that the Government might react strongly, 
he fe lt that the time had come for him to be ''sensible and moderate” , and 
make himself, occasionally, useful to the authorities.
At this stage, i t  would be appropriate to examine the considerations 
of the Mufti in his dealings with the British.
Britain in the early thirties was the strongest - or at least among 
the 2-3 strongest countries in the world, and certainly the dominant one 
in the Middle East and the Mediterranean basin.
Other European powers with interests in the M.E., such as France or 
Italy were weaker than Britain and could not serve - even i f  they wanted to - 
as a support against the British. Besides, their record vis a vis the 
Arabs was much worse than the British one.
A. for German,, her actlvltle. In the M.E. end her support for the
1 12Palestinian Arabs started only a few years later.
The Mufti knew thet Brltein intended to stay in Peleetlne13 formally 
because of i t .  obligation under the Mandate, actually becauae offita 
in teres ts.
H. further knew that even i f  the f.leatinian Arab, would achieve
their independence, the Britl.h influence would continue to be deci.lv.
14for a long time to come.
12.
13.
14.
See Hlrszowicz 1. "Nazi Germany and the Palestine Partition Plan' in 
The Middle Ka«tarn Studies, Vol. I October 1964. Pt.I.
Officials in the C.O. envisaged that Britain would stay in Palestine 
permanently. See Minute by Williams. "So far as i t  is possible to 
fom.ee, the likelihood of H.M.G. giving up it .  control of 
seems so remote as to be almost negligible . 23.9.33. C.O. 733/248/
17627. See also note by Parkinson Ibid. So indeed thought - or at 
least said - some Zionist leaders. See Evidence of H. Sacher before 
the Shaw Commission. The Shaw Evidence Vol. 2 p.789.
Hourani describes the practical meaning of the term "independence" 
at the time by saying: "They (i.e . the nationalists) had no choice 
between being dominated and being truly independent; they only had a 
choice between different degrees and kinds of domination. See Hourani 
Arabic Thought In the Liberal Age 1798^ 1121 Oxford 1970 p.345.
279
Any movement, and especially any leader whom the British would
really oppose and fight, had, in the long run - no chance of success.
In order to exist as a national leader one had to be - at least - bearable 
to the British.
An all-out opposition against the British was therefore impracticable. 
This did not, however, exclude the possibility of an all-out opposition
against a certain aspect of British policy, namely its commitment to support 
the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. On this the 
Mufti did not wish to compromise because of his nationalist convictions 
and also because his belief that any such compromise would weaken his
status as a popular national leader.
And what better way for neutralising *»<< counter-balancing th. 
embarraeament and anxiety which hi. Intent. antl-Zlonlst Influence caused 
to th. Government, than by volunteering hi. co-op.r.tlon In other matter.! 
This co-operation with the British wa. made easier for the Mufti
because of another two reasons:
1. HI. .trong and .m ere  belief H» “bat he termed "British
Justice” and
2. HI. assumption that because of the wide-spread British Interests 
In the Arab and Moslem worlds they would never sacrifice them 
for the good-will of a handful of Jews In Palestine.
He repeatedly stated15 those belief, and there 1. no reason for u. to 
doubt that at th. time he really and sincerely believed m them, a. did
most of the Arabs.16 Added to that was the impression and expectation so
15. During an interview with the H.C. on 28.1.30. C.O. 733/179/77013 or 
in a speech in a Committee Room at the House of Commons on 26.4.30 
Documents of Palestine Arab Resistance (Wataek al Mukawama al 
Palestiniyya al Arabiyya) Beirut 1968 p.168, etc.
16. As stated by Musa al Alami, ^  «7 C ^nt^  Op-Cit P.H6.
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well described by A. Hourani^ that the "true“ Britain would sooner or 
later reassert itself and understand that its interests were in harmony 
with those of the Arabs.
Much more important perhaps were two practical considerations which 
dictated to the Mufti this policy of co-operation:
1. The need to thwart the intentions and efforts, described 
above, to curtail his powers and influence or even to
remove him from his office, and
2. The acute financial crisis of the S.M.C. during the early 
thirties.
The financial position of the Supreme Moslem Council in the early 
thirties was critical. The Council derived its revenue from two main 
sources - tithes which were collected by the Government on behalf of the 
Waqf administration, and rentals from properties.
However, the economic situation of the Fellahin in 1930 was very bad. 
In addition to very difficult agricultural conditions there was a dumping 
of foreign wheat and flour and the prices of local wheat fell from LP. 16 
per ton in 1929 to LP. 6-7 in 1930. The Government, in order to assist 
the fellahin declared a remission of tithes for 1930 and again for 1931, 
and as a result the S.M.C. had a loss of LP. 30,000.
As regards to the rents, they too were 40%-50% lower than previous 
years, and in consequence the whole revenue of the S.M.C. was reduced by 
something like half. 178
17. Ilourani: "Arabic Thought” Op-Cit p.293.
18. Things were so bad that officials did not receive their salaries and 
it was therefore rumoured that some of them including Ahmed Hilmi, 
Ajaj Nuvayhid and even Jamal Husseini were going to resign. See 
Police summary report of 6.9.30. C.O. 733/193/77364.
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Then the S.M.C. had the additional expenditure of LP.15,000 on the
repairs of Waqf properties and mosques damaged by the earthquake in 1927,
and on top of everything else the S.M.C. was involved in the bankruptcy
of the Palace Hotel in Jerusalem where, instead of having profits on its
investment, and receiving LP. 7,300 a year in rent, the Council lost
LP. 12,000 owed to it by the bankrupt firm . The net result of this was
that at 31st December 1931, the deficit of the Supreme Moslem Council was
LP. 69,099, of which the overdraft on the Government had increased to
19approximately LP. 17,000.
The Council therefore had been obliged to reduce expenditure in every 
possible direction, including salaries. The members of the Council had 
given up 40% of their salaries and likewise the salaries of all other 
officials had been reduced.
How if the President of the S.M.C. wanted to keep the loyalty and 
allegiance of its officials spread all over Palestine, including the 
remote villages, who constituted his "army” and were actually the basis of 
his power, he had to do something urgent to repair the financial position 
of the Council. This the Mufti tried to achieve by negotiating a new 
financial agreement with the Government. The goodwill of the Government 
towards him, was therefore very important and the Mufti was ready to pay 
for it by cd-operating.
These, I think were the considerations which directed the Mufti s
policy towards the British. Accordingly, and using a phrase similar to
20the one coined by Ben-Gurion, it could be summarised thus: 1920
19. C.O. 733/213/97033
20. The original phrase describing the Zionist policy during the Second 
World War was:
”We shall fight Germany and assist the British War effort as if there 
was no White Book (the 1939 White Book) and we shall fight the British 
White book as if there was no war against Germany”.
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(I) To fight the Balfour declaration and the national home, 
as if they were not a part of British policy and
(II) to co-operate with the British as if they did not support 
the national home.
This formula may sound nice, but in real practice it was almost 
impossible to implement. However, the understanding which developed 
eventually between the II.C. Sir A. Wauchope and the Mufti, made this 
formula almost ’’operative" for a few years, at least on the surface, but 
about this later.
To resume. Following the publication of the ”1926 Committee” report
and proposals in June 1929, Jamal Husseini was despatched by the Mufti to
21London to negotiate with the Government about them. However, it seems
that because he was occupied in preparing the visit of the Arab Delegation
to London, and eventually because of his memberhip of it, and the
22propaganda campaign which he directed successfully in Britain this 
subject was not raised by him on that Journey.
About a year later, having learnt no doubt of the discussions held in 
the C.O. with Mills and Chancellor and the exchange of telegrams with 
Sir S. David, the Mufti despatched Jamal Husseini again. This visit was 
accompanied by a Husseini campaign aimed at assuring the British of the 
Arab good will.
During the visit to Palestine of the Pro-Arab M.P. Capt. Gordon-Canning
23in November 1929 the Mufti said in his welcome speech "We are making him 
the messenger of our people to his people, and we shall make this visit a 
cause to renew the friendship between our two nations, that friendship which 
every Arab in this country desires with all his heart. The Arab nations 213
21. See the II.C.*s letter to the C.O. of 5.11.29 that J. Hussein left for 
London "probably on behalf of the Mufti and future regulations regarding 
the Supreme Moslem Council". C.O. 733/178/67500.
22. See Supra pp. 87 - 88
23. See A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya, 7.11.29. See also Darwezc op clt p.63^4
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desire sincerely to strengthen the friendship and fraternity with the 
British based on common interests and friendship and not on might and 
dominance.”
On 2.1.30 at the farewell party to Mr. Stoker, and Mr. Silly, the two 
British advocates who represented the Arabs before the Shaw Commission,
2 a
the Mufti said^ ”We strongly desire to live in friendship with the 
British people. We, on our side endeavour to cultivate this friendship 
and we hope that the British will do the same and will consider our case 
with justice and righteousness”. To which Stoker replied ”1 am sure that 
1930 would be the year in which Britain would change its present policy. 
The Shaw Commission saw the justice of your cause”.
25On 1st January 1930, in its new year's English version issue the 
"Falestin” published a long article proposing to the British, Arab 
friendship and full co-operation in maintaining and safeguarding British 
imperial interests in the M.E. Such co-operation would be much more 
valuable than that of the Jews as ”in the imperialist context the Jews 
are like invalids".
This campaign was continued by Jamal Ilusseini during his visit to
London and by the Mufti and other members of the Arab delegation and all
through the year until J. IIu3seini*s second voyage to London to conduct
26negotiations about the draft Ordinance. The result of these negotiations
was, apparently a bargain according to which the Government decided not
to interfere with the prevailing arrangements of the S.M.C. in return for
27a comparatively peaceful Arab reception of the Prime Minister's letter. 24567
24. A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya 3.1.30.
25. It should be noted that though in its Arabic version the "Falestin" on 
the whole, co-operated with the opposition elements, in its English 
version it presented the "national view" thus expressing, to a large 
extent, the views of the Mufti. Falestin 1.1.30.
26. See Chancellor's letter to Williams 22.10.30. C.O. 733/183/77050.
See also Chancellor's letter to his son 26.11.30. Chancellor's papers 
16/3.
27. See private letter from Chancellor to Passfield of 13.2.31 in which he 
attributed the Arab inactivity to Jamal Hussein!'s moderating speeches 
after his return from London. C.O. 733/193/87050.
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This Government's decision was based on the fact that the Mufti's 
influence over Arab public opinion in Palestine, following the 1929 
disturbances was very strong. Ragheb Nashashibi himself told the H.C.
Sir A. Wanchope that was the Government to hold elections for the S.M.C.
28during 1932, the Mufti's party would win every seat on it. On the other 
hand it enabled the Mufti to strengthen his position further as the 
supreme leader of the <\rab community and as its intermediary with the 
Government, the more so as he had succeeded to e3tab lish a certain 
understanding with the new H.C. Sir A. Wanchope.
Wanchope, perhaps more than any other British H.C. in Palestine 
impressed his personal stamp on the policy and developments in the country, 
and therefore a grasp of his complex personality is essential for 
understanding later events.
He combined the contradictory qualities of flexibility and single-
mindedness and political shrewdness and idealism. He also had the gift
29od making friends easily. Having the full backing and support of his
30superiors in Whitehall, he felt free to initiate policies, which on the
31whole, were accepted by them. His philosophy of the Palestine problem 
could be summarized thus: This was a problem in which right contended with 
right. Neither the Jewsnor the Arabs had a just historical claim to 
exclusive rights over the whole country, but morally both people have the 
strongest claims to be considered in the fate of the country. The solution 289*
28. See the H.C.'s letter to the Colonial Secretary 3.11.36. C.O. 733/287/ 
75023.
29. For a full description of Wanchope's personality see G. Sheffer op. Cit. 
124-5.
30.
31.
Specially of Sir, 
1931-35.
P. Cunliffe-Lister the S. of S. for the Colonies
This brief summary is based on various sources, mainly letters, official 
and private, in the C.O. files, evidence before the f(.C. and his 
article "Palestine and Trans-Iordan” in Islam Today edited by 
A.J. Arberry and Rom Landau, London 1942 pp. 69-88. The two most 
important letters in this respect are his official letter to the Col. 
Sec. 16.9.32. C.O. 733/219/97105/2 and his private letter to Parkinson
8.9.36. C.O. 733/215/75528/55 Pt.I.
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lay In the double obligation of the Mandate in which he was firm believer.
He believed that with foresight, good will, and some breadth of vision on
either side, a measure of satisfaction could be given to each, so as to
enable both to live in peace and security within the framework of a multi- 
32national state. This multi-national state should strive towards inter-
33communal equilibrium and assimilation.
Hence his support for Jewish immigration as a slow and gradual process 
towards numerical equation of the two communities and his efforts to 
persuade Jewish Leaders to cease their policy of separation (such a3 Jewish 
exclusive labour etc.).
The better to achieve the inter-communal equilibrium each community 
has to have it3 own internal equilibrium, and therefore Uanchope departed 
from the policy of his predecessor who did not intervene in the internal 
affairs of the communities. * In his policy towards the communities whose 
loyalties he endeavoured to win, Hauthà£e;£cJllowed what Hourani describes as 
the Politics of Notables, namely using the traditional accepted leaders 
as intermediaries and channels of communication between the authorities and 
the people. 3245
32. For the British principle of multi-national state see W.K. Hancock. 
Problems of Nationality 1918-1936. Survey of Eritish Commonwealth 
Affairs Oxford 1937 pp.466-9, 472-3, 433-5. In this he differed 
basically from his predecessor Chancellor who envisaged Palestine as 
an Arab State with a Jewish minority.
33. 'Hitherto I have thought the solution could be found through assimilation:
not in the sense of assimilation as opposed to Zionism.... but in the 
sense I laboured, towards assimilation and against separation between 
Jews and Arabs in Palestine.' From his letter to the Colonial Secretary 
24.6.36 C.O. 733/297/75156. During a Cabinet discussion of the 
Palestine rebellion in September 1936, the Minister of War, Duff Cooper, 
commented thus on his policy: ”Wanchope*s theory that the two races 
could be made to live peacefully side by side in approximately equal 
numbers was in his view, one impracticable dream”. See Cab Con. 56(36)
2.9.36.
34. See his letter to the Colonial Secretary 12.4.34. C.O. 733/255/37313/4.
35. A. Hourani "Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables” in W.R. Polk 
and R.L. Chambers (eds) Beginnings of.Modernization in the Middle East. 
Chicago 1968 pp.45-46.
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Ilis intermediary to the Jewish Community was the Jewish Agency.^
As his key intermediary to the Arab Community, the II.C. after some
hesitations, and to a lesser degree than with the Jewish Agency in the case
of the Jews, had chosen the Mufti. As for the internal problems of the
Arab Community, his main aim was to prevent the eviction and to improve
37the conditions of the fellahin. He also tried to tackle the problem 
of Arab unemployment in towns. He viewed those problems not only as social 
but as political problems as well, and considered the steps intended to 
solve them, as preventive measures against creation of a focus for 
political discontent based on economic hardships.
In the political sphere, he aimed towards establishing close ties 
with Arab leaders who would serve as intermediaries - in both directions - 
and as channel of influence ofi the Arab community. Foremost among these 
leaders was the Mufti.
lAanchope considered - and rightly so - that Arab politics in Palestine
were based on personal, clan and internal political animosities and
friendships, rather than on strong ideological affiliations or nationalistic
feelings. He noted the growth of the "ideological non-clannish parties"*
33such as the Istiqlal and the Executive of the‘Arab Young Mens' Congress 
which tended to be more extreme and anti-British. In comparison with them 
the Mufti, with reason, could have been regarded as a moderate nationalist. 
He emerged as the most prominent Palestinian Arab leader. He belonged to 
the Husseinis, one of the most influential families in Arab Palestine. He 
had bargained with the Government before and rendered services. In return 3678
36. His relations with Arlosoroff, the head of the Political Department \
of the Jewish Agency were close, friendly and marked by mutual respect. 
After Arlosoroff's murder he had contacts with Shertok (Sharett) and !\ 
Ben-Gurion. V
37. Ills deep personal interest in the welfare of the fellahin was well 
known and widely appreciated. He even contributed big sums of his 
personal money for projects to benefit them.
38. See Infra, pp.
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for the post of Mufti, there were no disturbances in and around 
Jerusalem in 1921 and in return for no Government interference in the 
affairs of the S.M.C. following the publication of the draft ordinances, 
a comparative moderate Arab reception of the Prime Minister’s letter to 
Dr. Weizinann. And with the financial crisis of the S.M.C., and with the 
growing campaign of all his combined enemies to remove him from his office 
it would not be too difficult to tempt him again with a bargain.
That is how the Mufti and the 11.C. each because of his own 
considerations, were drawn towards one another, in order to reach an 
understanding, which though disturbed at times, lasted until early 1936, 
and even when it terminated, it was not so much by the Mufti’s wish as 
because of developments over which he had no control.
This tacit understanding, however, did not prevent the Mufti from 
following - as described before - as extreme policy as possible as long 
as he thought he would get away with it. Neither did it prevent the H.C. 
from passing through the motions of trying to hold fresh elections to the 
S.M.C. in order to keep the Mufti in the reins.
It could be well asked "Why did not Wanchope choose the Neshashibis 
as his key intermediary to the Arab Community?" A common but incorrect 
description of the relations between the H.C. and the Neshashibis actually 
accepts them as such. The truth is that he took care not to alienate 
them because many senior positions in the administration were occupied 
by their supporters, because of their growing affinity with the Amir 
Abdallah, and because he wanted to keep them contented in view of the 
growing strength of the Mufti. Cut basically, he did not sympathize with
o 0them . The H.C. and the Government did not believe in the sincerity of the 
Nashashibis "moderation" and kept in mind the possibility that once they 
obtained political predominance they would develop a hostile attitude to 
the Government^. They were also awsre of the fact that in order to 3940
39. See his letter to the Colonial Secretary 21.12.34 C.O. 733/257/37356/2
See also his letter dated 14.7.37 to the Col. Secretary C.O. 733/332/ 7 5 1 5 5
40. See minute by Williams 4.12.31 C.O. 733/193/77364.
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achieve the removal of Haj Amin from hi« office* the Mashashibis were 
reedy to follow extreme policies end form e coalition with the Istlqlal 
party as in the case of the intended non-co*operetlon Arab policy in early 
193341 42.
However, he also used the Maehashlbis as his Intermediary when It 
suited him, though in many cases they were not useful, as they were 
totally identified as Government supporters, thus in the eyes of the Arabs 
they became tools and not intermediaries.
These facts, or mors exactly these considerations, were certainly 
not known at the time, some of them actually appeared only later. So,
j j
towards the end of 1331 Che Mashashibis and their followers started 
their biggest campaign to discredit the Mufti, weaken his position, end
perhaps, even to achieve his removal from his posts.
43We have seen already how the press campaign against the Mufti, 
following the publication of the draft ordinances, did not develop because 
of the outbreak of the 1923 disturbances. Following the disturbances the 
ttashashibis were disturbed by the growing prestige end influence of the 
Mufti and hia emergence as the supreme Palestinian Arab Leader. I f  they 
had any hidden hopes that the Government would "punish" him for his role in 
the disturbances, or that the discussions in the Colonial Office in August 
1330, rumours of which must have reached thorn, would result In any action 
against him, they were disappointed. They, on the contrary, saw that he 
was going to convene a big Moslem Congress which would further enhance hla
41. See C.I.D. reports 'Jo.9/33 of 15.3.33 and Ho. 11/33 1.4.33 F.O. 371/16926.
42. Some opposition elements tried to organise themselvss into political 
parties even earlier. See the efforts of Omar Salah al Barguth<-to 
establish a party in Jerusalem during January 1930 - sas "Felastin and 
Miraat al Sharq'of January 1930, the efforts of Hasan iidql Dajant to 
form a political party in Jerusalem during March 1930 - seerMiraat al 
Shsrq'March 1930, and finally tha more successful but net Important , 
establishment of the Liberal Party in Haifa in October 1330. See 
"Falsatin” 11.10.30. See also footnote no.55 p.
See Supra p. 27643.
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prestige in the Arab and Moslem Worlds outside Palestine as well, so 
they launched their attack. Its timing was important too. The H.C. was 
new and a show of strength by the opposition might have impressed him, and 
secondly, the campaign was intended to embarrass and discredit the Mufti 
before a representative gathering of Arabs and Moslems attending the 
Moslem Congress. We have seen already^4 the efforts of Fahri Nashashibi 
and the opposition papers to sabotage the Moslem Congress, but the campaign 
against the Mufti reached its peak when the "Congress of the Palestine 
Moslem Nation" (a name proposed by Omar Salah al Barguhti) was held by 
the opposition party on the 11th December 1931, in the King David Hotel in 
Jerusalem. The Umma Congress was attended by well over a 1000 delegates, 
including Ulama, notables, political leaders, Sheikhs and representatives 
of towns and villages, and was quite representative of a considerable body 
of the Palestine Moslems. Its resolutions were far reaching and I shall 
quote them here in full:
"The Government shall be asked to audit the accounts of the S.M.C. 
from the date of its establishment.
The Congress demands of the Government that, in order to safeguard 
Moslem interests, the Sharia Courts should be separated from the Supreme 
Council.
The Government shall be asked to promulgate the draft constitution of 
the Supreme Moslem Council as amended by the opposition, that the elections 
to the Council be carried out forthwith and, in order that the elections 
should be held in an unbiased atmosphere, to demand that the present 
council, including the President, be dissolved and its administration to 
be temporarily entrusted, pending the completion of the elections, to an 
independent Moslem body. 45
44. See Supra 171-2
45. For description and resolutions of the Congress see "Falastin" 12.12.31.
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The Congress withdraws confidence from the President of the S.M.C. 
whom they consider to be alone responsible for bringing the administration 
of this Moslem Institution into such a defective state. The congress 
further refuses to recognize him as President of the Moslem Congress, 
since Palestine has not participated in the congress and since, in 
issuing invitations, he has behaved in a personal and partisan manner”.
And in order to divert attention from the partisan character of the 
resolutions the congress passed several other resolutions of a more 
general national and religious character such as support for the demands 
of the Palestine Delegation to London "which demands 'would help the nation 
to attain its national aspirations and avert the Zionist peril", a call 
for holding a General Islamic Congress in an Islamic country, and a 
resolution to endeavour to safeguard the Moslem Holy Places which had been 
lost or altered, to their former state.
The opposition, and specially Fahri Nashashibi who "directed" the 
congress, put a lot of effort into it and really achieved considerable 
success in organising public opinion. It could be said that the congress 
commanded considerable support among the Moslems of mdderate political views, 
The Mufti’s supporters held their reactions as long as the Moslem 
Congress lasted, not wishing to exhibit the deep divisions, or rather, 
wishing to prove that the blame for these divisions lay with the opposition, 
(which they did pardy), but once the Moslem Congress was over, the Mufti’s 
paper attacked the"Urama* Congress describing it with all the worst 
adjectives it could find such as "ugly* hideous, repulsive, scandalous"
¿l£\etc. It also stated that the Ummn Congress was financed by the Jews. 46
46. *A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya" late December 1931, January 1932. For
nationalist Arab views of the 'Urania Congress see Darwaza op clt. 
pp. 80-82 1!. Alu3h op cit. p.71-72.
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Ths Umma Congress informed the Government of its resolutions^ and
48on the 2nd January 1932, a deputation came to see the H.C. in order to 
lay before him the resolutions, which he promised would receive his 
serious consideration.
During all this period the propaganda war between the two camps
continued with intensity and bitterness.
Also at the time, several suits against the Mufti were brought
before the Courts. The first^ by Sheikh Ansari, the guardian of Al-Aqsa
Mosque, for being downgraded illegally, another two"^ by Ragheb Nashashibi
representing the Unroa Congress claiming (I) that the S.M.C. was not
publishing its financial accounts as it should do, since 1922 and
(II) that as Haj Amin received a salary as a Mufti, he could not serve
51also as the President of the S.M.C., and the fourth one was brought by
10 persons representing a body of people from Ilabron claiming that the
Mufti misapplied the income of "the Sidna Khalil" Waqf (the Patriarch
Abraham) in Hebron by spending it elsewhere and not appropriating a
suitable share of it for the needs of the local people of Hebron.
In all these case3 the verdict was in favour of the Mufti. About
that period, Abd al Rahman al Taji, for unclear reasons, arising perhaps
from his weariness with all these intrigues, resigned from his membership
52of the S.M.C., but the II.C. refused his resignation and he continued to 
serve. 47895012
47. In two letters Falastin 16.11.31, 17.11.31»
48. Consisting of: Raghab Nashashibi, Haj Shafi Abd el Hadi, Haj Nimr 
Nabulsi, Omar al flitar, Fahmi al Husseini and Sheikh Said abu Gosh.
For description of the interview see the II.C.'s letter to the 
Colonial Secretary 30.1.32, C.O. 733/222/97203 Pt.I.
49. Falastin"15.3.32.
50. "Al Janiah al Arabiyya 23.3.32.
51. ‘Falastin', 10.5.32. The Hebron people, were represented by - among 
others - Asaad al Shukeiri.
52. Mir'at al Sharq* 11.4.32.
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Of special interest is a long article published in the opposition
53paper "Mir'at al Sharq" on 20.2.32 under the heading: "Who are the
Pack Animals of Imperialism and the Props of the Mandate?” ¿After discussing
the unlawful methods by which the Mufti made the S.M.C. a "family and
party order" (Takiyah A'iliyya wa Hizbiyya) the article accused G. Antonius -
the special adviser of the Mufti - of being a British spy, and the Mufti
of being a tool in the hands of British Imperialism.
As a matter of fact Antonius left for London on the 30.5.32
presumably to discuss with the C.O. the question of the elections to the 
54S.M.C.
He met Parkinson at least twice, and on 20.7.32 Parkinson wrote him
"The Government h3S under consideration the holding of an election" (i.e.
55to the S.M.C.) "but no decision has been taken".
But already on its 464th meeting held on 11th April 1932, the 
Executive Council discussed the problem of the S.M.C..and decided as
r n  56 follows:
"(I) It was desirable and expedient to hold fresh elections for 
the S.M.C. as soon as possible;
(II) that representative Moslem opinion x^ ould be consulted as 
to the form and machinery of such elections.
(III) that representative Moslems should be informed oi 
Government's decision to secure a proper financial control 
of Waqf funds and to be made to understand that to that 
extent the powers granted to the Supreme Moslem Council
by the order of 1921 would be limited and 5346
53. Antonius later complained, and Bolous Seheada, the editor of "Mirat
al Sharq" apologised in court. From among all the anti-Mufti articles 
written by Arabs during the period 1918-1933, this article, in my 
opinion, was the strongest one. See'Mirat al Sharq*20.2.32.
54. "Falastin" 23.6.32 basing itself on reports in the Jewish daily 
"Davar". "Al Janiah al Arabiyya" reported it on 24.6.32 with a kind 
of a refutation.
55. G. Antonius file no.00133 I.S.A. My Italics.
56. C.O. 814/23.
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(IV) It was, however, agreed that since the Council would
in future be elected, there was no present necessity of 
removing Sharia affairs from the control of such a council, 
since the Council would be subject to the control of the 
Moslem Community itself”.
It should be noted that by taking these decisions, the Government
accepted, to quite an extent, the position held by the Mufti, and that
the major point of difference was the measure of Government’s control
over the Uaqf funds. It should further be noted that the Government*s
premise of 1923 to consult representative Moslem opinion as to the formal
mathinery of the elections to the S.li.C. which at the time was intended
to reassure the opposition became with tine a tool in the hands of the
Mufti in making it more difficult for the Government to hold such an 
57election.
Notwi-thstending that, on 7th May, 1932, the II.C. apparently not having 
reached a final decision and being affected - up to a point - by the
58campaign against the Mufti, and the need for reforming the S.M.C.,cabled 
to the Colonial Secretary proposing to revise the regulations so as to enable 
fresh elections to be held. lie also proposed to let it be known that the 
Government contemplated having the administration of Uaqf funds under 
financial control and aud.i.t.
59In his telegrams of the 13th May and 18th May the Colonial Secretary 
informed the II.C. that he entirely concurred with his views, nevertheless, 
as ”the revision of the constitution of the S.li.C. appears to raise issues 
of such magnitude” he suggested to study the subject further and to 
explain to Moslem leaders the Government's intentions. 5789
57. Simply for the reason that no machinery existed by which this
representative Moslem opinion could be consulted.
58. C.O. 733/222/97203 Pt. I.
59. Ibid.
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Accordingly, the H.C. met separately each of Musa Kazim - whom he 
described as "Chief of my "moderate" friends", Ragheb Nashashibi and the 
Mufti, and explained to them confidentially that before establishing a 
Legislative Council, the Government would introduce a local self-government 
act, which would regulate the administration of municipalities, local 
councils etc., but that the reform which he rea lly considered to be 
urgent was the election to a new S.M.C. The three of them welcomed what 
they called "an election long overdue". Eoth Musa Kazim and Ragheb 
Nashashibi emphasized the necessity for the Government to take action 
before the election as to the Control of the Waqf funds and Sharia Courts.^ 
R. Nashashibi, apparently leaked this information. "Mira*at al Sharq" 
observed that the elections to the S.M.C. would be held shortly and 
thereafter Municipal elections and finally elections to the Legislative 
Council. The paper said that "these elections will undoubtedly change the 
political atmosphere of the country and will involve such struggles among 
the parties as have never been seen before. But that nevertheless Palestine 
is in a need of a radical political change and if the II.C. is able to settle 
the problem of the Supreme Moslem Council and to establish the Legislative 
Council he will have rendered a true service to Palestine". The paper then 
called on the "Umma party" to prepare itself and prepare the people for 
these elections.
62On the same date the pro-Mufti paper "Saut al Shaab" announced that 
the forthcoming elections to the S.M.C. would be confined to the members 
and that the presidency would be excluded "since the presidency of the S.M.C. 
is regarded as permanent and settled". This announcement was based cn 
information given by the Attorney-General to certain Arab leaders. 6012
60. For record of these meetings see the H.C.*s letter to the Colonial 
Secretary, 4.6.32 Ibid Pt.II.
61. "Mira*at al Sharq" 4.6.32.
62. "Saut al Shaab" 4.6.32.
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What were tha views ox the Attorny-General wc can learn from what he
/JOwrote to the legal adviser of the Colonial Office. "My personal 
opinion is that we should be wise to avoid as far as possible any 
tampering v?ith the 1921 Order" (i.e. the elections not to include the 
President).
All through the period June-July, the proposal to hold new elections 
for the S.M.C. was the main topic of discussion amongst political leaders 
and in the press.^
It was clear that both parties would spare no effort to obtain a
decisive majority on the new council. Encouraged by the clear demonstration
of their superior strength at the Nebi Musa celebrations that year^, some
of his followers urged the Mufti to support new elections which perhaps
would rid them of the opposition members and specially of Sheikh Mohi al
Din Abd al-Shafi who made things difficult for the Mufti and opposed him.
The Mufti himself was undecided. Though he was sure of his victory,
he feared that new elections would involve him in considerable expenses
and he also feared at the same time, that the selection of candidates would
cause dissension amongst his own followers. Another reason which bothered
67him, and of which the II.C. thought as well was that if the Nashashibis
would realize that his supporters x/ould probably win the election they
68would cry out (which the Nashashibis actually did ) for the immediate 
election of a Legislative Council claiming that the elections to the S.M.C. 634578
63. Hr. Trusted to Mr. Bushe 1.6.32. C.O. 733/222/97203/2.
64. See C.I.D. Summary reports nos.22/32 of 8.6.32, no.23/32 of 17.6.32 
and no.26/32 of 15.8.32 Ibid.
65. In 1932 the Nebi Musa festival fell on 24th-25th April. The 
celebrations were on the whole quiet, with each party trying to show 
its strength. The Husseinis commanded by far the biggest crowd.
"Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" 26.4.32 see also the article "The Internal 
Enemy". Ibid. 4.5.32.
66. See interview between tha Mufti and the II.C. 1,10.32. C.O. 733/219/97113.
67. See his letter to the Colonial Secretary 4.6.32. C.O. 733/222/97203/2.
68. See'Mira'at al SharqX 20.6.32.
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■ware nothing but a Government manoeuvre to divert the people from
demanding a Legislative Council.
69It was therefore rumoured that the Mufti*s followers were even 
thinking of the following possibilities:
C D  endeavouring to induce the Government to defer the election 
or
(II) reaching an agreement with the opposition that if the election 
were held, each side would nominate two members or
(III) to try to obtain from the Arab Executive a decision to boycott 
the election, on such pretext as the safeguarding of the 
national aspirations and to avoid a division in the national
vtranks.
As would be seen, they succeeded as the Government did defer the
elections. On 23.5.32 the administrative Council of the Umma Party held
1
a meeting in Nablus, its stronghold, and decided - among other things - 
"to take action in regard to the rumoured elections for the Moslem Supreme 
Council".
And on 27th June 1932 they sent to the II.C. a memorandum signed by 
Ragheb Nashashibi in which they demanded that the forthcoming elections 
to the S.M.C. should include the office of the President as the council 
as well, and after repeating all their claims and complaints they stated 
that ’’should Government reject these representations and insist upon the 
exemption of the President from the elections, the Congress of the 
Falcstine Moslem Nation with all its members and adherents in all parts 
of Palestine will be compelled to completely boycott the elections and 
refrain from participating in any act of co-operation with Government in 
the future and will not recognise any council which may be elected on 6970
69. C.I.D. summary reports no.22/32 of 8.6.32 and no.23/32 of 17.6.32 
F.O. 371/
70. Falestin 29.5.32.
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such basis".^
The reason why the Umraa" party assumed such a sharp stand was because 
they perhaps felt that the H.C. and the Mufti were finding a common 
language.
Already in his letter of 4.6.32 reporting on his meeting with the 
3 leaders, one could detect that the H.C. tended to accept the Mufti’s 
views writing, "The Mufti definitely told me that he would agree to some 
form of control or examination of accounts after the election had been 
held".71 2 73
In his letter of 23.7.32 the H.C. wrote that the Attorney-General
was preparing with his approval a draft Ordinance with only a minor change
from the 1925 Ordinance and that he w3S going to show this draft to two
or three Moslem leaders. He repeated his belief that for good or evil,
the Mufti’s party was the strongest at the time and that this was
R. Nashashibi's opinion as well. And he concluded "It is also of great
advantage that I work with the co-operation of the Mufti. It may be, in
future, that this advantage has to be purchased at too high a price, but
73that is not so at present".
71. C.O. 733/222/97203/2. The H.C. answered R. Nashashibi on the 2nd July 
1932 telling him that he viewed this threat as "ill considered and 
would entail results which I hardly think you can fully thought out" 
to which Nashashibi on the same day, in a very fast retreat and 
proving once again his lack of political courage, answered that the 
memorandum was "dicated" to him by the Administrative Board of the 
party, and assured the H.C. "of the good intentions and clear aims
of the party to co-operate with the Palestine Government in all 
affairs" excluding the elections for the S.M.C. in case the President 
was not included in them. Ibid.
72. Though he goc3 on to say "but promises, I admit, are not the same as 
actual performances". Ibid.
73. So Mr. Parkinson. Ibid. My Italics. Parkinson wrote him on 
18.5.32 that the Zionist leader Rutenberg told him during an interview 
on 16.4.32 that the Nashashibis command the support of the majority of 
the Arab population.
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On 19.8.32 the H.C. wrote "I am delaying the S.M.C. elections, 
for Johnson (the Government's Treasurer) is steadily working with Haj Amin, 
and I am hopeful that Haj Amin may voluntarily agree to some form of
Government Control of Waqf funds....The Mufti and I are on excellent tPrwg|
as indeed I am with his opponents”.
On 16th March, 1933 the H.C. informed the Colonial Secretary^*5 that 
a marked improvement had taken place in the relations of the S.M.C. with 
the Government, and also in the working of the S.M.C. and that financial 
organisation of the Council was being carried out with the Treasurer's 
advice. He further suggested that unless a change for the worse occurred « 
expressing at the same time his view and hope that no .such charge would 
occur - ”the election for a new council should be postponed”. An opportunity 
for the establishment of an elected Supreme Moslem Council might more
suitably arise, he added, after the setting up of a Legislative Council.1 7 6In his answer of 26th April 1933 the Colonial Secretary agreed with the 
conclusion of the High Commissioner that the election of a new Council 
might be postponed. 7456
74
74. Ibid. My Italics. The Jews must have known of these developments. 
Sir J. Chancellor reporting to the Colonial Office on a talk he had 
with p. Agronsky, the editor of the “Palestine Post” on 16.8.32, 
that is 3 days before the H.C.*s letter, wrote the following:
'Mr. Agronsky told me that Mr. George Antonius was now in London 
intriguing on behalf of the Mufti of Jerusalem. He added that the 
Mufti had greatly strengthened his position of late, and was now 
regarded by the Colonial Office as a person of such international 
importance in the Moslem world that, in view of the present critical 
situation in India, it had been decided that no stops should be taken 
at present to interfere with him in any way, whether by curtailing his 
tenure of the appointment of President of the Supreme Moslem Council 
or by removing the Sharia Courts from his control or by establishing 
an audit of the Waqf Fund accounts.” C.O. 733/215/97054.
75. C.O. 733/339/17356 My Italics.
76. Ibid.
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i the Arab rebellion in April -rtic „**.«*. the outbreak ot tneOnly in Hay 1936 after tne 77
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( 78 thou?ht it -unfortunate that since that date
The Peel Commission though ^
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would have the effect of diminis circle which, ifl in fact, in a vicious circle, wh
The administration of Palestine *
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Hussein! was removed from his office®• The
this possibility seemed remote.
Five years earlier however, th U t  October, 1932
1 H C. and the inrecord of an interview between tn • «»vine measures toan o alli«s seeking ***reads as a consultation between . , 3 » diminishto - among other things
satisfaction to Arab grievances in or about whicha independence party bdou
the increase in strength of the extrem
neither was happy. 81 constituted the
. T„,<aial party i°The establishment of the 1st q „hlle the first
Arab poUtlc3, msecond important schism in Palest ne family rivalries,Hibis was based on
one between the Husseinis and the as _ "Istiqlal" party
of principlethis one was mainly based on matter an ideological
4 „ Arab party organised upon
was the first and only Palestinia ^  Palestine - and that is
platform. Its general outlook vas pan — --- - —“ ~------— --- 733/311/75528/6.
— -------------------- - of leaders.
77. See file: Disturbances. Treatmetv
78. The Peel Report pp. 180-181.
79. See Infra p. 457 733/219/97113,
80. For record of the interview see C.O. wadi, Akram Zuaiter,( Q a, bv Auni Abd al tjaa * HaJ Ibrahim,81. The party was formed on 4.8.32 Y ln ai llaadi, the
Subhi al Khadra, M. Izzat parw^Zn^ j t .. PP*]^3 * 309-310. See alsoand Ajaj Nuwayhid. See Darwaza see Ibid PP* 3
Constitution and Charter of the P 44-4 7. See ~g9
H. Assaf, the Arab Hovement ts np-Cit.», 279, *
and Infra pp.332-3 and Arab Document
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where it differed from the Husseinis - it maintained that the national
struggle should be directed against the British and the Jews simultaneously
with more emphasis against the British.
82
Now, when the H.C. mentioned in his letter to the Colonial Secretary
of 19.8.32 that "Johnson is steadily working with HaJ Amin" as the main
reason for his decision to delay the S.M.C. elections, he referred to the
financial discussions between the Government and the S.M.C. These
discussions had rather a long history.
83I had already mentioned that one of the decisions of the November 
1920 conference of Mufti’s principal Ulama and Moslem notables was "that 
the Government should continue the collection of Waqf tithes, debiting 
the Waqf account with the expenses of collection". The revenues were 
placed at the disposal of the Waqf administration in order to enable it to
fulfil certain obligations (education, maintenance of orphanages, Moslem
\
establishments etc.).
During 1925, the Palestine Government asked and received from the
84Colonial Secretary his agreement to open and conduct negotiations with 
the S.M.C. about the commutation of all Waqf tithes to a fixed annual 
payment.
Accordingly the then Chief Secretary, Sir S. Symes wrote to the 
President of the S.M.C. on 11.12.25 proposing to enter into negotiations 
about the possibility of commutation of all the Waqf tithes to a fixed 
annual payment. 8234
82. See supra p. 298
83. See supra p. 31
84. See letter from H.C. to the Colonial Secretary 29.5.25. C.O. 733À59 / 
25330.
and letter from the C.S. to the Colonial Secretary 3.7.25. C.O. 733/ 
31959.
and the answer from the Colonial Secretary to H.C. 14.11.25. Ibid.
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The Council had postponed their answer because they had sent one of 
their members to Constantinople. The report of the Supreme Moslem Council 
for the year 1931 says: ’’The efforts of Amin Eey Tamimi, members of the 
Supreme Moslem Council, were crowned with success at Constantinople. He 
obtained five hundred copies of documents and Waqfiahs in respect of 
valuable properties without which the Waqfiah of these properties could 
not be established.
The treasury of the Government of Palestine has delegated an officer 
to examine these documents for the purpose of their registration with the 
government. The examination of the documents has not yet been completed. 
Upon admission by Government of the Waqfiah of these many properties, a
new and considerable source of revenue will be secured to the Awqaf”.
85On 22nd July 1931, Haj Amin answered on behalf of the S.M.C. that 
it agreed to negotiations on the following bases:
Cl) that the amount which will be agreed upon should represent 
the right of the Waqf in lands and property, the Waqfiah of 
which has already been proved and admitted by the Government.
(II) That every 7 years the fixed amount would be reconsidered and
(III) that separate agreements should be made from time to time, 
additional to the original agreement, in respect of any land 
or property which would be proved to be Waqf.
In view of the financial crisis of the S.M.C. the Mufti requested 
that the monthly advances by the Government might not be less than LP 1.750.
But apparently, the tacit understanding was not yet achieved between 
the H.C. and the Mufti. 85
85. C.O. 733/213/97033/Pt. I.
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On 14.5.32 the H.C. informed the Colonial Secretary th3t in view 
of the opinion expressed by his Legal Advisers that it was doubtful 
whether the then existing nominated Supreme Moslem Council had sufficient 
powers to make any agreement for the commutation of Waqf tithes, he had 
decided not to proceed with negotiations with it but to wait until an 
elected council would come into being. He further informed the Colonial 
Secretary, that he had decided to reduce the monthly advances to the S.M.C. 
to LP. 750 (as against LP. 1750 asked by the Council in their letter of
22.7.31 mentioned above).
This last decision made the financial position of the S.M.C. unbearable.
87The Mufti wrote on 25.5.32 a memorandum to the II.C. explaining in full 
the reasons for the crisis and requesting urgent assistance, and on the
next day the 26.5.32 all the members of the council came for an interview
88with the H.C. Haj Amin again summarised the financial position of the 
council and repeated his request for assistance suggesting that "the 
Government might adopt a generous attitude towards the Council in their 
present difficulties". The H.C. promised to increase at once the monthly 
advance from LP. 750 to LP. 1000 and to see what he could do further.
On 19.7.32, the H.C. met again the President and the members of the 
S.M.C. The Mufti opened by thanking the H.C. for stopping the work on the 
proposed sewer through the Mamilah Cemetry in a matter which affected the 
religious feelings of all Moslems, and said that the H.C.'s instruction 
was highly appreciated. Again the financial position was discussed and the 
Mufti asked urgently for some funds. The H.C. promised to study the
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid Pt. 2.
88. Haj Amin Husseini, Amin Tamimi, Abd al Rahman Taji, Amin Abd el Hadi 
and Sheikh Muhi el Din Abd el Shafi. For full description of the 
interview see Ibid.
86
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possibility of increasing the monthly advance to LP. 1500 or LP 2000.89 901
By now, it seems, the understanding between the two sides was 
achieved.
On 17th September 1932, the H.C. sent the Colonial Secretary a long 
A SOand very interesting letter informing him that at the personal request
of the Mufti he had instructed the Treasurer to carry out a thorough
investigation into the accounts of the S.M.C. The results of this
investigation had revealed an extremely serious state of affairs which
called for an immediate and abundant measure of direct and continued
Government financial aid, if "the mo3t important institution of the
preponderating majority of the population of this country is to be
preserved from defaulting in the adequate and economical performance of
the duties entrusted to it under the Order dated 20th December 1921,
constituting the Supreme Moslem Sharia Council”.
After praising the spirit of good-will and the co-operation shown
by the Mufti in facilitating the Treasurer^ examination, and after
presenting in detail the causes which brought the S.M.C. into its financial
91crisis, the H.C. recommended to grant the Council LP. 30.000 for the
89. See C.S. file K. 178.33 Commutation of Waqf tithes I.S.A. The 
Mamilah Cemetry belonged to the Dajani family. The proposed sewer 
was to serve the Palace Hotel which was built for the S.M.C. The 
opposition accused the Mufti that the sewer was dug with his 
knowledge and agreement. Mir*at al Sharq', 9.8.32, 12.8.32. This, 
apparently wa3 true. See version by B. Katinka the Jewish architect 
whose firm constructed the Palace Hotel, who confirmed that the 
Mufti agreed that the sewage, after purification, would be conveyed 
to a swer passing through the cemetry. Katinka Qp-cit p.259.
”A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya” in its issue of 13.8.32 denied it all and 
blamed the Government. Following the protests by the Dajanis the 
H.C. instructed the work to be stopped.
90. C.O. 733/213/97033/PT.I.
91. The S.M.C. formally claimed that this sum is to make good the loss 
of revenue from tithe collections in 1930 and 1931. The Government, 
however, did not accept this claim (see letter from Young to Williams,
25.6.32 Ibid) considering it as a grant in aid.
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settlement of conatitments (which amounted to approximately LP. 32.000 
LP. 15.000 being arrears of salaries taxes etc. and LP. 17.000 for the 
repayment of Government advances) and (II) with effect from 1st January 
1932, to make to the Council anJannual grant of LP. 23.000 in lieu of 
paying over the receipts from the Waqf tithes.
The H.C. informed the Colonial Secretary that in return for this 
assistance he should naturally expect the Council to reform its financial 
and accounting system in accordance with the Government method, to limit 
expenditure and augment revenue in all practicable ways, and generally 
to make such dispositions of its estimates and accounts as will place 
Government in full and prompt possession of all necessary information as 
to its financial position from time to time. He gladly reported that "the 
Council has agreed to meet my chief requirements in this respect".
We can easily assume what were the other requirements which the H.C. 
naturally expected and which the Council, no doubt, agreed to meet.
The H.C. enclosed wLth his letter a memorandum by the Council setting
92forth the points of its agreement with the Government. *12345678
92. These points were:
1. Limitation of Annual Expenditure (to the amount of the estimated 
annual revenue for the year, exclusive of revenues from specific 
endowments, but in any case not to exceed LP. 44.500).
2. Audit of Council*s Accounts (and forwarding a copy of the audited 
accounts to the Government)
3. Accounting system and Financial Procedure (The Council agreed to 
adopt the financial regulations and accounting system of the 
Government)
4. Submission of Annual Estimates to High Commissioner for information.
5. Sharia Courts (The council will endeavour to balance the estimates 
of revenue and expenditure of the Sharia Courts by increasing the 
fees and reducing expenditure)
6. Claims of Additional Assigned Waqf Tithes.
7. Payment in lieu of Waqf Tithes (As recommended above by the H.C.)
8. Revision of Annual Amount (each five years). See Ibid.
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Referring to the doubts - of which ha wrote in his letter of 
14th May - as to the powers of a nominated Council to make any agreement 
for the commutation of Waqf tithes, the H.C. wrote: "I am satisfied that 
the concurrence of the Council in my proposals will not be seriously 
challenged by the Moslem Community when they have been fully implemented 
and properly appreciated'1.
A hint as to the arguments put forward - successfully as the results 
showed - by the Mufti in his endeavour to keep the S.M.C. as independent 
as possible, we have in the following lines of the H.C.
"The Council will be subjected to much criticism by Moslems for 
entering into the pact with Government and, in the circumstances, I think 
that, from its point of view, it has yielded to Government as far:as was 
practicable and politic having regard to the impending elections of a new 
Council and to Moslem opinion generally. From the point of view of 
Government, I am satisfied that what has been secured are the utmost 
concessions which it is proper to seek from the Council at the present 
Juncture as the price of Government support. It is, in my opinion, neither 
necessary nor expedient that Government should attempt to take advantage 
of the financial embarrassment of the Council so as to obtain some direct 
control of its finances or some power of interference in its internal 
affairs.
It would be injudicious on the part of Government to tamper with the 
right of the Council to manage its own domestic concerns as set out in 
Article 8 of the Order dated 20th December 1921. I consider it a 
sufficient quid pro quo that, in consideration of the Government assistance 
received, the Council accepts a measure of Government control which does 
not infringe upon its rights under the Order".
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And the H.C. concludes: "If you give your approval to this agreement,
in order to give it a fair chance to prove itself, I have decided to
postpone the elections for the Supreme Moslem Council for several months".
In its letter of 20th October 1932, signed by the President Haj Amin,
the Supreme Moslem Council informed the Government of its acceptance of the
93agreement as described above.
It is interesting to note that both the agreement and the discussions
94preceding it were kept secret in Palestine and London and the Arab press 
did not mention them.
Because of the growing affinity between the H.C. and the Mufti, the
Colonial Office even took care to defend the Mufti outside Palestine.
When Mr. Graves of the London "Times" informed Williams of the Colonial
Office that the "Tines" considered publishing an article about the Mufti
"of a nearly libelous character" Williams did his best, and succeeded, in 
95preventing it.
Shortly afterwards during February and March 1933, when the Istiqlal
party proposed to adopt extreme measures of non-co-operation, and were
supported - obviously for party manoeuvres, by the Nashashibis, the Mufti
96and his followers refused to accept this proposal.
97And when the 1933 Anti-British riots broke out the H.C. wrote with 
satisfaction "Thanks mainly to our good relations with the Mufti, the 
Supreme Moslem Council gave no encouragement to the demonstration". And 
more specifically when he explained the lack of religious undertones in the 
riots, as "due mainly to the agreement Government made laat year with the 
Supreme Moslem Council (in regard to the Waqf funds) and to my own (at 934567
93. Ibid.
94. See Hamilton^ evasive and vague answer to a question in the Commons
30.6.32, Hansard, Vol. 267, cols, 2017-8.
95. See Minute by Williams 10.8.32. C.O. 733/222/97208/2.
96. See C.I.D. Summary Reports No.8/33 of 10.3.33, No.9/33 of 15.3.33,
No.10/33 of 25.3.33 and No.11/33 of 1.4.33, F.O. 371/16926. See also 
the H.C.’s letter to the Colonial Secretary 1.4.33, C.O. 733/234/17272. 
See also Assaf Op .cit p.128.
97. To the Colonial Secretary, 23.10.33, C.O. 733/239/17356/1 Pt.I.
present) most happy relations with the Hufti and other members of the
98Supreme Moslem Council'.’
99On their interview on 20.11.33, the Mufti promised the H.C. that
he would do his best to calm the people. Earlier he had promised it to the
British H.C. in Iraq when he was on his way back to P a l e s t i n e . O n  the
whole he tried to keep his promise.*^*
During their interview on 2nd January 1934, the H.C. and the Mufti
discussed the demonstrations/processions which the Arabs intended to hold
at the Moslem feast Eid al Fitr, at the end of Ramadan, in pursuance of
the Arab Executive decision of 8th October 1933 ”to hold demonstrations
102until the Arabs are granted their requests”. Apparently they reached 
an understanding, and what might have developed into a repetition - 
perhaps on a bigger scale - of the autumn riots of 1933, turned, as a 
result, to be a series of quiet and peaceful processions.
The Mufti persuaded the H.C. to allow the processions, in contrast 
to the established practice since 1929 to prohibit them. For the record, 
it must be mentioned, that Musa Kazira, whose role in influencing the H.C. 
in that respect was as important, and also the high ranking Arab officials, 
Ruhi Abd al Hadi and Musa Alami, as well as other considerations, 
contributed to the permit being given. There is no doubt however, that 
the Mufti's request, accompanied by his assurance of assistance in keeping 
and maintaining the peace during the processions, played as important a 
role as any. In return, the Mufti suggested that in order to prevent 
disturbances he would be willing to select a number of respected people 98102
98. In his letter to the Colonial Secretary 18.12.33, C.P. 2(34). January 
1934.
99. See H.C.*s letter to the Colonial Secretary 23.11.33, C.O. 733/236/ 
17313 Pt. 4.
100. See Humphrys to F.O. 16.11.33 F.O. 371/16932.
101. See C.I.D. Summary Reports No.2/34 of 15.1.34 and No.3/34 of 30.1.34 
F.O. 371/17873.
102. See Supra p. 250
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whom he could trust, to walk with the crowd on leaving the Mosque, 
who would act as a steadying influence on the crowd. He al.o promised 
the H.C. that he would give definite instructions to all preachers in 
the various mosques of Palestine, to use all their influence in their 
sermons on the feast and on the preceding Friday and advise the crowd 
to behave in an orderly manner.
The Mufti had then a long talk with Jamal Husseini, who eventually
agreed with him that it would be wiser not to act in defiance of
Government orders. Jamal Ilusseini subsequently met the leaders of the Arab 
103Executive, and against the opposition of the young leaders, persuaded 
the Executive to follow a moderate line with regard to the demonstrations. 
Formal application:: to hold a demonstration in Jerusalem was made on
1QA8th January 1934 by the three secretaries of the Arab Executive, and
once it became known that this would be favourably received, similar
applications were made all over the country. Permission was granted after
the different District Commissioners and Officers, agredd with the
demonstrations organisers in each place, which route the demonstration
would follow. This was welcomed and commented favourably in the Arab 
105press.
On 17th January 1934, the day of the feast, processions took place 
in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Haifa, Nablus, Hebron, Ramdlah, Bethlehem, Jericho, 
Lydda, Ramie, Gaza, Majdal Khan Yunis, Beersheba, Safad, Tiberias, Jenin, 
Beisan, Tulkarem and Qalkiliya. In all these places the processions were 
in strict conformity with the Government^ conditions and passed off quite 
peacefully. The number of demonstrators in each place was much smaller 10345
103. "Falastin" 8.1.34. The fact that Jamal Husseini who was the Chief 
agitator during the 1933 riots appeared in the role of a moderator was 
commented on by the H.C. who said "so swiftly and unexpectedly do 
things sometime change in Palestine". See his letter to the Colonial 
Secretary 5.2.34. C.O. 733/258/37357.
104. "A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya" 8.1.32.
105. Ibid 9.1.32, 12.1.32, 15.1.32, Falestin 10.1.32, 15.1.32.
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than during the 1933 demonstrations. (In Jerusalem 1000-1200 persons as
against 7000 in 13.10.33 and in Jaffa 2000 as against 7500 on 27.10.33).
Again the numbers of fellahin was small and many leaders did not
106participate in the demonstrations.
The tone of the statements and speeches delivered, was peaceful and 
ordinary^^ and contained nothing new. Jamal Husseini in Jerusalem only 
promising that the Arab Executive was going to launch a new propaganda 
campaign and a new plan of activity.
There were several reasons for the moderate character of the January 
1934 demonstrations.
The fresh memory of the Government^ firm stand during the Autumn 
1933 riots.
The growing feeling among the fellahin that the Government and 
the II.C. personally realised their state of distress and was 
tbking steps to relieve it.
The unwillingness and lack of enthusiasm among Arab business
circles to intensify the struggle against the Governments or
.. T 109 the Jews. 106789
106. As for llusa Kazim, it was decided that he would not participate. About 
Auni Abdal Hadi the H.C. wrote: "In January Auni Bey played no part. 
His friends say he was discreet, his enemies drunk. I know not. 
Possibly Both". In a letter to the Colonial Secretary 5.2.34
C.O. 733/253/37357.
107. For full text of the speeches see Jamal al Husseini - Jerusalem 
Dr. Mustafa Bushnaq - Nablus Omar Saleh - Ramalleh and Bireh,
"Falastin" 20.1.34 Said Khalil - Jaffa and Sheikh Sabri Abdin - 
Hebron, Ibrahim al Alami ■* Gaza "Falastin11, 21.1.34.
108. And perhaps the personal recollections of several leaders of the 
uncomfortable - even harsh * treatment they got while in police 
detention.
109. See C.I.D. summary reports No.27/33, 19.12.33, F.O. 371/16926 and
No.1/34, 5.1.34, F.O. 371/17378.
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The reserved position of the Christians, and of the opposition
_ 111 party.
Eut perhaps the most important reason was the moderate position 
adopted by the Mufti, position which vzas also supported by Musa 
Kazim and the other Husseinis.
On 23rd December 1933, the H.C. sent the Colonial Secretary a 
secret despatch containing his views and appreciation of the situation in 
Palestine and which later was circulated as a Cabinet paper. It contained 
also 4 enclosures. A memorandum by Wing Commander Russel and Air Vice 
Marshal Freeman, Air Officer commanding Palestine and T. Jordan, dated 
9.3.33 and a second memorandum by Air Commodore Peirse, who had replaced 
Freeman as Air Officer Commanding Palestine and Trans-Jordan, dated 
8.12.33.10 12 13
A third memorandum by Musa al Alami, his adviser on Arab affairs, 
of whose integrity, and of his knowledge of the state of Arab opinion in 
Palestine he had the highest opinion, and a note of an interview held with 
the Mufti on 3.12.33. The record of this interview marks perhaps and 
symbolises more than everything else the understanding which wa3 achieved 
between the H.C. and the Mufti. Reading the record one gets the impression
110. See hints by Jamal al Husseini to the Jerusalem District Commissioner 
at the latter*s meeting with Musa Kazim at Jericho on 4.1.34.
C.O. 733/253/37337.
111. The H.C. wrote to the Colonial Secretary: ’’The Mayors of Jerusalem 
(R. Nashashibi) and other Chief towns were all definitely, but
not very openly, on the side of moderation, 5.2.34 Ibid.
112. These 2 memorandums elicited the following comment from Downie of 
the C.O. "These do not add anything valuable as regards the main 
issue"/ 31.3.34, C.O. 733/257/37356/2.
113. This was actually initiated by the Mufti who during his meeting with 
the H.C. on 20.11.33 suggested that ina future talk they might discuss 
in what way Government could meet legitimate grievances. See source 
f.n. 99.
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not of 2 opponents or even 2 persons representing 2 differing bodies 
but of 2 persons, on the same side of the fence, trying to solve a common 
problem. This, however, by no means weakened the national ’'spirit” of 
the Mufti's words.
After referring to the conditions of unrest and lack of confidence 
between the Arabs and the Government, the H.C. asked the Mufti whether he 
could advise him as ”what should be done with a view to (a) pacifying the 
bitter feelings of the Arabs and winning back their confidence in 
Government; and (b) laying the foundation for a permanent peace in the 
future”.
The Mufti answered that there was nothing more he would wish to work 
for, with all his power, than these two objects.
Notwithstanding his rejection of the Mandate, the Mufti stated that 
conditions were so serious and necessitated an immediate remedy, which 
should and could be found even within the Mandate. The obligation of 
His Majesty's Government to favour the "establishment” of the Jewish 
National Home implied that, at some time, there must be an end to the 
process of establishment. The criterion for determining this end, the 
Mufti continued, is the "prejudice caused to the Arabs as a result of 
the continuous process of establishment”. This point had already been 
reached.
Not enthusiastically, because of Arab disappointments from commissions 
in the past, the Mufti proposed a Royal Commission to carry an economic 
survey of Palestine, in order to settle the question "Did the process of the 
Establishment of the Jewish National Home reach its end?" Pending that, 
immigration and transfer of land to Jews, should be stopped.
These steps would have the effect of winning back the lost confidence. 
And if the Government would carry out the recommendations of the Royal 
Commission, which he was confident would be on the Arabs side, the 
foundations of permanent peace in the country would be laid.
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The Mufti then proposed to the H.C. that the Palestine Government 
would fa) compensate the families of those killed during the disturbances 
by paying some form of ”diyet,f (blood money) and (b) to help the Arabs 
in reclaiming the lands which were in danger of passing over to the Jews. 
The Mufti mentioned also that the S.M.C. intended r.to spend all the money, 
owed to them by the Government for their claims - which at the time were 
under consideration - and which he estimated to be a sum between 100 to 
150 thousand pounds, on land reclamation. The payment of this sum to the 
S.M.C. would have not only the double effect mentioned above, but by 
providing land for the landless class, would remove from the influence of 
communist propaganda a people in despair, who were a potential danger to 
public security.
Incidents ny. this last remark, of being a bulwark against the spread
of communism amongst Arabs and Moslems in Palestine, was another indirect
argument used by the Mufti in his claim for Government support, an
114argument which was generally accepted by the Government.
The Mufti then spoke of the duty of the Arab leaders of pacifying 
the feelings of their follox/ers and said that as far as he was concerned, 
he had already embarked on a campaign of propagating the advice of the 
late King Feisal to the Arabs which was that they should never break touch 
with the British, and that they should work hand in hand with them.
The H.C. in his answer touched upon all the points raised by the Mufti. 
Referring to the claims of the Supreme Moslem Council the H.C. said he 
hoped that the Council and the Treasurer would agree as soon as possible 
about the Uaqf claims to certain tithes and that the Government would be 
glad to pay all claims to tithe and arrears to which the Council had a right. 14
114. See Minute by Williams, that in any loss of prestige by the Mufti,
there is also the risk of Communist influence amongst the Arab3 gaining 
ground at the expense of both the Ilusseinis and the Hashashibis. 
4.12.31. C.O. 733/193/77364.
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Actually at that tine, the second stage of the financial discussions
between the Government and the S.M.C. was already held.
115I have mentioned that one principle on basis of which the S.I1.C. 
agmsd to negotiate with the Government on the commutation of the Uaqf 
tithes was: That separate agreements should be made from time to time, 
additional to the original agreement, in respect of any land or property 
which would be proved to be Uaqf.
Amin Tamimi, the member of S.M.C. brought with him back from 
Constantinople more than 500 documents and Waqfiaho for additional assigned 
Waqfs.
116Judge Webb was appointed to enquire into the new claims based on
these documents, and towards the end of 1933 he submitted his report. The
Webb committee admitted most of the claims of the S.M.C. and recommended
that the S.H.C. should be paid the revenue collected in respect of the
claims admitted as from the 22nd July 1931, being the .date on which the
Council was first ready to submit its claim. In addition to that the
Webb Committee recommended that a lump sum should be granted to the S.H.C.
to meet the C03t of repairs of the Dome of the Rock and al Aqsa Mosques.
This lump sum was proposed because the Government feared that the S.H.C.
might claim the arrears of the additional assigned Uaqfs since the
Occupation or since 1921, the date of the constitution of the S.H.C.
These arrears amounted to approximately LP. 100.000.
However, after negotiations which lasted several months, an agreement
was signed by the Treasurer, on behalf of the Government, and by the
117President of the Supreme Moslem Council on 8th April 1934 according to 1567
115. Supra p. 304
116. He was assisted by Mr. Gress, Senior Assistant Treasurer, and Mitri 
Hanna, Lands Officer. See letter of H.C. to Colonial Secretary, 
27.1.34. C.O. 733/250/27223.
117. See H.C.*s cable to Colonial Secretary 9.4.34 and letter 13.4.34 Ibid.
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which the S.M.C. received from the Government the lump sum of LP. 43.690 for 
extraordinary repairs of the Dome of the Rock, the A1 Aqsa Mosque and the 
Mosque of Hebron, and the sum of the annual payment was increased from 
LP. 23.000 to LP. 30.000. The LP. 7000 being the annual payment in respect 
of the tithes revenues from the additional Uaqfs admitted by the Uebb 
Committee.
As a result of the 1934 agreement the annual expenditure, which had 
been limited to LP. 44.500 under the 1932 agreement was increased to 
LP. 49.500 for the two years 1934/35 and 1935/36 and to LP. 51.500 
thereafter, exclusive of expenditure out of the revenues from specific 
endowments.
The S.M.C. also took on itself to appropriate and carry to a special 
repairs fund a sum of LP. 5000 annually for the two years 1934/5 and 1935/
36 and LP. 7000 annually thereafter, until the total amount expended from 
the fund on the stipulated repairs had reached a total of LP. 43.690, the 
amount of the lump sum granted by the Government.
On 28th May 1934, the Sharia Court of Jerusalem authorised the S.M.C. 
to conclude the agreement with the Government which was equivalent to 
ratification.*1® The H.C. authorised the Treasurer to pay during June, 
the sum of approximately LP. 59.440.
Addressing his colleagues in the Cabinet, the Colonial Secretary,
119Sir P. Cunliffe-Lister, in a memorandum about Palestine wrote the 
following with regard to this agreement: "Fortunately, the High Commissioner 
has acquired considerable influence with the Mufti of Jerusalem, who is 
unquestionably the most influential Moslem in Palestine today. If he were 
to throw in his lot with the extremists, I should regard the position as 
much more serious. It is therefore of the utmost importance that the High 189
118. Ibid.
119. C.P. 95(34) April 1934.
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Commissioner should maintain his influence with and ascendancy over the 
Mufti. In this connection it is very desirable to get a settlement as 
soon as possible of the Moslem claims to T7aqf funds. The High Commissioner 
has come to a provisional agreement with the Mufti as regards this, which 
I hope will have been approved and settled by the time this paper reaches 
my colleagues’1.
And summarising his opinion about the influence of the agreement on
120Arab-Erttish relations in Palestine the II.C. wrote ’’This last 
agreement as to the Uaqf funds was almost of equal importance as the former 
agreement with the Supreme Moslem Council,... At one time, the Mufti's 
suspicions of our fair dealing were thoroughly aroused; but after it had 
been signed he came spontaneously to thank me personally for an agreement 
which he rightly said will prove of definite'advantage to the Supreme 
Moslem Council, Government and general goodwill. The agreement will be of 
definite help towards lessening the Arab mistrust of British Government, 
though that mistrust can never be dissipated so long as we continue to 
facilitate the formation of the National Home, a policy which, as you know,
I loyally and openly carry out”.
In this last sentence the II.C. laid his finger on the main limitation 
of the possibility of even closer co-operation between himself and the Mufti. 
As long as the II.C., or to be more exact, as long as the Government (because 
as was proven by the case of Chancellor, it is the Governments policy which 
counts in the long run) carried loyally the policy of facilitating the 
formation of the National Home there could be no full, long-range 
co-operation. The maximum which could be hoped for, and actually achieved, 120
120. In a letter to the Colonial Secretary 14.4.34 C.O. 733/250/37223.
The Istiqlalist Izzat Darwaza had this to say about it: ’’The II.C. 
agreed to pay the S.M.C. part of the money owed to it for the tithes, 
and won by that the gratitude of the Council's supporters who 
constituted the majority of our national movement and its leaders. 
Darwaza op.cit. p.91
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was co-operation lasting a few years, and based - as described earlier by
the H.C. - on the principle of quid for quo.
In the meantime the co-operation continued. At the beginning of
1934, describing the situation following the January demonstrations the 
121H.C. wrote: "The Mufti exercised his great authority over the fellahin
to stop them heeding the extremists". At the end of the year he wrote to
the Colonial Secretary: "The Mufti has been a good deal criticised for
his silence and inactivity both as to Huleh and the disturbances at Jebel
Canaan. He was helpful to us (and to the Supreme Moslem Council) over the
drainage of Birket Ramadan; and has now promised me his aid in a small
122scheme I have for irrigation near Samakh."
Before finishing this subject, it should be again emphasised that the
second big schism in Palestine Arab politics, when a strong element of
mainly young nationalists seceded from the Pro-Mufti party and established
the Istiqlal party, originated from differences of opinion with regard
to the problem of relations with Britain. While the Istiqlalists maintained
that the enemy was Britain and that the political struggle should be
directed against it, the Mufti, for the considerations mentioned above, was
123adamant for concentrating all the national efforts against the Jews.
The Husseinis view of this problem was explained very clearly ly
Jamal al Husseini, perhaps the closest and most trusted of the Mufti*s advisers.
X2AIn an interview published in March 1931 in "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" when 
he was asked: "Do you not consider that we should aim all our efforts 
(Juhud) directly against British Imperialism?” He answered: "The Palestine 1234
121. In a letter to the Colonial Secretary 5.2.34 C.O. 733/253/37357.
122. The Hulah concession which was given to the Jews, and conflict about 
ownership of land in Safad sub-district. These two cases brought on 
Arab protests and complaints. C.O. 733/257/37356/2
123. See Darwaza Op-cit. pp. 109-110. See also N. Alush Op-Cit. pp. 77-78.
124. "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" 2.3.31.
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problem differs from the problem of its sister countries in that here we 
face two enemies. The Jewish danger is an immediate one and a permanent 
one and it concerns only Falestine, and no compromise is possible with it, 
absolutely. The Imperialist danger, on the other hand, is a more general 
one, as it concerns all the Arabs. It i3 also of a temporary nature, 
because the Imperialists claim that according to the Mandate system they 
are in our part of the world only for a limited period of time. Ue, 
therefore should aim all our efforts against the immediate and permanent 
danger which face3 us only. That does not mean that we should forget the 
danger of imperialism. Uhen we shall overcome the Zionist dang_r, w_, 
together with our Arab sister countries, will fight for the termination of 
the Mandates".
Jamal Ilusseini was also asked in the same interview about his views 
with regard to two problems which engaged then the Arab's attention:
(I) ' The Arab Union (or Treaty - "al Hilf *1 Arab!) as initiated
by lJuri Said and the Iraqi Government and
(II) The imperialist railway line between Baghdad and Haifa.
Two projects, which as was then well known, were supported by Britain 
as serving its interests in the Middle Bast. In both ca3e3 hi* an*w<_r3 
were that he favoured the plans as being useful to the Arabs.
Early in April 1931 "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" published a long article 
(in two parts)125 by its editor Munif al Husseini, "Why do we fear the 
Arab Union?" in which after mentioning the fact that the nationalist^ 
opposition in Iraq considered the project as a British union and not an 
Arab one, he \/ent on to say "prove to us that it is a real *.rab project and 
not one intended to guard the Baghdad railway and the imperial means of 
communication in the Middle East and we shall support it
125. "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" 1.“2.4.31.
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Tne project o: the Arab Union was very warmly defended by Emir
Shakib Arslan who published two articles and again criticised by
127Hunif al llasseini who answered him. The paper then sent its reporter
to interview the Ilufti about his views of the projected "Arab Union and
128published his following answer: "The Arab Union, and indeed a full
Arab unity, is the dream of evdry sincere Arab, and Palestine wants it 
and needs it more than any other Arab country. It is therefore, the duty 
of the Palestinians to support it and co-operate v/ith the other Arab 
countries towards its achievement. I do not thin!; that there are people 
who oppose the "Union" as such, but there are some who oppose it because 
they fear the intrigues around it. I do think that we have to be cautious, 
but that does not mean that we have to cease all work and freeze all 
efforts towards Lf, for fear that wa may be v.nrong. He have to continue to 
struggle cautiously but energetically towards the fulfilment of our aims.
I, therefore agree with the views of Shakib Arslan. I believe strongly 
in his judgement, and if he agrees to the Union we should believe in it
and support it as well".
The opposition papers blamed the Mufti all along, and were only too 
hhppy to do that, with the same criticism directed usually chainst them, 
with not less justice, namely that he followed a moderate policy which 
served British interests. I shall cite only a few examples. In September 
1930 "Falas tin" publishedreports of "The British influence over the Mufti". 1267*9
126. Ibid, 17.4.31 and 19.4.31.
127. Ibid, 22.4.31.
123. Ibid, 26.4.31.
a «« f-t.■?e occasion the well-knovm129. "Fa las tin" 19.9.30. The paper used on this occ conflicts
and accented strategem of Arab press m  its mtei. p ^ .and accepted scratc6uj nress. so that their readers
namely that of quoting from t h e ^ b'*u !bed aad known, while at the could read what they wanted to be pu£>li-neu ,
same time, they could not be blamed for this information.
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At the time of the Hosiers Congress, the "Mir»at al Sharq" commenting on
the fact that in his opening speech at the inaugurating ceremony the Hufti
130did not mention the British even once, wrote "Does this not prove once
again that the Mufti is directed and made to "dance" (move) by the
. 131Government?" and the same criticism was made once again - witn many 
similar one3 in between - in April 1935 ¿hat the liufti speaking at a 
national meeting in Jaffa, did not mention the British even once, thus 
showing who were his masters.
Using his vulnerability to that charge the Anti-Mufti papers, both
the Istiqlalists and the traditional opposition (liuareda) papers u^el to
criticise him for not following a more agressive policy against Britain.
That did not, however, prevent them from accusing the Hufti of being
involved in intrigues with Italy. In April 1935, 2 opposition papers
published a photostat of a letter130 32 written by Amir S. Arslan to the Uufti.
In the letter, Arslan advised the Mufti against relying on the British,
warning him that continuance of his Pro-British policy night lose him his
influence over the Palestinian .and other Arabs. Arslan referred to
negotiations which he had had with the Italians on the Arab question and*
encouraged the liufti to start a pro-Italian propaganda in the Arab
130. "Mir»at al Sharq" 21.12.31.
131. Falestia, 16.4.35. Few days later the "Falestin" even charged 
the «Mufti with requesting the Hafd party not to welcome Lord 
Brentford the British Home Secretary who intended to visit Egypt. 
"Falestin" 3.5.35. Jamal Husseini admitted it explaining that 
Lord Brentford was none other than Joynston Ilichs a well-know Arab 
supporter. "Al Jarniah al Arabiyya", 5.5.35.
132. The letter was dated 20.2.35. For a full text see "Falastin" and 
"al Jamiah al Islamiyya" 19.4.35. Arslan himself denied vehemently 
evervwriting this letter and accused Fahri Nashashibi of fabricating
the whole story. See Ahmad Sharabasi. Shakib, Arslan Cairo n.d. pp.33-34
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The publication of the letter aroused violent arguments in the Arab
press accompanied by mutual recriminations and accusations, and hoth
reflected and expressed the acute differences between the two main parties
following their formal constitution a short period before that.
At this stage, I shall review in short the subject of the establishment
133of Arab political parties in Palestine. As stated earlier the central 
division around which evolved the inter-Arab conflict was that between the 
Majlesiyyun (the Husseinis) and the Mu’aridum (The opposition headed by the 
Mashashibis). As a result, however, of an understanding reached at the 
7th Arab Congress in June 1923, the Arab Executive Committee - comprising 
representatives of both camps - was elected to supervise and direct the 
national movement. Though the power and influence were passing gradually 
to the hands of the Mufti following the 1929 disturbances, the formal 
leadership of the national movement was in the hands of the Arab Executive 
Secretariat headed by Musa Kazim.
T h e  S e c r e t a r i a t  o p p o se d  t h e  o r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  s e p a r a t e  p a r t i e s  a n d  w as
supported in this by the Mufti who preferred to appear as a national leader
rather than to be identified with one faction only. Thàs the Executive
opposed in 1930, the tentative unsuccessful efforts of some of the
134opposition elements to form themselves into political parties. Despite
all its inner rivalries, the Executive was kept together by the important
unifying influence of its President Musa Kazim. In March 1934, however,
Musa Kazim died, and the Executive, unable to elect a new President, and
torn by bitter inter-factional conflict, was virtually dissolved after
passing a resolution calling for the formation of political parties and
135
c o n v e n in g  t h e  8 t h  C o n g r e s s  a f t e r  6 m o n th s . 1345
133. See supra p. 50 For a full study of the subject see the Chapter 
“Political parties” in my wider work Op-Cit.
134. See footnote 42. For the Executive’s opposition, see the letters by 
the President Musa Kazim “Falastin" >2.3.30 and by the Vice-President 
Y Farraj Ibid 13.3.30.
135. See Falastin 13.8.34.
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The'ïstiqlal" party formed themselves es a political party already
in August 1932. 136 The second group to organise themselves were the
Uaslushibi Ilacaridin elements of the previous decade which constituted
themselves on 2nd December 1934 as "The national Defence Party" (Hizb
al D If a al f-atani). Their immediate aim was to destroy the Mufti's
influence and power among the Arabs and to discredit him with the Government.
The party had no influence over the youth and was never strong in numbers,
but it was influential as it was mainly composed of rich Arabs, important
land-owners, notables, most of the Arab Mayors and many high-ranking .
officials in the administration. Tho majority of the Arab Christians
137strongly supported and influenced the party.
In its relation with the Government, the National Defence party 
followed - on the whole - a moderate policy. On several occasions, however, 
and mainly for tactical reasons, wishing to embarra^o the liurti for his 
co-operation with the British, it advocated an extreme line.
The Ilusseinis, as a counterstep had, therefore, to organize themselves
too, and on 24.4.35, they constituted themselves into "The Palestine Arab
133Party" (al ui2b al Arab! al Folastini). The ti.ular heed of the party 
was Jamal al Ilusseini. It was, however, dominated by the llufti. 1367*
136. See footnote 81. _ IJash3shibi and Fahri Hashashibi as
137. The party's President was Mag - ^  former Vice-President of the
his righthand man. ¥. FaJ r3_prGSidsat, and Ilasan Cidhi Dajani and 
Arab Executive - a3 t^ ie ' three former secretaries of the Arab
Mugannam Kugannam, one o  ^ central Committee of the party
Executive - as secretaries* nayor of Nablus, A/sem Said,
included also Sulinan Bey ° ajlL(j xssa al Issa the editor of
the Mayor of Jaffa, Omar a organ. See "Falastin" 5.12.34.
"Falastin" which became the P Areial Aref Qp-Cit. p.413, Esco 
See also Darwaza Ui* _P* * - -
138.
Arab Movement Op-Cit. p.42. See also
_^cit. Pp- 477‘^3* ' Aarty to the II.C. 21.7.37. C.O. 733/331/75718/6.the memorandum of the ¿arcy
Por- a , nf the opening ceremony, the oath of party
th- description ution of the party see "al Janiah al Arabiyya"
allesiance and tho p.U 3. Aref al Aref Oo-Clt. P.41325.4.35. See also Darvaza 2fi=Si£ P 0n-Ctt."M^42.
Esco Op-Git. 475-77. M. Assai en T 3 \ ----See alto file "The Palestine Arab Party . I.o.A.
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The party's objectives were the achievement of Arab independence in
Palestine and resistance to the establishment of the Jewish National
Home. The party was the most influential in the country and its leader
139claimed that 70% of the Palestinian Arabs are behind it. It should be 
noted that the Vice-President of the party was the Roman Catholic Alfred 
Rock and that the party tried to strengthen its position among the 
Christian Communities. This was done in order to demonstrate Arab 
Moslem-Christian solidarity, and to show that the Husseinis were not Moslem 
fanatics and that not all Christians supported the opposition. The Mufti, 
in general, tried to court the friendship and co-operation of the 
Christians. He simply had to do that as he aspired to become the leader 
of all Palestinian Arabs and not only of the Moslems. Furthermore, as he 
was regarded, on the whole, as the leader of Moslems in particular, and as 
he was the President of the S.M.C., a body engaged directly and indirectly 
in activities such as raising funds for specific Islamic institutes, anti- 
missionary campaigns etc., he took special care not to be identified with 
anything savouring of "Anti-Christian" about it. From amongst the numerous 
incidents between Moslems and Christians during the years until 1937, no one 
as far as I could find out - was, or could be linked, with the Mufti. On 
the contrary, he always sought to cultivate the Christian's goodwill.
On 18th Ji ne 1935, "The Reform Party" (Hizb al Islah) was formed around 
Br. Hussain Khalidi, who from being hitherto in opposition to the Mufti, 
changed sides and in the 1934 mayoralty elections in Jerusalem, and assisted 
by the Jewish vote, defeated R. Nashashibi causing him the most severe 
setback of the latter's whole career. The party was a family affair of the 139
139. See Wanchope's letter to Macdonald 25.7.35, C.O. 377/275/75102. See 
also Assaf Op-Cit. p.39.
323
wealthy Khalidi clan of Jerusalem supported by some mayors, notables and
140Government employees.
Another unimportant party was the "Congress Executive of Arab Youth 
(Lugnat Muutamar al Shabab al Arabi)*^* which was established in 1932 as 
a non-political organisation at the service of the Arab Executive. However, 
after the establishment of the other political parties, it was reduced in 
numbers and became a personally financed instrument of its leader Yacoub 
Ghussein the son of (perhaps) the richest Arab in Palestine. Its policy 
was opportunist, following at one time the Mufti, at another Nashashibi, 
according to the whims of its leader.
Even less important was "The Nationalist Bloc" (Hizb al Kutla al 
Uataniyya) established in 4th October 1935 by Abdul Latif Bey Salah, a 
former member of the S.M.C. The party's function was to give expression 
to the loca^ parochial spirit of Nablus and to give a national standing to 
its President.
143The Palestine Communist party (P.C.P) had almost no Arab members,
but with its extreme anti-Zionist and anti-British line it influenced the
144spread of the extreme ideas and views in Arab society.
Now the organization of these parties (except the P.C.P) was rather 
loose and wa3 based on the family ties and as for their platforms there 
really was no essential difference between the declared objectives of the 
parties except for the extreme anti-British policy of the Istiqlal party, 
which boycotted the negotiations concerning the question of the Legislative 14023
140. See "Fahstin" 19.6.35. See also Darwaza Op-Cit. p.118 Esco Op-Cft. 
p.480. Assaf Op-Cit. pp. 43-44. See also the Memorandum of the Party 
to the H.C. 20.10.35 and file no.3661 "The Reform Party" I.S.A.
141. See Darwaza Op-Cit. p.118. Esco Op-Cit p.730. Assaf Op-Cit. p.47
142. See sources of footnote 141.
143. Though, in accordance to a decision of the 7th Congress of the Cominstern, 
the majority of its central committee x?ere Arabs. See Esco Op-Cit.
p.781.
144. Mainly through the left wing part of the Istiqlal party headed by 
Hami al Husseini. See infra p. 348
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Council.
The Mufti, on the other hand, championed these talks all through 
1934 and 1935 and continued consistently to develop his special 
relationship with Wanchope.
Towards early 1936, however, conditions changed, pressures grew and 
the Arab rebellion was approaching. The co-operation between the H.C. and 
the Mufti had to give way and come to an end.
r
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Chapter 15
The concept of "Armed Struggle11 and the problem of Jewish Arms.
The political struggle of the Palestinian Arabs was marked from its 
beginning by a violent undertone which found its expression in the riots m  
1920 and 1921 and to a larger extent in the disturbances of 1929. In 
years to come, following the rebellion of 1936, it was described as the 
"Armed Struggle". Its ideology - so far as it had one - was very simple 
and basically echoed the old slogan "The Religion of Muhammad - by the 
Sword" (Din Muhammad bil Saif). The idea was that exerting pressure on 
Britain, by using violent means would be the best and most useful met - 
of making her change her Zionist policy. It also reflected tae tr 
supremacy - in Moslem and Arab societies - of the sword over the pe 
other means of persuasion. Its champions were people whose bas 
profession was violence and who were outside the traditional cir 
those who constituted the recognised national movement anu its leader , 
who repeatedly emphasized that the struggle of the Palestinian Arabs was 
of a political character, a peaceful one, and using only legal means.
The view that "sovui¿ignty is acquired by force and power and by viole 
may have seemed too abstract to the majority of the Armed utrug^ 
champions, but one lesson which they - together with all Palestine - uenvud
from the 1929 disturbances, was that violence pays. The disturbances broucat
, iicg th.6 SalUCthe Arabs some"dividends", they reasoned, so why not continue t
methods in order to get more results. The result of this line
was that all over the country mmours were prevalent that armed banns
would be formed to continue the national struggle, and the question of
organizing such bands was discussed widely. The first one to
was the "8afad Gang"1 which operated in Upper Galilee mainly around Safad.
1. The information is based on a despatch of the High Commissioner Sir ^
J. Chancellor to the Colonial Secretary Lord Passfield on 
see File "Safad Gangs" C.O. 733/190/77171.
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Later it came to be known as the "Green Hand Gang". The idea of its organisers 
was that once this gang and its operations proved successful, a number of other 
bands might be formed in the Nablus area and in the area lying across the 
Jerusalem-Jaffa road and the Jerusalem-Jericho road and around Hebron. The 
band started to operate in the inaccessible parts of Upper Galilee where the 
country is broken and rocky and facilitated its movement and concealment, while 
hampering the operation of the organized forces.
Its hard core consisted of 27 persons who had already participated in the 
disturbances in Safad and fled the town. Their leader was Ahmad Tafesh (who 
fled to Transjordan where he was arrested on 27 January 1930, extradited and 
sentenced for life.) Later they were joined by a number of outlawed Bruze^ 
from Syria who had participated in the Druze rebellion. The band continued 
to grow until at one time it was as much as 80 strong though the police 
estimated it at hot more than 25 armed men. The gang sent messengers to 
Jaffa to collect funds and to assist in organizing more bands. These 
messengers were caught, however, by the police and on information received 
from them, the gang was eventually broken up. It operated from September 
1929 until February 1930 and had some small successful skirmishes. Still, 
only combined operations by the Army, the Transjordan Frontier Force, the 
Police and some assistance from French troops who patrolled the Syrian frontier 
succeeded in breaking it up.
The Jews described its members as brigands. In the eyes of the law 
they were escaped criminals, fugitives from Justice. There is no doubt that 
many among them - if not the majority - were absconded offenders, bad 
characters and riff-raff of the villages in the area in which the band had 
operated who attached themselves to the band in order to spoil and pillage or 
to settle private accounts, or even to be able to enjoy the hospitality - 
many times perhaps an enforced one — of the villages •
Be that as it may, the criterion for a national act is whether the
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people end their opponents consider it to be so, which in this case they did.
Whether the doer is moved by sincere noble ideas or by base selfisn motives
is of secondary importance in the context of our study.
Even the Government did not consider them as primarily highway robbers
and described them thus : "They have nothing to hope for and little to lose
and they have been used as tools by disaffected politicians in order to create
a state of anarchy in the belief that any change which might arise out of
it would be better than the existing state of affairs".
There is no direct evidence to link any of the known important Arab
leaders with the activities of the gang. Rumours, however, circulated
among the Jews^ that both Subhial Khadrau (who himself was from Safad and
4was active there during the 1929 disturbances) and Rashid uaj Ibranim
assisted them. The Arab press praised and encouraged them indirectly
and the villagers in the area in which the band was operating were sympathetici
towards them though it should be added that if sympathy was lacking, 
intimidation was successfully resorted to. Their aim was to create an 
atmosphere of unrest in order to encourage the extreme Arab nationalists, 
frighten the Jews and discredit the authorities. Another more immediate 
aim was to intimidate the prosecution witnesses in the series of trials 
of the riot offenders, many of whom were committed on capital charges.
The success, though limited, of the Green Hand Gang could serve as 
an example and perhaps as an omen for the future. In case of a future 
renewal of disturbances this method of fighting the Government would be 
resorted to on a considerable scale. 234
2. Ibid
3. The Jewish daily "Doar Hayom" 28.8.1930.
4. Subhial Kliadra was one of the Mufti's chief assistants in the 1929 
disturbances. Later he and Rashid Ilaj Ibrahim were from among the 7 founders 
of the Istiglal party. For biographical note see file "Who is Who" in 
Arab Palestine. C.O. 733/248/17693. See also biographical note lay 1946
8/8 The H.A.
Ko other big bands were formed at the time, but individuals and 
small groups were active in armed violence. on the nignt of 23 
September 1929 a Jewish guard was killed in an attack on Kfar Yeladim and 
on 7 November 1929 all the males at Kvutzat Muzra were stolen. An 
atmosphere of unrest spread all over Palestine.
These small groups were mainly organised in Haifa,centered around 
the Young Men's Moslem Association (Y.U.1I.A.) which also had branches 
in the neighbouring villages. The dedicated members from these groups, 
who were found suitable, joined then a secret terrorist organization 
called the "Slackhand". The leader and the moving spirit of the 
organization was a political refugee front Syria named Sheikh Iz::-al 
Din al Kassam, an extreme Arab nationalist who enjoyed a wide reputation 
as a preacher and religious leader.
5From evidence given years later in court , we learn that the members
r
were initiated to the secret organization through the Y.M.M.A. after a 
ceremony in which they had to take the following oath : "1 swear by the
holy Koran that I shall not betray the organization or disclose its 
secrets Co anyone, I swear that I shall submit to all its orders of my ovu 
free will”. Each member was addressed as Sheikh and grew a beard. During 
their meetings they discussed the revolt and killing of Jews mentioning 
the Siiying ”The religion of Muhammad by the sword”. Their activities, 
however, started only later.
Another aspect of the problem which engaged the attention of the Arab 
Katioual Movement in Palestine during the early thirties was the problem of 
the arming of the Jews. A self-evident fact of the disturbances of 1923 
was that it was possible for the Arabs to get easy victories in places 
the Jews were not armed such as Hebron and *?afad. Tne lesson 5
5. By the witness Taha Ahmed in the Kahalal murder case. Haaretz 2St29.9.1933 
For more particulars on the Kassam organization at it3 earliest stage see 
History of Hagana Op Cit.451 and see also Darvaza 29 Op Cit p.119-120 and 
H. Subhi Yassin The Great Arab Rebellion (al Thawara al Arabiyya al kubra) 
no date. Egypt p. 12.
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to the Jews was that they should try and arm themselves; the lesson to 
the Arabs was that they should try and prevent this.
Jewish endeavours to arm6 78910themselves proceeded both legally, namely by 
getting arms from the Government, and through illegal channels.
Already on 7.11.29, 3 months after the disturbances, the French 
authorities in Beirut arrested two Jews and confiscated a large quantity of 
firearms which they had tried to smuggle into Palestine.^
Again, on 15.3.1930, the Department of Customs in Haifa confiscated a
g
quantity of smuggled arms for the Jews.
All Arab papers reacted immediately. "Miraat al Slxarq" wrote an 
editorial "as against the arming of the Jews we have to arm ourselves".
"Falastin" asked in its editorial*0 "Are we to ignore the Jewish 
Arming,if two cases were discovered how many such Jewish attempts passed 
undetected ?". The paper demanded that the Government should stop all 
arming by the'Jews. And in another article** it asked : "Are the 
Jew3 preparing another wave of disturbances as in 1929"?
The press campaign was accompanied by a stream of protests to the II.C. 
and the Government expressing the Arabs' apprehension that "the Jews 
have been, and still are, actually engaged in smuggling firearms to Palestine 
with a view to the arming of Jewish youth and forming semi-military 
organizations".
6. This subject is described thoroughly in the "History of the Hagana" 
Op-Cit chapter 30. "The supply of arms to the Hagana through the 
early thirties pp. 531-548.
7. "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" 10.11.1929. The "History of the Hagana" p.531.
8. "Falastin" 17.3.1930. The arms included about 150 guns and a large 
quantity of ammunition. For full story see "History of the Hagana"
Op Cit p. 535.
9. "tliraat al Sharq"26.3.1930. At the time, the paper was edited by 
Abram Zuaiter and followed a more extreme line than usual.
10. "Falastin" 20.3.1930.
11. Ibid 28.3.1930.
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As against this, the protests usually emphasized the Arabs' will for
peace. For example, "the Arab Women's Executive takes leave to assure you
that their only object is to see peace and order maintained in this country
12and to ensure that no blood be shed in future".
But at the same time, those other extreme Arab elements continued
their preparations and employment of violence so that Arab activities in
this respect took place on two levels. The recognized Arab leadership,
Arab politicians and organizations and the press concentrated their
efforts mainly against the arming of the Jews and preaching and calling
abstractly on Arab youth to regain the spirit of heroism and sacrifice,
while the extreme elments, whom I shall describe hence forward as
"terrorist groups", continued their illegal underground activities. If
there was any connection between the two, it was well hidden.
On 4.1.1930, a painted black hand was found in Tel-Aviv with unreadable 
13Arab script . 1 Jewish papers of early January 1930 expressed their fear
14of continued Arab arming and preparations for attacking the Jews 
Towards the end of the month, a Jewish farm was attacked by Arabs in Upper 
Galilee, 2 Jewish drivers were beaten in Nablus, and 3 Arabs from the 
village Colonia near Jerusalem attacked and beat a Jew from llotza, a 
witness in the Maklef murder case (a cruel murder of a Jewish family in 
Motza by Arabs from the neighbouring Arab village of Colonia during the 
1929 disturbances).
In early February, Arab labourers working on a construction site in 
the centre of the Jewish part of Jerusalem were heard singing for several days
12. See for example the protest by the Moslem Society in Haifa - "al Jamiah
al Arabiyya 20.3.1930. The protest of the Executive Committee of 
Palestine Arab Women's Congress Ibid. Also see M. Kugannam "The Arab 
Women" Op Cit p. 80. ~
13. "Doar Kayora" 5.1.1930.
14. ibid 6.1.1930. 10.1.1930. "Haaretz" 9.1.1930.
I;
\
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"As long as the Mufti lives we shall not fear evil, let us collect our guns,
15f- the Jewish girls and slaughter all Zionists"
In May, when the news reached Palestine that the Arab Delegation to
London had broken its discussions with the British Government***, tension rose.
The II.C. issued instructions for the troops and police to take special
precautions in order to prevent demonstrations on 16 May*^ and asked the
Colonial Secretary if there was any public announcement that could be made
ISon behalf of the Government that would ease the situation .
Towards June 1S30, French intelligence sources reported to the British
that the Arabs contemplated further disturbances and that large bands of
Arabs were advancing from Transjordan to attack the Jewish Colonies. Similar
19reports were received from the Jewish Agency . Tension rose sharply after
20the execution of the 3 martyrs in Acre prison on 17.6.1930.
21Jewish sources considered , however, that as long as the Arabs thoughtr
that they were winning on the political front they would refrain from using
terror and violence. The II.C. also informed the Colonial Secretary that the
members of the Arab Delegation who returned from London visited him on 27.6.1930
and assured him that the rumours about further disturbances by the Arabs
were absolutely unfounded and expressed their strong desire to cooperate with
22the British Government.
23'A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya' commenting on this meeting said that when the
K.C. informed the Arab leaders of the rumours about impending Arab disturbances 156789203
15. "Doar Hayom" 8.2.1936.
16. See supra _ «2
17. Which was declared "The Palestine Day" by the India Moslems. The Arab 
Delegation to London cabled the Executive bureau in Jerusalem to hold 
on in demonstrations all over Palestine. Ibid.
18. In a cable 14.5.1930. C.O. 733/188/77120/A.
19. Ibid.
20. Following the 1929 disturbances, 16 Arabs were sentenced to death. After 
an impressive Arab effort, the death sentences of 13 Arabs were commuted to 
life. 3 however were hung. From their death cell they sent their legacy 
saying that the struggle for freedom and independence of Palestine should 
continue until victory, and counselling the Arab people not to have faith 
in foreigners and their policies, "al Jamiah al Arabiyya". 2.7.1930.
21. The History of the Hagana Op Cit p. 451.
22. See supra p. SV
23. "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya"5.7.1930.
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it cane to them as a total surprise. "These rumours must be Jewish 
devices to cover up their own preparations for new disturbances".
The Arab press meanwhile was sounding the alarm against the increase 
of Jewish armed strength.
24"A1 Jamiah al Arabiyya" published an article on the growing numbers
of Jews in the police force where they all received military training.
Another article was published in 'Falastin"on "Brit Trumpeldor and the
25secret Jewish army" of the extreme Revisionist Jews". And, summing up
26in its enlarged version of the New Year issue , the seven most important 
developments during the year 1930 "Falastin" counted the arming of the Jews 
as one of them.
About the middle of March 1931, as a result of the Prime Minister's 
27letter to Dr. Weizmann , it was reported that the "Arab Nationalist 
Terrorist Committee" had been revived and had started to send threatening 
letters to both ,Jews and Arabs who were considered to favour an Arab-Jewish 
rapprochment, and to Arabs who failed to carry out the Executive's appeal 
for a boycott.
On 20.3. 1931, the Colonial Secretary, on the basis of information
28received from a certain Jew , advised the H.C. of the possibility of 
disturbances which might arise at Easter. 245678
24. Ibid 10.2.1930.
25. 'Fa las till'30.8.1930.
26. "Falastiu"30.12.1930.
27. See note prepared on the situation in Palestine in the light of 
information received from secret sources. June 1931. CO. 733/204/87156.
28. Captain Alex Aaranson, who had served in British Intelligence during the 
first World War, who informed his 2 M.P. friends that "massacres on a 
large and terrible scale are being prepared" both against Jews and British. 
It seems that he was not thought highly of either by the Jewish Agency
or by the H.C. still the H.C. took all necessary precautions during the 
Nebi Musa festival, Ibid.
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On the night of 5.4.1931» a group of Jov* travelling in s. cart on 
their way hack to their settlement at Tsjour, was attacked by armed persons,
3 were killed an 4 veto seriously injured,
' 29In a very interesting oemaremkaa dated S May 1931, Hr. barker ,
analysing the murder, reached the conclusion "that the killers were
determined men intent on the business of killing Jews, who belonged to a
gang acting under the direction of a political organisation as did Che
Green Hand Gang which «* as has been definitely established - was organised
inby political extremists." Barker went on to write "Three killed and 
four wounded ... these casualties were inflicted by rifle fire fro» about 
eight rounds, probably not more than nine, fired at point blank range.
This fact not only illustrates the intensity of the hatred in the minus of 
the firers, but the calm, skillful handling of the weapons, Not & single 
shot hit the animals or the cart. Were not the weapons then in ther
¡winds of persons trained in the use of arms? ...” From which wo m y  
learn something about the motive« and the training of the killers.
Barker wea convinced that the heeds of the Y.M.K.A. (Young Men's 
Moslem Association) in Haifa had definite detailed information concerning the
31crime end he asked for authority to give a large financial reword to e certain 
informer who would give (1) full details of the political murder gangs 
organised by the Y.M.M.A, Haifa and (2) full details of the political murder 
gangs organised throughout the country. The murderers, however, were not
found. 29301
29. Mr. Barker was the Deputy District Superintendent of Bailee C.I.D. 
for cue Memorandum see C.o. 733/2G4/S71S6.
30. Hypothesis which was accepted by Mr. Young the G.A.C., see his letter 
to the Colonial Secretary 30.3.1931. Ibid
31. 11« had in mind Kami Am, the Executive leader oi YJK.H.A. Haifa, who 
apparently was ready to cooperate with the C.l.D, Ibid.
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In a well balanced appreciation of the political situation in 
Palestine, prepared in the Colonial Office, it was noted that a more or 
less organized campaign of incitement to violence against the Jews and 
the Palestine Government started during the summer of 1929, which had taken 
the form of (1) inflammatory journalism (2) public speeches (3) attempts 
at demonstrations and (4) strikes.
The paper stated that Nablus, which had always been a centre of
extreme Arab nationalism had become a focal point for concentrated
expressions of Arab discontent and hostility to British rule. The paper
concluded that there were indications that the initiative - political and
other - was passing from the hands of the Arab "moderates" who so far had
controlled the Arab Executive, into those of the extremists who, for
attaining the same ends, advocated the use of other means such as relying
on agitation and threats of violence (possibly on the actual preparation for
violent measures) rather than on argument, deputations, appeals to the
32League of Nations etc.
The paper also mentioned the many rumours as to the organization, 
by both Arabs and Jews, of secret caches of illicit arms and the Jewish 
complaints against the Government permit for the Nablus Congress and similar 
gatherings. 32
32. The paper was written by Williams 3.9.1931 C.O. 733/204/87156/1. One 
cannot help being impressed by this paper especially in comparison with 
one other Intelligence appreciation paper dated 21.5.1931 and titled, 
"The Pan Islamic Arab Revolutionary Movement" in the same file.
This paper, misreading perhaps the preparations for the Moslem Congress, 
discussed - with all seriousness - a plan by Amir Shakib Arslaan, 
together with the Mufti, Shaukat Ali and other Arab leaders, to deliver 
the Arabs and Moslems from European rule, by a general revolt in which 
all Arabs would participate and which would be assisted by the Turks 
Afghans, the Amir of Muscat, Egypt etc. Ibid.
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This Nablus Congress was called to protest against the Government's
arming of the Jews and against sealed armouries in the Jewish Colonies.
33One of the recommendations of Sir 1-1. Dowbiggin was that the Government
should maintain in the Jewish Colonies sealed armouries to be opened only
in cases of direct attacks against these colonies.
The Congress was preceded by some of the most extreme articles in
the press. The Istiqlalist paper 'A1 ilayat' came out with a long 
34editorial g "Oh Arabs. Your enemies are arming themselves. What are
you waiting for ?", to be followed by the Husseinite paper, *A1 Jamiah
35al Arabiyya' in its article "the Sealed Armories", which was of such
inflammatory character that the paper was suspended for a month and his
editor Munif al Husseini was cautioned personally by the Chief Secretary,
Mr. M. Young. However, in its first issue after its re-appearance, it
36published an article "The Nablus Congress and the arms for the Jewish 
Colonies" in which it praised the Congress for "tackling this most dangerous 3456
33. Sir II. Dowbiggin was appointed by the Colonial Secretary early in 1930 
to carry out an inquiry into the reorganization of the Palestine Police 
as was recommended by the Shaw Commission. Ills excellent report served 
as the basis of the working of the Palestine Police during the thirties. 
For his inquiry and report see file C.O. 733/180/77015. The armories 
contained only "Gruners" defensive shotguns with effective range of about 
100 yards only. The problem of getting these guns turned out to be a 
complicated one. Supply from Britain would have taken a long time and 
the Palestinian authorities, needing them urgently, requested them from 
Egyptian Government. Negotiations had to be secret and delicate in view 
of the sympathy of the Egyptian public to the Palestinian Arabs. See file 
"Jewish Colonies Armories" C.O. 733/209/87353.
34. "Al Ilayat" - 29.6.1931.
35. "Al Jaaiah al Arabiyya" 3.7.1931.
36. Ibid 2.8.1931.
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problem", which should have been tackled by the Arab Executive "this body 
in an advanced stage of dissolution which does nothing besides sending
petitions and protests to the Government".
37The Congress was held at Nablus on 31.7.1931 attended by about 
300 delegates from every part of Palestine mostly young Arab politicians, 
supporters of the Kusseinis and the Istiqlal party. It was opened by 
Jalal Kassem from Nablus, who set the tone in a very exciting speech, in 
which he pointed to the British Government as the "chief enemy of the 
Arabs" and stated that "the nation expects us to act and not to talk".
Sheikh Muzaffar proposed non-payment of taxes. Fasluni Aboushi from 
Jenin, who was elected as the Chairman of the Congress proclaimed, "either 
we should be ready to sacrifice everything for our country or we should leave 
it" (Ama al tadhiyya fi sabil al Bilad ou al rahil an al bilad).
One delegate from Hebron, apparently Sheikh Sabri Abdin, proposed
38to form armed gangs to fight both the Jews and the British.
A heated argument started as to whether to send or not to send a 
delegation to complain and protest to the Ii.S on the arming of the Jewish 
colonies. Sheikh Muzaffar and Munif al Husseini, the editor of "al Jamia’a 
al Arabiyya" were in favour, while Jamil Kassem and Akram Zuaitar, who had 
the upper hand, were against. The main resolution passed at the Congress 
was to hold demonstrations all over Palestine on 15.8.1931 against the 
arming of the Jewish Colonies.
However, another important resolution to form a committee, composed of 
Jamal Kassem, Dr. Sidki Milham and Wasef Kamel, in order to buy arms for the 
Arabs, was not published. 378
37. For a full description of the Congress and its resolutions see Ibid.
38. The History of the Ilagana Op Cit p.44o
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The significance of the Nablus Congress lay in its extreme radical nature.
It was dominated by the young ("skabab") who from that time started gradually
to gain a growing share in the direction of the Arab national movement in Palestine.
It affected to a considerable measure the tone and character of the discussions
and resolutions of both the Arab Executive meeting of 17.8.1931 and the Nablus
assembly of 20.9.31 which followed it. Furthermore, it basically challenged
the fundamental concept of the "political struggle" as held by the official
recognised leadership, and secretly advocated the idea of "Armed struggle",
The resolutions of the Congress were repeated in the Arab and Jewish
press thus intensifying the apprehension of the public who feared a prolonged
strike which might result in disturbances. The Government issued on 6.8.1931
39an official communique with a view of counteracting the effects of distorted 
descriptions of the Government action as regards the "sealed armories".
On 5.8.1931 the Chief Secretary met the Arab editors and cautioned them 
against publication of material which was likely to lead to breaches of the peaceW . 
The Arab papers, protesting that they were prevented from publishing news which were 
of interest to the public, decided to strike and not to appear during the 
period 10 - 18.8.1931.
The Government also did not permit the proposed demonstration on 15.8.1S31
41and on the whole the strike was peaceful.
The Nablus Congress caused a lot of excitement in Arab circles. It \vas 
supported by the Uusseini's paper 'al Jamiah al Arabiyya' and by the Istiqlalist's 
paper 'al Hayat'. But 'Falastin' and the other opposition papers were 3940*
39. Official Communique 6.8.1931. "Falastin" 7.8.1931.
40. "Falastin" 6.8.1931.
. See cable from H.C. to Colonial Secretary 17.8.1931 C.O. 733/209/87353.41
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against it. It had, as mentioned above, a strong impact on the
discussions of the Arab Executive Committee's meetings of 16.8.1931 and
4317.8.1931 to which it sent two representatives. The Executive resented
the fact that it was pushed by the Nablus Congress, but pushed it was, and
44this was reflected by the extreme decisions it resolved. It published 
a manifesto to the Arab people calling on them to hold a general strike and 
to demonstrate on 23.8.1931 in order to convey to the Government the nation's 
indignation at the arming of the Jewish Colonies.
43The demonstration on 23.8.1931 was not permitted eitiier. In Jerusalem,
the members of the Arab Executive Committee met and marched in a demonstration
4 3to the Government's Office . They were stopped by armed police and after
exchange of heated words mainly between Jamal Husseiniand the Police Officer
a delegation of 10 members headed by Musa Kasim were allowed to proceed and
present their protest while the rest of the members waited for them in the
street. In Nablu3 ther<? were attempts to defy the Government's prohibition.
The people marched shouting "down with the Mandate, Long live Arab independence".
The police, assisted by troops, promptly suppressed the demonstrations and 3
47people were arrested.
In the rest of the country the day passed off without any serious incident.
43"A1 Hayat" in its long editorial "Why do we strike" explained that the strike 423567*
42
42. 'Iliraat al Sharq' even used the regional and local aspect of Palestine 
politics by stating that Nablus made with this Congress a bid to transfer 
tue centre of the national movement from Jerusalem to itself. "Falastin" 
wrote that none of the first class Arab leaders attended the Nablus 
Congress and that important national decisions should be resolved in the 
Arab Executive. "Falastin" 2.8.1931.
43. For the discussions and resolutions of these meetings see Supra pp. 197-199
44. "Al Janiah al Arabiyya" 20.3.1931.
45. Though a delegation of the Arab Executive met the H.C. on 22.8.1931 in an 
effort to get a permit. Ibid. 22.8.1931.
46. For a full description of the demonstration see Ibid 25.8.1931. See also 
3797:65 I.S.A.
47. Jamal Kasem, one of the Nablus Congress organizers, Dr. Sidqi Milham, who
during the revolt 1936-39 became famous as the doctor of the rebels and 
Sheikh Abdin from Hebron. For a biography of hr. Sidqi Milham see file 580 
The 1I.A. 48< ,,A1 Eayat., 23.8.1931.
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symbolized the nation's resolve to fight until it would achieve its freedom 
and independence.
The members of the Arab Executive bureau travelled on 26.8.1931 to
Nablus "to demonstrate their appreciation for the noble and leading stand
it took with regard to the problem of the arming of the Jews and to identify
49themselves with the courageous people of Nablus and the detainees".
Another resolution of the Arab Executive Committee meeting of 17.8.1931 
was that a general assembly should be held at Nablus on 20.9.1931, Accordingly,
on the appointed date, the assembly, attended by about 200 persons, was
jQopened under the presidency of Musa Kazera at 11.0 a.tu. and concluded at 2 p.m.
The opposition elements abstained from participating in the assembly. They, 
anyway, were not wanted there and only a very small number of tickets was 
issued to them. There was a thorough check of the cards and the uninvited 
and suspect persons were turned out."*^  Izzat Darwaza welcomed the .V
delegations in the name of Nablus. A 2 minutes silence was observed in 
memory of Omar al Mukhtar, the Tripolitanian national leader executed by 
the Italians. Sheikh Muzaffar in his speech referred to the Arab national 
movement in Palestine as moving between the ebb and the flow. linen the 
1929 events took place, the cause of the country was revived, but the tide 
abated and "energy fell in sound sleep" until Nablus woke it up by its great 49*51
49. "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" 26.8.1931.
•50. For a full description of the Nablus assembly, its discussions and 
resolutions see Ibid. 21.9.1931.
51. It seems that the organizers tried and succeeded partly - a very unusual 
thing in Arab Palestine - to keep the discussions secret. Hr. Barker, 
the Deputy Commandant of the C.I.D* finished his repctt on the Congress 
thus: "it is reported that secret deliberations took place between the
leaders during lunch, but great secrecy is being observed in this regard. 
Efforts to obtain details are being made". See Police Daily 
Intelligence summary No. 221 of 21.9.1931 F.O. 371/15333.
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example of sacrifice. He finished by declaring "let them (i.e. the 
imperialists) put to death whomever they wish, nevertheless the Arab nation 
wants to live" and by calling for strong leadership. The central speech 
of the assembly was given by Jamal Eusseini. In it, he summarized the 
political situation in Palestine since the British occupation and sharply 
criticized British policy, which ignored the pro-Arab recommendations of all 
its ox/n commissions.
He then urged the members of the assembly to adopt one of the following 
two ways. "Either to follow theoretically a passive and practically a 
positive policy, as the one adopted by Egypt; or, to follow a negative 
policy theoretically and practically as the one adopted by India".
He was followed by Rashid Ilaj Ibrahim who referred to Jamal al 
Husseini's motion and pointed out that the Government had never fulfilled 
any of their demands. Colonizing powers could only be moved to action when 
compelled to do so. 'The rulers were strong and the subjugated nations weak, 
forceful opposition was not therefore possible. He suggested the example 
of India and Gaandi, and the boycott of foreign goods. Protests were 
unavailing.
Jamal Husseini proposed the resolutions and after long discussions
52
and modifications they were unanimously approved. The first resolution was :
11 (a) So long as the British Government governs the country in a direct
manner every Arab effort to cooperation with Government is bound to fail. 
This has been proved during the past 13 years. The Arab Executive and 
other representative bodies should not negotiate with Government except 
on the basis of independence within an Arab unity or on matters, 
whether economic or political, which are likely to lead to this 
independence."
52. The other resolutions were
(b) About half of the revenues of Government are derived from Customs
dues. The boycott of all goods imported through Customs is therefore 
necessary. The people should further be called upon to boycott, 
where possible, whatever gives revenue to Government such as tobacco, 
to abstain from the use of telegraphs for congratulatory or otner 
messages, and, as far as possible, to abstain from the use of telephones. 
3y this means, Jewish merchandise and European goods can be boycotted 
and local industries encouraged. A Committee to lay down a programme 
should be elected. (It is understood that a great deal of difference
arose over the selection of the members for the Committee).
(c) In view of the repeated declarations of Zionists respecting their
desire to come to an understanding with the Arabs, the latter once
more declare that so long as the Zionists persist in following a policy, 
which is not in accord with the Arab national and political aspirations, 
no understanding between these two parties is possible.
(d) The assembly calls upon young men to hold a conference for the 
purpose of organizing their ranks and carrying out these resolutions.
The young men should realize that this is a trust placed in their 
lianas .
Ladies should be appealed to to abstain from wearing European 
dresses.
(e) The Arabs should in future direct all their propaganda to the East 
and the Arab world. As guardians of the Holy Places, the Arabs can find 
no better supporter than the Islamic world,
(f) To declare disgust at tue treatment of prisoners and of the press, 
to work for Arab unity and the formation of a committee under Haj Amin for 
this purpose, to form a company for the purchase of lands, to greet
Arab prisoners etc.
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The members present took then the following oath 
"We swear by God to support the National Funa and work for its success, to 
boycott commission agents, traitors and spies with all our power and not 
to sell our lands to the Jews".
The assembly also elected a special group of the following persons 
who gave an oath as to their fidelity in serving the national cause :
Adel Zueitar, Jamal al Husseini, Auni ,abd al Hadi, Faniui al Abbousai, 
Sheikh Muzaffar. What was not published in the papers was that this 
group met during lunch and after the assembly was closeu, they had a short 
secret meeting at which they decided to continue the mission given to 
Dr. Sidky Malhas, Jamal Kasem and Wasef Kamal which they could not complete 
as the first two were arrested. This mission was to buy arais for the 
Arabs.
The O.A.G. H.A. Young, reporting on the assembly to the Colonial
Secretary wrote : "It is not anticipated that the Nablus resolutions
will have any practical effect other than to create discussion amongst
54the Arab leauers".
As far as practical effects were concerned, he was perhaps right.
But the Nablus assembly resolutions were important in tae sense that while 
the Nablus Congress (of 31.7) resolutions - on which they were based - 
were passed by a congress dominated by the young (Snabab) these were passed 
by an assembly attended by the majority of the recognized official 
leadership of Arab-Palestine. By passing these resolutions (including the 
secret ones), tnis leadership endorsed also the concept of "the armed 
struggle". 534
53. Ibid. See also Report of Acting District Commissioner of Samaria. 21.9. 
Ibid.
54. Young to Thomas 26.9.1931. Ibid.
342
The competing concept of "the political struggle" was, by and Large, still 
the supreme one out it was not any more the only one as far as tue political 
thinking of the whole national movement as against the marginal extremists 
was concerned. Cut for the time being the "discussion"was increased. The 
opposition papers described the assembly as a party assembly aimed at
33serving tne interests of a party and not the national interests as a whole. 
"Sirat al llustakim" published a violent article by Kaiudi al Husseini 
against the Nablus assembly claiming that it was intended to obstruct the 
national aims of the Nablus Congress (of 31.7.31). It criticized the 
assembly's resolution for not going far enough. "Our slogan should be", 
he wrote, "No talks before evacuation". (La Kufawada ila band al Jala). 
Referring to the fact that many sincere nationalists were not invited to 
participate in the assembly, he criticized the politics of "personalities" 
and wrote that the Arabs should follow the proverà, "Do not consider whot'
said, consider what was said". (La tanzur ila minkala unzur ila ma kila).
57"Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" answered these articles and said that the best 
proof that the Nablus assembly was a national one, was that it was 
opposed by the Nashashibi opposition, by the Communists and by the Jews 
who were going also to oppose the intended Moslem Congress. 56*
55. "Falastin'22.9.1931.
56. It is interesting to note that the very radical llaradi husseini 
wrote regularly in the moderate opposition paper "birat al Mustakim". 
(The Istiqlalist Abram Zuaiter wrote also, and actually even edited 
for a while the"Miraat al Sharq1) . I could not find the issue of 
the paper in which this article was written, probably it was written 
between the 15-28.10.1931. I know of its context through the answer 
to it written as an editorial of "Jamiah al Arabiyya" 29.10.1931,
57 Ibid
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During the following IS months acts of violence were committed :- 
On 31.6.1931 a bomb exploded in the Geula Jewish quarter of Haifa 
and five Jews were wounded.
On 5.1.1932 3 bombs exploded in Jewish places in and around Haifa.
On 16.1.1931 a Jewish farmer was murdered in Balfouria in the Valley 
of Jesrael.
On 5.3.1932 a Jew was killed in Kfar Kasidim not far from Haifa.
On 30.4.1932 2 Jews from Kfar Yecheskel in Jesrael Valley were 
attacked and wounded.
On 22.12.32 a Jewish farmer and his young son from Nahalal were
murdered in what became known as the ‘Nahalal murder case'.
All these cases were committed by people who were connected with
53the Haifa secret organization , and there is no doubt as to the political 
motivation which caused them. The Arab lawyer defending the killers in the 
Nahalal case said in his defence speech, "This murder is the result of 
the bad policy of the Palestinian Government. It is a calamity that 
the accused used illegal means because of their opposition to the 
Government's policy .... They wrongfully thought that their religion 
ordered them to do so.^
During the same period, the following cases also took place 
On 28.6.1931 a young Jew and Jewess were killed on the seashore 
in what became known as "the Zohar and Stahl murder case". The 
discovery of their bodies was followed by an attempt by 2 Jews to murder 
an Arab in the same area. 589
58. As came to light in the trial of the two murderers of the Nahalal crime 
who were sentenced to death. "Haaretz" 7,12.1933. See also the 
Report about the Kassamian organization 8/3 The H.A. Following the 
trial Sheikh el Kassam and his secret organization ceased their 
activities temporarily.
59. "A1 Jatuiah al Arabiyya". 4.12.1933.
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On 3rd and 4th April 1932, in a period of 24 hours, a Jew and an 
Arab were killed in Jerusalem, The Arab, Azmi-al Aref (the cousin of
Aref al Aref) received a "national burial". In its obituary "A1
60Jamiah al Arabiyya" wrote "we mourn the pure blood of the martyr 
(Shaid)" and finished the article by repeating three times the phrase, 
"Palestine will be Arab and free".
On 9.5.1932 two Jews were robbed and beaten near Tulkarm.
On 8.6.1932 a body of a dead Jew was discovered near the road of 
Jer u s a 1 ern-Be tli 1 ehem.
A train carrying Jewish labourers working in Rutenberg's 
Electricity Co. in Nahariya left the lines after the railway was 
sabotaged during July 1932.
Shots were filed on the night of 1.9.1932 at a Jewish farm near 
Gedera.
On 23.2.1933 a Jewish guard was killed by Bedouin in Wadi 1
Hawareth.
The Arabs claimed that some, if least, of these crimes had other
61than political motivation ana should therefore be considered ordinary 
crimes. Theoretically they were right but in fact there were no ordinary 
inter-communal crimes in Palestine. By being inter-communal they 
immediately became political crimes. Describing the killing of the Jewish 
guard at Wadi Ilawareth, "al Jamiah al Islamiyya" wrote : "The Bedu
never meant to kill, he only had a stick, he was pressed, and he hit and *612
GO. Ibid. 10.4.1932.
61. The Jewess S. Zohar, for instance, was raped before being murdered.
62. "Al Jamiah al Islamiyya" 23.2.1932.
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Benjamin died. The man did not seek to kill, he sought only to save 
his own life".
To this list of crime arid violence should be added the dozens of
cases of what is known in the Iliddle East as "Agricultural or Agrarian
Crimes", namely burning and uprooting trees and forest, destroying and
damaging the crops in the fields, the wounding of cattle etc and also
the conflicts about ownership of land, evictions etc.
As for the campaign against Jewish arming, even Arab Colonies in
remote parts of the world participated in it.°"*
In August 1932, 3 Jews were caught in Jerusalem trying to buy arms
64from British policemen. Commenting on their trial "al Jamiah al 
Arabiyya" wrote a long editorial, "the Jews, tiieir arms and the Jewish 
Defence Force" in which it described in great detail the growth and 
increase of this force.
On the occasion of the anniversary of Ilittin, all the papers
1'mentioned the Arab victories during their days of glory "which no doubt
would be renewed". "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" published the speech of
65Sheikh llusaffar in which he said, "How tonlgnt resembles yesternight" 
(that is, the present to the past). "The Crusaders of the past are like 
the Imperialists of today. And if Sala-al-Din was alive today he would 
have certainly fought the 3ritish, French and Italians, but before that 
he would have fought the internal traitors who sell lands and cooperate 
with the enemy".
Commenting on an article written by the Jewish Revionist leader, 
Jabotinsky, in which he called for the creation of a Jewish Army, as without 634*
63. See, for emanrple, telegram of protest from the Arab Community in 
Tela, Honduras to the British Ambassador in Guatemala. 3.9.1932 C.O. 
733/209/87353.
64. Only one of them was sentenced to 3 months' imprisonment. "Al 
Jamiah al Arabiyya". 27.8. 1932.
Ibid 29.8.1932.65
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such an army the Balfour Declaration would not be fulfilled, "A1
66Jamiah al Arabiyya" said "ana vnat are we doing ? Should we not have
an Arab Army to see that the Balfour Declaration should not be fulfilled ?"
And the same question "What are we doing?" was posed in another article
"the Jewish Military Organizations" published some time later.6 7 68*70
The paper also published in full a speech by Sami Shawkat, the
Director General of Education in Iraq, in which he said that the Arabs
ought to learn the profession of killing (or profession of death -
Sina'at al Haut) because nations who do not know this profession die
dishonourable deaths. And the Editor, Hunif al Husseini auded : "if
learning the profession of killing is the duty of every Arab, it is much
more so for every Palestinian who has to fignt 2 enemies." °
Anu indeed, learning the profession of death and the concept of the
"armed struggle" got a further boost among the Arab public by the growing
activities of the more radical parties, the "Youth Congress" and specially
09the "Istiqlal" (Independence) party towards the end of 1932 and early 1333.
The C.I.D. periodical Appreciation summarizing this period,emphasized
continuously the extreme nature of these activities. In one report we
70found the following :
"The Arab Palestine Independence Party
The Istiqlal Party, which is the only active political body in 
Palestine at present, and which is so well merged in the pan-Arab 
movement, is showing signs of increased activity. Its cause Is 
apparently becoming more and more popular amongst young men, and
66. Ibiu. 7.3.1332. Jabotiuslcy's article was published in"Aaswesd', the 
Revisionist paper appearing in Paris, on 24.8.1332.
67. Ibid. 28.11.1332.
68. Ibid. IS.10.1332.
63. See Chapter 14.
70. See C.I.D. Summary rep'Ort the 6/33 of 18.2.1333. F .0.371/16926. See 
also report Do. 43/32 of 16.12.1332. Ibid,
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politicians who are not blinded by personal interest in the 
Kashashibi-Iiusseini conflict. Tne party leaders arc quietly, 
but diligently at work spreading their independence (extreme) 
doctrine and inculcating hatred in the minds of young men, 
students, teachers etc. with the ultimate object of organizing 
public opinion and paving the way for military activity under 
their own leadership.
They spread agitation against Government in every possible 
form, with the clear intention of arousing the people and directing 
hostility against Government. They speak of secret organizations 
and action, and maintain the closest relations with their colleagues 
in Trans-Jordan. They have in particular found a fertile ground 
for their anti-Government propaganda in Nablus.
The energy shown in the North in opening branches of the Y.M.M.A. 
in small villages is due to the activity of Rashid Kaj Ibrahim and 
Subhi el Khadra, and there is little doubt that the party aims at 
organising and assuming control over these associations,which would 
become a dangerous weapon in its hands. The increased interest of 
Arabs in sports and in independent Boy Scouts troops, as is 
witnessed in their frequent excursions and displays, with political 
manifestations, is clue to the spirit which the party is spreading.
It should be noted that the party includes a dangerous element who 
hold revolutionary views and are intent on militant activity and 
vho may in future prove a source of agitation and trouble."
I already pointed out that Rashid 11aj Ibrahim and Subui al Khadra 
were the two Arab leaders most connected with the terrorist groups and also 
the close relationship between the Y.H.M.A. and these groups. As for
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"Sport activities" and "Soy Scouts activities", these were the "formal 
cover" for para-military training both with the Jews and the Arabs.
The Palestine Communist Party (P.C.P.) though of very limited 
practical importance in Palestine Arab society, because of its very 
small number of members, most of whom were Jews anyhow, served it all 
the same as a source of thoughts and ideas, both directly and through 
tue lert wing p^ -rt of t^e Istiqlal party centred around I lamei al Ilusseini.
Its slogan "armed revolt" publicized end popularized the use of this
expression and it slowly became absorbed in general usage. And in 
general, reauiug tarough Arab announcements, declarations, speeches 
etc. of that time, one is struck by the increased use of warlike words 
suca as "struggle" (nidal, kipah), "holy war" (gihad), "battle" (maarakha), 
"revolt" (thawra), "war" and "fight" (Itarb) etc. This usage started with 
the extreme radical parties, but soon it became general.
In one of his typical speeches, for instance, Akrata Zueitar (who at
ti
the time was a school teacher in the nationalist school "Al llajah" in 
Nablus) addressed a meeting of "Khalid Ibn al Walid" - Boy Scouts organization 
in tae Sports Club of Nablus on 24.2.1933 (all meaningful names in the context 
of our subject). lie spoke^ of sacrifice and the need to boycott 
foreigners, he mentioned de Valera and Ghandi, ha commended military 
training and concluded by saying that he hoped to see the young Palestinians 
fighting for the independence of their country.
In a manifesto to the Arab people dated 21.3.33, the Arab Executive 
said : "Tae nation will not expect any good from the Government and its 
oppression. The nation will consider the Government as the enemy from
Jee C.I.D. summary report No. 8/33 of 10.3.1933 Ibid,71.
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which i t  must liberate itse lf through every legal means".
However« even the continuing emphasis which the Arab Executive used
to put on "the peaceful and legal" means of its struggle vent through a
slight but meaningful transformation. In its manifesto of 23.4.1933 calling
73the people to non-cooperation» the Arab Executive said ; "Whereas this
nation is oppressed but firm in its faith and does not possess the means
that would enable i t  to parry the harm and repel the transgression it »
except its firm unity and perseverance in its struggle through peaceful
and legal means» the Arab Executive Committee fervently appeals to a ll
the noble Arab nation . . . .  to enforce the recent decision of non-cooperation".
I t  followed therefore that once "this nation w ill possess the means
that would enable i t  to parry the harm and repel the transgression"» it
would use them rather than the "peaceful" and "legal" means.
The authorities» keeping an eye on developments amongst the Arabs»
noticed these changes and "got the message". In Government circles» the
discussions were not any more whether there would be an outbreak of
74Arab hostility but when this outbreak was going to occur.
And truly enough» on 13.10.1933» the short but very violent autumn 
riots of 1933 started.
After the riots were suppressed» the H.C. presented his Government 
with his appreciation of the situation» accompanied with memoranda by the 
military and police authorities on the same subject» as well as a memorandum 
by Musa al Alami.
They a ll stated the probability of future riots and use of violence. 7234
72
72. "Al Jamiah al Ielamiyya" 22.3.33.
73. "Falastin" 24.4.1933.
74. See note of discussion in the C.O. about the situation in Palestine
1.5.1933 C.O. 733/239/17356 P t.l. The Government, for reasons 
which I  shall explain later, was not worried.
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The H.C. wrote : "the liab ility  to further riots is greater* since 
instead of a reasonable measure of goodwill, there is now a general 
feeling of hostility".
76
Musa al Alami wrote : "the feeling now is decidedly anti-British. 
There is no moderate and no extremist in this regard. The only difference 
of opinion is that some people have no hope whatever in the British and wish 
to go to extremes to revenge their rights and deliver themselves; and others 
hope that as the days go by, Britain may recognize that the Arabs are 
better friends than the Jews and may thus change their policy. I t  should 
be nevertheless made clear that there are no Arabs who believe now in the 
Justice and fairness of the British and who expect a change of policy because 
of that sense of justice. The feeling is that pressure must be brought to 756
75
75. To the Colonial Secretary 18.12.1933 C.0.733/248/17700. However, the 
H.C. went on to express his confidence. He did not consider the 
disorders a threat to British rule "for three main reasons: firs t, 
because their character was purely political; second, because the 
fellaheen did not join in the riots; and third, because the leaders 
showed no powers of organization".
He considered that there were three main sources of Influence 
which bear on the Arab mind: religious, political and economic,
of which religious was by far the most important. He believed 
therefore that as long as his understanding with the Mufti continued, 
the latter would not raise the religious issue, the only one which 
would move the fellaheen, so that i f  any further disturbances were 
to occur, the Government could easily suppress them with the available 
means of police and military.
76. See Memorandum from Musa Alami to the H.C. "Present state of mind 
and feelings of the Arabs of Palestine". September 1933 (my italics) 
C.0/733/257/37356/1.
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be.r upon Britain to change Ite policy either : ( , )  positively, by u.ing
force, or (b) negatively, by the Jews eaasperatlng the British, or, 
alternatively, by the British finding thems.lv., In the need of the Arab 
and Moslem worlds".
And later on he continued :
''TAe ^ro^ra^^^the^outh 1 a based on violence The older
generation is also now discussing violence, when only a few years ago it  
used to reprimand any remarks of this sort. The older generation would 
wish things to go from bad to worse so as to bring about a spontaneous 
and bloody reaction. The younger one prefers the on.n deliberate fight. 
The general feeling is this : that i f  death is a ll we can look for as a 
result of the present policy, rather than a slow and long process of 
death, let us die in an attempt to free ourselves from our enemies".
In retrospect, the 1933 riots can, no doubt, be regarded as a prelude 
and a general rehearsal for the Arab revolt of 1936 so what happended 
after 1933 in the ideological change towards the use of violence was not 
any more a qualitative change but only a quantitative one.
The concept of "armed struggle" became as important as the concept of 
"political struggle" using peaceful and legal means".
The Jews, sensing the growing danger, continued and increased their 
efforts to arm themselves.
Early in February 1934, three Jews were caught buying arnnunition 
77from men of the R.A.F. This became the subject of a protest meeting 
held in Nablus and the Arab Executive Bureau sent a complaint to the 
Government.
The largest seizure of arms occurred on 16 October 1936 when a 7
77. Police Summary report No. 4/34 of 13.2.1934 F.O. 371/17878
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large quantity of arms and ammunition, smuggled by the Jews in a
consignment of cement from Belgium on board the ship S.S. Leopold I I ,
78was discovered at Jaffa port. The news spread quickly throughout
the country and changed the political situation.
The Arabs of a ll classes were indignant to learn of the quantities 
of arms and ammunition seized and expressed deep resentment, blaming the 
Government for allowing the Jews to be armed, citing previous incidents 
of smuggling and alleging that the Arabs had no weapons with which to 
defend themselves. Hatred against the Jews became evident. The Arabs 
took it  for granted that the arms were not Intended only for defensive 
aims but would be used against them, and that their own lives - not only 
their economic and political status - were in danger. The Arabic press
79gave prominence to the subject and in particular the Istiq la list "al-Difa" 
was strong in its attacks on Government.
Only after the government had warned the editors of the Arab press
I’«
did the papers show more restraint.
Political bodies at once became active. The Executive of the Young 
Men issued a strongly worded statement in the press, the Husseinite 
Palestine Arab Party drew up a Memorandum and submitted a protest to the 
government. The Hashashibite Defence Party also submitted a protest. A ll 
parties as well as other political organizations held meetings where 
various suggestions as to the necessity of strikes, demonstrations and 
protests were made. The general view was that protests to government 
were of no avail and that a ll parties should combine. The strength of 
the general apprehension was such that the Arab parties - which only days 78
79. "Al Difa" 18.10.35.
7 8 . "A 1  J a m ia h  a l  A r a b i y y a "  1 7 . 1 0 .3 5 .
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earlier had refused to cooperate - were Induced to abandon their differences
fin
and combine in one protest. An all-party meeting (excluding the Istlq lal
who were against any contacts with the Government) was held on 21st October
which decided to submit a memorandum to the Government, emboydlng Arab
demands with respect to the smuggled arms, searches in Jewish settlements
etc., and to hold a general strike on 26.10.35. The strike was completely
observed with total closure of shops - including cafes and restaurants,
and cessation of the main activities including traffic. The S.M.C.
also struck. On the borders of Jaffa and Tel Aviv, large crowds of
Arabs and Jews faced each other and a very tense situation arose which
was averted by prompt and firm police action. Stones were thrown in Nablus
81at Samaritan houses but on the whole the day passed by peacefully.
The all-party meeting of 21.10.35, which was held to discuss the
question of arms, discussed also the submission to Government by a ll
parties, of a memorandum embodying Arab political demands in general. The
memorandum was to take the form of a final warning end was intended to be
a last effort to approach the Government with Arab grievances. Accordingly,
the memorandum was presented to the II .0 . at an interview which he granted
32the heads of the parties at their request on 25.11.1935 shortly after 
his return to Palestine. I t  included the following demands : 8012
80. Even this was not achieved easily as the Palestine Arab Party, 
considering themselves as representative of the majority, and 
not willing - for party reasons - to cooperate with the others, 
did not attend the general party meeting held on IS.10.35 at the 
Young Men's offices, but hurried with their protest to the 
Government and convened a meeting of their own, elso on 22.10.35.
This was resented bitterly by the representatives of the other parties, 
and only after intervention by the Mufti was a combined action 
achieved.
81. Police Summary Report No. 16/35 of 30.10.1935 F.O. 371/18957.
82. For fu ll particulars of the interview and the fu ll text of the 
memorandum see C.O. 733/278/75156.
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1. The establishment of a democratic government
2. Prohibition of the transfer of land to Jews and the enactment 
of a law similar to the Five Feddan Law in Egypt
3. (a) The immediate cessation of Jewish immigration and the 
formation of a competent committee to determine the absorptive 
capacity of the country and to lay down a principle for 
immigration
(b) Legislation to require a ll lawful residents to obtain and 
carry identity cards and
(c) Immediate and effective investigation into i l l ic i t  
immigration.
During the interview, Ragheb Nashashibi - who opened on behalf of 
the Arabs - referred to the question of arms and said that the Jews who had 
been enabled by British protection to lay their hands on a ll the resources 
of the country, had no longer any confidence in the protection of the 
powerful British Empire and were now arming themselves. The arms imported 
by the Jews would one day be used either against the Arabs or the British. 
In the circumstances, i t  was the duty of every Arab to arm himself as a 
measure of self-defence. The Government should discover the importers 
of arms and punish them severely, however important might be their 
position. Nashashibi said that the H.C. would, no doubt, admit that 
the consignment of arms which was seized was not the only one, and that 
there must have been more of the same kind and also that it  must have been 
arranged by a Jewish national organization as i t  was too big to be 
arranged by private individuals•
He also demanded an answer to the all-party memorandum about the 
smuggled arms.
The question of the arms was also referred to by Abdul Latif al 
Salah, the president of the National Bloc party.
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The Arab leaders emphasized that unless they received a reply 
within a month which could be generally regarded as giving satisfaction 
to their requests, they would consider the matter as finished and their 
demands as having been rejected. They would lose a ll influence with 
their followers and would have to resign, the extremists would take 
control and the political situation would rapidly deteriorate.
But actually the event had already occurred which caused the 
traditional leadership (o ffic ia l) to lose influence and even "put to 
shame" its readiness to 'sacrifice* for the national cause as proven 
by its compromising attitude in order not to go to ja il  following 
the 1933 disturbances. On 20.10.1935 Sheikh Izz al Din al Kassam 
died courageously with 3 of his followers in an armed clash with a much 
superior police force.
We have already seen that the Haifa secret organization of Sheikh 
al Kassam ceased temporarily its activities after the discovery of its
f
responsibility for the Nahalal murder case. In September 1934, he 
renewed his activities when he organized the "League of the Holy War 
fighters" (Usbat al Mujahidin) whose aim was to "fight for the religion
Q3and the homeland and kill British and Jews because they occupy Palestine.
He used the preacher's stand at the "Independence" Mosque in Haifa to
disseminate his views. At that time he joined the branch of the Istiq lal
84party in Haifa and became close to some of the branch leaders. Subhi
85Xasin mentions in his book that Sheikh al Kassam approached the Mufti 8345
83. "AI Jamiah al Islamiyya", as reported by the History of the Hagana 
Op d t  p, 4 6 7  - no date was however mentioned and I  could not locate
the issue.
84. Darwaza Op Cit p. 120.
85. Subhi Yassin "The Gréât Arab Revolt in Palestine 1936-39." Op-Clt 
pp.14-15. See also N. Alush Op C it. p. 102.
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with a request to appoint him as a "travelling preacher" so that he would
be able to "preach the revolt" in different parts of the country. The
Mufti's answer, however, was "We are working to solve the problem
through political means". On another occasion, he sent to the Mufti
one of his followers informing him that he intended to declare a revolt
in the north of the country and asked the Mufti to do likewise in the
south, to which the Mufti answered, "the time is not yet ripe for such a
step, and that the political endeavours would be enough to achieve the
rights for the Arabs of Palestine'.
During that period, the Sheikh also established contact with the
„ 86
Italians, who promised him their support.
He also bought arms and trained his people and made his preparations 
for further actions. The discovery of the Jewish smuggled arms had 
perhaps influenced him to start earlier than he intended. On the 2nd 
November 1935, the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, the command of 
the organization met86 7'and resolved to act, and early in November 1935, 
he departed together with his followers to the area of Mount Gilboa.
The C.I.D. summary of 16.11.1935 reported 88, "one feature of the 
reaction to the discovery of smuggled arms and ammunition . . . .  has been 
the suggestion to Arabs to arm themselves and the formation of gangs etc.
named for want of a better name, 'Fascist Nazi*." There are indications
that this has met with some response. A party of 4 armed men was found 
to have been collected from Haifa early in November. They were accompanied 
by a follower with a horse to convey a kit, and two or three minor sheikhs,
8 6 . N. Alush. Ibid. No other source, however, confirms this.
87. N. Alush. OP C it. P* 1°3*
„ . .,.„1 AnDreciation Summary No. 17/35 of 16.11.35 F.O.8 8 . c.I.D. Periodical Appreci«w ✓ 371/10007
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after staying at the edge of the Jenin area overlooking the Jewish 
colonies below the Gilboan h ills , they were disturbed by the arrival 
of a police patrol (7th Nov.) which apparently surprised them. The 
Sergeant (Rosenfeld of Shatta Police post) was faced unarmed and shot 
dead. The party hurriedly decamped leaving property (which had 
earlier been stolen from the Haifa railway stores) in a cave nearby.
The four armed men had been given a kind of uniform and wore buff 
Kalpacks. Further information as to the formation of gangs and some 
useful correspondence has been seized. These and the growing youth and 
scout movements must be regarded as the most probable factors for 
disturbance of the peace of Palestine in the future.
The gang of Sheikh al Kassam numbered 23 persons (among them some 
who later became famous during the revolt, such as Farhan al Saadi,
Yousef Abu Durah and Halil al Issa ’The Big Abu Ibrahim») with an unknown
 ^ 89number of supporters.
The police started to close in on the gang. On 17.il. 35,
e police force came across the gang end hilled one of Its .»embers. The
gang then split Into two parts. The police »obillsed e specially trained 
force consisting of 50 British and Palestinian pollcement. On 20.11.35. 
this force, in e deep valley near Yaabed In the Jenin sub-dlatrict, surrounded 
the smallest part headed by Sheikh Ksssam with nine of hie followers.
One British policeman was killed instantly. The police called on the 
gang to surrender, hut the Sheikh answered that he would fight until death.
89. Accordina to Izzat Darwaza the group of Sheikh Kassam numbered 50, see 
Darwa** nn fMtSl2û N Alush says that the group numbered 200 with another 800 
supporters'll “ ésh'op c‘ t P.io3 N. Alush, who is .  Marxist, gives .  very 
a of The organization of al Kassam emphasizing itstendentious description of t h e ^  ^  £act that l t  consiated of ..peasants
« “ wrkers"1“ indeed l t  did, but e ll other sources, end I  accept their view,
_  wocKers . in , character of the organization.
fÂrinou iem en whom the gang left alive when Sgt. Rosenfeld was 
k llled i gave Information and so did other paid informers of the police.
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The exchange of fire  continued for more than 4 hours, "the Jenin sub­
district was like a fie ld  of battle", wrote 'Talas tiri^ . Only after
Sheikh Kassam and three others were killed and a fifth  one was seriously
92wounded did the remaining five yield to the police."-'
His herioc death, and more particularly the religious character 
which was associated with the formation and subsequent behaviour of the 
gang and the eulogy by a ll the press of its acts, greatly impressed the 
general Arab masses. The Arab press, finding a real hero, raised him 
to the ranks of the firs t hero/martyrs of Islam and published his pictures 
in their front pages.
The Arab extremist arranged for the deceased an impressive funeral
which was an outstanding event. Under instructions from the M.S.C.,
the death of Sheikh al Kassam was announced from the minarets. Akram
Zueitar the Istiq la list leader from Nablus called on Arab leaders to
participate in the funeral, but there was not much response though local
leaders and representatives of the S.M.C. attended the funeral and
visited the families of the deceased. Many sent wires of condolence.
In a eulogy in the mosque before the funeral started, a preacher said,
''Dear friend and martyr, I  have heard you preach from a platform
resting on a sword. Today........ you are, by God, a greater preacher than
93
alive you ever were."
Despite the precautions taken by the Haifa leaders, the crowd who
91. "Falastin" 21.11.1935.
92. xhe other part of the gang under the command of Sheikh Farhan al 
Saardi escaped and found refuge in the Nablus mountains.
93. The Peel Report pp. S8-99.
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considered Sheikh Kassam a martyr in the cause of religion and the country, 
started to stone the police, and disorders on a large scale were very near 
and only the appearance of armed police parties brought order.
94On the 40th day following his death, Jamal al Husseini declared 
"that unless the Government would change its policy", a ll would follow 
the way of Kassam.
Even i f  it  was agreed that although practically Sheikh Izzal Din 
accomplished lit t le ,  or even nothing, he expressed in practical form an 
idea, set an example to his countrymen and opened the new avenue of 
armed struggle. The Jews clearly understood this development. A few
days after Sheikh al Kassam’ s death, Ben-Gurion said "the Arabs have
95found for the firs t time their Tel-Ilai.
9 6N. Alush describes how the traditional leadership, wishing to 
weaken the impact which Sheikh Izzal Din had on the Arab people, and at 
the same time to prove the effectiveness of the political efforts inV
97achieving Arab national aims, interviewed the H.C. less than a week after
his death. However, following the sacrifice of al Kassam and the example
set by him, the concept of the "armed struggle" became the supreme one in
Arab eyes even though some of the Arab leaders ignored i t  and continued
their political struggle. On A p r i l  1 9 3 6 , h o w e v e r , s t a r t e d  t h e  g r e a t  A r a b  
r e b e l l i o n .  T h e  id e a  o f  th e  arm ed  s t r u g g l e  h a d  w on.
94. "Al Jamiah al Arabiyya" 30.12.1935. He said the same in a gentler 
manner to the H.C. during the interview on 25.11.35 C.O./733/278/75156/2.
95. Tel-Hai, where Y. Trumpeldor and his friends were killed by Arabs in 
defence of the place in 1921, became the symbol of Jewish heriosm and 
sacrifice. In a speech to the Labour Party, Ben Gurion Memoirs. Vol. 2 
Op Cit p. 52.
96. N. Alush Op C it. p. 104.
97. Sne p.354
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PART IV. THE ARAB REVOLT 
Chapter 16
The Mufti and the Arab Revolt 1936 (First phase)
The history of the Arab revolt of 1936 is well known*1 23and I do 
not Intend to recapitulate it here again. I shall try, however, to 
examine the role played by the Mufti, the first among the Palestinian 
leaders, and therefore considered - wrongly - as the initiator of the 
revolt.
On 3.11.36, that is, after the first phase of the revolt was over,
the H.C. General A. Wauchope who - as shown in this study - depended on
the Mufti as the cornerstone of his 'Arab Policy', suggested to the
Colonial Secretary to curtail and limit the power and Influence of
2Haj Amin. He wrote the following: "After nearly five years experience,
I have reached the conclusion that the Mufti is not an outstanding
personality, nor a great leader and during the last few months, if I may
' 3so describe the mind of the Mufti, wicked Dr. Jekyll has become more and 
more dominant over the more moderate Mr. Hyde. He has allowed himself to 
be pushed into extreme courses against his better judgment. And,as I have 
repeated on several occasions, he is afraid of being left alone in the dark. 
On the other hand, like almost every Arab in Palestine, he is at heart an 
Arab nationalist and a strong and implacable anti-Zionist".
1. See the Peel Report Ch.IV. The Disturbances of 1936 pp.96-112. Marlowe - 
Rebellion in Palestine Ch.X. The Rebillion - First phase pp.138-172.
Simson On Cit pp.183-273. Haikal O p .Cit pp.194-238. The Arab Rebellion 
1936 (Thawrat Falastln 1936) published by "A1 Jamiah al Islamiyya" Jaffa 
1936. I. Safari Op .Cit. pp.147-176 N. Sadaqa Op.Cit p p.176-190.
Darwaza Op .Cit pp.121-147. Amin Said Arab revolts in the 20th Century 
(Thawrat al Arab fi ilkrin al Isrin) Cairo 1960 pp. 115-127. Y. Oman
The Felaheen and the Arab Revolt (Hafalahin ve ha mered ha Aravi) an 
unpublished M.A. thesis Jerusalem 1970 and S. Yassin the Great Arab 
Re Revolt in Palestine 1936-1939 Op .Cit.
2. Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore 3.11.36 C.O. 733/287/75023. My Italics.
3. Williams noted in the margin "This should be the other way around".
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In the next paragraphs» we shall examine the opinion of the H.C. 
that the Mufti was pushed Into extreme courses against his better judgement» 
in other words» that developments and events proved stronger and forced the 
Mufti'8 hand.
The Palestine Government which was continuously supplied with 
intelligence by the C.I.D. appreciation summaries had» more or less, a 
clear cut picture of the tactics that the increasingly radical parties, 
including the Husseinls might follow. These were:- the establishment and 
growth of the para-military organizations, non-co-operation with the 
Government, followed by civil non-violent disobedience, and further 
establishment of terrorist groups modelled on the lines of the band 
organized by Sheikh Izz al Din al Kassam whose preaching combined religious 
fanaticism, anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism.
The Mufti's subsequent behaviour during the period Aprll-June Indicates 
however, that he was not then of the opinion that the Arabs should pursue
V
an extreme anti-Government policy and he was very reluctant to use violence. 
In trying to prove this, I shall rely on 2 main sources: the C.I.D. 
appreciation summaries and Jewish Intelligence reports covering that period. 
I consider these and especially the C.I.D. summaries, to be the most 
accurate available sources of Information as to what really happened in the 
Arab camp during that period.
We should also remember that the Mufti tried at the time - and for 
understandable reasons - to appear in the public eye as more militant than 
he really was, and the same applies more or less to Arab papers of the time 
and to most of what was written since by the Mufti himself and other Arabs.
Towards the last months of 1935, there existed two different opposing 
groupings in Palestine inter-Arab politics. One was based mainly on policy 
differences with the 5 coalition parties as they were called (the Palestine
361
Arab Party, the Reform Party, the National Defence Party, the National bloc
and the Youth Congress) which presented their joint memorandum to the H.C.- 
4
on 25.11.35 on the one side against the Istlqlal party with its followers, 
advocating the policy of non-co-operation on the other.
This "ideological difference" did not hinder the existence of a second 
one, based mainly on personal sympathies and family differences, in which 
on one side were allied the Istiqlal, the National Defence Party, the 
National bloc and some elements of the Youth Congress - called the
5"associated opposition parties” - against the Husseinlte Palestine Arab
party supported quietly by the Reform party.
In each of thèse opposing groupings, the real opposition was between 
the Husseinites and the Istiqlallsts. This is not to say that the 
traditional real hatred between the Husseinls and Nashabishis diminished 
in any way, and indeed it soon re-asserted itself stronger than ever.
The field of battle between the Husseinis and the Istiqlal centred
V
around the question as to which would have the support of the-'Youth and 
students, amongst whom political feeling was becoming more and more strong.
At the outset, the Istiqlal with its more extreme views, had the 
better chance. Several groups of independent Young Men, led by Akram 
Zueitar in Nablus, Hamdi Hussein! in Jaffa and Atef Nourallah in Haifa 
tended to co-operate with them. A. C.I.D. appreciation summary in early
g
December 1935 remarked;) "......Party leaders (e.g. Jamal al Husseini) 456
4. See supra p. 234 Another instance of co-operation between these 
parties to the exclusion of the Istiqlal was the discussion about 
the Legislative Council and the delegation to London etc.
5. See the comments cf "Falastin" on the fact that 2 public meetings 
were held on 2nd November 1935, one in Haifa by the "Palestine Arab 
Party", and one in Nablus "by what may be termed the Associated 
Opposition Parties" "Falastin" 3.2.35, 11.2.35. See also C.I.D. 
summary report No.17/35 of 16.11.35. F.O. 371/18957.
6. C.I.D. Appreciation summary No. 18/35 of 4.12.35. F.O. 371/20018.
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will find themselves forced to adopt an extremist policy, not only in 
order to restore their prestige and prevent the leadership of the 
nationalist movement from passing out of their hands, but also in order to 
satisfy public opinion and try a new course of action, as all their 
previous efforts in protest, demonstrations, public meetings etc. had 
failed to attain their object".
The result was that each party, Including even the Nashabishis, were 
ready to put forward extrema demands in order to out-manoeuvre the others 
and gain the support of the young. Furthermore, the increasingly radical 
complexion of the Istlqlal, the Eusselnis, as well as the Nashabishls was 
also due to the intensive political activities of younger leaders whose 
aim it was to replace - or at least to join - the old and established 
leadership.
Each party, therefore, was organising the Youth. In Haifa and the
north, Rashid Haj Ibrahim for the Istlqlal was endeavouring to revive
\
the activity of the Young Mens Moslem Association.
Fahri Nashabishi, for the National Defence Party, was behind the 
activities of the "Workers Organization" in Jaffa, run on the same lines 
as the "Black Shirts" in Italy. And the Husseinls endeavoured to organize 
their boy scouts groups under the title "Futawah" (strength or Youth) on 
lines of similar semi-military young mens groups in Egypt and other 
countries.
On 11.2.36, the Futuwah held its first public meeting^ in 'Rowdat 
al Maarif* Jerusalem attended by seventy persons the majority of whom were 
youths and students of the College. The Chairman commented that although 
the attendance was small, it represented the flower of Jerusalem's youth.
............. ........ ...... ..................................... v
7. For a full description of the meeting see "al Liwa" 12.2.36. See also 
Jewish Intelligence report 17.2.36, File 8/35 the H.A. and C.I.D. 
report No.2/36 of 18.2.36, F.O. 371/20018.
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Those present, he went on to say, would become the standard bearers and 
leaders of this new movement. Other speakers quoted the words of Bismarck 
"Our problem will not be solved by loud voices but only by Iron and blood”.
The Chairman spoke on the organization of the "militia” movement and 
recited the following oath to be taken by those joining the movement 
"Liberty Is my right, Independence my aim (my hope - amali). Arabista my 
principle, Palestine my country and mine only. This I attest and God is 
my witness to my loyalty". Jamal al Husseini mentioned a statement made 
by Hitler to the effect that he started in the beginning with 6 followers 
only which increased to 600 and grew In time to 60 million, and he expressed 
his hope that their small gathering would be the nucleus which would repel 
the ambitions of colonization and heal the wounds of the nation. He then 
said that the Arab nation and their posterity were threatened with death 
and annihilation. He laid special emphasis on thè difficulties which 
confronted the movement and stressed that their path was surrounded withr
dangers. Those who felt weak should leave their ranks, but those who were 
full of faith and determination and desire to work should advance and come 
on to the field. The struggle for which they had assembled was difficult 
and the road long. Everyone should asks "Is my body which will be a 
foundation stone in the edifice of this nation, made of mortar or of rock?". 
And he ended by calling upon all those who participate in the Fuluwah's 
activities to do it with full faith.
The organization's uniform was khaki shorts and blue shirts and the 
members were going to receive full military training.
Through the Futuwah, the Palestine Arab party aimed at organizing and 
dominating the youth of Palestine.
The "battle" over the support of the youth was part of an all-out war.
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At two of its informal meetings in (early) 1936, the Istlqlal party
8resolved on the following decisions:-
1. To reject the Legislative Council.
2. T.o.continue working against..Hal Amin Hussein! who was blamed for 
having previously ruined the Istlq la l party.
3. To endeavour to withdraw public confidence from the five coalition 
parties and secure the support of the public to "Youngmen Groups".
4. To hold public meetings with the object of provoking public opinion 
so that the masses would be prepared to participate in any movement 
when a suitable time should arrive;
5. To secure the participation in the Nationalist movement of the 
students (as in Egypt).
Another field in which the two parties competed with one another 
was their effort to "adopt" the memory of Izz-al Din al Kassam. With the 
Istiq lal holding memorial meetings (in Hafia and Jenin on 5.1.36 and Haifa
V
on 30.1.368 9) in which a ll the important party leaders made strong speeches 
praising the acts of Sheikh al Kassam and his followers whom they said 
"opened a door through which a ll Arabs should enter" and stated that the 
actions of the deceased had done more for the Arab cause than anything so 
far undertaken by the Arab leaders (referring, no doubt, to the Mufti).
In Jenin, there was a procession to the cemetery of some thousand pebple, 
carrying Arab flags and wreaths which bore the inscription "Long live 
Palestine as an independent state for the Arabs".
8 . See C.I.D. appreciation summary No.1/36 of 22.1.36 F.O. 371/30018.
My Italics. On the very strong differences of opinion between the 
Husseinis and the Istiqlalists see also Jewish Intelligence reports 
of 19,2.36 and 23.2.36 File 8/35 The H.A.
9. See al Difa 6.1.36 and 31.1.36. See also C.I.D. reports No.1/36 of
22.1.36 and No.2/36 of 18.2.36. F.O. 371/20018.
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The Husseinis, however, in their more practical way, established 
what could be termed, politico-religious societies*** "walking in the path 
of al Kassam" such as the society "to commend virtue and condemn vice"
(al Amr bil Maaroof wal Nahi an al Munkar) headed by Sheikh Sabri Abdin 
and Sheikh Mohammad Ali al Jaabari in Hebron, "The Sunni Party of Allah 
in Jerusalem" and the Darawish Society (al Darawish) in and around Haifa 
which were connected with each other. (The latter one, it  seems, was more 
independent and less under Hussein! influence).
In these activities among the religious elements, the Husseinis no 
doubt, were greatly assisted by the Ulama Conference which met in Jerusalem, 
on 14th February 1936 under the Chairmanship of the Mufti** who, during his 
speech, "urged young men to cultivate the spirit of manhood and courage".
All these facts prove, that on the organizational level, the Husseinis 
succeeded in establishing and bringing into existence these different bodies 
and societies which were joined by the young and other enthusiastic elements
V
who, in the case of the non-existence of the Husseini led organizations, 
would have most probably joined similar organizations led and dominated by 
the Husseinis* Opponents.
How, the fact that these bodies existed on the organizational level, 
tended no doubt, to effect and influence their activities on the operational 
level, as actually happened later, but this was not necessarily the aim of 
the Husseini leadership.
At a meeting of the Executive of the Palestine Arab Party on 28.2.36, 
certain members from among the young and more extreme elements of the party, 
raised the question and suggested following a "negative" policy, i.e. to 
adopt c iv il disobedience, demonstrations, and other extreme means. 10
10. See Subhi Yassin Op Cit p.20. See also File 8/2, note of 10.3.36 and 
police letters of 22.1.36 and 28.1.36. The H.A. and C.I.D. summary 
No.3/36 of 3.3.36. F.O. 371/20018.
11. See supra p. 214
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Jamal al Husseini answered, that I f  the Arab demands were rejected, the
13Nablus Assembly which had been postponed would be convened and asked to 
decide on the action to be taken. He added, however, that before anything 
effective could be done, the 'Futuwah* groups must be formed, the branches 
re-organized and activity increased, He went on to say that they had two 
courses before them; either negotiation or struggle. Since they had begun 
negotiations they should persevere with them, and i f  the result was 
unsatisfactory the other course of action would s t i l l  be open to them.
A logical convincing answer, no doubt, but one which gave the leader­
ship further time to complete their preparations whilst at the same time 
it  was a further delay of starting the struggle. It  also authorised the 
leadership to continue negotiating.
From the subsequent behaviour of the Mufti, i t  was clear that he 
preferred negotiations and was very reluctant to start "the Armed struggle". 
Not that he opposed violence because of any moral or ideological principles. 
His previous and subsequent history showed that he did not hesitate to use 
any means in pursuance of his aims. His considerations, however, were 
political and practical.
In the early thirties, following the 1929 distubances and up to the 
issue of the Prime Minister's "Black Letter" but even later as well, the 
Arabs tried to "sell" Britain the idea that once she would ditch her 
pro-Zionist policy she could depend on permanent Arab friendship and 
collaboration. In the middle thirties, when the unchallengability of 
Britain in the Mediterranean and the Middle East was shaken and Italy and 
Germany made known their Intentions to try and change the "status quo", the 
Arabs fe lt that they could raise their "price" for their collaboration. 123
12
12. See C.I.D. Summary No.4/36 of 10.3.36. F.O. 371/20018.
13. See p. 2V~|
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They considered that in case of war Britain would find herself in need
of the Arab and Moslem worlds and might, as a result, change her policy 
14in Palestine.
When the Abyssinian War broke out, the Arab community's feelings 
were, on the whole, anti-Italian and in sympathy with Britain, and Arabs 
hoped that i f  Britain would embark on a war against Italy, they might 
attain independence in return for the assistance they would extend her.^
The likelihood of an Anglo-Italian war subsided however, and these hopes 
had to wait.
The beginning of 1936 was not not any better in that respect and 
Palestine's Arab neighbours were very reluctant to support a Palestinian 
uprising against the British.
When the strike in Syria was in progress during February and March, 
Palestinian leaders were conducting talks with Syrian leaders with the aim 
of co-ordinating a simultaneous general strike in Palestine. But Syrian
V
leaders objected to this Palestinian plan, apparently because they did not 
want to offend the British Government which they thought viewed with 
benevolence their struggle against the French, and explained that they were 
not prepared to discuss Palestinian problems until their forthcoming 
negotiations were successfully concluded.The Mufti also had visited 
Egypt but did not succeed in getting support as the Egyptian leaders, at the 
beginning of March, started their own negotiations with Britain and were not 1456
14. See Musa Alami's paper "Present state of mind and feelings of the Arabs 
in Palestine" written for the H.C. in September 1933. C.0.733/257/37356/ 
See also speech of Hassan Bidqi Dajany the Secretary General of the 
"National Defence Party" in the popular meeting in Ramallah on 21st July 
1935. "Falastin" 22.7.35. The speech of Jamal Husseini in the 
inaugurating ceremony on opening the "Palestine Arab Party" branch in 
Tulkarm on 16.9.35. "Ai Jamiah al Arabiyya" 17.9.35. See also the long 
paragraph "Pan-Arab affairs"in the C.I.D. Periodical Appreciation 
Summary No.14/35 of 28.9.35. F.O. 371/18957.
15. Ibid.
16. See C.I.D. appreciation summaries No.4/36 of 10.3.36 and 6/36 of 24.3.36 
F.O.371/20013. Even after the riots started, Syrian Nationalists 
decided, in a secret meeting, to sympathise openly with the Palestinians 
but to counsel confidentially to curtail and stop agitation in 
Palestine lest it  would affect their own treaty negotiations in Paris.
See cable from Col. Mackereth, British Consul in Damascus to F.O.
21.4.36. C.O. 733/310/75528.
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keen on the existence of troubles in Palestine.
However, it would be a mistake to ignore that the Syrian and Egyptian 
examples, of the success of violence or the threat of violence, did 
influence the Palestinians.
It should be mentioned also that during that period the Husseinis were 
advocating and actually preparing to send a delegation to London to further 
there the ¿rab political effort.
These considerations, and Jamal Husseini's emphasis that the Arabs
should persevere with the negotiations into which they had entered, showed
17that the answer which the Mufti sent to Sheikh Izz ai Din al Kaasara (some 
time in October 1935) that the time had not yet come to declare a revolt 
against the British, was still valid in his view in March/April 1936.
However on the night of 15th April, a number of cars on the road 
between Tulkarm and Nablus were held up by Arab highwaymen. After removing 
the valuables from the occupants, the bandits shot in cold blood three
r
Jews who were among the passengers.
Many Arabs tried ever since to present this event as an ordinary
18crime with no political motivation.
19Others, however, stated that these were no ordinary highwaymen but 
a group of "the Brothers of al Kassam" (Ihwan al Kassam) led by Sheikh
Farhan al Saadi and motivated by ideological national motives.
20The Government's view was that "there is little doubt that the
unfortunate victims were deliberately chosen because they were Jews".
On the following night, two Arabs were deliberately shot by Jews and
21there was no doubt in Arab minds that this was a reprisal for the murder 
of the Jews on the previous night. 178920
17. See supra p. 355
18. See "Falastin" 25.4.36. See also N. Sadaqa Op Cit 177-8. Y. Haikai 
On Git, p.193. Darwaza Op Cit p.121
19. Subhi Yassin Op Cit PP.30. 127. Halil Sakik Op Cit p.47. N. Alush 
Op Cit P.109.
20. Palestine Report 1937. Col. No.129, p.177.
21. See "Falastin", "al Liwa", "ad Difa" 19.4.36.
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The funeral of one of the two murdered Jews in Tel-Aviv on 17.4.36
turned into a demonstration. There were cries "We don't want this
Government, we want a Jewish Army” and the police were stoned. A party
22of Jews started to move towards Jaffa but was stopped by the police.
The funeral was followed by an anti-Arab labour campaign in Tel-Aviv 
and its vicinity and during 17th and 18th April, there were several cases 
of assault and threats against Arabs.
On 19th April, following rumours that two Arabs had been killed in 
Tel—Aviv by Jews, serious riots started on a larger scale.
23A Jewish summary report written on 20.4.36 at 12.00 states that
"there is not yet ajy clear information whether any of the Arab leaders
instigated the Jaffa riots or not. It is known that the Mufti visited
Jaffa on the afternoon of the 18th. Knowledgeable sources, however, report
that though he showed interest in what was going on in Tel-Aviv,
Instructed nor hinted that something (reprisals?.ehoult be done.
24The outbreak of the Jaffa riots was attributed later to a great extent 
to the Mufti's opponent Fahri Nashabishi. On 19.4.36, the day of the Jaffa 
riots, rumours started to circulate in Jerusalem that an Arab was murdered 
in the Jewish quarter of Mea Shearim and the tension increased. Only after
the Supreme Moslem Council denied the rumours after an investigation, were 
25the Arabs calmed.
On the same day at 20.00 a meeting was held in Nablus which decided
* .. 26"to demonstrate and strike for a few days .
At approximately the same time, a Youth meeting was held in the Arab 
Labourer's Club in the old city of Jerusalem which passed a similar decision.27
22. C.I.D. Appreciation Summary No.9/36 of 6.5.36. F.O. 371/20018. See 
also Baikal 0£_Ci£. p.199.
23. See information of the "Arab Bureau" 20.4.36. File 8/36. The H.A.
My Italics,
24. See Y. Shimoni Op ,<?&» P*297*
25. See source of f*n. 23.
26. Haaretz 20.4.36.
27. See source of f.n. 23.
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Shortly before however, on 19.4.36, in the evening hours, the Mufti,
28during an interview with the H.C. confirmed the latter's view "that
barring accident, no further rioting should occur". He also went on to
express his hope that agreement would be reached concerning the delegation's
composition so that the delegation would be able to proceed soon to London.
On 20th April, an Arab National Committee was formed at Nablus and
resolved that a General strike should be declared throughout the country
and maintained until the Arab demands, as put forward in the previous
29November had been conceded.
A similar National Committee was formed in Jaffa and the formation
in other places was urged as well. A deputation of notables was received
30by the Jaffa District Commissioner who was informed of the strike. One 
forms the clear impression that the Arab leadership was caught unprepared 
by these developments.
The strike on 20th April in Jerusalem was resolved by the youth meetingV
31of the previous day and not by a decision of the leadership. Only later 
an appeal was published by the Palestinian "Arab Party" to all Arabs to
32continue the strike until "the atmosphere is clarified and calamity removed".
The Mufti, it seems, also HA 5 not formed by then a definite line. When
tribal leaders and the representatives of a big popular meeting which was
held at Beersheba on 20th April, telephoned the Mufti and consulted him about
any immediate action which they should take, he refrained from giving a clear
answer saying that no definite policy was as yet decided upon and that every
33one should do what seemed best to him.
28. Kauchope to Parkinson 19.4.36. C.O. 377/297/75156.
29. Baikal Op Cit. p.200. 11. Sakik Op Cit. p.48. A. Zulitar Op Cit p.98.
The Peel Report p,96
30. For the full text of the declaration of the strike see "Falastin" 21.4.36 
See also Issa Fafari Op Cit. pp.10-19. Resistance Documents pp.374-75.
31. See f.n. 23.
32. See Wauchope's cable to the Colonial Secretary 20.4.36. C.O. 377/310/ 
75528. My italics.
33. See source to f.n. 23.
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The first one to form a definite extreme line was apparently the 
Istiqlal party. During two meetings, held on 20th April (one at noon and 
the second at six in the evening), the Executive of the party decided
(1) to continue the strike vigorously, to enforce it by all means (including 
violent ones - according to Jewish appreciation reports) and to form 
national committees in those places in which they were not yet formed;
(2) to protest to the H.C. against Jewish attacks on Arabs; and (3) to
34invite the Husseinis to a joint co-operation.
Accordingly, Auni abd al Hadi and Ahmad Hilmi met the Mufti and 
suggested to him that the Husseinis and the Istiqlal should work together.
The Mufti again did not commit himself and directed them to Jamal Husseini 
with whom a meeting was arranged only for the next day.
On 21.4.36, the H.C. met the 5 leaders of the Coalition parties. He 
impressed upon them the evil consequences of disturbances and told them
that he felt that he could rely upon them to use their influence to check
\
all forms of disorder. "They promised", he informed the Colonial Secretary,
"Co do what was possible to pacify the people". The H.C. then raised
the question of the composition of the London delegation and Jamal Husseini
and Abdul Latif Salah expressed the view that on account of the disturbances,
36the departure of the delegation should be delayed.
34. Ad-Difa 21.4.36. See also information of the "Arab Bureau" 21.4.36. 
File 8/36. The H.A.
35. Wauchope to Colonial Secretary 21.4.36. C.O. 733/310/75528. for a 
full description bf the interview in which all the Arab leaders 
expressed their regrets regarding the loss of lives and property and 
promised to help the H.C. in restoring peace - see enclosure to 
Wauchope's letter to Thomas 23.4.36. Ibid.
36. The 3 other party leaders and especially R, Nashabishi wanted the 
delegation to go. Nashabishi actually wrote on 21.4.36 a declaration 
to the Arab people in favour of terminating the strike "which doe? not 
help the Arab cause". However, his assistants advised him that ttiq 
publication of the declaration would cause damage to the "National \ 
Defence" party and it therefore was not published. See the second \ 
source in footnote 34.
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Later in the day, the H.C. saw also the Mufti who promised to do
his best to prevent continuance of disorder.
On 22.4.36, the meeting was held between the Husseinis and the
l8tiqlalists (the Mufti and Jamal Gusseini, Auni abd al Hadi, Ajaj Nuvayhid,
37Ahmed Hilmi, Izzat Darwaza and others). It was decided to unite their 
forces for common action, to postpone the departure of the delegation to 
London and to form several committees for raising funds and contributions, 
for medical assistance, for propaganda abroad, for boycotting the Jews etc.
On the same day the five Arab leaders of the Coalition met and though
38Nashabishi hesitated, he joined the others in deciding (1) to postpone
the departure of the delegation to London (2) to urge the people to
indefinite continuance of the strike "exhibiting patience, quietness and
determination1* (however the flour mills, bakeries, clinics, pharmacists
and means of transport were excluded) and (3) to meet again on 25.4.36 in
order to examine the general situation.
It should be emphasized that the decision about the strike was an Set
of formalizing an already existing situation, because at that stage the
strike * under the supervision of local national committees - was already
on, since 20th April at least in Nablus and Jaffa and in Haifa since
21st April. The dynamics of the strike and the disturbances continued in
the towns Irrespective of the resolutions adopted in the leaders' meetings.
All Jews and many Arabs as well as the Government expected serious
disturbances would take place on 24th April after the Friday noon prayers
and it was felt that the centre of the disturbances would be transferred to 
39Jerusalem. The Mufti, however, gave the H.C. categorical assurances
that the sermons preached on Friday would be moderate in tone and under his
v \
influence the Arab leaders organized no demonstration for that day.
37. Ibid.
33. "Falastin" 23.4.36,
39. See Wauchope to Thomas 29.4.36. C.O. 733/297/75156/1. See also 
Jewish Intelligence report 21.4.36. File 8/36. The R.A.
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A Jewish intelligence report describing that day states "The number of 
people who attended the Friday prayers did not exceed 600 - half the 
average Friday attendance - only 200 of whom were villagers. Said Musa 
Darwish, who served as the right hand man of the Mufti during the 
disturbances of 1929, collected the villagers in the mosque yard before 
the prayers and advised them not to follow the youth of the city (the 
Shabab) in any incidents» not to participate in any disturbances and to 
return directly to their villages at the end of the religious service.
They were so affected by what he told them that they le ft immediately after 
the prayers without waiting to listen to the sermon.
The sermon itse lf, by Sheikh Said al Hatib was a short purely religious 
sermon which did not mention the current situation at a ll. The Mufti, who 
attended the service accompanied by the District Office N. Baydoun, was 
asked several times by the crowd to say a few words but he refused. When 
he moved to his office in the S.M.C. the crowd ran after him and angrilyV
demanded that he should make a speech. His assistants and bodyguards had
to intervene, explaining to the crowd that as a ll Jewish shops were closed,
there would be no use demonstrating in front of them and as for the
Government, any action against it  would be foolish as the Police had strict
orders to shoot so they would not advise the crowd to demonstrate.
41The "Falastin" next day poured its wrath and contempt on the 
Jerusalem leaders and praised the striking heroic towns of Jaffa, Nablus
40
40. See Information of the Arab Bureau 25.4.36 File 8/36. The H.A.
In this report the Hagana "Intelligence Service" started to 
differentiate - as had been done already much earlier in the C.I.D. 
reports - between Jamal, and the Palestine Arab party which were more 
extreme and the more moderate Mufti. The report does not produce any 
evidence to prove this distinction so it  can be assumed that it  was 
based on their "reading" of the situation. So when at the beginning 
of the report it  is stated that the Husseinis tried to persuade the 
villagers to come to the Friday prayers, as is made very clear later 
in the report - is to the more extreme elements of the Husseinis but 
not the Mufti.
41. "Falastin" 25.4.36.
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and Haifa. The fact that Friday, 24th April passed in Jerusalem
peacefully was resented by the provincial leaders and confirmed their
suspicions that the Jerusalem leaders were reluctant to pursue a policy
of strike and riots. They therefore, hurried, on 25th April, to force
42on the Jerusalem leaders their extreme line. At 11.00 the Haifa and 
Jaffa deputations met the Jerusalem leaders and proposed to form a Supreme 
National Committee which would control a ll national activity in Palestine.
R. Nashabishi hesitated, and asked that the meeting should be postponed until 
4.30. By then the meeting had turned into a-public meeting with the hall 
filled  with some 300 young people and students, shouting and quoting the 
nFalastin” issue in which the Jerusalem leaders had been criticized for 
their weakness and fear. Under pressure of the young men, i t  was resolved 
to form the Supreme Committee and cease a ll party activities. In their 
presence also, and no doubt under their pressure, the Supreme Committee 
adopted its firs t decision "that the General Strike should continue until 
the British Government makes a fundamental change in its present policy in 
Palestine in a manner which w ill be manifested by the stoppage of Jewish 
immigration".
"The Committee w ill work with the nation, inspired by its true and 
genuine determination to achieve a realization of its major and fundamental 
demands which have been persistently made, namely: ( 1 ) complete stoppage of 
Jewish immigration (2) Prohibition of transfer of Arab lands to Jews and
( 3 ) the establishment of a national government responsible to a 
representative council........
42. Jewish Intelligence Report 25.4.36 File 8/36 The H.A.
43. See Declaration on the formation of the Supremd Committee" and text of 
resolutions. Issa Safari Op Clt 22-25. Resistance Documents Op Cit 
pp 378-79. See also Wauchope's letter to Thomas 29.4.36. C.O. 733/ 
297/75156/1.
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The Supreme Council was composed of the five party leaders to whom 
were added the Mufti HaJ Amin (President) Auni abd al Hadi (Secretary), 
Ahmed Hilmi (Treasurer) and Yacoub Farraj and Alfred Rock (Christian 
representatives).
Both the Mufti, who did not relish the idea of coming to a direct
confrontation with the H.C., and R. Nashabishi who was not happy to "serve"
44under his rival the Mufti, were reluctant to join' the Committee but they 
had no chance of withstanding theppular wave of enthusiasm for "a united 
national action led by a united body".
However, the Supreme Committee, even in its best moments, was never a 
body entirely free from party interest, as became apparent very soon. This 
internal division, together with the disinclination of the Mufti to sever 
all connections with the British Government in general, and with Wauchope 
in particular, counted for the fact that the resolutions of the Supreme 
Committee were cautiously drafted. It should be emphasized that the 
resolutions did not consider or mention the possibility of taking further 
steps other than the strike.
Indeed, it could be stated here that the Mufti and the Supreme
Committed did very little leading, and in fact were dragged mostof the way. 
45Subhi Yassin confirms this by asserting that the Supreme Committee and the 
parties did not play any significant role in the strike and the rebellion 
(la fi il Idrab au al Tawra). He emphasized that the Supreme Committee was 
the upshot of the strike and rebellion and not their mainspring. It was 
the Kassams (the followers of Sheikh Izzal Din al Kassam) and the people 
who nurtured the rebellion. It was the various national committees which 
forced the leaders who were busy in their personal quarrels to start 
the struggle, or rather to adopt it.
44. See I. Darwaza Op Cit. p.123
45. Subhi Yassin Op Cit. pp.31-32. See also Darwaza Op Cit. p.123 and the 
C.I.D. appreciation summaries especially no.11/36 of 23.6.36
F.O. 371/20018.
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The differences of opinion between the members of the Supreme 
Committee were strong. It  was Ragheb Nashabishi who appeared then in the 
old/new version of "moderate turned extremist", and started to initiate 
more radical resolutions and policy. No doubt, he was encouraged by the 
moderate British reaction and by the apparent reluctance of the H.C. to 
use force and harsher measures. The more radical elements within his party, 
such as Fahrl Nashabishi, Hassan Sidqi Dajani (the influential leader of 
the Arab transport workers), and Fahri abd al Hadi, urged him to follow a
more extreme line as this would be the only way to achieve the people's
46support. Another possible explanation which I am disinclined to agree
with, could be that R. Nashabishi hoped that i f  the Arabs would follow an
extreme policy, the Government would be forced to intervene, break up the
strike, and so put an end to this situation which he did not like, and the
last, but not least important reason, was his desire to undermine the Mufti's
position. Nashabishi's extreme line was designed to manoeuvre the Mufti and
Dr. Khalidi, both in a sense Government employees, into a position in which
they would be compelled to commit themselves openly, anc event which might
produce a strong Government reaction.
Already at the firs t meeting of the Supreme Committee, Sidqi Dajany,
the Secretary General of the National Defence Party, suggested that the
47Arab officials in Government service should be required to resign.
The C.I.D, appreciation summary of early May states: "Ragheb Beyand
and his followers (and one or two of the National Committee in Nablus) are
disposed to suggest non-cooperation and other extreme measures, probably with
the object of embarrassing Dr. Khaldi and Haj Amin Husseinl who hold 
48o ffic ia l posts",
46. See Sharett On Clt p.91
47. See Information Report of the "Arab Bureau" 25.4.36 F 8/36 The H.A.
See also C.I.D. appreciation summary No.9/36 of 6.5.36. F.O. 371/20018.
48. Ibid.
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To face this challenge, the Mufti apparently decided to appear in the 
public eye as a militant, or rather let Jamal Ilusselni and the Arab party 
appear militant, which was easy, as many Important elements within the 
party were really so, whilst ha himself tried to keep something of the 
"special relationship" which existed for so long between himself and the 
High Commissioner.
49In a moderately worded letter which he wrote, as Chairman of the 
Supreme Committee, to the H.C. and to which he attached the manifesto of 
the Supreme Committee, he expressed the hope that the H.C. would endeavour 
to change the present Palestine policy fundamentally so as to secure 
realization of demands stated in the attached manifesto". Conceiving that 
this letter might indicate the Mufti’ s desire to terminate the disorders, 
the H.C. again pressed the British Government for concessions for the Arabs^ ® 
and proposed the appointment of a Royal Commission, though at that stage he 
opposed total stoppage of immigration.
Indeed the H.C. considered that the Mufti and Arab leaders had put 
themselves in a tight corner. " It  is important", he wrote to the Colonial 
Secretary, "that the position of the Arab leaders be understood’ . A demand 
was pressed upon them from a ll Arab quarters in Palestine that the strike 
should continue until immigration had been stopped and this they foolishly 
endorsed in the excitement of the firs t few days of disorder. They thought 
that as Sir Herbert Samuel had stopped immigration after the disorders of 
1921 I would accept this demand. They were mistaken. But leaders are at 
present powerless to stop the strike unless immigration is suspended as the
feeling of Arabs is now so strong........
The fact that the leaders were not in a position to direct the people 
was repeatedly emphasized.
49* Haj Amin to Wauchope 27.4.36. C.O. 733/297/75156/1. See also
Wauchope’ s cable to the Colonial Secretary 28.4.36 C.O. 733/310/75528 
Pt. I.
50. See his letter to the Colonial Secretary 29.4.36 Ibid.
51. See his cable to the Colonial Secretary 16.5.36 Ibid.
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During a meeting of the H.C. with the members of the Supreme
Committee on 5.5.36, Ragheb Nashabishi said that the tension in the
country was great and that the attitude of the leaders was dictated by the
52pressure brought to bear upon them by the nation. "The people", he said 
"at the present time were ruling the leaders and not the leaders ruling 
the people......" Before finishing, he again asked the H.C. to Inform the
Colonial Secretary that it  was not in the hands of the leaders to stop the 
tension prevailing in Palestine.
During another meeting on 14.5.36, the H.C. communicated to the
Committee’ s members in strict confidence, the Government’ s decision to
appoint a Royal Commission. Reporting to the Colonial Secretary on their
53reactions, he wrote that they a ll gave the same reply, saying that they 
were powerless - against the strength of public opinion a ll over the 
country - to call off the strike, nor would they succeed in stopping acts
of lawlessness, unless he would promise them that there would be a temporary»
suspension of immigration until the Royal Commission had made its report.
Issa Bandeck, the Mayor of Bethlehem, during a meeting between the H.C.
54and Arab Mayors held on 30.5.36, said "the situation was not in the hands 
of the leaders. Neither the Supreme Arab Committee no any other leader 
could oppose the people without losing honour and credit. I f  Governmnt took 
steps to stop immigration, the leaders would be able to stop disorder but 
they could not do this unless some concessions were made by Government."
The H.C. came to believe that the appointment of a Royal Commission 
might save the leaders' face and thus end the strike and arrest the growing 
mood of rebellion.
52. For a fu ll description of the meeting see enclosure I I  to Wauchope's 
letter to Thomas 13.4.36. Ibid.
53. See cable from Wauchope to Colonial Secretary 14.5.36. C.O. 733/297/ 
75156/1.
54. For a full description of the meeting see enclosure to Wauchope’ s 
letter to the Colonial Secretary 6.6.36 C.O. 733/310/75528 Ft. I l l ,
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The C.I.D. appreciation summary indicated at the same time that the 
Husseinis sought secretly a way to end the strike without losing face and 
power.
55On 4.5.36, in the evening, the Mufti informed the H.C. that there 
was a possibility that the Supreme Committee might support illegal measures 
such as non-payment of taxes.
On the same evening the members of the Supreme Committee were summoned 
to the H.C. the following morning. During the meeting on 5.5.36, he warned 
them of the gravity of their being associated with any illegal action. Ha 
also asked them to use their influence to bring back law and order, and he 
advised them again to send the deputation to London.
In a written answer by Auni al Hadi, which they delivered to him during 
56a second meeting in the afternoon of the same day, they expressed regret 
for the loss of life and property and added: "As regards the responsibility 
for the illegal'actfi whether or murder, arson or other acts, the Committee 
cannot accept responsibility as it always adopts purely peaceful means".
They went on to state that unless the H.C. would stop the immigration during 
the period of their discussions with the Colonial Secretary in London, they 
could not call off the strike or send the deputation to London. The Mufti 
again stated the Arabs readiness to co-operate with the British, asked for 
British help towards the reiization of Arab aspirations, and finished by 
expressing his confidence that the H.C.would endeavour to help the Arabs 
of Palestine.
Commenting on the Arabs* demand to stop immigration, the H.C. expressed 
his view that if Government refrained indefinitely from granting Labour 
Schedule, it would show weakness and consequently he could not recommend 
that this course be adopted. He added however: "but I see no bridge which
55. See Wauchope's cable to Col. Sec. 5.5.36 Ibid Pt.I
56. For the full text of the answer and description of the meeting see Ibid 
See also Y, Baikal Op Clt p.204.
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would assist leaders to withdraw from the impossible position in which they 
are now placed. It  seems therefore that the strike w ill continue and the 
chance of further disorders w ill grow?'^
One gets the clear impression that the H.C. wanted the British 
Government to be the first to propose a measure of suspension of 
immigration.
On the same night, after the second meeting of the H.C. with the Supreme
CO
Committee, several National Committees demanded by telephone the
convening of a general meeting to discuss the current situation.
Also the same evening, the first Arab leader with some standing was
detained by the police. Hassan Sidqi Dajani the Secretary-General of the
Opposition party and President of the Arab Transport Strike Committee was
detained with his Vice-President for publishing an illegal manifesto calling
on Government officials to cease work and recommended the refusal to pay 
59taxes. V
The General Conference of the Supreme Committee and the District
National Committees met in Jerusalem on 7.5.36. It  was opened by a most
60impressive speech by the Mufti passionate and dramatic yet restrained, 
extremely anti-Jewish but very moderate as regards the British. Ha finished 
his speech by calling upon Arabs and Moslems everywhere in the World to 
support Palestine lest it  would become the second Andalusia. The Conference 
was, however, dominated by extreme views and resolved^ to continue the 
strike and abstain from payment of taxes as from 15th May until and unless 
the British Government introduced a fundamental change in its present policy 
manifesting Itself in stoppage of Jewish immigration.
57. Ibid.
58. Information of the "Arab Bureau” 5.5.36 File 8/36. The H.A.
59. After walking out of the courtroom in which each of them was fined L.P 25 
they received heroes welcome by hundred of cheering drivers.
60. For a full text of the speech sea "Falastin" 9.5.36. See also 
Resistance Documents Op Cit pp.388-393.
61. "al-Liwa” 8.5.36. N. Sadaqa Op Clt p.130. Y. Haikal On Cit p.205.
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This decision met with general approval in the press and in the towns,
and well-attended meetings of villagers in its support, were held in the
. 62 Nablus and Jerusalem districts.
The C.I.D. appreciation summary which reported on the conference stated: 
"There is also l it t le  doubt that the adoption of the proposal for non-payment 
of taxes was largely due to the activities of Ragheb Bey Nashabishi and his 
supporters"..,... while "certain of the leaders particularly the Mufti and 
Jamal al Husseini were against the proposal and only supported it  because 
i t  was clear that opposition was useless".
On 14.5.36, the H.C., as mentioned above, in strict confidence 
communicated to the members of the Supreme Council the Government's 
decision to appoint a Royal Commission with wide powers which would come to 
Palestine i f  the Arabs would end the strike.
The Mufti asked that the Supreme Committee be given time to study the 
H.C.'s statement carefully, and it  was agreed that the answer would be given 
some hours later.
The Committee then met in the house of Auni abd al Hadi.
A Jewish Intelligence Report describing the meeting states^ that 
Ahmed Hilmi and Alfred Rock suggested acceptance of the H.C.'s proposal 
as the best way to end the strike which had caused heavy damage to Arab 
economy in Palestine. Dr. Khalidi, however, (tired no douht of Nashabishi's 
attacks on him and wishing to prove his 'nationalism') opposed it  saying that 
the youth, who were a ll extreme, would not accept it  and would turn the 
people against the Committee. The Mufti and Jamal Husseini agreed with 
Dr. Khalidi. Ragheb Nashabishi refrained from expressing his view.
62. "Falastin" 8.5.36, "al-Liwa" 9.5.36.
63. C.I.D. appreciation summary No.10/36 of 21.5.36. F.O. 371/20018.
64. Information of the Arab Bureau 15.5.36 File 8/36. The H.A. See also 
"al-Liwa" 15.5.36. Arab papers just reported that the meeting had 
taken place. See also C.P. 198 (36) May 1936.
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The last to speak was Auni abd al Hadi who spoke at length against the 
H.C.'s proposal saying that this was their last chance to force the 
British and get from them real concessions as it  would be Impossible to 
organize once more Arab public opinion and solidarity as it  then existed.
It was Auni's speech which deciced the issue.
At 4.30 in the afternoon, the Supreme Committee met the H.C. again 
and informed him "that the Arab people w ill not agree to end the strike 
on the basis of this proposal" (Royal Commission) "as the policy of the 
Arab people at present is to continue the strike until the British 
Government Introduces a fundamental change in its present policy which will 
manifest itse lf in stoppage of Jewish immigration". The H.C. then repeated 
his proposal that an Arab delegation should go to London but this was 
rejected by the Mufti. The H.C. got angry and spoke very sharply saying 
that he was very sorry that he had no alternative but to use force. Until 
then he had been lenient but from then on he would use harsh and extreme 
measures to repress the riots by force.
After leaving the H.C., the Committee met again to discuss the question 
of sending a delegation to London. R. Nashabishi opposed it  strongly, and 
the issue was closed.
Reporting to the Colonial Secretary on these meetings and informing him
of the negative reply to their demands that immigration be stopped until
65after the Royal Commission had reported, the H.C. wrote : "But in view of 
the gravity of the fact that, unless some limitation of immigration be made, 
I see no prospect at present of the strike ending or of any lessening of 
lawless acts, I shall be glad to hear i f  you consider my reply to the Arab 
leaders embodies your views or i f  you consider advisable any modification of
my reply". One feels as i f  the H.C. requested such a modification.^ *
__________________________________________________________ ______  \
65. Ibid.
6 6 . To those not acquainted with Wauchope*s style, this may seem a strahge 
way to request, but that was as far as the proud Wauchope could bring 
himself to ask for a reversal of his own previous decision.
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67On 15.3.36, the Arab Press published the appeal of the Supreme 
Committee against payment of taxes. It  asked the people, however, to 
resort to peaceful methods and to avoid violence.
The general strike, however, developed in the meantime into a general 
rebellion a ll over the country with arson attacks on communications,
individual murders etc.
68The H.C. believed that the revolt was directed by leaders whom he 
described as Mthe real, tough, more or less secret instigators of vidence 
and intimidation".
He did not include in this category the members of the Supreme
Committee who "have publicly dissociated themselves from violent methods",
and among these members he considered the Mufti to be one of the moderates.
Yet, for all his belief in the moderating influence of the Mufti, ridden
by the need to face both ways, he foresaw that the time might come when he
would have to detain or deport the members of the Arab Higher Committee and 
69the Mufti. As a precautionary measure, the Colonial Secretary authorised
70him to do It i f  need should arise. He was, however, most reluctant to do 
that, considering that the disadvantages outweighed the *gains', and in a 
meeting of the Advisory Council** he explained again his reasons for 
abstaining from deposing the Mufti and the members of the Supreme Committee: 
" It  is important that there should be responsible leaders with whom I can 
deal and the Council of Ten" (another name for the Supreme Committee) " have 
publicly dissociated themselves from violent methods". In this the H.C. was 
following the advice of the very experienced British Consul in Damascus 678901
67. "al-Liwa" 15.5.36.
6 8 . See his statement made in Executive Council in the presence of the 
District Commissioner, Inspector of Police etc. 21.5.36. C.O. 377/ 
311/75528/6.
69. Wauchope to Thomas 18.5.36. C.O. 733/311/75528.
70. Thomas to Wauchope 20.5.36. Ibid.
71. See Minutes of meeting held on 21.5.36. Ibid.
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Col. Mackereth who, in comparing the situation in Syria and Palestine 
72stated that "the greatest blunder which undoubtedly prolonged and 
embittered the Syrian conflict was the exile administratively of the 
nationalist leaders."
By then, however, i t  seems that the H.C. knew of the role played by
the Supreme Committee, or at least by some of its members, in spreading 
73the strike. When it  was suggested in the Advisory Council that the 
Felaheen were acting without provocation by any leaders, the H.C. replied 
"that he was convinced of the contrary". He s t i l l  believed however, as 
shown by future pronouncements that the Committee had a moderating influence 
on the extreme elements.
On 23rd May, 61 Arab leaders, among them Fahri Nashabishi, were
arrested in various parts of the country and in most cases were compelled
to reside under police supervision elsewhere than their home towns. In
June, some of the more prominent leaders including Auni abd al Hadi, were
74interned in a 'concentration camp* at Sarafand. The Mufti, however, and
his close supporters remained untouched. R. Nashabishi and several 
75Istiqlalists circulated rumours that the arrests and detentions were 
carried out by the authorities with the knowledge of the Mufti. More than 
that, a story went around that in a private meeting which the Mufti had had 
with the H.C. on or about 21st May, the Mufti promised to bring the strike 
to an end. Public opinion then turned against the Mufti and his close 72345
72. Mackereth to Wauchope 21.4.36. C.O. 733/310/75528.
73. Earlier, he himself allowed the members of the Supreme Committee to 
tour the northern part of the country. The Northern District 
Commissioner attributed the deterioration of the situation in Haifa 
and the north to the propaganda made during that tour, which started
on 12th May. See The Peel Report p.95. See also Simson Qp-Cit pp.195-6. 
Assaf Qp-Clt pp.135-6.
74. See The Peel Report p.98.
75. Jewish Intelligence report 31.5.36 File 38/8. The H.A. The story as 
such is not mentioned in the opposition Arab papers, however, thelx 
criticism of the Mufti towards the end of May was stronger than usual.
See "Falastin"*Mir'at al sharq". As for the alleged meeting on 21st May 
it  is not mentioned in any of the Government o ffic ia l papers which I 
examined.
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supporters. Faiz Haddad, the head of the local National Committee In
Jerusalem, during a meeting on 25.5.36(7), proposed a vote of non-confidence
in the Mufti and Dr. Khalidi and was supported by the majority of the
Committee. Only after Jamil Husseinl, who headed the minority, hurried
and brought to the meeting Auni abd al Radi who spoke for a long time,
explaining the damage which would be caused by such a vote, and requesting
them to withdraw it  was the proposal withdrawn and i t  was further agreed to
keep it  a il secret. However, the National Committees of Nablus and Gaza
learned of i t  and they also wrote to the Supreme Committee expressing non-
76confidence in the Mufti and the Husseinis.
Sharett records that during a meeting which he had with Musa Alami 
on 21.6.36,^ the latter asked him why the Jews had attacked the Mufti 
personally, when he in fact was less extreme than others. M. Alami added 
that because of these attacks the Government had taken upon itse lf to protect 
the Mufti thus damaging his standing in the public view. Alami then stated 
his sincere belief that the Mufti was against the use of violence saying 
that the Mufti had changed and understood more, and become more tolerant 
than he had been a few years previously. The Mufti's intention added Alami, 
was to employ against the Jews only the weapon of a non-violent general 
strike to be followed by an economic boycott but not to use violent means 
as they would not bring positive results, besides the fact that the 
Government was much stronger in the use of such means and would repress the 
Arabs by force.
The fact that at the time Sharett did not argue this fact of the 
comparative moderation of the Mufti and his reluctance to use violence - 76
76. Ibid.
77. See Sharett Op Cifc pp.177-78. Alami also put the whole blame for the 
deplorable situation in Palestine on the inconsistent policy of the 
H.C. See also Furlonge Qp Clt p.110 and Ben-Gurion Op Cit pp.90-106.
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78as he well did some six of seven weeks later - does not necessarily 
prove, but at least it  indicates, that at that time he indeed could not 
argue it. He continually asked, however, for the Mufti's deportation.
On 7th August 1936, the H.C. in a letter to the Colonial Secretary
wrote the following: 78 9  " ...... the Jews, you know, want me to banish the
Mufti. You know what far reaching effects this would have within and 
without Palestine. I imagine the closing of a ll Mosques would be certain 
and I doubt i f  we should not find our difficulties increased rather than 
lessened by his removal.
I came to Palestine fu ll of rather vague ideas how to "clip the Mufti's 
wings" but Drayton8 0  81 and Trusted8 0  have shown me how great are the legal 
difficulties apart from the political drawbacks, and during the last four 
years the Mufti has been more a help than a hindrance to Government. Even 
now, I know he is not so extreme as his enemies say and though rather a foxy 
gentleman, he is more genuine than a man like Ragheb Bey and more to be
relied on".
At this stage, we ought to examine the role of the religious aspect 
in the revolt.
In pursuance of his line to contain the disturbances, the Mufti did
not raise the religious cry and for this, the H.C., who as we saw, was
very sensitive on this aspect since the 1933 autumn riots, was very grateful.
81"I am informed", the H.C. wrote on 23rd May 1936, "and I believe that 
this Committee" (the Supreme Committee) "has on several occasions had a 
moderating influence on more extreme leaders. It  is certain that the Mufti 
has on each Friday refrained from exciting crowds who come to the Mosque.
78. In his interview with the H.C. on 15.8.36. Sharett 0p_ Clt pp. 262 «63.
79. Wauchope to Onus by-Gore. C.O. 733/297/75756.
80. Attorney-General in the Government of Palestine.
81. Wauchope to Parkinson 23.5.36. C.O. 733/310/75528.
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I t  is largely due to his influence that the religious cry has not yet
been raised and a ll serious disturbances avoided on Friday".
And again in his report about the interview which he granted to the
82 83Chief Ulama of Palestine on 1.6.36 the H.C. commented "It  is a
remarkable fact that the religious cry has not been raised during the last
8 lx weeks, that the Friday sermons have been far more moderate than I
could have hoped for during a period when the feelings of the people are
so deeply stirred and for this the Mufti is mainly responsible".
The significance of this should be examined in view of a background
84which was described in the following manner:
"The Religious (Moslem) Aspect - Jihad or Holy War'1 
It  has long been the considered opinion of students of the Palestine 
problem that real and prolonged disorder can only be stimulated and 
protracted through the medium of religion. The events of November last, 
when the late Sheikh Izzal Din al Kassam took to arms and the field, wereV
given the cloak of religion; his action has been glorified by certain
sections, and he and his followers regarded as 'martyrs'. Further similar
politico-religious bands, between that time and April this year (when more
serious Incidents occurred) only failed*for the want of a courageous leader.
There are now demands that Haj Amin Husseini, President of the Moslem
Supreme Council should declare a Holy War (Jihad)."
In a cable dated 17.6.36, the H.C. commented on the statement which
the Colonial Secretary was going to make during the Parliamentary debate
85of 19th June and proposed the following:
82. For the fu ll minutes of the interview see enclosure to the H.C.'s 
letter of 6.6.36 Ibid.
83. Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore 7.6.36. C.O. 733/297/75756.
84. See para. 5 In the C.I.D. Appreciation Summary No.11/36 of 23.6.36 
F.O. 371/20018.
85. C.O. 733/297/75156.
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" I  shall be greatly obliged i f  during the debate on 19th June you could 
state that the Supreme Moslem Council has ordered no strike and Sharia 
Courts and Waqf Administration are open and working. This statement 
w ill have an excellent effect on the c iv il service i f  made by you”.
0 £Accordingly, Ormsby-Gore included the following passage in his speech:
"1 should also mention that the Supreme Moslem Council have decided not to 
take part in the strike, the Sharia Courts are open and the Waqf Administration 
is working. I  am glad to say that there has been no disorder or complaints 
regarding anything in connection with the services at Mosques which have 
carried on their religious duties in a normal manner".
Reporting on the reactions in PalestIn to the speech, the H.C.
87informed the Colonial Secretary:
ttatementa in your speech were misinterpreted as challenges 
(1) that Supreme Moslem Council had decided not to take part in the strike
and ( 2 ) that religious duties were proceeding in a normal manner.......
As regards (1), I stated in my private and personal telegram of 
June 17th that Supreme Moslem Counciltad not ordered a strike. I should 
have emphasised the difference between those words and a statement made 
that the Council had decided not to declare a strike. The Mufti had 
refrained from calling a meeting so that no declaration should be made. His 
opponents pretended to read your remarks as a challenge and pressure was 
brought to bear to such an extent by those who constantly criticize the 
Mufti for not taking any steps against Government that he issued a statement 
that Supreme Moslem Council is in fu ll sympathy with strike. This statement 
is being forwarded to you. The effect of (2) has been to cause an attempt 
to be made to import a religious issue into the conflict but so far this 
has raey with very l it t le  result.........."
8 6 . Hansard, Commons 5th Series Vol.CCCXIII Cols. 1313-24.
87. Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore 1.7.36 C.O. 733/297/75156.
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Indeed, a. soon as the Colonial Secretary’ s statement was published
88
in fu ll in Palestine, the Supreme Moslem Council issued a statement to 
the effect that i t  was in fu ll sympathy with the strike.
At the same time the Mufti, as President of the S.M.C. wrote a short
89
memorandum to the H.C. which he published in the Press as well. In the 
memorandum9 0  the Mufti stated that the continuation of the National Horae 
Policy involved great danger to the Moslem Holy Places including the "al 
Aqsa" and he went on to say that "the Council” (the S.M.C.) "believe that 
the principal motive which moved the Jews to think of making Palestine a 
National Home for themselves, was a religious one. That being the case the
Zionist cause in fundamentally and principally a religious cause...... and
which aims at the reconstruction of the Jewish Temple of King Solomon in
the place of the Holy Mas Jed al Aqsa.........."
I t  was also noted9 1  that from the beginning of July these same themes
were preached In the Mosques.
In his answer to the Mufti’ s memorandum, Hathorn Hall the Chief
92
Secretary writing on behalf 6f the H.C. wrote*
" I t  now appears from your present letter that your Eminence is raising
a fourth issue. The Secretary of State fannot fail to conclude from your
l . t t « r ,  . .  it oo. .Mod., that th. prlndp.1 Mo.1«. rdiglou. .uthorlcy in
Pales tin. 1 ,  naking .n .pp«d to r.llglnu. £..Ung. throughout th. Modem
world la order to achieve certain political .in . in Paleatine."
The Chief Secretary went on to e.y that "the High Commlaaloner cannot
. , . . the Zionist case is fundamentally andagree with your statement that tne 7
. . .  . . . .  „.mt. but he i »  gravely concerned to contradictprincipally a religious case....... "  ^ ______________
............ - ...-.... ' by the S.M.C. 21.6.36 ’ al-Liwa' 22.6.36.88. "Declaration and clarification °y
89. "Falastin" 26.6.36. dated 22.6.36 see C.O. 733/310/75328.
90. For fu ll text of the memor F e v t 8 8  l5#l0#36> c .0. 733/3l7/75528/
91. See description of Air Vi««-«* l2/36 of 12.7.36. F.O. 371/20018.
74. S.. .1 .. C.X.». „ 3/3l0/75H8.
92. See letter dated 27.6.36.
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your assertion that the Moslem Holy Places are in danger...." and he
finished " ........Remembering your correct attitude up to the present in
reprobating acts of violence, he would remind you of the responsibility 
which rests upon you as the Head of the Moslem Community in Palestine to 
declare publicly and emphatically that you are on the side of law and 
order".
93In his answer to the H.C.S the Mufti, in a friendly letter in which 
he tried perhaps to retain or to revive something of their old "special 
relation" assured the H.C. that i t  was not his intention to raise a fourth 
issue, adding however that the religious aspect of the Palestine case was 
there a ll the time, and that he did not intend to make a new appeal to 
religious feelings throughout the Moslem World in order to achieve 
certain political aims in Palestine. He then wrote: "As regards myself, I 
am s t i l l  of the same attitude to which your Excellency refers in your 
letter, in that I sm actuated by a keen and distinct desire to follow lawful
and peaceful means in asserting the nation's rights".
94In a letter which this time he signed himself in order perhaps to 
8 how his approval, the H.C. expressed his satisfaction with the Mufti's 
assurances adding that the Mufti should make clear the goodness of his 
Intention not only to the H.C. "but to make i t  clear to everyone that you
wish a ll violence to end and that you are on the side of law and order".
95The Jewish Chief Rabbinate published a statement, asking the H.C. 
to bring it  to the knowledge of the British Government, in which i t  said 
that the revival of this "old and new libel" of the organizers of riots 
against the Jews purporting to attribute to the Jews a wish to invade the 
Holy places of the Moslems, could only prove "an Intent so malicious and 
mischievous" that the Chief Rabbinate found it  unnecessary to react to it. 9345
93. HaJ Amin to Wauchope 1.7.36. Ibid.
94. Wauchope to Haj Amin 6.7.36. Ibid.
95. The Chief Rabbinate to Wauchope 8.7.36. Ibid. See also "Haaretz" 8.7.36.
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The religious issue was not raised and the agitation which followed 
these publications subsided.
The Royal Commission, in enumerating "the underlying causes" of the
961936 riots did not consider the religious factor as one of them.
This is not to say however, that as the riots progressed, Islamic
religious motives, the idea of Jihad - (a holy war against the unbelievers
97(kufar)) * and other religious aspects were not emphasized by the rebels.
It seems, however, that around late July/early August the Mufti started
98to emerge as the most extreme among the Arab leaders. J. Marlowe states:
"the Rebellion was directed only by the Mufti and his satellites". On close
examination, however, it is found that as far as the first two to three
months of the rebellion are concerned, the facts do not match this statement.
The first stage of the revolt, following the radical resolutions to
Intensify the strike and to call for c iv il disobedience and non-payment of
taxes, was - as shewn above - mainly initiated by the Nashabishis supported
by the Youngmen groups and the Istiqlalists, with the Mufti and his
supporters following unenthusiastically in order not to remain behind and
lose a ll their Influence and power. Indeed, the firs t stage was described
go
as the revolt of the opposition (Thawrat al Muaridin).
The first armed bands were organized by the Nashabishls and the first 
"Commander General" of the revolt was Fahri abd al Hadl, an opposition m a n . ^ ^  967810
96. The Peel Commission pp. 106-112. Most students of Palestine affairs 
agree with that conclusion. See however, for comparison Marlowe
Op Clt p.138 and especially Marlowe Rébellion Op Cit pp.80-81.
97. See E Danin Documents and Figures - from the Archives of the Arab 
bands during the riots 1936-39 (Teudot to Demuiot) Tel Aviv 1940 
Op Cit p.28. See also Y. Ornan Op Clt p.25.
98. J. Marlowe Op Clt p.157.
99. Y. Shimoni Op Clt p.297. See also Assaf, Arab Movement Op Clt 
note p.41. For the fact that the Mufti had no Influence at the time 
on the rebels - see Intelligence Report of 31.5.36. File 8/38 The H.A.
100. Ibid. See also Y. Oman Op Cit P.34.
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When Fawzi Kawokji reached Palestine, he stayed for the firs t few
days with the Rasheids, a well known opposition family in the Jenin
sub-district. Most of the Kawokji's captains were non-Palestinian Arabs,
but the Palestinians among them belonged to the opposition .Abd al Kader 
102al Husseini, who commanded an armed band in the Jerusalem area was 
ignored by him.
Marlowe's statement, however, is certainly true as far as the latter 
period of the rebellion, following the change In the Mufti's position, is 
concerned.
At this stage, It would be useful to examine what the considerations 
of the Mufti probably were and what caused him to harden his line in framing 
his line of policy. Sincere nationalist that he was, hefelt like a ll other 
Arabs and especially the educated classes that the fate of the Palestinian 
Arabs was definitely in the balance and that unless the Government would 
change its policy and grant them some concessions they were doomed to become 
a minority and to be eventually expelled from the country. He saw that 
during five years, Jewish population had doubled and had reached 
approximately 400,000 and that with the same rate of increase the Arabs 
would be submerged in the next few years. He was not prepared to believe 
that a Royal Commission would save them from this fate and, based on his expert i 
ience of previous commissions, he was by no means confident that the 
recommendations of even a Royal Commission - i f  in favour of the Arabs - 102
101. Ibid. Indeed in his firs t manifesto he declared himself as the 
Commander General of the revolt and did not mention the Mufti or the - .• 
Supreme Committee at a ll, and from the phraseology of the manifesto,
it  is clear that it  was done on purpose and not because of security 
reasons. See Palestine Resistance Documents On Cit pp. 433-436.
102. Musa Kazim's son. During the firs t months of Israel's War of 
Independence, he commanded Arab forces in the Jerusalem area dnd was 
killed in the fighting at al Qastal.
I
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vould be likely to be carried out. He suggested that i f  the Government 
would carry out the recommendations of previous commissions such as the 
Shaw Commission and the Reports of Hope-Simpson and French« no further
enquiry was needed. He was, of course anxious that the Royal Commission 
would see the country in its disturbed state and that its members might 
be impressed with the solidarity and bitterness of Arab feeling.
The calling off, therefore, of the strike as a condition precedent 
to the appointment of a Royal Commission was unacceptable to him, much 
more so as he knew well enough that i t  would be most d ifficu lt to 
recapture again the same enthusiasm. He argued that i f  conditions would 
improve before the Royal Commission arrived, i t  would be like taking away 
from the Arabs what they regarded as the only means by which any concession 
might be obtained. He also asserted, with a considerable amount of truth, 
that he was pledged to persevere in the policy of non-co-operation until 
immigration was stopped even temporarily. He was convinced that.any 
capitulation on his part would mean that any control and influence which he 
s t i l l  exercised would be lost and that he would be swept aside by more 
extreme elements. He found it  considerably d ifficu lt to control many of 
his supporters and he knew well enough that he succeeded in retaining 
certain measure of control by accepting some of the less violent demands 
of his followers. These, however, were continuously pressing to adopt 
more active measures.
There were another two more personal considerations. The first was
fear for his life . The Mufti was simply afraid that i f  he would advocate
103moderate measures, he would be killed. The second one concerned his 103
103. ”He even borrowed........a bullet-proof jacket to protect himself
against these shabab and young thighs” . See H.C.*s letter to 
Parkinson 22.10.36. C.O. 733/297/75156. See also H.C.'a cable to 
the Col. Sec. 19.9.36 Ibid and H.C.’ s cable to the Col. Sec. 31.5.37 
C.O. 733/311/75528 and letter from Iraqi Consul in Palestine to the 
Iraqi Foreign Ministry 28.1.37 - Iraqi Consulate f i le  3780 I.S.A.
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relations with Wauchope*, Ever since the outbreak of the riots, he H.C. 
had asked him to declare publicly and in unmistable terms his personal 
opposition to the acts of violence. This, for all the reasons mentioned 
above, he refused to do. His continued refusal brought to an end this 
"special relationship" which existed between him and the H.C. and on which 
he could count to "carry him over" once the strike and disturbances would 
have come to an end. He could be sure that whatever the outcome would be, 
as far as he personally was concerned, the authorities this time, would 
fu lf i l  their old intention of curtailing his power, removing his from his 
offices and even punishing him.
However, by taking over the rebellion and by means of terror, 
intimidation and fear he could hope to make himself irreplaceable in the 
sense that his removal would make any political discussion with the Arabs 
impossible. So the authorities would have to think twice before taking 
any steps against h,lm.
This consideration, however, was valid only as long as the Government 
was ready to negotiate, to compromise and to have this political discussion 
with the Arabs.
In fact, this turned out to be exactly the Government’ s policy.
Furthermore, neither the Jewish reaction nor the British one invited 
moderation on the Arab side. The Jewish policy based on the principle of 
self-restraint ("havlaga" in Hebrew) - that is, not engaging in reprisals 
and retaliation - was interpreted by the Arabs as weakness and fear. As 
far as the authorities, no really serious effort was made to cope with the
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strike and with the rioting so that the simple-minded people were 
again - as in 1929 - led to believe that "the Government is with us", 
(al Dawla Maa'ma).
Indeed, the fact that quite a considerable section of British 
officialdom in Palestine led by the Chief Justice Sir H. MacDonnell, 1045
104
104. An unofficial Committee of the U.S.A. Senate reported: "We
received many complaints........ that the terror is not due to the
inability but to the unwillingness of the British to cope with it 
effectively". See report of Senator Copeland in "the Crisis in 
Palestine". Report of Hers. Unofficial Senatorial Commission,
New York 1936 p.18. Writer's italics.
See also despatch hy Air Vice Marshall R.E.C. Peirse on the 
disturbances, dated 15.10.36 W.O. 32/4177 in which he indicated that 
during a crucial phase in the rebellion which started in the middle 
of May 1936, there were difficulties in donducting military 
operations because of the c iv il administration's reluctance to use 
force. See also Simson Op Cit Ch. XII-XV "Rebellion and extreme 
moderation" pp. 183-251.
The H.C. explained his lack of action by his desire that the 
strike might die naturally. He then wrote " I  am reluctant to take 
steps the effect of which would be to increase Isolated attacks on 
Jews, arson, bomb throwing etc. which are inherently more difficu lt 
to *top". (see his letter to the Col. Sec. 16.5.36 C.O. 733/297/ 
75156). When the riots became more serious, he rejected repression! 
by force because it  would entail the alienation, possibly permanently, 
of a ll moderate elements in the Arab community and it  also would 
cause unrest in Transjordan and fierce reactions in other Arab 
countries and the Moslem World and even raise the religious cry of 
Moslems against Christians (see his cable 3.6.36 Ibid).
His assumption that it  was desirable that the crisis should 
subside on its own was debatable and indeed the military authorities 
in Palestine opposed it  strongly. However, his conciliatory 
attitude towards the Arabs was supported by the Cabinet until early 
September.
105. For the fu ll story, concerning the differences of opinion and
confrontation between the H.C. and the Chief Justics, the ruling 
of the latter in the case of the demolitions in Jaffa and the way 
i t  was used by Arab propaganda, and of his resignation see f i le  
"Position of the Chief Justice" C.O 733/75528/24.
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and apparently Hathorn Hall^^ the Chief Secretary, Keith Roach^^,
the Northern District Commissioner and others, as well as the majority
108of the non-official British community in Palestine, favoured the 
Arab cause in differing degrees.
These, 1 think were the considerations which brought the Mufti to
* „  109follow a more extreme policy. 106789
106. Jewish intelligence reports contain information, though it  is not 
stated categorically, about meetings between Hathorn Hall and other 
high ranking officials with Arab leaders, once in the house of 
Musa Alami and once in the house of G. Antonius. See reports of
30.6.36 and 12.7.36 File 8/38 The H.A.
E. Main, the author of "Palestine at the Crossroads", was at 
the time the special correspondent of the "Daily Telegraph" in 
Palestine. On 18.1.37, he cabled, "that the Arabs were openly 
boasting how Hathorn Hall advised them to conduct themsdves during 
the disturbances". See the cable and Hathorn Hall's strong denial 
in his letter to Parkinson of 21.1.37 C.O. 733/316/75528/61.
107. The decidedly pro-Arab views of Keith Roach who, in 1928 drew the 
Mufti's attention to the famous screen on the Wailing Wall pavement, 
are clearly shown in his memoranda to the Col. Sec. of 28.7.36 and
5.8.36 which he also sent to Parkinson in the Colonial Office on
30.9.36 together with a third memorandum. These include the following 
sentences: "Not only the Arabs but many other people" (he apparently 
was one of them) "consider that Arab interests were bartered for T.N.T." 
(discovered by Weizmann) and "The Prime Minister's letter to
Dr. Weizmann...... is a very dangerous document" etc. etc.
108. For these views see record of interview between the H.C. and 
Mr. A.P.S. Clarke the Manager of Barclays Bank, and Archdeacon 
W.H. Stewart representing the non-official British community in 
Palestine on 17.6.36, C.O. 733/311/75528/8.
109. Another factor which could be mentioned in this respect is the 
financial help which the Arab revolt received from the Italians. I 
purposely minimize it  as I am basically inclined to accept the Arab 
argument as presented by the Supreme Committee in a cable to the 
P.M.C. in Geneva protesting against the "propaganda resulting in 
doubting strength of Arab national spirit and claiming that the 
movement is instigated by foreign funds, which matter shows lack of 
appreciation of Arab spirit which bears greatest sacrifice« and 
deprivation for freedom and independence". 12.8.37. C.O. 733/341/75528/ 
26 and "Falastin" 13.8.37. See also interview between Musa Alami and 
Sharett 21.6.37. Sharett Op Cit. P.177.
For Italian activities in Palestine affairs see f i le  "Activities 
of the Italian Consul General - 1936 C.O. 733/321/75589. See also 
the Paper written by Rendell "Italian Propaganda in Palestine and the 
Middle East" 23.11.36, F.O. 371/20018. See also f i le  "Italian 
propaganda", C.O. 733/299/75180 and f i le  "Disturbances, Alleged Italian 
Activities C.O. 733/341/75528/38. G. Sheffer Op Cit pp. 237-245.
Darwaza Op Cit pp. 175-76.
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As far as can be judged, however, the change dtd not take place 
a ll at once and was rather a slow gradual process. There was, however, 
one event which served perhaps as the turning point.
The reference in the Secretary of State's statement during the 
Parliamentary debate on 19th June about the non-participation of the 
Supreme Moslem Council in the strike, was the cause of the circulation 
of various rumours as to the nationalist bona fida of the Mufti who, in 
order to deny them, issued his statement in reply to the Colonial 
Secretary affirming that the Supreme Moslem Council was associated with 
the national demands and the strike.
Following this statement, the Friday sermons in the mosques started, 
during July, to become inflammatory while during April/June and following 
the promise which the Mufti gave to the H.C. in April, the Friday sermons 
were generally religious in tone and intended not to arouse excitement.
And then on 5th August, the members of the Supreme Committee.travelled 
to Amman at the invitation of the Amir Abdallah who also invited many other 
known moderates. The C.I.D. appreciation summary which described the 
meeting stated: * ^ " It  became evident to the Mufti:that some intriguing 
was going on behind his back to ensure that many persons would be present who 
would favour Ragheb Bey Nashabishi rather than himself and it  was therefore 
in a bad mood that Haj Amin attended and listened to the discussions".
The Amir explained that i f  an end would be put to the strike and to 
acts of violence, he would be able to approach the Government and submit 
to it  the Supreme Committee's demands which were namely 1) the stoppage of 
Jewish immigration; 2) the release of political prisoners; 3) the pardon 
of prisoners convicted of offences arising from the disorders; and 4 ) the 
remission of the collective fines imposed on the villages. The Mufti then 10*
110. See the H.C.'s comments on the despatch of Air Vice-Marshal Peirse
13.11.36. C.O. 377/317/75528/74.
411. C.I.D. Appreciation Summary No.14/36 of 18.8.36. F.O. 371/20018.
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requested the Amir to produce written guarantees from the Government 
which the Amir was certainly unable to produce. The C.I.D. summary 
continued its description: "The delegates, therefore, le ft the conference 
unsatisfied, probably the most annoyed being Haj Amin Husseinl who formed the 
conviction that some solution to the present situation had been considered 
in which he was not himself the prime mover and which, i f  successful, would 
undoubtedly have affected his prestige as the most important Arab 
personality in the country".
The result of this, the report continued, was an immediate outbreak
of disorders throughout the country. Determined efforts were made to bring
about a general strike in Haifa. The campaign of terrorism was Intensified,
and the action of armed bands in the hills became stimulated particularly
in the Nablus District and elsewhere. More determined Husseini pressure
to adhere to extreme national demands became apparent and discussions were
held about boycotting the Royal Commission when it  arrived. The breach
between the Husseinis and the Nashabishis which was relatively bridged
112during the disorders began to widen again.
Accordingly, the H.C.*s"reading" of the Mufti started about that period 
to change too. Commenting on a report submitted by Air Vice Marshal Peirse 
to the Secretary for A ir,1'*'* Wauchope wrote to Ormsby-Gore: *** "the hatred 
between the Mufti and Ragheb Bey Nashabishl has always been extreme. Until 
June and July it  was veiled since until then Ragheb Bey had leaned to the 
extreme side to as great i f  not a greater extent than the Mufti. But at 1234
112. Ibid.
113. Despatch by Air Vice Marshall R.E.C. Peirse, D.S.O. A.F.C. on
Disturbances in Palestine 19th April to 14th September 1936. 15.10.36
C.O. 733/75528/74. On p.94 of his despatch, Peirse wrote: " I  was
of the opinion that the Mufti was the real motive force behind the 
strike and early in August I renewed my recommendations that he 
should be deported".
114. 13.11.36 Ibid.
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about the time in question, Ragheb Bey had come to realize the hopelessness
and fu tility  of the struggle and like some of the Arab Mayors, he had
115become much more Moderate. The Mufti, pressed by evil counsellors, 
threatened by his extreme followers and even hopeful of gaining concessions, 
became more extreme and more reluctant to give in without some tangible 
success.
116Jewish leaders, too, who during May had to admit unwillingly to
the H.C. that the Mufti was comparatively a moderate, and that the Youth
organizations preached and followed a more extreme line of policy,
maintained in early August*^ that the "abnormality" of the Mufti’ s
moderation was rectified and he had reversed to what was to them his
natural traditional position of chief agitator. Indeed Sharett stated
most emphatically that the Mufti personally was directly responsible for
the terrorist activities. The H.C., however, assumed that the Mufti was not
a hero but a weak span physically and morally, who was afraid for his life ,
having received some threatening letters, that he did not pursue a way bf
his own but was always afraid of the Istiqlalists who dominated the situation
and were more extreme than the Mufti.
During that period, the strike had been maintained steadily throughout
118the country. On the 100th day of the strike a proclamation was issued 
by the Supreme Committee urging the nation to continue its support of the 
movement. During early August and in accordance with the hardening of the 
Mufti's position, very determined efforts were made to force Arab labourers 15678
115. Strangely enough it seems that Wauchope included among these •
G. Antonius of whom he later wrote "Antonius, in my opinion, is a 
real extremist and exercised an evil influence over the Mufti.... 
see his letter to Parkinson 21.12.37 C.O. 733/332/75156/2.
116. See Sharett Op Cit p.98.
117. See Sharett's interview with the H.C. on 15.8.36 Ibid p.262-268.
118. "Falastin" 26.7.36.
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on the railways, the Haifa Port, the I.P.C. (Iraq Petroleum Company),
119the P.W.D. (Public Works Dept) to cease work. Emissaries were sent
frena Nablus, inspired probably by the Supreme Committee to stir up the 
120strike movement. This drive was intended to counterbalance the distinct 
signs of dissatisfaction following the economic stress which was being 
seriously fe lt by Arab traders, merchants, producers (soap and o il),  
banana and fruit growers and citrus owners. A ll these were anxious that 
the strike should end and the situation be restored to normal, and pressure 
to that effect was put on the Supreme Committee through several local 
national committees.
The exasperated Mufti who was convinced that this pressure was
organized by Ragheb Nashabishi aiming to pose as the merchant's friend and
trying to direct their dissatisfaction against him (the Mufti) authorised
each Of the local national committees to end the strike on its own, knowing
121well enough that none would dare to do it. And none did. The Mufti's 
extreme line, supported by the more extreme line of the Shabab and Istiqlal, 
dominated and dictated the Arabs' policy.
119.
120.
121.
In a ll these places, the strike was not observed. There is no clear 
evidence concerning the Mufti's view on the participation of the Arab 
Government officials in the strike. It should be remembered, however, 
that many of them were contributing to the "strike fund" and that some 
senior Arab officials had been passing on to their compatriots 
confidential information as to Government's intentions - see Minute bv 
Williams 16.7.36 C.O. 733/313/75528/37. However, there are slight * 
indications to show that he agreed to the memorandum presented to the 
H.C. by the Arab Government officials which was prepared by Musa Alami 
and G. Antonius. See Jewish Intelligence Report 30 6 36 File 8/^8 *•!.<» 
H.A. For this memorandum, asking for the stoppage of*Jewish immieratiL 
beforethe arrival of the Royal Conmls.lon see the f i le  "MemorandL by 
Arab officers in the First & Second Division of the Public Servir« ^
O^ITÀI'755^ 7- SeS 8180 the *"1 ^ P-t p;.M-99 .od Darlr,OP Clt p.126.
See C.I.D. appreciation sutanary No.14/36 of 18.8.36 F.O. 371/20018.
See Jewish Intelligence summary 26.7.36 File 39/8 The H A
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On 22nd August, the H.C. sent to the Colonial Secretary an important 
122despatch containing his appreciation of the situation in Palestine 
together with his recommendations. He presented three possible courses of 
action:-
(a) "The continuance of our present policy on its present line and 
methods of action.
(b) The second alternative is the granting of some concession to people 
with whom it  is most important we should live on friendly terms in 
future years, but not granting a concession of such a nature as to 
give the impression of yielding in face of violence and disorder, 
which we have been unable otherwise to end.
(c) The third course would involve a complete departure from the present 
moderate measures adopted and recourse to much more violent measures 
designed to subdue lawlessness in the shortest space of time. By 
this is meant'ruthless action including the bombing of villages and 
towns, after due notice to the inhabitants, And the imposition of 
martial law over at least a large part of the country".
As for the first course, both the H.C. and the military commander
(Air Vice Marshal Peirsei agreed that it  did not hold out any prospect of
speedy success in the restoration of order. The third course was
123recommended by the Air Officer commanding. Air Vice Marshal Peirse 
proposed a declaration of Martial Law and strong military measures including 
air bombardment of Nablus and other villages i f  necessary, which would cow 
the country and put an end to the revolt. In addition to his military plan 
he proposed other complementary measures the firs t of which was "Arrest and 
deportation of the Mufti and other leaders unlikely to be required as 
Government intermediaries with country". Peirse went on to say in his 123
122. See secret despatch from Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore 22.8.36. C.P. 225(36) 
August 1936.
123. See Memorandum by the Air Officer commanding on the military situation 
in Palestine and Transjordan 20.8.36 Appendix I I  Ibid.
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memorandum, that i f  the initia l action would be adequately severe the 
religious cry would not be effective.
The H.C. strongly opposed this course of action. Sticking to his 
view that the restoration of law and order should not be achieved by such 
measures as would "leave an embittered, sullen, and in their hearts, 
rebellious Arab population ready to rebel in any future year", he 
recommended to the Government to follow the second course.
Commenting on the proposal to depot the Mufti,the H.C. remarked 
that the advantages of deporting him were known to a ll. He pointed, however, 
to the grave drawbacks of such policy, stating that the Mufti had very 
considerable influence as head of the Moslem community in Palestine and 
was influential in other Arab Moslem countries and known in India and even 
farther afield. Through the control of Moslem funds, patronage and through 
the employees of the Awqaf and the Sharia Courts, he had great political 
power throughout Palestine. The H.C. then posed the following questions:
" I f  it  is legally possible to remove him from his post as President of the 
Supreme Moslem Council, is it  expedient to do so? Would that stop the 
disturbances in Palestine or would it  make them worse and more widespread? 
What would be the effect in neighbouring Moslem countries? And those farther 
afield? Could he be effectively replaced by someone who would be acceptable 
to the Moslems and amenable to British authority?"
In discussing the second course which he recommended, the H.C. stated 
that the concessions adopted would have to meet the approval of the 
extremists as otherwise the revolt.would not be ended. The extremists, he 
said were made of the Shabab or Young Men Party and the Istiq lal led by 
Auni abd al Hadi. Of the Mufti he wrote: " I  do not believe the Mufti w ill 
have the courage to oppose in the open the demands of this party” , (the 
extremists). "What action he may take behind the scenes is hard to foretell.
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There are many factors that weigh with that astute mind, but perhaps his 
chief fear is to be le ft alone in the open, liable to be accused by friend 
and foe of treachery to the Arab cause. We can expect l it t le  backing from 
that quarter”.
On the basis of discussions which he had with several Arab leaders,
, 124including Auni abd al Hadi but not apparently the Mufti, the H.C. 
submitted for the Government's consideration that i f  the leaders were to 
make a successful public appeal to end disorder, i t  would be wise to make 
a concession to the Arabs.
The H.C. enclosed with his memorandum a note giving his views on the
125strength of the Arab national spirit in Palestine. 1245
124. H.C. visited al Hadi twice at the detention camp in Sarafand. The Jews 
were unhappy about these visits see Sharett On Cit p.267.
125. Appendix IV to C.P. 225 (36) August 1936. The note contained the 
following passages:-
IV "In the course of a national struggle i t  is hard for any leader 
to proclaim ¿he advantages of surrender, that is to say, in Palestine 
today the ending of the strike an4 the ending of armed resistance.
The Mufti is not a morally courageous man and i t  would be contrary 
to his whole nature to take a decisive lead in ending disorders when he 
would be criticized loudly by his many opponents as a traitor to the 
Arabs and a tool of the English.
£ During the last three months many different people have been 
suggested as the real leaders of the strike and of violence. The real 
leaders throughout have been the extremists. The extremists lead and 
they frighten those who, like the Mufti, refuse to stand in the open 
and declare themselves wholeheartedly for violence or wholeheartedly 
r for acceptance of Government offers......
VII The Amir (Abdullah) considers the Istiqlalists and the Mufti as 
the main opponents to his policy of mediation. The Amir has many 
enemies but the failure of his attempted mediation was inevitable 
because he had nothing to offer".
And the note finishes thus: "The unexpected constancy and tenacity 
of purpose shown by the Arabs during the past four months has surprised 
everyone including the Amir and most, i f  not a ll, Arab leaders.
I have said before, this tenacity is due to the Arab fear of being 
submerged by the Jews. Suspension of immigration would be a definite 
act - as distinct from a promise - which in their eyes would show that 
Her Majesty's Government had regard for this danger. I fear no further 
promise w ill have this effect. I have no reason to believe that their 
tenacity w ill weaken unless some temporary concession as to 
immigration is made".
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The Colonial Secretary Ormsby-Gore, who from the beginning of his
tenure of office in early June, a new determination towards sterner action
126 127was discernible accepted, however, Wauchope's second alternative.
At this stage, we should examine briefly the question of the
128intervention of the Arab rulers. Already on 26.4.36, the Mufti, according
to a resolution of the Supreme Committee, sent to Arab kings and rulers,
129appeals for moral support. Two early attempts to mediate (except for the
unceasing but fruitless efforts by Abdullah) one by King Ibn Saud towards
130the end of April 1936, which was discouraged by the Foreign Office and
a second one at the beginning of June by Nuri Said the Iraqi Foreign
131Minister who met Welzmann in London on 9.6.36, came to nothing. 12678930
126. See his cable to Wauchope urging him to act more firmly within the 
then existing defence regulations and encouraging him toask, i f  
necessary, for additional powers. 4.6.36, C.O. 733/297/75156. See 
also his firs t statement in the Commons on the question of Palestine
9.6.36. Hansard Vol. 313 cols. 35-37.
127. See memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies 26.8.36 - 
C.P. 225(36) August 1936 - in which he proposed to his colleagues in 
the Cabinet to authorise the H.C. "to endeavour to secure, without 
delay, the declaration which ha suggests would be made by the Arab 
leaders calling for the cessation of violence with a view to the 
announcement shortly afterwards, of the decision to suspend temporarily 
a ll permanent immigration into Palestine with effect from the 
beginning of October” .
128. For a detailed study of it  see G. Sheffer Op Cit pp.330-370. See also 
Darwaza Op Cit pp.137-140 Halkal Op Cit P.232-240. Besiso Op Clt
p.196-200. N. Sadaqa OpCit pp.188-190 and the bulky files 
"Intervention of Arab Kings" C.O. 733/314/75528/44.
129. "Falastin" 27.4.36.
130. See cable from F.O. to British Embassy in Jedda 7.5.36. C.O. 733/314/ 
75528/44.
131. Nuri suggested that Iraq would gladly mediate between Jews and Arabs
in Palestine with the ultimate aim of incorporating the Jewish National 
Home within an Arab Union, but that the pre-condition to such an Iraqi 
move must be Jewish agreement to stoppage of immigration. According 
to one version given by Nuri, Weizmann wished for a time to consult 
his colleagues. Nuri in a meeting with Rendel from the F.O. held on 
9th June. See minute by Brenan from the F.O. 24.6.36 F.O.371/20020. 
According to a second version of Nuri "Dr. Weizmann had agreed to ask
H.M.G. to stop Jewish immigration. See letter from A. Clark Kerr to 
Rendel 16.6.36. Ibid. A third version joining the first two was 
given by Nuri in a meeting with Sharett in Palestine on 21.8.36.
Sharett Op Cit. p.29.
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Following further communications from the Mufti in which ha called
132for the King*« support, the Saudis, towards the end of June, made a
133second, more determined effort. This time, and mainly because of
Anglo-Saudi relations, the British Government accepted the proferred 
134Saudi mediation. However, when the Saudis, supported by Iraq and the 
Yemen, put forward the Palestinians* preconditions for the termination of 
the strike which were: stoppage of immigration, release of a ll Arab 
detainees and the cancellation of collective fines imposed on Arab 
communities, the first one was rejected by tha Cabinet132 4 3 5  136 in its meeting 
on 15th July 1336 on tha grounds of preserving imperial prestige.
The Egyptians, too, proclaimed at tha beginning of July their 
readiness to mediate in Palestine but their offer was turned down. 1 3 7  138
A second more serious Iraqi attempt started during August initiated
133
it  seems, by tha British • When hurl Said reached Palestine, Wauchopo 
gladly played host 'to him in Government House and a ll along supported Nuri's 
mediation as an alternative to the implementation of repressive measures 
which would have entailed the transfer of his and the c iv il authority's 
powers to military hands. The H.C. strongly recommended1 3 9  to the British 
Government to authorize him urgently to confirm Nuri's intervention on the 
basis of a memorandum to be addressed by him (Hurl) to the Supreme Conmittee.
132. “Falastin" 20.6.36.
133. See Minutes of meeting between Oliphant from the F.O. and tha 
Saudi Minister in London 23.6.36. F.O. 371/20020.
134. Cab Con 51(36) 6.7.36.
135. Cab Con.52(36) 15.7.35.
136.
137.
138.
139. Wauchope to Ormsby-Bore, 22.8.36 C.O. 7 3 3 /3 1 4 /7 5 5 2 3 /4 4 .
See minute by S, Bennett from the F.O. 4,7.35. F.O. 371/20020
See minutes by Campbell and Oliphant 7.7.35. Ibid.
Hints by Wauchope to Sharett during a meeting on 2 4
P* 293. Se. a 1 . 0  private Uttar o£ Bateann UoTthe
Baghdad to Randal In the F.O. 1.9.37. F.O. 3 7 1 /3 0 0 5 - ^  sl1 Emba**y “
tee Baikal who atatee that tha mediation was d . S \  ' ‘" f " 1”? '
the Iraqi Cabinet on 18.8.36 heeded by kC  ‘ T i ¡2 u
Murt VM ld « * •  *  * * • «  “
This followed a long and apparently successful talk which Nuri had with 
the Mufti and other members of the Supreme Committee about the terms of 
the proposed memorandum.
140The memorandum stated that because of Iraq's racial ties with the 
Palestinian Arabs and her friendship with Britain, she had fe lt i t  incumbent 
upon itse lf to mediate"......
The mediation aimed at (1) securing the end of the strike and the 
disturbances (2) securing the "grant of a ll legitimate demands of the Arabs 
in Palestine whether such demands arise out of the present disturbances or 
are connected with the basis of general policy in Palestine". From the 
way the draft memorandum was phrased, there was no doubt that the Iraqis 
intended to support the stoppage of immigration and later a reconsideration 
of the whole policy of the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration. Arab 
newspapers and the Arab public in general hailed the mission of Nuri as "a 
big stride towards»the cementing of Arab unity and the making of Palestine 
as an integral part of the system of Arab countries*^" and "as an act 
which has done away with the local character of Palestine and put upon it  
the international Arab stamp and also as a decisive step towards the
, „  , „ 142establishment of the Arab Federation".
Nuri's memorandum was regarded in London as "a most dangerous proposal"
much more so when it  was followed by a suggestion of Yasin al Hashaml the
Iraqi Prime Minister, to establish in Jerusalem a permanent Iraqi office.
The Colonial Secretary therefore, suggested a redrafting of the
memorandum omitting the last clause and emphasizing thatllraq's representations
oa behalf of the Palestinians could be related "only to such recommendations
144as may be made by the Royal Commission." 14023
140. Ibid.
141. "Falastin" 27.8.36.
142. "ad-Difa" 27.8.36. See also ad-Difa and al-Llwa 30.8.36.
143. Bateman to Foreign Secretary 27.8.36. The F.O. in its telegram to 
Bateman dated 29.8.36 refused this offer. F.O. 371/20023.
144. Ormsby-Gore to Wauchope 27.8.36 C.O. 733/75528/44,
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145 146And though the H.C, and the British Embassy in Baghdad continued
to press for acceptance of Nuri's offer, there was no change in London’s
views when Nuri left Palestine on 30th August 1936. Following his depature,
the Arab press published a manifesto by the Supreme Committee accepting
147Kurt's offer of mediation and declaring that the strike would continue.
It was the Mufti who insisted on the inclusion of the last paragraph 
148in the manifesto referring to the continuance of the strike, an inclusion 
which no doubt affected the decisions of the Cabinet on 2.9.36 but about that 
later.
We have seen above that the Colonial Secretary, though in general
favoured a more harsh policy with regard to the revolt, was ready, however,
to advise his colleagues in the Cabinet to accept the H.C.'s proposal to
confirm the second alternative of granting the Arabs some concessions
including the suspension of immigration in order to bring to an end the
strike and the disorders. But on second thoughts, and after an interview
with Weizmann and Ben“Gurion on 31.8.36, and after being flooded by letters 
149and telegrams in which he was accused of lowering still further British 
prestige, betraying the Jewish people and surrendering to murder and crime, 
and being impressed by Jewish and pro-Jewish demonstrations in different 1456789
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
See his telegrams of 28.8., 29.8., and 31.8 to the Col. Sec. Ibid.
Bateman to Foreign Secretary 27.9. and 29.9.36 F.O. 371/20013.
"al-Liwa" 31.8.36, "ad~Difa" 31.8.36. The manifesto read:
"the nation will continue its complete strike with the same 
perseverance and confidence by which it has been known in a proud 
manner, steadfast in its faith, patience and dignified until such 
time as these negotiations (with other Arab Governments and with h ,. 
British) will arrive at wuch th. de.ired result. ,“ h V i U
for this brave nation its existence and secure for it its riehts and rsiization of its aspirations. rignts and
See Sharett On Cit p.304.
From, among others, General Smuts, Lloyd Gpor«** . .
representatives and leaders etc. S<>‘ taarlMn
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parts of Britain, he changed his mind and wrote to the H.C.:*^0
"Quite frankly, I fear that things have turned out in a way which makes
it really impossible for me to press my colleagues tomorrow to go so far
as you wish". He stated that the Mufti's proclamation about continuing
the strike had the worst effect in Britain and added "I have a profound
mistrust of the Mufti and all his works. I believe him to be not only
bitterly anti-Jewish but also anti-British and a rascal",
When the Cabinet met^^ on 2.9.36 to discuss Palestine, it was
Ormsby-Gore with his tough line who dictated the tone. After describing
the worsening situation in Palestine, he enumerated the various pressures
that had been exerted on the Colonial Office. He referred to Nuri's
memorandum which if accepted, would be regarded "as a direct challenge to
the Mandate". Turning to the manifesto of the Supreme Committee and the
alleged terms of a provisional agreement between Nuri and the Palestinian 
152leaders as published a day earlier in a Jerusalem newspaper, he argued 
that rather than attempting to achieve the end of the strike at all costs 
the "authority and prestige of the Government of Palestine should be 
re-asserted without any delay." 1502
150. Orm8by-Gore to Wauchope 1.9.36 C.O. 733/297/75156. According to
N. Sadaqa, the German Ministry of propaganda reproduced a zincograph 
copy of this letter in 1939 saying: "We may have admitted too many 
Jews in Palestine, we may have been inadequate in protecting peasantry 
from losing their lands and homes..... however, should we accept Nurfs 
proposals, the strength of international Jewry with all its numerous 
mighty friends in all parties will oppose us strongly. Sadaqa On Clip 
p.189. The letter as it appears in the above-mentioned file in the
P.R.O. says: "We may....we may....homes....but that our fundamental
policy has been wrong X for one can never admit".
151. Cab. Con 56(36) 2.9.36.
152. These were: a general amnesty, suspension of immigration during the 
enquiry of the Royal Commission, undertaking that the Royal Commission 
would recommend the reduction of immigration, a continued Iraqi 
involvement in Palestine affairs. They were published in the 
"Palestine Post", mistakenly described by Orrasby-Gore as a pro-Arab 
paper, in its issue of 1.9.36.
The tough line of Ormsby-Gore was supported by the majority in the 
153Cabinet and it was decided to crush the rebellion by force. It should 
be stressed, however, that from reading through the Minutes of the Cabinet 
meeting, one gets the clear impression that it was the question of the 
prestige of Britain and her armed forces, that was at stake, which 
contributed to this decision not less if not more than any local 
Palestinian consideration.
Accordingly, the Cabinet re-affirmed their previous decisions that 
order must be restored and British authority re-established in the country. 
It deferred decisions regarding the suspension of immigration, and it 
resolved "that intensive measures” short of bombing civilian centres 
"designed to crush Arab resistance should be taken" following the despatch 
of an additional division and the introduction of Martial Law.
The H.C. was informed of these decisions by the Colonial Secretary*^ 
who at the same time informed of the appointment of Lt. General Dill as 
the supreme commander of all troops in Palestine. However, as the issue of 1534
153. The main support came from Ministers responsible for the services.
Lord Swinton (the ex-Cunliffe-Lister), the Secretary of State for 
Air and until then the staunchest supporter of Wauchope in the 
Cabinet stated that: "a surrender was politically Impossible both
at home and in Palestine and throughout the world". Duff Cooper, the
Secretary for State for War pointed out that Wauchope's policy.....
had, in fact, failed". He stated that "even if we were to surrender 
we should only gain a temporary peace". He suggested the despatch of 
an additional division, proclamation of Martial Law and the transfer 
of the supreme control to the hands of an experienced Lieutenant- 
General who should not be subject in any way to the High Commissioner 
in Palestine. Other members supported them as well. Only Zetland, 
the Secretary for India, Lord Cranborne - who in the absence of Eden 
represented the Foreign Office - and Halifax, the Lord Privy Seal 
who stated that "we had hitherto accepted the advice of Sir. A. Wauchope 
and had relied on his great experience and local knowledge. It was a 
very serious thing for the Cabinet to adopt a policy to which their 
adviser on the spot had raised the strongest possible objections" 
favoured the line of policy proposed by Wauchope.
154. Ormsby-Gore to Wauchope 3.9.36. C.O. 733/297/75156.
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supreme authority in Palestine was still left open, Wauchope continued
as best as he could to resist the transfer of his powers to the military.
156The publication in Palestine in the meantime of the denial by 
the Colonial Secretary (in reply to a letter from Dr. Weizmann) that Nuri 
Said had been given authority to promise any concessions, severely shook 
the confidence of the Arabs who entertained until then great hopes about 
the results of his mediation.
The draft of the statement of policy covering the Cabinet decisions
157 158was finally approved on 5.9.36 and published in Palestine on 8.9.36 .
This outspoken declaration of policy was critically answered in the Arabic
159press and was attributed by the Arabs to Jewish influence in London.
Even before the statement's publication, the prospects of more drastic
measures of repression caused a "certain wavering among the Supreme Committee"
. 160members.
Wauchope naturally seized the opportunity, perhaps his last, before
the transfer of the supreme control in Palestine to the hands of General Dill,
to initiate new diplomatic moves towards reaching a settlement.
162In three separate meetings with the Mufti and R. Nashabishi on
9.9.36 and Auni abd al Kadi on 10.9.36, he warned them about the measures 
the Government was contemplating and advised them to end the strike without 
delay. 15678902
155
155. See Correspondence in File "Relations between the H.C. and G.O.C. 
(Delegation of powers to G.O.C.) C.O. 733/317/75528/90.
156. "Falastin" 5.9.36. For Arab reactions to this letter see Darwaza 
Op Clt p.141
157. C.P. 237(36) Sept 1936.
158. Official communique No.248/36 Sept 1936,
159. "Falastin", "al-Liwa" 9.9.36 "ad-Difa" 10.9.36.
160. Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore 6.9.36 C.O. 733/297/75156.
161. See his cable to the Col. Sec. dated 6.9.36 asking whether there was 
any objection to such a step and the latter's answer of 7.9.36 
authorizing him to do it on condition that there would not be any 
concession or promise to the Arabs C.O. 733/314/75523/44.
162. For a full description of the meetings see the enclosures to the H.C.'a 
letter to the Col. Sec. 12.9.36 Ibid. See also Sharett Op Cit
p.293*300.
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The three leaders suggested that Nuri Said should return to Palestine 
to continue his mediation. When the H.C. showed his reluctance to accept 
it, they said that were the Supreme Committee alone to appeal to the public 
to end the strike and stop the disorders, the appeal would not be obeyed.
The Mufti and Nashabishi therefore suggested that the Government should 
appeal to the Arab rulers to call on the Palestinians to end the strike 
while Auni abd al Had! proposed that only King Ghazi should be asked to do it.
The H.C. promised to forward the proposals to the Colonial Secretary 
after considering them.
In his letter to the Colonial Secretary, the H.C. wrote: "The 
three leaders have assured me that they are confident the Supreme Committee 
will pass a resolution as below provided they receive a message from 
Ibn Saud and Ghazi saying:
"It is in the interests of the Arabs in Palestine that you should 
immediately cdll off the strike and all disorders should be ended 
in order that the Royal Commission should come without delay to 
Palestine to carry out the enquiry as promised by His Majesty's 
Government.”
In his talk with the Mufti, the H.C. mentioned that during his first 
four years, they had often worked together with good results which could 
only have been achieved as the result of mutual confidence. However, reading 
the Minutes of the meeting, one notices that the direct contact which existed 
previously between them matching often a certain mutual warmth was totally 
missing. On the other hand, Uauchope's increasing dealings with Auni abd al 
Ha<ji163 indicated his appreciation of the shift of the centre of power 
within the Arab camp. It is interesting to note that Auni admitted during 
his interview that the continuance of violence meant only loss to the Arabs.
163. Who was released from internment two weeks earlier following 
representations made onfflls behalf by Nuri. Said. See words of 
Sir T. Inskip, Minister for co-ordination of defence during a meeting 
of Ministers held on 11.9.36. Ibid. 8
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In London, the proposals of the Arab leaders were discussed at a
164meeting of ministers on 11.9.36, who decided to refuse them.
The Supreme Committee were informed of this during an :interview
which they all had with the II.C. on 12.9.36.*^ They, retreating, asked
whether they themselves could initiate an appeal to the Arab rulers. The
Government responded favourably and thus started the final successful 
X66phase of mediation which brought the strike to an end and consequently 
facilitated the arrival in Palestine of the Royal Commission in a 
relatively calm atmosphere.
The Supreme Committee met on 13.9.36 and discussed the Government's
statement of policy and their interview with the H.C. on the previous day.
167They published a declaration answering the Government's statement. This, 
however, did not solve their real problem. They knew that unless the strike 
and the acts of violence would stop, the Arabs and perhaps they personally, 
would have toface these drastic measures of repression, but their principal 
difficulty was that without being able to promise the people some concession 
they feltunable to face them after over five months of hardship. On the 
one hand there was the pressure of the business and trade circles, the 
citrus growers and others to bring about the termination of the strike, 
and on the other, threats had been uttered and letters written urging them 
to maintain their stand against the Government until Arab demands were 
satisfied in view of the sacrifices already made.*^ They felt, therefore, 
that they were asked to shoulder too much responsibility to take the final 
step themselves, and that they would have failed anyway if they had tried 164578
164. See conclusions of a meeting h&ld on 11.9.36 Ibid.
165. Rauchope to Ormsby-Gore 12.9.36. For a full description of the meeting 
and the text of the H.C.'s statement see Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore
19.9.36 Ibid.
166. F o r  t h e  d e v e lo p m e n t s  d u r i n g  t h i s  p h a s e  s e e  c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  in t h e  file 
" P r o p o s e d  m e d ia t io n  b y  t h e  K i n g s "  C . O .  733/314/75528/44.
167. "Falastin" 14.9.36.
168. See C.I.D. appreciation summaries No.15/36 of 1.9.36 and No.16/36 
of 28.9.36. F.O. 371/20018.
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to do so. They decided that it was imperative that the Committee should 
receive support from the Arab Kings and rulers the way they got it from 
Nuri Said.
The Mufti accordingly, sent a telegram to King Ibn Saud informing
him that in view of the statement of policy issued by the British Government,
the Supreme Arab Committee "had decided unanimously and with pleasure to
accept the mediation of Xbn Saud and welcomed such mediation".
171The final successful phase of mediation was on.
172It should be noted that the anti-Mufti Arab papers which favoured 
the King's mediation denounced all the same, subsequent to 14.9.36 the 
Supreme Committee's "indication of weakness and desire to shelve its 
responsibilities".
The exact text of the King's appeal was hammered out in an endless 
stream of cables and in a non-stop series of meetings of the Supreme 
Committee between the Mufti and Kazem Bey the Iraqi Consul at Haifa and 
between the Mufti and Sheikh Kamel al Qassab the representative of 
King Ibn Saud. *
169
169. Ibid.
170. "Falastin" 14.9.36. See also cable from R.Ballard in Jedda to the 
Foreign Office 23.9.36. C.O. 733/314/75528/44.
171. See note 165. Mention should be made here of another effort of 
mediation initiated by Lord H. Samuel who produced a 9 point plan 
of agreement between Arabs and Jews in a wide frame of an Arab 
Confederation including Palestine with the Jewish National Home.
Lord Samuel discussed his plan with Nuri Said in the presence of
the pro-Arab Lord Winterton. For full particulars see file "Proposals 
of Lord Samuel". C.O. 733/315/75528/58, For the impact of this 
plan on future British train of thought see Kedourie Op Cit pp. 77-81. 
For Zionist resentment against the plan see Sharett Op Cit. pp. 311-313,
172. "Falastin" 14.9.36, 17.9.36, 20.9.36 "ad-Difa", 15.9.36, 20.9.36.
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The main point of difference was that the Mufti wanted the appeal to
include conditions and promises which the kings - because of British firm
opposition - would not include. On 1.10.36, the Mufti expressed to the
173Iraqi Consul in Palestine his fear that the agreed draft of the appeal
might not be forceful enough to persuade the armed insurgent bands to
disperse. He therefore, begged that efforts should be made to strengthen
the wording of the appeal. The C.I.D, appreciation summary17^ reporting
about a meeting of the Supreme Committee on 29.9.36 attended by Sheikh
al Qassab says: "Haj Amin fought until the very last for certain conditions.
The remaining members of the Supreme Committee with the exception of
Jamal al Hussein! realized that it was useless to endeavour to insert any
conditions whatsoever and that the call-off must be complete". In another
meeting on 3.10.36, when the Iraqi Consul, Kazem Bey, called upon the
Committee to produce for examination by the rulers, the text of the
manifesto which they proposed to publish after the receipt of the ruler's
appeal, the Mufti attempted to vacillate and postpone the meeting, but
the majority insisted on taking an early decision and the manifesto was
drawn up and signed by the members. At this juncture, Ragheb Nashabishi
suggested that the calling off of the strike meant ipso facto the dissolution
of the Supreme Committee. The Mufti, hoping that if the National Committees
would eventually be called together, they would express their confidence in
the Supreme Committee so that it might continue to function, insisted that
when the appeal of the Kings arrive, the National Committees should be
175assembled to signify their approval. Arab papers at the time were 
suggesting that the text of the appeal was being varied to suit the views 
of the Mufti. 17345
173. See Bateman's cable to the F.O. 3.10.36 C.O. 733/314/75523/44
174. C.I.D. appreciation summary No.17/36 of 16.6.35 F.O. 371/20018.
175. "al-Liwa" 3.10.36, 5.10.36 "Falastin" 3.10.36.
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About 6th October, the negotiations appeared to have come to a
standstill and at a meeting on 7th October, a rupture occurred between 
the Mufti and R. Nashabishi and others.
The draft appeal was finally agreed to by the Supreme Committee after 
long discussions at an emergency meeting on 8.10.36 and only after a letter 
was read from Ibn Saud saying: "If you consider that you can continue 
your struggle with good results, it is your affair. We should, in that 
case, afford you whatever assistance is possible. On the other hand, should 
you desire us to send you an appeal without embodying restrictions then we 
are prepared to comply".
During this period, the Colonial Secretary, whose extreme dislike and 
profound distrust of the Mufti was mentioned above*^ did not change his 
view that some steps should be taken against the Mufti.
On 7.9.36, British representatives in Egypt, Iraq and Saudi Arabia 
179were informed that "the question is under consideration of possible 
deportation from Palestine of the Mufti of Jerusalem who appears to have *
176.
177.
178.
See source £.n. 173. 
See supra p. 408
He wrote: "that H. Luke who was "on the Arabophil side described the 
Mufti as a very bad arrogant man who has always hated the British in 
his heart and would never be loyal or trustworthy and that as long as 
he had so much wealth and power the British would always have the 
danger of similar outbreaks and serious trouble". Ormsbv-Gore then 
continued: "Ever since the «rival of hurt it is p r ™ ,  culr thlt 
the Mufti has been the chief villain of the piece Z w til 5 * .  
to preserve his own personal power are the chief obstacle to the0 rigUeS 
restoration of order. I do not wish to appear to v .
way but with the new powers it would appear to me thu- an^
how-vhen-and*why are well conceived, there should aria Pr°V ^  ^  
of getting rid finally of HaJ Amin al Huaseini t u ” fPP°^unity 
never do if he is eliminated to let him back uncW woul'd» however, 
that time comes". 30.9.36 C.O. 733/315/75523/55. 30 amneSty when
A few days later he wrote, again: "If, as i DrAC
to get rid of the Mufti, it seems to me, taking «-if12? y0u ^esfre
is important that we should not place Ourselvoa 4 S *°n8 v*ew that it -tv. „  ves tn a position where weare unable to eliminate this mischief maker “ P°3i-tion where we
5.10.36. 733/315/75528/44. r 8°od at this Juncture".
See cables from F.O. 7.9.36. Ibid.179.
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been evil genius of Palestine throughout recent troubles and «ho now 
appears to be losing credit**.. . . . . .and they were asked for their views
concerning the possible reaction which deportation might produce in these 
countries. A similar enquiry was made to the Government of India. A ll 
answered that " it  would create a most unfortunate impression" but fthat 
reactions would not be serious.
The H.C., after considering the question with General D ill, recommended
181to the Colonial Secretary that whether the Kings' appeal was made or not,
in case the disorders would continue the supreme authority in Palestine
should be delegated to D ill who would deport the Mufti. But i f  the appeal
was issued and the strike and a ll disorders came to an end, it  would be
difficu lt to deport the Mufti, unless he were to commit some action
justifying deportation. The Colonial Secretary agreed to this line of 
182action though he expressed his hope "that we shall s t i l l  be able to 
effectively clip his wings".
It  can safely be assumed that the Mufti knew, or at least guessed
about these British intentions and this no doubt served as a factor in
influencing his decision to accept the Kings* appeal.
183Just before midnight 9**10th October, the appeal reached the 
President of the Supreme Committee to be followed by identical appeals 
from Ghazi and Amir Abdallah early in the morning of the 10th. 18023
180. The British representative in Baghdad answered that although on account 
of his intrigues with the Italians the Mufti was not personally 
popular with the Iraqi Government, he was the recognized leader with 
whoa the Iraqi Government was negotiating and that his deportation would 
create a most unfortunate impression and would make the Government's 
task of holding extremist agitation in check much more difficu lt. See 
A. Clark Kerr to F.O. 8.10.36. See also Mr. Kelly (Alexandria) to F.O.
8.10.36, Sir. R. Bullard to F.O, 9.10.36 and cable from Home Dept. Govt, 
of India to Secretary of State for India 10.10.36 Ibid.
181. Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore 7.10.36 Ibid.
182. Ormsby-Gore to Wauchope 13.10.36 Ibid.
183. "To our sons Arabs of Palestine. We have been much distressed by 
present situation in Palestine, and in agreement with our brother Kings 
and the Amir, we appeal to you to restore tranquillity in order to 
prevent further bloodshed, relying on the good intentions of British 
Government and their declared desire to see that justice is done. Be 
assured that we shall continue our endeavour to help you". "Falastin"
11.10.36.
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The appeal was published In Arab papers together with a manifesto:
The Mufti Issued 10,000 copies of his manifesto to the villagers. The call 
of the Supreme Committee was approved by a ll local national committees 
throughout the country and there was an Immediate response. Attendances 
at Mosques in various parts of the country on Monday morning the 12th 
were large and enthusiastic and the strike was over. In order to let the 
bands disperse quietly the General Officer commanding had issued 
instructions to the troops to abstain from a ll aggressive action until
toe
16th October.
This period of grace was later extended until 19th October and by
then there had already been a very marked impoovement in the security
situation so it  was decided that the supreme authority in Palestine would
18 6remain in the hands of the H.C.
As soon as the H.C. learned of the decision to end the strike, he
sent, by a trusted'Arab o ffic ia l, a message to each of the Mufti,
R. Nashabishi and Aunl abd al Hadi expressing his pleasure that the Supreme
Committee had called o ff the strike and the disorders and informing them
187that he relied on them that a ll aggression would cease.
The termination of the strike, in my opinion, was achieved as a result 
of three cumulative reasons: firs t and foremost the late but firm decision 
of the British Government to crush the rebellion by force; second, the 
weakness of the Palestinian Arabs; and third, the continuing pressures - 
open and secret - of the Arab rulers on the Palestinians to end the strike.
184
184. "The Arab Supreme Committee has decided, after consideration and 
consultations with members of the local Committees from whom agreement 
was received, to publish the text of the Arab Rings' appeal. We call 
upon the noble Arab people to remain steadfast and quiet in ending 
this period of strike and unrest, on Monday morning, 12.10.36.
The Arab Supreme Committee calls upon the Arab people to arise early on 
Monday morning for prayers in the mosques for the martyrs who have 
fallen in our struggle. Following the prayers, the Arab people should 
return to their stores, places of business and their regular work". 
Ibid.
185. Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore 12.10.36 C.O. 733/315/75528/55.
186. Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore 13.10.36. Ibid.
187. Wauchope to Parkinson 16.10.36 C.O. 733/314/75528/44.
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Chapter 17
The Mufti and the Royal Commission and its Partition Plan
The Arabs emerged from the long strike feeling victorious. Arab
papers congratulated "the heroic Arab Nation in Palestine which is now
entitled to reap the fruits of its victory."1 2*4
Summing up Arab feelings during the first days after the end of the
,2strike, the C.I.D. appreciation summary stated "The Arabs have 
the impression .... that they have come through the ordeal of the 167 
dayscstrike with success and that Zionism has received a check. They 
are very hopeful that the Royal Commission will recommend at least the 
more important of their demands, while political leaders empress 
gratitude that the Palestine Arab question has now become the concern 
of all Arab states and rulers".
In intra-Arabic politics, the Mufti's position became stronger 
than ever. A C.I.D. summary of early November stated "the Hufti
....  has come out of the whole matter of the disturbances as the strong
Tpgn in Palestine Arab politics. Ragueb Nashashibi has lost much of 
his influence and is nothing like the power he was until comparatively
3recently. His wish to dissolve the Supreme Committee has not materialized."
This same feeling of satisfaction mixed with expectation, was shared
and expressed by the members of the Arab Supreme Committee who asked for and
4were granted an interview by the H.C. on 24.10.36. Reading the record of
1 "Miraat al Sharq" 17.10.36. See also "Falastin" 14.10.36, 16.10.36 
Hal Liwa" 13.10.36, 14.10.36, 15.10.36,
2 c!l.D. appreciation summary No. 17/36 of 16.10.36 F.O. 371/20018
2 C l  d , appreciation summary No. 18/36 of 7.11.36. Ibid, The report
stated'also that the "National Defence" party was much weakened with 
Hassan Sidqi Dajani breaking away and Fahri Nashashibi confining himself 
to organizing the workers in Jaffa.
4 Attended by the Mufti, Auni abd al Uadi, Jamal Husseini, Ahmed Hilml, 
Alfred Rock, Y. Ghussein and Fuad Saba - all supporters of the Mufti’s policy. 
Another supporter Dr. Khalidi, and R. Nashashibi, Y. Farraj and Abdul Latif 
Salah, who opposed him, were absent. For a full record of the meeting, 
see the enclosure to the H.C.'s letter to the Colonial Secretary 3.11.36.
C.O. 733/311/75528. See also "al Liva". 25.10.36.
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of the meeting one gets the impression that the Mufti felt and behaved 
as a winner presenting his demands. The II,C. opened by expressing his 
satisfaction that the appeal to call off the strike and to stop violence 
was promptly and effectively answered and that order had in general been 
restored. The Mufti, after associating himself with the H.C.'s remarks, 
went on to ask for the release of the detainees, the abolition of the Emergency 
Regulations, the termination of the service of the supernumerary police, 
the withdrawal of the collective fine imposed on Hebron, the closure of the 
new Jewish port at Tel-Aviv, the evacuation of Government school buildings 
held by the Army, and the re-eraployraent of about 100 Arab workmen at Haifa 
port who had been dismissed during the disturbances. He also spoke 
against the grant of a new Immigration labour schedule and he asked the 
Government to stop Jewish attacks on Arabs. He then said that the Supreme
Committee was doing its utmost to get the bands dispersed. lie suggested
\'
that it would be better if the rebels would not be arrested or make the 
subject of police enquiries; if they could have a private assurance the 
rebels would at once leave the frontiers. Alfred Rock, Y. Ghussein and 
Auni abd al Uadi spoke too. Jamal Kusseini said that if the Colonial 
Secretary were to grant a new immigration schedule, he considered that 
there would be no need to send the Royal Commission to Palestine. Both the 
Mufti and Jamal Ilusseini spoke of the Royal Commission and expressed their 
satisfaction that its terms of reference were very wide. The II.C. in 
a very conciliatory manner answered them point by point. He refused to 
abolish the emergency regulations, to terminate the services of the 
supernumerary police or to close the Tel-Aviv port. As for the labour 
schedules, he said that the decision rested with the Colonial Secretary.
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Ke promised to look into their other requests and see what would be done. 
Referring to the armed bancs, he said that if the Supreme Committee would 
look back, they would realise his attitude from the fact that imminent 
martial lav; was not applied and that two divisions did not apply drastic 
measures. He could not give any promise about the armed bands but he 
would consider what had been said and would do his best to restore normal 
conditions as soon as possible.
And in fact the II.C.'s policy, without committing himself publicly
to the Arabs, was to let the armed bands disperse or leave the country
witaout military intervention. When General Dill commanded on 22.10.36
his troops to intercept Fawzi Kawokji and prevent him from crossing the
Jordan, the U.C. asked him to call the action off on the grounds that such
5an action might make the Arabs renew the rebellion.
In this case, as well as in their appreciation of the role played
\
in the rebellion by the llufti and the Supreme Committee, and their 
opinions regarding the Supreme Committee's policy towards the armed bands 
the views of the H.C. and the G.Q.C.* 6 differed considerably.
5. See report from General Dill to Under-Secretary of Uar 30.10.36. G.O. 
733/317/75523/74 See also Simson Op Cit pp.289-398.
6 In a telegram to the C.I.G.S. on 13.10.36, General Dill wrote : "Feel 
* there was°ro distinction between strike and disorders. There was one 
well controlled rebellion. Efficiency of control confirmed by efficiency 
in caiur* off.... In particular he (the H.C.) considers I greatly 
I t e r a t e  influence of Higher Arab Committee" C.O. 733/713/75528/74. 
Describin’' the situation after the end of the strike and disorders, he 
wrote- "At this date, a fortnight after the calling off of resistance, the 
Arabs as far as I can judge, remain in the belief that a truce exists and 
the Hi»her Arab Committee are encouraging their followers in the view 
that any military action would be a breach of the truce. The Higher Arab 
Committee remains intact, reinforced by members released from internment; 
the local Arab organizations are also intact, and the armed bodies which 
formed part of the whole are being left in a position in which they keep 
their organization and their arms, an armed truce is therefore the best 
description of the existing situation". Dill's report to the Under 
Secretary of War 30.10.36 Ibid.
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The II.C. believed that it was a complete misconception to think that 
the llufti ever had been or ever would be a great or forceful leader and 
that he had a1nays to be pushed into every line of action that he reluctantly 
took. He considered that it would be the height of folly to imagine that 
by the removal of the Mufti or the Supreme Committee - of which the local
national committees were until the end of August very often independent - 
the danger of a fresh Arab rising would be ended or even greatly reduced, 
and he concluded : "The Committee of ten are a feeble and disunited crew 
who are rea lly in the position so well described by Bacon in one of his 
essays:- "The fly sat on the axle-tree of the chariot wheel and said what a 
oust do I raise”. The security of the country is not dependent on their 
presence or absence. Such organizations as existed during the disturbances 
sprang up locally and spontaneously. " The H.C. attributed the end of 
the strike and the disorders almost totally to the intervention of the Arab
V
Kings and not to any action taken by the Mufti and the Supreme Committee.
And in a letter written on behalf of the H.C. to General Dill, Ilathorn
8Hall the Chief Secretary stated that the Supreme Committee wanted the armed 
bands to be dispersed.
-, t , m « letter to Ormsby-Gore 17.10.36 in which he commented on Dill’s 
telegrafi to the C.I.G.S. of 15.10.35 Ibid.
n vattorn Hall to Gen. Dill. 28.10.36 Ibid.
-'The Kisher Arab Committee now seems as anxious as in the Government 
t ensure that armed bands should be dispersed and order restored in the 
rountryside*. Indeed they made an unconditional offer through one of 
their members to take any action that Government wished in order to 
ensure that Fawai Kawokji and his band left Palestine forthwith."
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At the same time, however, the H.C. envisaged a plan of limiting the
power and the influence of the Mufti by a series of reforms which would have
reduced the S.M.C. to a purely advisory body to assist the Moslem director
9
o f  t h e  p r o p o s e d  G o v e rn m e n t D e p a r tm e n t  o f  W a k f s ,
It is clear that the H.C.'s policy towards the Mufti and the Supreme 
Committee, and his intention that the armed bands should disperse peacefully 
and not under military pressure, was dictated by his desire to facilitate 
the early arrival and the enquiry of the Royal Commission and by his 
estimate of the Mufti and the Supreme Committee.
The terms of reference of the Royal Commission^ and its final 
membership were approved by the Cabinet in its meeting of 29.7.36^.
But because of other commitments of the Commission's members, it could not 
leave for Palestine until the following October, a welcome delay as by then 
the country was pacified.
Following the f.nd of the strike and the disorders, the Supreme
12
C o m m itte e  e le c t e d  a  s u b -C o rm a it t e e  t o  p r e p a r e  t h e  A r a b  c a s e  b e f o r e  t h e  
R o y a l  C o m m is s io n  t o  c o l l e c t  d a t a  e t c .  9102
9. See his letter to Grmsby-Gore 3.11.o6 C.O. 733/287/75123. As a result 
of the strong objection by Parkinson who argued that because of the 
undertaking given by Lord Plumer in 1928, that representative Moslem 
opinion would be consulted in connection with any proposed reforms of the 
Sd-i.C. and because such consultation could not take place in the then 
prevailing conditions, the proposal was shelved. See Minute by Parkinson
24.11.36.
10. C.P. ISO (36) July 1936. The terms of reference were intended to be as
* wide as possible, short of authorizing the Royal Commission to reconsider 
the existence and the substance of the Mandate.
11. Cab. Con. 55 (33) 29.7.36.
12. Consisting of Auni abd al Uadi, Jamal Lusseini and others. See Darwaza 
Op Cit p. 146.
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MMCion should be sode her« of the feet that herd Peel ex. rassed 
uls view that If the Mufti did not cam te give evidence before the 
Royal Couoissiau, nod requested the Ctacissio« to catae to hear his evidence
i& the . .HX.'e office in the isa.;»a ¿asmer os was done by the Shaw CasMiaaiou,
13then they aowld dispense with his evidence. In en eawhsnje of telegrsns 
between tua Col. Site, end the E.C., it was decided not to give the Mufti 
any exceptional traauaenf.
14The anuouncuueut by the Colonial Secretary on 5.11.30 in ?arliaaent 
thst iut .deration would not be stopped and that the R.C. had approved a labour 
schedule of 1800 (as against IO.X xj requested by the Jewish Agency) 
caused consternation acumget the Arabs.
"Al Liu«’, the Husselnite paper, tic scribed the grant of the labour 
schedule as an act of bad faith and considered it - in view of the whole 
lengths to which the Arabs had gone to res core order - as a stab in then
back. The paper went on to say that this act was a bad ower. of tits
intentions of the British Govermaont and suggested an Arab boycott of the
ISRoyal CotaniasioA.
The boycott was resolved by the Suyrene Committee at Its meeting on
0.11.3b «»d i '.micato to that -fi«ct * *  iaaued to the press.10 Efforts
were aadc by the Hashashibia and apparently by Auni abd al Radi to delay 
the publication of tin# Manifesto until after an interview which the Supresac 1345
13. See ««change of telegraia» between the U.C. and tit* Coi. d*c. 6.11.36/
7.11.36. In his telegree to Wsuchop* dated d.11.30 Crsasby-Gore
wrote ’ It1’ (exceptional treotswuit to the Mufti) would be certain to 
lead to questions in Parliaeent her« and while I have hitherto don« wy 
best to defend tbe Mufti, you will realise how eausrrsssing this would be 
to «« p or set. ally"- see also Vauchoye’s letter to Parkineoo 13.U.36 C.O. 
733/316/75550/1.
14. Hansard, C o m » « ,  Fifth Series. Vol. CCOVli Cols. 250-232.
15. Al Liwa o.li.36, 7.11.36.
16...... T h e  decision declared by the Secretary of State is a strong challenge
to Arab feeling and an encroachment on their rights aou proof of lack 
of good intention to solve the Arab case in Palestine lu e proper wanner 
based on the realisation ot tteir rights and the proaervatioo of their 
national existence .... "Falaati»" 8.11.3b.
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Committee had with the H.C. on 7.11.35 during which he advised them to 
re-consider their decision. They net, however, on the evening of 7th November 
and under pressure of the Ilusseinis who continued to advocate a more extreme 
line the manifesto was signed by all members and published.
As a result of the decision to boycott the Royal Commission the atmosphere 
in Arab circles was changing rapidly and again mistrust of Government was 
being cpealy expressed.
The Colonial Secretary consulted the H.C. as to whether, in view of 
the boycott by the Supreme Committee, it would be desirable that the Arab 
Kings should be permitted to appoint representatives to present the Arab 
case before the Royal Commission which "might help to put the Ilufti in a 
ridiculous position and so prove helpful in the long run."^ The II.C. 
answered that "so far from such a course putting Ilufti into a ridiculous 
position, he would contrive thereby to enhance his prestige representing it 
as a diplomatic victory.*^
The Arab rulers, however, were uneasy about the Supreme Committee's
decision to boycott the Royal Commission and were advising them to reconsider it.*^
And though the majority of the local National Committees continued to support
the boycott, there were dissenting factors headed by the Nashashibi's Defence
Party and seme elements of "Youngmen" of Jaffa who were reported to be in
favour of calling off the boycott and were willing to appear before the Royal
20Consmission and give evidence.
■p7. Ormsby-Gore to Wauchope 11.11.36 C.O. 733/75550/27
IS. Wauchope to Crmsby-Gore 14.11.36 Ibid.
19. A. Clark Kerr to the Foreign Secretary 8.11.36 and 21.11.36. Ninute by 
J.C. Sterndale Dennett on his meeting with the Saudi Charge d'Affairs in 
London 11.11.36 F.O. 371/20029.
20. See C.I.D. appreciation summary No. 19/35 of 20.11.36 F.O. 371/20018.
The Summary reported : "It is understood that strongest in their 
opposition to cooperation were Auni abd al Uadi and Haj Amin al Iiusseini. 
The belief exists in the minds of the majority of Arabs that any Arab 
appearing before the Commission voluntarily will be asking for ostracism 
and possibly assasination.
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nevertheless, the ¿uprejae Contuittee extended a welcome to the
Royal Counission and two of its raerubers called upon tko Cor-r.iissioa soon
after its arrival arid presented a note outlining the Arab stand end their 
, t 21reasons tor t».a boycott.
Furthermore, in accordance with a decision passed by the Supreme
Cotuoittce in its meeting on 17th h'ovcnber, the Arabs secretly continued to
22prepare their evidence er,d collect all relevant data.
At the same time, it should be emphasized that the Supreme Cec»;ittee 
insisted that no disorders should occur during the enquiry o1' the Royal 
Commission and when some extreme elements demanded to dcclaif« a strike on 
12.11.26, the day on which the ceremonial opening session was hold at 
Government House, the Corciittec issued a jannifesto calling the drab nation 
to remain quiet in response to the request of the Arab Rings. J
After many hesitations end discussions, the Supretw C omit tec decided 
to send a delegation' to Bagdhad and Ried to consult Rings Chari and Ibn Gaud. 
As the*Kings' dislike of the boycott vas known, this decision by itself 
showed & certain change of heart. The liufti, however, informed the Iraqi 
Consul in Palestine that the Cup-res* Committee resolved to continue the 
boycott unless there was a total stoppage of immigration and until the 
country was granted autonomous rule like Syria.2*
21. Ibid.
2 2 .  I b i d .
23. "Al-Liwc” 11.11.36.
24. tea letter from Iraqi Consul in Palestine to the Iraqi Foreign Office
23.11.36. ''Reports and Press Sutstary” file of the Iraqi Consulate in 
La I fa ho. o7t-u X.u....
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The delegation, headed by Auni abd al Kadi reached Baghdad on 
19.12.35. They had several long consultations with the Iraqi Foreign 
Ilinister and left for P.iad on 24.12.36. After meeting King Ibn Saud,
they returned to Palestine via Baghdad taking with then identical letters
from Ibn Saud and King Ghazi in which the Kings, after expressing faith
in the justice of the British Government, urged the Cupreine Committee to
cooperate with the Royal Commission.
On 6.1.37 the Supreme Committee had a meeting lasting from 9.0 a.m.
un til 3 .30 p.m. After long discussions in which the members of the
delegation - who x^ ere mainly Istiqlalists - supported by the Nashashibis
did they best to convince the Supreme Committee to respond to the Kings'
appeal, it was decided to call off the boycott.
27The Committee published a manifesto to the Arab people explaining 
their decision "in compliance with the request of Arab rulers" and warned 
at the same time against giving evidence without the agreement of the 
Supreme Committee.
The problem of Arab evidence, however, worried the Supreme Committee
to quite an extent. It was decided to form a sub-committee to prepare
the evidence and to decide who would be the Arab witnesses and what should
be said by each. The opposition elements, however, were not satisfied
28with the sub-committee's composition. As Arab leaders had very little
faith in each other, it was decided that the Arab witnesses would give evidence *154
25. And consisting of Sheikh Kamal al Qassab, Izzat Darwaza and Huin al 
Ilaadi. On the delegation see Ibid. See also Darwaza Op Cit. pp.153-
154. See also A. Clark-Kerr to Foreign Office 29.12.36 and 4.1.37
and R. B u l l a r d  to F o r e i g n  Office 2.1.37 C.O. 733/320/75550/27.
26. "Falastin" 7.1.37. (The letter of Ibn Saud was dated 1.1.37 and that 
of King Ghazi 3.1.37).
27. I b i d .
28. Auni abd el Uadi, Izzat Darwaza, Jamal Husseini, Fuad Saba and Abdul 
Latif Salah,!iAl Jamiah al Islamiyya" 8.1.37.
26
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only in open sessions so that it would not be possible later to accuse
29each other of betraying the Arab cause . On the other hand, one cause 
for hesitation was the "reluctance of the leaders to state openly their
extreme demands and fear that some of their arguments will be riddled in
30the course of their evidence."
31The Royal Commission then prolonged its stay in Palestine for an
extra two weeks to enable Arab evidence to be heard. The first Arab
witness was the Mufti, who opened the Arab case by stating: "The Arab
32case in Palestine is one which aims at national independence".
33Reading the Arab evidence, one gets the clear impression that with 
the exception of G. Antonins and even that is arguable, the Mufti's 
deposition was the best, but he too was not always convincing in answering
q /
questions. On the whole the Arab evidence was presented in the crudest
29. Letter from Iraqi Consul in Palestine to Iraqi Foreign Office. 12.1.37 
File 3780. I.S.A.
30. The Iraqi Consul wrote that as many Arab leaders were not good
at answering questions and might give weak answers which would damage 
the Arab case, it was preferable to give written evidence only.
See his letter to the Iraqi Foreign Office 6.1.37 Ibid.
31. The Peel Report p.
32. The Peel Evidence p. 292.
33. Ibid pp. 292-368
34. In his description of the Mufti's evidence, C. Sykes writes thus
"lie had a formidable task to impose on the Commissioners, an impression 
deeper than that made by the Jewish witnesses, especially Dr. Weizmann. 
His performance was uneven, at one moment he argued with keen and 
impressive skill, at another he spoilt the effect of undoubtedly 
strong arguments on his side by supporting them with weak ones."
Sykes Op-Cit. pp. 128-200.
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and most extreme form and tended to stir up their followers rather than 
convince the Royal Commission.
At the end of their enquiry, the Royal Commission concluded that "the
underlying causes of the disturbances vere (1) the desire of the Arabs for
national independence (2) their hatred and fear of the establishment of
36the Jewish Rational Home.
Reaching the conclusion that the HanJate had become unworkable and 
must be abrogated, the Royal Commission decided to recommend the partition
37of Palestine into three regions : a Jewish soverign state, an Arab state *36
35 To Musa Aland, "the Arab evidence, although adequate on the legal side 
of the case, seemed to have suffered from hasty preparation as well as 
from the chronic inability of his race to distinguish between arguments 
which appealed to them and arguments likely to impress their auditors" .
See Furlonge Op Cit p.lll.
In his report to the Iraqi Foreign Office, the Iraqi Consul in Palestine 
wots : "On the whole, the evidence of the Arab witnesses was useful 
and good for the Arabs, but in many cases, unfortunately, it lacked 
supporting proofs and exact statistical data so that the members of 
the Royal Commission received only a weak impression as the Arab witnesses 
could not verify their arguments by facts and figures". 19.1.37. File 
37CO. I.S.A.
British views of the Arab evidence were described thus by A. Eden, the 
Foreign Secretary:- "The recent speeches of the Ilufti of Jerusalem and 
his followers before the Commission are calculated to produce an 
intensive reaction against the Arabs which is already beginning to have 
i‘ effect Clearly no one could contemplate acceding to such Arab 
ciato, and even i£ tie dale,a vere reasonable, tie hectoring and 
threatenin'» tone which has been used in their prosecution would be 
e ’o u V t o  prejudice the least easily influenced Government against a 
o ooVMrh relies on such defenders". In a memorandum embodying his 
ld^~ on Palestine 12.1.37 which he sent to Ormsby-Core. C.O. 733/332/75156.
„ „ no. They further concluded that these two causes were36. The reel *>fP°« sboui cha disturbances o£ 1320, 1921, 1923 and
i < m SathaV'thay ware and always bad been inextricably linked together 
and that all the other factors were complementary or subsidiary. Ibid p.lll
ti„. tr-Kj coin!* to include all of Palestine north of Beisan and 
3?* thfentlrfioastll rSion north of a point halfway between Gaza and Jaffa.
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incorporating Transjordan and the rest of Palestine, sr/i a Jerusalem 
38enclave ’ under permanent British ncndate.
39The Cabinet endorsed in principle the acceptance of partition
and simultaneously with the publication of the Royal Commission report
41on July 7, the Government issued a statement of policy announcing its 
adoption of this recommendation for a solution of the Pales tine problem.
Following the ena of the strike the security situation in Palestine 
was far from being quiet but cor-.pared to the previous si:-: months it vas 
much better. Indeed, following the Supreme Committee's decision to 
give evidence before the Royal Comission, there was little prospect of any 
serious general disorder in the country until the publication of the Royal 
Comission's report and the Government's intentions towards it were known. 
And actually the incidents which had occurred during that period, most of 
which were highway robberies, with the majority of the victims Arabs, were
contrary to the wishes of the Arab leaders. On the other hand, it was ccmtuon
belief among both Arabs and Jews that if the report of the Royal Ccfccnlssion
and the Government's decision thereon were unfavourable to the Arabs, the
42rebellion would break out again. However, a series of terror acts started
3b.
39.
40.
The enclave was going to include also Bethlehem. Lydda, Ramie and 
a corridor to the sea at Jafta,
Cab. Con. 27(37) 30.5.1937 Cab. Con 23 (37) 5.7.1333
Palestine, Royal Corciission Report Cmd 5479 July 1935. The Summary of 
the Report was embodied in en official communique published in Palestine 
under Ho. 9/37 ''¿alastin" 9.7.->u.
41 Palestine, gtofcomeut of Policy, Cü-i uhla, Ju^y 1>37 
as official Communique Ho. 11/37 Ibid,
.Wished in Palestine
42. See V/uacuopc's telegram to Ormsby-Core 29.12.3Ó C.P.l (37)
See also letter of Iraqi Consul in Palestine to Iraqi Foreign Office
27.12.36. File 3730. I.3.A.
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around early February. On 6.2.37, the H.C. sent for the Mufti, R. Hashashabi 
43and Auni al Iladi. They expressed abhorrence of the recentaacts of
violence and assassination which had been perpetrated so they said by
irresponsible people for personal motives. The Mufti assured the H.C.
that the Supreme Committee would consider the question of issuing a public
statement expressing their abhorrence of assasiinations and crimes of violence.
44No such statement was issued, however, and the Chief Secretary, not 
prepared to let matters rest, issued a statement the text of which was agreed 
by the three Arab leaders before its publication, saying that during a meeting 
on 6th February the H.C. spoke with the three Arab leaders "on the subject
of the recent assassinations and crimes of violence. They all expressed
45their abhorrence of these acts." The Mufti, feeling the need to renew
his personal contacts and to explain his views to non-Falestinian Arab leaders, 
left Palestine on 10.2.37 for Egypt and continued on 13.2.37 on hie way to 435
43. For a full record of the meeting see the enclosure to Hathorn Hall's 
letter to Grmsby Gore of 13.2.37 C.O. 733/311/75528 Pt.VII. During 
the meeting the H.C. enquired about the rumours that funds which were 
collected for the poor by the Central Relief Committee were used for 
other aims. The Mufti denied this. It should be noted that the 
talking on the Arab side was done only by the Mufti and Abd al Hadl.
44. As the II.C. left Palestine for Britain two clays after the interview, 
the Arab leaders thought perhaps that they could get away with it.
When the Chief Secretary approached them, they argued that to issue the 
statement immediately following an interview with the H.C. would
have given the impression that they were dictated to by the Government. 
They decided, therefore, to await the occurrence of another incident 
and then to issue a strongly worded statement of condemnation. Ibid.
45. "al-Liwa" 10.2.37.
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Riad. General Dill,who all along regarded the Mufti as the main instigator
of the rebellion, felt that his return from the Haj (Pilgrimage) with enhanced
prestige might be the signal for renewing the rebellion. He, therefore,
47suggested that an order be issued excluding'the Mufti from Palestine.
A SThe O.A.G. strongly opposed this suggestion. Both the H.C. (who was then
in Britain for his holiday) and the Colonial Secretary, concurred with the 4678
46. al-liwa 11.2.37. Amir Abdallah during a conversation with Cox, the 
British resident in Amman, said that the Palestine Government had made 
a very serious mistake in allowing the Mufti to go and carry out his 
intention of conducting a campaign in Mecca against the British policy in 
Palestine. The Mufti, siid the Amir, had no intention of seeking a 
middle course and was doing his utmost to defeat the moderates - 
including the Amir, who had a genuine desire to find some workable 
solution. The Amir declared that the Mufti had been given so much rein 
that people in Palestine were saying that the Government wanted him to 
maintain his intransigent attitude so as to make trouble. See Cox's 
letter to Moody 11.2.37 C.O. 733/326/75023/2. On the Mufti's visit
to Bgyit, see Lamp-son's cable to the Foreign Office 1.3.37 Ibid.
On the Mufti's visit to Saudi Arabia, see Bullard's telegram to the 
Foreign Office 25.3.37 and his letters of 4.3.37 and 9.3.37. Ibid.
The Mufti - wfio apparently refrained from open political activity during 
h i s  v i s i t  i n  Saudi  A r a b i a ,  a i p e a l e d  t o  Ibn  Saud f o r  h e l p .  The King 
a d v i s e d  him to await the f i n d i n g  of the Royal Commission and to 
cooperate w i t h  th e P a l e s t i n e  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n  th e  main te na nce  of law and 
order.
47. See cable of O.A.G. to the. Colonial Secretary 27.2.1937 Ibid.
48. Though he agreed that there would not be lasting peace in Palestine 
as long  as  the Mufti's i n f l u e n c e  remained u n im p a ir e d ,  he maintained 
t h a t  it would be r e p r e s e n t e d  t h a t  as long as llaj Amin was in Palestine, 
t h e  Government had been f r i g h t e n e d  to d e a l  with him, b u t  that as soon
as he left the country for his religious devotions they had, by a trick, 
secured his exclusion and this moreover when, the country was at peace 
and when the Royal Commission which had heard his evidence were preparing 
their Report. The C.A.G. further claimed that an order of exclusion 
would leave the Mufti free to intrigue against the British in other 
Arab countries. He inscribed the act as ' distasteful15 and said that 
it would be regarded as "an instance of British perfidy and bad faith"
I b i d .
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view . The Cabi m t  uiscussea the subject ena «greed with tne 
Colonial Secretary.
Meanwhile, act« of terror continued in Palestine mainly in Jerusalem.
51
It needed some urging by the O.A.G. both orally and in writing to bring
the Supreme Committee to fulfil their promise made to the fi.C. during their
52meeting on 6.2.37, to issue a public statement. The statement Issued on
16.3.37, did not express abhorrence of the Assassinations as promised, but
it included an appeal to avoid acts of violence and to ’’restore to full
quietness and tranquillity" as advised by the Arab Kings.
Oa 1.4.37, the H.C. granted an interview to the Mufti, R. Eashashlbl
53end Auni *1 Abd el Uadi. The Arab leaders showed e reasonable disposition
and the Mufti reiterated twice his assurances of the desire of the Arabs for 
peace end tranquillity and of their readiness to cooperate with the Government 
in the restoration of good order throughout the country.
But this readiness of the Mufti was very short-lived. On the following
49
49. Ormsy-Core wrote to the Prime Minister* "If we can or do get rid of the 
Mufti, for whom I have no love, I want him deported fairly and squarely 
. I cannot azree to Dill's proposal which to my mind would not be 
"cricket". 2.3.37. Ibid.
50. Cab. Con 10 (37) 4.3.37
51. See letter from Moody, Acting Chief Secretary to the Supreme Committee
12.3.37. C.O. 733/326/75023/2.
!riWa asked for the interview on 16.3.37 and were informed
• i S T e  to ... tho.8 thr... For full particular, of
tte « •  Vauchop.’. l«t.r to Orray-Coro of 6.4.37. Ibid.
Describing the Interview the B.C. wrote:- "Several ‘grievances* were 
dilcissed ... the three leaders adopted a more reasonable attitude than 
they have during the last 12 months. The Mufti stated clearly that he was 
ready to cooperate with Government in maintaining good order. In this, I 
thifk I detect the influence of Xbn Scud, the influence of moderate Arabs 
J,I.dL Palestine as compared to the extremist Arabs within. But I fear 
thit underlceitain circumstances, the influence of local Shabab and the
i.tiolel Party may later on bring pressure to bear against satisfactory 
cooperation with Government and counsels of moderation which the Mufti 
now preaches and as regards his Sheikhs and Qadis at present practices."
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day, two English papers reported that the Royal Commission was considering
either the cantonisation of the country or, more probably, the creation by
the Partition of Palestine of two Independent Jewish and Arab States.
The Arab press evinced the strongest opposition to the Partition scheme,
and declared that the Arabs would never accept it. It denounced the
scheme as a "Jewish proposal supported by a small English group". The
scheme would defeat Arab aspirations for a pan-Arab Federation and would bring
Gt. Britain into conflict with the Moslem world at large. The Arab
papers agreed that the object of publishing the scheme was to sound the Arabs
55and to test their pulse.
Arab protests started to pour in on the H.C. from all parts of the 
country, most of them emphasizing that the Arabs would oppose any attempts to 
divide their country with all legal means.^ 546
54
54. "Daily Herald"1 and "News Chronicle". 2.4.37.
55. "al-Liwa" 4.4.87. The paper said that neither the Mandatory 
Government nor the League of Nations could force the scheme upon the 
Arabs. Religious questions as well as legal questions stood in the
way of the proposed partition. What for example would become of 
the mosques, cemeteries and Waqf lands, which under the Partition would 
fall in the Jewish party ? "Falastin" of 4.4.37 said that the rumoured 
resolution might be a mere manoeuvre but that the Arabs should express 
their resentment against it. "Falastin" mentioned that Amir Abdallah, 
when questioned by Lord Feel, branded the scheme as a most irresponsible 
and unworthy idea and warned the Royal Commission against its grave 
consequences. See also "ad-Difa" 4.4.37 and "Jamiah al Islamiyya"
4.4.37.
56. See for instance the protest of the Gaza Municipality 8.4.37 "Falastin" 
9.4.37 or the protest of the Local Council of Majdal 11.4.37 "Falastin"
12.4.37.
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The Mufti, however, who no doubt opposed the scheme bitterly, did not
make any public comment. Indeed, the H.C. noted"the Mufti, since his
visit to Ibn Saud, has been very quiet and the Higher Arab Committee almost
57dead except for Internal squabbles".
In early May the Arab press published agrily statements to the effect
that the Jewish Agency had submitted an application for over 11,000
58certificates at a time when there was serious unemployment.
On 7.5.37 the H.C. received the Mufti, who remonstrated against any
further immigration. The meeting, however, was cordial and to the H.C.*8
59surprise, the Mufti again promised to cooperate with the Government.
On 11.5.1937, the Supreme Committee held a meeting and decided to
issue a manifesto to the Arab people, as well as to send a cable to the
Arab Kings and Princes and the British Prime Minister protesting against
60the grant of the labour schedule. 578960
57. Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore 27.4.1937 C.P. 127 (37) May 1937.
58. "Falastin" 1.5.37, "al-Liwa" 2.5.37. For the worsening situation
of Arab unemployment in 1937 see file "Unemployment C.O. 733/325/75007.
59. "I gave an interview to Haj Amin .... who urged the release of all 
internees, remonstrated against the issuing of the schedule and any 
further immigration of Jews, and in a quiet and friendly way, discussed 
the action of Government in compelling a large number of very poor 
Arab workers to move from their present completely unsanitory quarter 
of tin shacks in the middle of Haifa town. Haj Amin again to my 
surprise promised cooperation with Government and suggested he might be 
able to find some Waqf land suitable for our transfer scheme .... The 
Jewish press, of course, say that Government released the internees owing 
to the pressure of Haj Amin and that we reduced the schedule also owing
to fear of that gentleman".... Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore 20.5.37 C.P. 144
(37) May 1937.
60. Both the Manifesto and the cable contained the following passage:
"The Committee declares that the Arabs will not accept any Jewish 
immigration and will not rest assured until all their national demands 
are fulfilled". "al-LiwaM 12.5.37.
On 29.5.37 the Mufti was involved in a certain accident. Being
fearful that an attempt was being made to assassinate him« he instructed
61his servants to search Jewish passengers of a car which stood by.
The incident by itself was not important except for the implications
which it could have on the future behaviour of the Mufti. Even if he had
any ethical feeling against murder« the fact that he believed that an
attempt was made on his life would have made it easier for him - morally -
to order the murder of those whom he considered to be his enemies.
On 28th April 1937 Amir Abdullah left Haifa for London to attend
62the Coronation ceremonies. It was generally believed that during his
stay in London« he would hold political discussions concerning the Partition
plan and the unification of the Arab part of Palestine with Trans-Jordan
probably under his Crown. His departure became the occasion of big
63popular receptions in his honour in Jerusalem« Nablus and Haifa. 7 
These receptions were organized by the Nashashibis and all the 
traditional opposition elements. The Husseinis and their supporters didI
not participate. A similar series of receptions organized by the 
opposition and boycotted by the Husseinis was repeated when Abdallah returned 
on June^. The signs were clear. The Palestine opposition elements 
identified themselves with the cause of Amir Abdallah and established with 
him a unified front against the Mufti and his supporters. 61234
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61. See Police Communique 30.5.37, "al-Liwa" 31.5.37. See also cables no. 
246 of 31.5.37 and No. 266 of 5.6.37 and letter of 7.6.37 from Wauchope 
to Ormsby-Gore C.O. 733/311/75528.
62. "Falastin" 29.4.37.
63. Ibid. 24.4.37, 26.4.37, 28.4.37 and also Darwaza Op-Clt pp.156-157.
64. "Falastin" 8.6.37, 11.6.39.
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The tension between Abdallah and the Mufti grew, and on 19.6.37 the
i f
Chief Minister of Trans-Jordan at the instance of the Amir, wrote a letter
to the Mufti, with the intention that its contents should become public,
accusing him of trying to sow dissension between the Amir and his people.
On his side, the Mufti too was looking for allies outside Palestine against
66Abdallah. On 22 June, he arrived in Damascus and stayed there until 3
July. During the many conferences with the Syrian Nationalists, in which
Iraqi politicians participated as well, together with the Iraqi and Saudi
Arabian Consuls in Damascus, they discussed the partition scheme. The
Mufti raised objections, but the Syrians thought that it  should be accepted
as a step forward. There was a majority against accepting Amir Abdallah
as soverign of the new Arab State. The qualifications of other Arabian
princes were discussed but none of them seemed satisfactory. The meetings
ended Inconclusively, but the impression remained of a general desire to
work for an amalgamation of Syria and the new Arab State in Palestine,
i f  and when it  should be established. I t  was proposed to convene another
67congress to discuss this plan. 657
65. Ibrahim Hashim to Amin al Husseini 19.6.37. C.O. 733/326/75023/2.
6 6 . "Al-Liwa" 23.6.37.
67. See letter from B. Mackereth - British Consul in Damascus to Wauchope 
5.7.37 in which he also wrote s "the stay of the Haj Amin was the 
occasion of a remarkable political 'va et vient' about which it  has been 
unusually d ifficu lt to obtain precise information. Both the French 
delegate and the head of the French Intelligence bureau te ll me that 
they have but the vaguest notion of what went on." I t  was considered, 
however, that there was a general review of the Pan-Arab political 
position. Mackereth also enclosed with this letter a lis t of the 
persona who visited the Mufti. The lis t included practically a ll the 
"Who is Who" in Syrian politics as well as many Iraqi leaders and also 
several famous Arab 'fighters' and band leaders. C.O. 733/326/75023/2.
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British Military Intelligence, however, stated that: "Reliable
reports state that Mufti obtained l i t t le  support from v is it to Syrian 
politicians"... 6 8
But, in addition to the political discussions, i t  is most probable that 
the Mufti plotted the renewal of the rebellion and had several lengthy 
meetings in private with some known band leaders and arms smugglers.6 9
On several occasions, the Mufti was alleged to state that he would "declare 
war on the British on the 8 th July".
On 3.7.1M9, Kagheb E.sh«hibl « d  Y. Fnrr.J, the two repr«.<mt.ttv..
Of tb. opposition "E.tion.1 Defence Pert," (tbcugb Y. Ferr.j . . .  o , f ic l.U y
representing the Christian Cowmunity end not the Party) withdrew fro « the 
Arab Supreme Committee.^
Ostensibly, the withdrawal was on the , ,n cne ground of the Mufti’ s mismanagement
of the Supreme Committee*a affairs, but it* t it  was generally accepted that thia
step - taken with the encouragement of Amir i t. . .6  wcut ox amir Abdallah - was intended to make
the party free to take its own decision«oecisions independently of the Supreme
Committee.
Learning of this withdrawal, the Hufn ,* n nuIti returned immediately to Palestine
on 4 ,7 .3 7 , A military Intelligence r»nnrt ,'  ^nce reporustated "Attempt to terrorize
opposition by poUtlcsl ....s.inetions likeiy 1 »  ne«  f . „  days. « 7 3
Following th. publication of the goy.l Con®!,,!«, report «nd tb.
Govermoent'e . t « « « n t  of policy, tba n.C. rec.iyed on 8.7.37 tb. Mufti
and other Arab leaders. They a ll promised th»* »*. ,F waiea th*t they would try to keep the
hotheads quiet, but emphasized that the hoth*»si« . . ,notheada were very many and that the
despondency and depression among the Arabs was great. 74
6 8.
69.
70.
71.
See cable from G.H/Q Palestine t* , ~~~
Ibid. The cable says; "While M u f t i 0f£lce 5.7.37 Ibid, 
inate known to have interviewed Wlth Politicians his subord-
and bandit" (who commanded the Syrian  ^ * 1  Ashmar notorious leader 
phase of the rebellion of 1 9 3 §) oootingent during the firs t
That is , after the publication of th* *
letter of Mackereth Note 67. * H°y*l Commission’ s report .See
"Palastin" 4.7.37. 72. Darvaza rw
the withdrawal "was regarded in Paf « ^  157”158. Toynbee states that 
the anticipated proposal of Partim  ‘ f 1 “ 6  ** a step toward acceptance of 
Esco Study Op Cit p.857. 7 3  l0a • Toynbee On Clt p.550 See also
see source note 617 f!n ,74 p.to.
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The Supreme Committee held also a meeting on the same day and issued 
75a statement that "Whereas this country does not belong only to the Arabs 
of Palestine but to the whole Arab and Moslem worlds, and whereas the nation 
has been working in times of crisis under the guidance and support of their 
Majesties the Arab Kings" . . . .  the Supreme Committee would communicate 
immediately with them again da order to decide upon the policy to be adopted 
by the Arabs. The Committee then called on the people not to be taken In 
by enticements, to stick to the national covenant and to keep tranquility.
A telegram^ was sent to the Arab Kings stating that by accepting the 
Partition scheme, the "British Government's definite promise to your Majesty 
to do justice to present Arab demands w ill not be fu lfilled ". The telegram 
went on to ask for support and advice and appealed "to work for rescuing 
the country from imperialism, Jewish colonization and Partition."
The Istiq la list paper"ad Difa'^ attacked the Peel report for ignoring 
Arab national rights and aspirations but went on to say that in its findingsI
the report is "the verdict of Time upon the Incapable policy, the corrupt
national organization and the long lethargy" of the Arabs.
"FalastinJ' the organ i f  the Nashashibis at the time gave a survey of 
78the report without, however, giving sweeping statements or clear cut 
decisions as to its contents and recommendations. In the nature of things, 
no Arab could be expected openly to accept the terms of the Royal Commission 
without an effort at bargaining. I t  was generally considered, however, that
75. "Falastin" 9.7.37. The statement ended thus: "The Arab Supreme 
Conaaittee asks the honourable Arab nation which is confident in its 
rights and steadfast in its demands not to be taken in by enticements 
and adorned words, to remain on its national covenant and to maintain 
its self-restraint, its seriousness and tranquility, confident in the 
ultimate success of its rights and claims."
76. Ibid.
77. "al-Difa" 9.7.37.
78. "Falastin"9.7.37.
74. See Wauchope's cable to Ormsby-Gore 8.7.37. C.O. 733/351/75718/6
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the Nashashibia had been favourably inclined towards Partition, and
following the publication of the Peel Report, both R. Nashashibi and Y. Farraj
told the H.C. freely without being asked that they were definitely in favour
80of the principle of Partition.
S till, among the first to express their strong opposition to the
Partition scheme were the 2 Opposition leaders Omar al Bitar from Jaffa and
Acre^. Encouraged by this the Supreme Committee proposed to
Asaad al Shukeiri from'»tlhe National Defence Party that-it  should re-join, but
the party declined. I t  could not, however, ignore the strong public
opposition to the Partition plan. The surrender of Galilee and the Acre
districts to the Jews had united a ll its Arabs - who on the whole followed
the opposition - against the partition scheme, quite apart from the Mufti's
82influence.
In the meantime also the Iraqi Prime-Minister made a formal protest
against the proposed partition and in his answer to the Supreme Committee's
telegram to King Ghazl which was prominently reproduced in the Arab press,
83he denounced it  publicly. Publicly, the reaction of Ibn Saud was more
restrained but already by 10 July the Arabs of Palestine came to know of
84his total opposition to the Partition scheme.
The Central Committee of the National Defence Party had a meeting on
11.7.37 and after careful consideration and under the impact of the Iraqi 
and Saudi opposition, resolved unanimously to reject the Partition
79
79. See Darwaza Op Cit pp. 161-163.
80. See Wauchope's letter to Parkinson 14.7.37. C.P. 193(37) 1937.
81. See Darwaza Op Clt p. 160.
82. See Wauchope's letter to Parkinson 19.8.37. C.O. 733/352/75718/6 and 
Wauchope's letter to Shuckburgh 30.7.37. Ibid.
83. The telegram read: "Iraqi Government is not in favour of the 
partition and fully sharing in National hopes and aims of her people 
they w ill do anything possible through customary channels to avert 
this misfortune. As head of Iraqi Government I had already protested 
against the recommendations of the Royal Commission". See A. Clark 
Kerr's cable to the Foreign Office 12.7.37 C.O. 733/352/75718/12. See 
also "al-Liwa" 14.7.37.
84. See Wauchope to Parkinson 14.7.37 C.P. 193(37) July 1937.
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scheme“ "' and Co ask for Che termination of the Mandate and the setting up 
of an independent soverlgn state, bound to the British Government through 
a treaty, on the understanding that the ratio which existed then between
or
the Arabs and the Jewish population would not be altered.
Memoranda to that effect were transmitted to the Colonial Secretary
S7and to the P.M.C. and the Council of the League of Nations.
The National Defence Party was very angry with Abdallah for declaring
83himself in favour of Partition and R. Nashashibi denied in a press
89interview any previous agreement between Amir Abdallah and the party 
about accepting the plan.
On 23.7.37 the Supreme Committee submitted its reply to the Royal
90Commission report in a long memorandum signed by the Mufti and the 
Secretary Fuad Saba. The memorandum, which was similar in its contents 
to that of the National Defence Party, demanded the immediate stoppage of 
immigration and the>sale of lands end the establishment of a national 
democratic government bound to Britain by a treaty on the lines of the 
Anglo-Iraqi and Anglo-Egyptian treaties.
The Mufti, being anxious to find a solution other than Partition, and
85. "Falastin" 12.7.37.
8 6 . and "Insuring all lawful rights of the Jewish minority"
87. For the fu ll text of the memorandum see enclosure to Weuchope's letter to 
Ormsby-Gore 24.7.37 C.Q. 733/351/75718/6.
8 8 . Wauchope to Parkinson 19.7.37 Ibid.
89. "Falastin" 22.7.37. Indeed the Govt, of Transjordan too had to publish 
a declaration denying ita support of the plan "Falastin" 24.7.37.
90. For a fu ll text of the memorandum, see the enclosure to Wauchope' s letter 
to Ormsby-Core 26.7.37 C.O.733/351/75718/6. The Arabs, the memorandum 
said, were prepared to negotiate the safeguarding of reasonable British 
interests, the guarantees for the preservation and right of access to 
a ll Holy Places end the protection of e ll  legitimate rights of the Jews. 
The memorandum stated that a creation of a Jewish state in Palestine 
would be a blow aimed at Arab unity as i t  would erect e geographical 
barrier between the Arab states, and would stimulate "Jewish aspirations 
for further expansion".
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counting on Jewish opposition to the plan, agreed in mid-July to an Arab 
initiative to hold tentative negotiations through an unnamed intermediary with
leaders of the Jewish Agency. Nothing resulted from these contacts,
. 91however.
On 16.7.37 there appeared in the "Times” an article which practically
started the process of the Mufti's attempted arrest and his subsequent
escape. But before that mention should be made of the Mufti's alleged
statement concerning British attempt to reach with him an understanding on
the basis of the Royal Commission's Partition plan according to which the
Mufti was going to emerge as the head of the new Arab state. The Mufti 
92recounts that when i t  became known that the Royal Commission would recommend 
the Partition of Palestine, he was approached by a high ranking British 
o ffic ia l who tried to persuade him to accept the scheme saying: "What is 
wrong with Partition ? I t  aims in creating an Arab state consisting of 
the Arab portion and Transjordan, and i f  you think that Amir Abdallah would 
be the head of this state, I  can inform you that free elections would 
be held and that the person who wins the majority would become the head of 
State. "We know," he added smiling to me, "who is the people's choice 
and who would get a big majority of the votes".
No other source - to the best of my knowledge - mentions this attempt. 
However, considering the high esteem in which he was held and the "kid glove" 
treatment which he received until then from the British and the fact that Iraq 
and especially Ibn Saud, whose views were important in British eyes, opposed 
partition both because they detested the establishment of a Jewish state and; 
because they disliked, not less, the Intended crowning of Amir Abdallah over 
the new united Arab state, I  think it  would be 6afe to assume that this story 
was not only a figment of the Mufti's imagination.
91. See Sharett Op Cit Voi. 2. p. 189. See also Ben-Gurion Op Cit pp. 151-15 
Wauchope's letter to Lord Dufferin 30.7.37 C.O. 733/351/75718~and 
Wauchope’ s letter to Parkinson 20.8.37 Ibid. Darwaza Op Cit pp. 180-181
92. See Amin al Husseini-Haqiiiq Op Cit p.75 See also the Cairo daily"Ahabar- 
Yom"28.9.1957, as reported in the f i le  "memoirs of the Mufti" attached tc
the Mufti's diary. The H.A.
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The Mufti continues to recount that after failing with the "carrot" 
the British turned to the "stick". When they were convinced that his 
opposition to partition was absolute, Donrville, the head of military 
intelligence in Palestine, passed to him - through a close friend - a message 
to the effect that the British would do anything for their Empire and would 
not hesitate to k ill him should he stand in their way, and the message 
ended: "Do not be stubborn, think of your li fe  and have pity on your 
family and relatives". The Mufti adds that when he learned of the "Times" 
article of 14.7.37, he knew for sure that the decision to "finish" him 
had been taken finally.
On 14.7.37 the "Times" published an article by its special correspondent
in Jerusalem which contained the following passage :- "When the Report"
(the Peel Report) "was published, it  was assumed that its strictures on the
Mufti would lead to his prompt elimination. Mow that they" (Arab
moderate notables who followed the Nashashibis) "see him s t i l l  in office
and able to direct the machinery for agitating and trouble-making, they are
nonplussed. I f  the partition scheme goes through, the Mufti's position
must inevitably be liquidated. I t  follows, therefore, that he must fight
94it  tooth and nail".
93
93. Ibid.
94. The Times 14.7.37. The article then continued: "Any Arab who makes 
a conciliatory move or does anything short of rejecting the partition 
scheme as impossible may expect to find himself denounced as a traitor 
and exposed to terrorism .. . .  I understand that another point which 
weighed considerably with the gathering (of Jewish Labour Federation whit 
voted against partition) is the fact that the Government does not show 
any sign of removing the Mufti. This is considered as equivalent to 
giving free rein to Arab Nationalism. Thus from both the Arab and the 
Jewish side we see that the Mufti's maintenance in his present position 
is an obstacle to any consideration of the report on its merits. I f  
the Government really wants it  to go through, it  would help enormously 
i f  an announcement were made that an election for a new President of the 
Moslem Supreme Council was to be held at an early date."
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The Report's strictures to which the "Times" reporter referred were
no doubt those concerning the responsibility of the Mufti for disorders^"*
96and the remarks on the delay in reforming the Supreme Moslem Council
and about the vicious circle which w ill have to be broken sooner rather than
later".
In the Colonial Office, i t  was expected that following the publication
of this article, the Colonial Secretary was going to be criticized strongly
in the forthcoming debate on 20.7.37 and that unless he could say that
97action was contemplated, his position might be d ifficu lt.
95. The Peel Report, Chapter Vi para. 97 p. 179 . . . . .  "But whatever may have 
been the apparent moderation of the Mufti's attitude at the commencement, 
the manifestos issued by the Higher Arab Committee under his chairmanship 
endorsing the strike and then urging the Arabs to continue i t  until 
certain political aims had been achieved, were clearly prejudicial to law 
and order. Nor as far as we are aware, did the Higher Arab Committee
at any time condemn the acts of sabotage and terrorism which became more
frequent as the strike continued and the Mufti as Chairman, must
in our view, bear his fu ll share of responsibility for these disorders".
V.
96. The Peel Report Paras. 103-105 pp. 180-181.
ggg Minute by Downie 14.7.37 C.O. 733/326/75023/4. Two possible 
avenues of action were studied: (1) a drastic amendment of the Supreme 
Moslem Council Order of 1921 and (2) a direct action against the Mufti 
such as deportation. I t  was suggested that from the point of view 
of damaging relations between the Government and the Arabs in the 
delicate negotiations which were in prospect about the partition, 
there was more danger in the firs t one. The difficulty with the 
second one, however, was that as far as the Government knew, there was 
no evidence against the Mufti to justify such action against him and 
that "the rather mild reflection on his behaviour" in the disturbances 
contained in the Peel Report "hardly affords the necessary excuse".
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The H.C. was consulted and proposed that the Mufti together with
99Auni abd al Iladi should be deported without delay to the Seychelles.
100The Colonial Secretary authorised the deportation and was "most anxious 
to be in a position to make an announcement on the subject during the debates 
otherwise the whole tenor of debate w ill be misleading.^
98
98. See Ormsby-Gore to Wauchope 14.7.37 Ibid. The H.C. of his own
accord waited for an opportunity to deport the Mufti and as early as 
13 July made the necessary arrangements with General Dill and Capt.
Godfrey of the R.N. See his letter to Parkinson 14.7.37 C.P. 193 
(37) July 1937. The H.C. also informed Parkinson in the letter that 
Gen. D ill suggested to "buy" Nashashibi and give him £10,000 i f  he 
declared himself in favour of partition. The U.C., though, vof c£ 
the opinion that Nashashibi could be bought for that sum, opposed u^d 
the suggestion.
99 Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore 14.7.37 C.O. 733/352/75718/9. The cable
contained the folloxdLng passages : "I am convinced that the presence
of the Mufti in Palestine is contrary to the best interests of the country. 
I  have no doubt that he is fomenting feeling against partition which 
H.M.G. support in principle. One can give no proof of undesirable 
activities. Publicly the Mufti has not denounced the principle of 
partition, though this has been denounced publicly by both Ragheb Bey 
and Ben-Gurion and others. Before taking action against the Mufti...
I  should have preferred to wait until he had committed himself more 
definitely to some illegal act or act clearly hostile to the Government.
But I  do consider that there is some truth that moderate Arabs fear to 
express their real feeling for fear of reprisals. Whether the latter 
would be carried out by the Mufti's agents is, I  think, very doubtful 
but the fear is genuine..." Wauchope argued that the message which 
the Supreme Committee sent to the Arab Kings and especially the phrase 
"to work for rescuing the country from Imperialism and Jewish colonization 
and partition" gave fu ll justification for deportation but he strongly 
ooDosed that this should be given as the reason for deporation as the 
effect would be to unite a ll Arabs in the strongest opposition to the 
rLernment The effects of deporation he thought would be considerable 
hut not as'grave as i f  i t  had taken place a year earlier. Then the 
Mufti was looked on as a religious leader, while his deporation in; 
the summer of 1937 would have been accepted as an action against a 
"discarded partisan".
100. Ormsby-Gore to Wauchope 16.7.37 Ibid.
101. Ormsby-Gore to Wauchope 17.7.37 Ibid.
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Accordingly the orders were given and a ll necessary arrangements 
were taken to effect the Mufti's arrest during a meeting of the Supreme 
Committee on the afternoon of 17.7.37 held at the Committee's office 
outside the old city. But the police failed * and the Mufti took 
refuge in the holy area of Haramash Sharif which he used as a sanctuary 
until his escape.
The Supreme Committee protested to the Colonial Secretary against
103the search of its premises , not suggesting, however, that the action
was directed against the Mufti personally.
The H.C. - who fe lt i t  necessary for security reasons - that
further-action should be taken without delay against the Mufti, consulted
104both the Colonial Office and General D ill about possible courses of 
action. These were (a) to force entrance into the Mufti's home in the
Haram ash - Sharif area, and endeavour to arrest him there, and (b) to
>■
order the Mufti to appear at the Government offices and then the H.C. 
would either ( i )  give him the choice of resigning his post as President 
of the Supreme Moslem Council and the Presidency of the Arab Higher Committee 
or of being arrested and deported forthwith or ( i i )  inform him that it  was 
no longer in the interests of security that he should remain in Palestine 
when excitement was great and that the H.C. must deport him at once, in 
which case he was to be arrested immediately, and (c) in the event of the 
Mufti refusing to obey the order to leave the Haram, to declare the 
Supreme Committee as an illegal body and to announce that legislative
102. For tull particulars of how the attempt failed, see Wauchope’ s report
to Ormsby-Gore of 16.8.37 with Its 5 enclosures including the report 
dated 30.7.37 of Mr. Fitzgerald, Deputy Supt. of Police C I  D who 
was entrusted with the duty of arresting the Mufti and ¿as reDrimanded 
for his failure. C.O. 733/352/75718/9. 8 repr
103. The Arab Supreme Committee to the Col. Sec. 19.7.37 im h  c*»
"Falastin" 18.7.37. Ibid* See ttU°
104. See exchange of telegrams between the H.C. and the Col Sec during
the days 19.7. - 21.7.37. Ibid. 6eC* S
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measures would be taken to remove the Mufti from the Presidency of the 
S.M.C.
Gen. D ill was in favour,of course (b) ( i i ) ,  though it  would lay
the Government open to the charge of treachery.
The Cabinet in its meeting on 21.7.37 decided not to pursue any
of these courses, considering that the best course was to play for time
- even i f  i t  involved some loss of prestige - and to wait for some more
overt act on the Mufti'a part before re-attempting deportation.*®^
The situation which emerged was that the Police continued to guard
the gates of the Old City under orders to arrest the Mufti i f  he should
appear. The Mufti himself, however, continued to live in his Haram house,
and there to receive deputations and to hold meetings of the Supreme
Committee. His liberty of action and his power and ability to pursue his
policy against the Government was not diminished by his lack of ability to 
10 6move around. However, apart from expression of his opposition to the
Government's policy, he had been behaving - as far as the authorities knew - * 0 7  
in a strictly correct manner, and in an interview which he gave to the
1AO
Daily Telegraph correspondent he spoke in moderate and guarded terms.
106. See Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore 29.7.37 Ibid.
107. See Minute by Downie 29.7.27. Ibid.
108. The Daily Telegraph correspondent described him very warmly : "With light 
eyes which periodically break into a merry twinkle .. .  he has such an 
attractive disarming personality, one could not believe that this smiling, 
soft-speaking, somewhat languid Sheikh, had been o ffic ia lly  held respons­
ible for most of the troubles of the past year. He shows no trace of 
the anxious arduous period he has Just traversed. Throughout the 
interview he appeared Just as debonair, alert and fu ll of high sp irits... 
he expressed no resentment at the recent attempt to arrest him ...he 
escaped owing to his own presence of mind.,., the Mufti now never leaves 
the enclosure. His only distraction is to promenade within the walls of 
the area or to watch the world from his private rooms overlooking the 
Wailing Wall"... During the interview the Mufti discussed the memorandum 
of the Supreme Committee to the Colonial Secretary and repeated his 
pledges to the Palestine Jews". Daily Telegraph 29.7.37.
105. Cab. Con. 31(37) 21.7.37. This decision was accepted in response to the 
For. Sec.'s observations about the negative effects deportation would 
have on Arab countries. For these effects in Iraq, see A. Clark Kerr’ s 
telegram to the For. Office 18.7.37 C.O. 733/352/75718/9.
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This no doubt calculated behaviour of the Mufti (who at the time also 
initiated the contacts with the Jewish Agency mentioned above), brought about 
the reaction which the Mufti no doubt wished for. It was proposed in the 
Colonial Office to reverse the policy towards the Mufti, not to take any 
action against him as long as he behaved, to rescind the orders for his
109arrest and even that the H.C. would resume official relations with him.
The Cabinet, which discussed further the problem of deporation of the Mufti 
took the following decision: "That the policy of arresting and deporting the 
Mufti if and when opportunity should offer should be adhered to, but without 
using any form of enticement
Lord Dufferin, after discussing the matter with the Prime Minister, 
proposed to the H.C. to relax the arrangements for watching the Mufti and to 
adopt towards him a more flexible and moderate policy along the line of action 
proposed in Downie's note.^-^
109. In a long departmental note prepared before the Cabinet meeting on
29.7.37 which was going to discuss further the problem of the deportation 
of the Mufti, Mr. Downie wrote: "...Without the strongest justification 
to arrest and deport the head of the Arab cause on the eve of the 
negotiations on the partition policy which must soon be undertaken with 
Arabs and Jews would surely be regarded as an outrage and would wreck any 
prospect of accomodation with the Arabs for a long time to come. I f  the 
Mufti is indeed the irreconcilable opponent of the Government's policy which 
he is represented to be, he w ill surely commit himself before long; i f  he 
does not commit himself, is there any good reason for not resuming relations 
with him and endeavouring to bring him to a reasonable frame of mind."
29.7.37. Ibid.
110. Cab. Con. 33 (37) 29.7.37.
111. See Lord Dufferin's cable to Wauchope 30.7.37 Ibid. I t  should be 
emphasized that this line of policy followed one basic assumption, 
namely that no "moderate" body of opinion had emerged and that a ll Arab 
Parties In Palestine opposed partition. I t  ignored the arguments 
raised by the "Times" correspondent in his articles of 14.7 and 16.7.37 
and stated also by the Jews (see Dr. Jsseph's letter to Dr. Weizmann
18.8.37 Ibid) that the fact that the Mufti was s t i l l  maintained in his 
office retaining all his power and control over the Awqaf funds had
"a paralyzing effect on Arab opinion in Palestine, and that the "moderate" 
body of opinion which was going to emerge, had been reduced to silence 
by fear."
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The H.C., with the full agreement of the Executive Council, accepted
this line and the position practically reversed to what it  was prior to
the publication of the "Times" articles and the Colonial Secretary's telegram
of 14.7.37. In his telegram, the H.C. wrote: "I have now cancelled my
previous orders to the police to arrest the Mufti ....... I feel that arrest
of the Mufti now is contrary both to our wisest policy and to your wishes.
Later, i t  came to the knowledge of the H.C. that the Mufti might go
113to Damascus, the Colonial Secretary informed Wauchope that he did not 
object to the removal of the guards from the gates of the old city and to 
let the Mufti go to Damascus.
The Mufti, who no doubt had learned of these developments, was certainly 
heartened by them. Several other developments about that time caused him 
further satisfaction.
During the P.M.C.'s session discussing Palestine, the Iraqi Minister
for Foreign Affairs(sent on 30.7.37 a note to the Secretary-General for
communication to the Council, protesting against the proposed policy of 
114partition. The fact that Iraq, generally considered as a British vassal 
state, allowed itse lf to protest publicly against partition at Bagdhad and 
Geneva was interpreted as a clear sign that the attitude of the British 
Government itse lf towards partition was a lukewarm one.
112 Wauchope to Col. Sec, 31.7.37. Ibid. In his telegram, the H.C. also 
stated that he would not recommend the dismissal of the Mufti from 
his offices or the declaration of the Supreme Committee as an illegal 
organization. He also informed the Col. Sec. that the military 
command in Palestine was of the opinion that the Mufti should be 
arrested i f  he gave the police any opportunity and that failing that 
he should be removed from his office.
113. Colonial Sec. to Wauchope 3.8.37 Ibid.
114 For a full text of the note see f i le  "Situation in Iraq" C.O. 
733/352/75718/12. See also "al-Difa" 6.8.37.
This impression was further strengthened as a result of the
Parliamentary debates, and the result of the vote in the House of Commons
which was taken as a rejection of the Partition scheme. "^*
In addition to that, there was the known opposition to partition
(or at least to the partition plan as proposed by the Peel Commission) of
X X 6many high-ranking British officia ls.
The cumulative effects of a ll these facts was to encourage the 
Mufti and his supporters and stir them to make every resistance against 
partition.
The Arab press - whose general tone towards the Jews was moderated
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115. During the debate in the House of Lords on 20th July and 21st July, 
the Government'8 policy came under severe attack, especially in a 
very strong speech of Lord Samuel who again presented his scheme of 
an Arab Federation including Palestine and "the Jewish Rational Home". 
See Hansard, Lords 5th Series Vol. CVI cols. 559-674, 797-824.
On 21.7.37, the Col. Sec. introduced in the House of Commons a 
resolution asking for formal approval for the Government's new 
policy on the principle on partition. The Labour Opposition 
demanded a Jpint Select Committee to study the Peel Report and 
finally a compromise motion by W. Churchill was adopted whereby the 
Government was authorized to ask for the League of Nations approval 
of partition as a necessary preliminary to the drafting of a definite 
plan for submission to Parliament. See Hansard, Commons 5th Series, 
Vol. CCCXXV1 cols. 2235-2367.
I t  should be noted that during the debate the pro-Zionist lobby 
opposed the Partition plan while the pro-Arab lobby - despite 
the Arabs' opposition to i t  - supported i t .  For the views of the 
pro-Arab lobby in the Commons see the letter of A. Crossley and 
another 10 M.P,'s to Ormsby-Gore 29.7.37 in the f i le  "Parliamentary 
Debate" C.O. 733/352/75718/12.
lió . See the Memorandum by Mr. Keith-Roach 5.8.36 C.O. 733/316/75528,71.
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following the publication of the Peel Report - again became more aggressive.11*
The Arab-Jewish "negotiations" - and not less important, the rumours about 
these negotiations - ceased,
118The opposition elements retired again into their shells and even
119Amir Abdallah made overtures to his arch-enemy the Mufti whose position 
seemed to be stronger than ever.
We have seen that the Government’ s line of policy towards the Mufti
was to "play for time" and "endeavour to bring him to a reasonable frame
of mind", keeping at the same time the open option of arresting and deporting
120him i f  he would be "out of step". We do not have clear evidence of
what was the Mufti's line of policy towards the Government but i t  can be
safely assumed that he too was playing for time and endeavouring to bring
the Government to pursue a more pro-Arab policy. This he tried to do by
121using political means - by organizing Arab opposition in Palestine and
in the Arab countries against partition* by convening the Beludan Congress
etc. At the same time, however, ha organized by remote secret control
so as not to give the Government any justification for arresting hi», *
122controlled terror campaign aimed both at intimidating those Arabs who 
did not follow hia and as an additional pressure on the Government, and the 
preparations for the renewal of tha rebellion which he kept as an open 
option to be used in case the political efforts would fa il.  Earlier, on
117, For comparison sea Arab papers during the second and third weeks of Julv
1937 and during the first end second weeks of August 1937. ^
118. It should be noted that on 30.6.37 Fahri Kaskashlbl v z s attacked in Jaffa
"/•lastin'' 1.7.37. On 3.7.37, th. Mayor of B.thlel1CT> a‘ “ n n o j l t £ n  
sympathiser, was also attacked. "Falastin" 4.7.37. opposition
11». So much so that the 11.0. found it necessary to advise the Amir strongly 
against it. See his letter to Orrosby-Gore 22.7.37 C o 733/351/75118/2 7 
On Abdallah', effort. to improve his relations with’th, Haiti se. lie™r- 
andum by the acting British Resident in Amman A.S.larto^i^c t 7 7 TK,.
120. See Downin'. Minut. oi 29.7.37 and lord D u f f e r ! ^ ^ “ * lbl4' 
30.7.37 C.O. 733/352/73718/9. 121. l e t  Arab protesta Ical^t oartltlon
see files C.O. 733/351/73718/6 and 73718/83. Se. also 13 7 37
122, campaign, which during the second phasa of t h .  Arab
rebellion during 1938-39 became even stronger, i* beat reflected by whet 
E. Kedowrie describes as the "immortal" remark addressed to the Mufti by
i A t l T t  f i T i  * * * * * *  sukairi, whose brotherwveakilled by fellow Arabs . *The Arabs, the Jews and the British differ 
over everything, but agree on one thing, the British kill the Arab, the 
i * ? ^ 111 th* Arab and the Ar*b Wile the Arab". E. Kedowrie. Arabic 
Political Memoirs Encounter Vol. 39 No.5 Hov.1972. London. w T f T .---
16.7.37, a day before he sought refuge in the Haram ash-Sharif, the Mufti
established his firs t o ffic ia l contact with a German representative, when he
visited Dohle, the German Consul-General in Jerusalem. He emphasized
his sympathy for the "New Germany" and expressed his hope that i t  would
support the Arabs and oppose Zionist aims in Palestine. He requested the
Germans to maintain contact with his confidential Agent who was to proceed 
123to Berlin. The Mufti also discussed the Partition plan with the
124.representatives of other powers irxluding the U.S.A.
125On 12.8.37 the Mufti sent a protest to the 11 .C., stating that the
attitude of the Royal Commission was biased and discriminatory in that it
126consultedDr. Weizmann on the proposed partition plan even before 
completing its enquiry while no such consultation took place with Arab
representatives.
In the last days of July, the campaign of lawlessness was revived
12 7and was much intensified during the firs t 3 weeks of August . The 
Supreme Committee, however, protested in a cable to the Prime Minister on
123. Report of the German Vice Consul Dittman, Jerusalem 10.8.37 as 
reported in L. Hirszowicz Op . Cit p. 43. During another meeting, 
the Mufti requested the Germans to intervene on behalf of the Arabs 
with the Polish Government, which, for its own internal reasons, 
was encouraging Jewish emigration from Poland to Palestine. The 
Mufti also sent a direct letter to the Polish Government on this 
subject. Ibid.
124. Wadsworth to the Secretary of State Jerusalem 16.8.37 F.R.U.S. Voi.
2 Washington 1954 pp.905-09 as reported by L. Hiszowicz Ibid.
125. "Falastin" 14.8.37. For a fu ll text of the protest, see C.O. 
733/336/75206. The Mufti asked that copies of the protest should be 
submitted to the Royal Commission, the Colonial Secretary and the 
League of Nations.
126. Referring to the closed session on 8.1.37 - even before the Mufti's 
evidence - during which Weizmann was asked his views concerning 
partition and to the famous secret meeting between Weizmann and 
Prof. Coupland in Nahalal. See Sykes Op. Cit. pp.200-203.
127. Palestine Report 1937. Col. No. 146, pp.7-8.
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19.8.37 that "While country enjoys tranquility and political Arab bodies
urge for quietness, a number of honest Arabs have been arrested without any
128proof of culpability in any illegal act meriting arrest....".
However, and as is so often the case, the terror campaign started to
get out of control. The Mufti sensed that his policy of "playing for
time" might be endangered as the Government would be forced to take
stronger measures* Accordingly, the Supreme Committee met on 31.8.1937
129and published a Manifesto deploring the crimes and appealing to the
Arabs to remain calm and keep the peace and self restraint. The following
Friday speeches were made in several Mosques urging the Arabs to observe
the appeal of the Arab Supreme Committee and to take no part in reprisals
130for the recent attacks on Arabs.
Commenting, however, on the manifesto, the O.A.G. expressed his
doubts as to whether the Supreme Committee could effectively control 
131Arab elements.
In London thft Colonial Secretary was very much disturbed by the 
"murder campaign" and fearing a "very severe criticism" in Parliament unless 
the murderers were caught and hung, he sent the O.A.G. very strong 
instructions impressing upon him the need to maintain law and order and to 128930*
128. "Al-Liwa" 20.8.37. See also the full text of protest in C.O. 
733/351/75718/6.
129. "Falastin". 1.9.37. See also enclosure I I  to Battershill«s letter 
to Ormsby-Gore 11.9.37. C.O. 733/341/75528/93. The Va’ad
Leumi (elected leadership of the Yishuv) published a Manifesto of its 
own, as by then the Jews, or at least a part of them, followed a 
policy of reprisals.
130. Ibid.
131 Ibid.
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eliminate "the Mufti and his gang".*^
The impact of Ormsby-Gore's strong words was dampened,.however,
at least in the M.E. Department of the Colonial Office, by the observation
of Shuckburgh who, basing himself on previous decisions, re-stated that "our
policy towards the Mufti........ is in effect that the Mufti is not to be
133proceeded against xjjthout fresh and obvious .lustification.11 132
132. See Ormsby-Gore to Battershill 8.9.1937 Ibid. Even before that in 
a note to Shuckburgh on 5.9.37 Ormsby-Gore complained bitterly of 
"the weakness of the Palestine administration vis-a-vis the Mufti, 
their hesitation in backing Abdallah and their apparent ineffectiveness 
in stopping the terrorist campaign." Ibid. In his letter to 
Battershill, the Col.Sec.wrote:"I s t i l l  feel that we shall never get
on top of this murder campaign ....... until we have eliminated the
Mufti and his gang. Re was the fons et origo of the murders in 1929 
and as long as we appear to funk dealing with this black hearted 
villain and allow him to disseminate anti-British propaganda throughout 
the Islamic world and organize terrorism of any Arabs in Palestine not 
subservient to him and his Supreme Moslem Council, we cannot hope to 
maintain law and order or even to be the de facto Government of Palestine." 
"Clearly too, we ought to do more to back Abdallah and any of his 
friends and back any enemies of the Mufti we can. I s t i l l  want to 
deport the Mufti to the Seychelles as soon as it  is practicable to 
get him. We shall never be able to carry out any policy in Palestine 
as long as the Mufti is where he is and has the power he has. The 
disastrous failure to effect his arrest in July is s t i l l  the main 
cause of my anxieties and misgivings. Nothing but a strong hand - not
with the small fry but with the big, is, in my opinion, any good.......
I  bitterly regret that we did not give the rebels an effective taste 
of martial law before the leaders called o ff the strike and disturbances. 
Our action or inaction appears to the world to have been weak . . . .
Our one duty now is the maintenance of order with a strong hand. The 
only deterrent to crime is the certainty of its punishment. This is 
lacking in Palestine today and steps must be taken, in cooperation with 
the military, to alter this "state of things."
133. See observation by Shuckburgh 7.9.37. Ibid.
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The Mufti, on his side, after publishing the Supreme Committee's
manifesto deploring the crimes and appealing for peace, continued his
political offensive. The real opposition to partition was supported by
a drive of "spontaneous" opposition organised by the Mufti's assistants in
134towns and villages a ll over the country.
On 4.9.37, the Mufti sent on behalf of the Supreme Committee, a protest
135to the Chief Secretary against the continuance of Jewish immigration.
On the Sth, 9th and 10th September, a vast pan-Arab Congress called 
"the National Arab Congress" was held at Bludan to voice vigorous protest 
against the British policy of partition in Palestine.
The Bludan Congress was planned during the v is it of the Mufti in 
Syria during June and was organized by Muin al Maadh, who was selected for 
this task by the Mufti, and Nabih al Azmah in the name of the "Damascus 
Committee for the Defence of Palestine". The expenses of the Congress 
were covered by the> Mufti.
154 In a letter to the Mufti dated 12.7.37, Sheikh Muhammad Eashim al
1 * Khatib wrote the following "In accordance with your Eminence's
instructions, I exerted my best efforts by the sending of 
teleprams to his E. the Higher Commissioner protesting against partition 
Ld  supportin'» the Arab Higher Committee which is working for the 
realisation of the country's aspirations... We are endeavouring to 
arrange the despatch of a large number of telegrams in the names of
„ The Jewish Agency obtained possession of a photograph of 
this letter*and passed i t  to the authorities. See C.O. 733/332/75156.
135.
136.
See "Falastin" 6.9.1937. See also enclosure to Battorchini , 
to Crmsby-Gore 22.9.37 C.O. 733/330/75113. 1 1 1  8  letter
The information in this chapter on the Bludan Congress is h 
a memorandum by G. Mackereth, the British Consul in aSed °n
the Foreign Secretary, A. Eden on 15.9.37, together with its ^  C° 
enclosures, a memorandum by a person named X - an Arab 
the Congress - and a copy of a verbal report made bv anP<r f iCipant in 
succeeded in attending a secret meeting of the more e f ln£ormant 
and Syrian elements of the Congress, For fu ll parti reme Palestinian
of important participants, see f i le  "Arab Congress at** 1?»1? * lis t
733/353/75718/35 which includes the fu ll repots of * C*°*
Economic and Propaganda Committees. See also Darwaza L  
and A. Zuaitar Op Cit. pp.116-117. -JEjSit.pp,183-85
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The general tone of the Congress was vehemently anti-Zionist but not
anti-British. No Minister from any country participated, but the
Congress was attended by more than 400 national leaders from all Arab 
137countries.
The extreme elements - mainly Palestinian and Syrians - were not
138satisfied with the results of the Congress and held a close secret
meeting of their own which discussed the problem of renewing the rebellion.
It was stated that considerable accumulations of arms and ammunition
had been made and hidden in different parts of Palestine under the
139direction of the Mufti and others.
The Bludan Congress succeeded in crystallizing a general far-flung
140Arab opposition to the partition plan.
137. 160 Syrians, 123 Palestinians, 65 Lebanese, 39 Trans 1ordlnians 12  
Iraqis - among them the President of the CongreL, the ex-Iraqi
Plfnea<iiiliSter* Na4i1alfSuWeidi Wh° Very ably led the moderates and was mainly responsible for the comparatively weak anti-British character 
of the Congress - 6 Egyptians and 1 Saudi-Arabian. Ibid.
138. Though its moderation probably added to the influence of its
resolutions which were : 1 ) Palestine is an Arab country 2)
unqualified rejection of the Partition plan and the proposal to 
establish a J^ish stats. 3) the ahrogatioa of the Balfour Declaration 
and the Mandate, and the establishment of an Arab State which would
! , sign a treaty with Britain and would guarantee the rights of the 
Jewish minority. Ibid.
jL3 9* See the report of the secret meeting on 10.9.37. Ibid.
140. IJhe Congress was very widely covered by the Arab press in Palestine
See issues of the 2nd and 3rd week of September. The Mackereth * 
memorandum contained also this paragraph "Incidentally the 
Palestine Broadcasting Service lent a generous hand by broadcast!»* 
at great length the proceedings of the Congress (it is a matter for 
conjecture how far the British Authorities in Palestine followed these 
accounts of the Arab commentator)". Ibid. 8
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In a telegram to the League of Nations sent 3.9.37, the Supreme
141Committee re-affirmed the resolutions of the Bludan Congress. The
Mufti, however, could not fully exploit the political usefulness of the 
Bludan Congress in Palestine because of further developments.
On 26.9.37 at about 6.0 p.m. Mr. L.Y. Andrews, the District Commissioner
in Galilee, who had been placed first on the Mufti's .blacklist was
142murdered by Arab assassins, together with hi3 police guard whilst 
walking to church. The O.A.G. gave orders for the arrest of all 
suspects, both terrorist and political. 109 were taken during the night 
of 26/27 September and by 30 September about 200 suspects were detained 
in Acre Detention camp. Only very few Arabs, including Dr. H. Khalidi, 
attended the funeral and there was no Arab feeling of sorrow or show of 
sympathy.
On 27.9.37, the Supreme Committee published a statement f deploring
n
the crime and condemning its perpetrators. The statement was published
by all Arab papers or. 2d.9.37 without comment. On 29.9.37, however,
144Arab papers took the line that while the Arabs sincerely condemned 
the two murders and terrorism in general, the Government was far from
justified in exploiting the tragic event by imprisoning without trial
hundreds of innocent Arabs.
On 29.9.37 the Supreme Committee asked the O.A.G. to receive them as
a body. Realizing that they proposed to make an official protest over
the arrests, he refused to sec them, so the Mufti 3ent him a protest by 
145letter asking that a copy be transmitted to the Prime Minister and the
141. "Falastin" 4.9.37. See also full text of the telegram in the O.A.G.'s 
cable to the Colonial Secretary 13.9.37. C.O. 733/351/75718/6.
142. For a full story of the murder and the following events, see Report by 
Keith Roach to the Chief Secretary 9.10.37 and the O.A.G.'s letters
to Ormsby-Gore 14.10.37 and 23.10.37 C.O. 733/332/75156/Pt.I.
143. "Falastin" 28.9.37. "al-Liwa" 28.9.37.
144. "Falastin" 29.9.37. "al-Liwa" 29.9.37.
145. For the full text of the protest see enclosure to Battershill letter to 
Ormsby-Gore 29.9.37 C.O. 733/333/75156/23.
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the Colonial Secretary.
The Cabinet discussed the Palestine situation on 29.9.37 and
decided that steps must be taken at all costs "to re-affirm and establish
the full authority of the Government". The Colonial Secretary accordingly
147authorized the O.A.G. to take the necessary steps. However, on the
insistence off the Secretary of State for India, it was decided not to 
lay hands on the Mufti as long as he remained in the Ilaram area. On 
1 October, at dawn, the action which was authorized by the Colonial 
Secretary was put into operation. The Arab Supreme Committee and all 
national committees in Palestine were declared to be unlawful associations. 
Warrants of arrest were issued in respect of the members of the Supreme 
Committee. Dr. II. Khalidi, Fuad Saba, the Secretary of the Supreme 
Comaittee, and Ahmed Eilmi, its Treasurer, were arrested during the day, 
and together with Rashid Ilaj Ibrahim, who was arrested in Haifa, were 
placed on a naval ship and early on the following morning Y. Ghussein 
surrendered himself and was embarked on the ship which left with the 
five deportees for the Seychelles. Jamal Ilusseini, however, succeeded in 
escaping to Syria.
The Mufti, Haj Amin al Husseini, was deprived of his two posts of
President of the Supreme Moslem Council and Chairman of the General 
143Waqfs Committee.
146. Cab. Con. 36 (37) 29.9.37.
147. Ormsby-Gore to Battershill 29.9.37. C.O. 733/332/75156.
148. On 16.10.37 after the Mufti's escape, a commission was appointed to 
control and manage the finances of the Moslem Awqaf in Palestine. 
Palestine Gazette No. 731 16.10.37.
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An official Communique concerning these acts was Issued at noon.
It was broadcast, however, only at 7.0 p.m. and published in the press only
the following morning. Simultaneously with the issue of the Official
Communique to the press, all editors were prohibited from making any
150reference or comments on these events until further notice.
1 October passed on the whole quietly but on 2 October there was a small
demonstration of Arab youths in Jerusalem followed - partly as a result
of threats - by a general closure of all shops in the Old City of
Jerusalem. The movement to close the shops started to spread to other
parts of Palestine but by 5th October it had completely petered out.
This, partly at least, could be ascribed to the Mufti who realized that the
movement was only a half-hearted affair, and not wishing its failure to
appear as a result of the Government's firm measures issued on 4th
151October a manifesto calling on the Arabs to return to work.
rTo prevent publication of such additional pamphlets by the Mufti,
, . „ , , „_152 declaring all printed matter -censors orders were issued on 6.10.37 * v
149
149. Official communique No. 16/37 "Falastin" 2.10.37.
150. This prohibition was removed at midnight on 5th/6th October. 
The editors, however, were warned against the publication of 
false reports or false rumours or extreme comments.
151. I could not find a copy of this manifesto as it was not 
published in the Arab papers. The fact that it was issued is 
mentioned in Battershill's letter to Ormsby-Gore of 14.10.37. 
C.O. 733/332/75156/Pt I
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- including photographs and pictures dealing with the Mufti's movements and
activities to be prhibited matter, liable to seizure.
On the night of 14/15 October, the Mufti, disguised as a woman,
reached the sea-shore where a boat was waiting for him and he reached Beirut
153on the morning of 16.10.37 under the name of Mohammad al Jaafari.
Two nights earlier, on 12/13 October, the Mufti convened in the court of
the Ilarara ash Sharif a meeting of the band leaders and instructed them to
renew the rebellion. The Mufti prepared a manifesto to that effect to
154be published on the morning of 15.10.37.
On the evening of 14th October, according to a pre-determined timetable, 
the comparative peace which had prevailed in Palestine since the end of 
the strike in October 1936 was suddenly and violently broken by a series 
of violent activities. The second stage of the rebellion was on. By 
the end of October, however, it had almost subsided and during November theit
normal life of the country had been little affected and the day to day routine 
of life in Palestine had not been untowardly disturbed.
The Arabic press adopted a very careful tone and the opposition papers 
discussed the political developments as if nothing had h a p p e n e d . " a l  
Sirat al Mustakim" published on 26.10.37 a leading article under the heading
153 "Al Ahram" 16.10.37. Waters Oj^Citi P-17- Incidentally when it was 
learned^ Friday morning 1 5 o O T t h a t  the Mufti did not attend 
nr avers in the al Aqsa Mosque rumours began to spread that he had left 
the^IIaram" » « e d  Arab. « u « U r .
where it was given out m /  “  1 f !  ’Battershill to Ormsby-Core 23.10.37 C.O. 733/332/75156/ Pt I
154.
155.
156.
The memoirs of the Mufti, published by "Ahabar al Yam" 5.6.57.
No other source to the best of my knowledge mentions the Manifesto.
The Mufti explains his escape by the fact that he had learned of the 
Government's intention to send Moslem soldiers from India into the 
Haram area to arrest him there. See also Y. Ornian Op Cit. p.82. 
Probably because of the winter. The Rebellion started again in early 
1938. The Mufti, however, claimed that the renewal of the rebellion 
forced the British to drop the partition plan. See Hanaio On Cit. p.47 
See "Falastin'1 "Sirat al Mustakim" and "Mirat al Sharq" of 16/31.10.37.
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"What happened is enough" in which it proposed to open a new chapter and 
called upon ft. Nashashibi and the "national Defence Party" to lead the
people and to defend their interests as there was no one else to do it.
The Government desired to believe that by his escape» the Mufti had
158lost influence and ceased to be the leader of the Palestinian Arabs.
It also wished to impress the Arabs that the strong action taken during
October had been taken solely due to the necessity for keeping public
159security ard that these actions did not prejudice the Arab case.
In both these assumptions, however, the Government was wrong. Battershill
157
157. "Sirat al liustaldUa" 24.10.37.
158. On 21,1137 Battershill wrote Shuckburgh: "The influence of the 
Mufti has definitely wanted in Palestine, though the fear that 
he may come back still operates in that some Arabs, who would 
otherwise be willing to give us information and help, still fear 
to do so. Son« villagers believe that they have been exploited 
and then abandoned by the so-called leaders. Outside Palestine, 
the 15u£ti‘’s stock is low. lie is, in certain circles, looked 
upon as a coward for having run away, and as he no longer ha* large 
sums of money not any patronage at his command he has much less 
influence. His personal prestige is not improved by hi# irritability 
and by his habit of petulantly blaming Arabs in other countries
for not doing more on bis behalf. Ke appear* to have been of the 
firm conviction that his "hegira" (emigration) would be the sign for 
a general uprising in neighbouring Arab countries on behalf of the 
Palestinian Arabs. If he can be insulated from major politics, 
as he is now, for another year or so, he will only have a nuisance 
value and that n pretty low one". C.P. 286 (37) November 1937.
159. Sea the Official Communique Ko. 16/37 of 1.10.37* See also 
Battershill's letter to Shuckburgh IS.10.37. C.0.733/332/75156.
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IK)himself had to admit that most of the Arab Palestinians thought that the
Government's action in depriving them of their leaders had been done with
the precise object of pushing through the partition scheme, which they
considered was dictated by the Jews, without any effective Arab protest.
And as for the leadership issue, even Amir Abdallah, the real competitor
of the Mufti, had to admit that the only leader of Palestine (al Zaim al
161Wahid li Falastin) was the Mufti. This reluctantly was also confirmed
, ■ 162 by the Government.
The Mufti's flight brought to an end an era during which the national; 
struggle against the foreigners was led by Palestinian leaders living in 
Palestine. Thereafter the command of the struggle moved abroad, and in 
1943 it totally passed into the hands of the Arab states.
160. Ibid. Eattershill wrote that, "the Arabs consistently confuse the 
political issue with the security issue", (the leaders, he.,said 
were doing that deliberately). "The large bulk of the Arabs cannot 
and wjill not believe that this Government has now taken drastic action 
for any other reason than for breaking, down political opposition to 
H.M.G.'s partition plan".
161. In a conversation with the Iraqi Consul in Palestine 19.12.37.
See letter of Iraqi Consul Haifa to the Iraqi Foreign Minister 21.12.37. 
Iraqi Consulate file No. 3761 I.S.A.
162. See Battershill's letter to Shuckburgh of 21.11.37 in which he wrote:
" His (R. Nashashibi's influence in the country is very slight.... the “ 
Amir is suspect and carries no weight in Palestine at the moment...." 
"and though Battershill claimed that "the influence of the Mufti has 
definitely waned in Palestine" (see note), his description of the 
situation showed that actually the only one who still had any influence 
over the Palestinian Arabs was the Mufti. C.P. 286(37) November 1937,
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TI?5 MUFTI * S IM/.DEIS’IIP
"If great men ever existed, and more particularly, if individuals 
can in any sense be said to be the authors of revolutions that permanently 
and deeply alter human lives then11 he "was a man of this order".* The
"he" in this description applies to Weizmann, the Mufti's Jewish counterpart. 
The Mufti's leadership did alter the lives of hi3 co-patriots, but very 
much for the worse.
The positive aim of the Arab National movement in Palestine was the 
establishment of Palestine as an indepndent Arab state. Its negative aim 
was to prevent the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine or in a part 
thereof. The personal aim of the Mufti was to lead this Arab movement 
and the country towards indepnnder.ee and to become its ruler.
In 1947/48, the Palestinians, led and directed for so long by the 
Mufti - directly until 1937, indirectly through the Husseini family until 
1947/43 - were brought to utter ruin and destruction. The Jewish 
State of Israel was established in the greater part of Palestine, and the 
remainder of the country was salvaged for the Arabs by its incorporation 
in the Kingdom of Jordan under the crown of Amir Abdallah, the Mufti's arch 
Arab enemy.
And yet, it must be remembered, that the Palestinian Arabs, led by
the Mufti, were very near - formally at least - to achieving their
national aims. When, as a result of the approaching war in 1939, the
friendship of the Arabs in the Middle East appeared to be of vital
importance to the British Empire, and following the failure of the London
2Conference of February/Karch 1933 , the British Government published on
May 17th its statement of policy known as the Macdonald Unite Paper .
1, Isaiah Berlin, ChaimWeizmarimLondon 1957 p.l.
2. See file "The London Conference" C.Q. 733/406/75872/H,
Palestine, Statement of Policy. Cmd 6019. London May 1936.3.
463
"It provided for a virtual cessation of growth within the Jewish national
home after five years and foreshadowed the creation of a self-governing
4Palestinian state having an Arab majority".
This British decision, no doubt, was thé result of two basic factors ;~
1. The unmistakable existence of a more or less organised general will 
among the whole Arab population in Palestine, Moslems as well as
5Christians for some kind of national independence, connected with 
fear and rejection of Jewish dominance and
2. The growing interest and involvement of the whole Arab and Moslem 
worlds in the fate and affairs of Palestine.
The Mufti contributed to and could have claimed credit for the 
existence of these two factors, more than any other individual, and the 
ultimate Arab failure does not change this fact,
g
It could be further claimed that the Arab failure was not necessarily 
that of the leadership, but of the Arab society as a whole. In his very 
short and revealing comparative study of the Jewish and Arab societies in
7
Palestine, W.K. Hancock has described the emphatic inequality between the 
two communities, the comparative backwardness of the Arabs in the fields of 
education, political and economical organisation etc., added to which was the 
support given to the Zionists by the Jewish World community with its command 
of wealth, influence, intelligence and devotion.
4. P . L .  Hanna C>p-Cit. p.141.
5. On the situation of the Arab Christians in Palestine and on their 
participation in the national movement, see the Chapter "The Christians" 
in my work "The Arab national movement in Palestine During the 30*s".
O p - C i t .
6 . As was actually done by the Mufti himself in his book, Haqajq. see also the 
article of Musa Alami "The Lesson Q.iLiL^^sJLi^e,lPP»373--405 in the Middle East 
Journal Vol. 3. No. 4. C. Zuraik "The Disaster of Palestine" (Nakbat 
Filastin) Beirut 1949, Valid Kamhawi "The Disaster and the Construction".
( a i  N a k b a  v a l  B i n a ' )  B e i r u t  1955 a n d  o t h e r s .
7 .  H a n c o c k ,  W .K »  S u r v e y  o f  B r i t i s h  C o m m o n w e alth  A f f a i r s  V o l .  I ,  P r o b le m s  
o f  N a t i o n a l i t y  1 9 1 8 - 1 9 3 6 .  Lo n d o n  1 9 3 7 .
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The gap, it was said, between the two communities caused the Arab 
failure. I would not discuss here this wide subject] it should be noted, 
however, that the Mufti’s leadership proved insufficient to face the Zionist 
challenge. As against the totality of the Jewish effort, the Arab 
national movement in Palestine presented disunity, lack of a unified 
leadership, diversity of opposing plans and policies, no solicitude for the 
people and their welfare, lack of long range planning, improvisation and 
lack of seriousness in directing national affairs.
As shown in this study, the Kufti on many occasions collaborated with 
the authorities in order to obtain some advantage for the Arab cause (and 
for himself) - which he did. My view is that on the whole the Mufti 
preferred during the early thirties to follow a moderate line of policy.
He could not, however, bring himself to follox* this line consistently 
and courageously.
Describing the'policy of the Arab leaders, E. Kedourie writes :
"These leaders no doubt calculated that by being intransigent they would
obtain more from the British Government than by cooperating and thus
tacitly acquiescing in the Mandate and the Zionist Programme which it 
Sincorporated."
Being intransigent and extremist was a "must" for any Arab politician
aspiring for the leadership. As early as February 1923 Mr. Moddy, the then
9Acting Chief Secretary, wrote - "In Palestine, a politician cannot hope to 
be successful unless he is an extremist".
8 . ICedourie Op-Clt p.73. Kedourie goes on to say that this attitude may 
have been more than mere tactical calculation as they never accepted the 
fact that they were no longer the masters in the country and members of 
a ruling group which dominated not only Palestine, but also an extensive 
empire and that the consciousness of belonging to a ruling, an imperial 
group, played its part in making the Palestinian leaders adopt the 
rigid and cutting attitude towards Zionism.
9, In a minute dated 23.2.23 C.O. 733/42. See also Kedourie The Chatham 
House Version Op-Clt. pp.75-76.
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The Mufti - and that was his tragedy - could not be an exception to 
that rule even if he wanted. Discussing the Mufti's influence in the summer 
of 1936 the Palestinian correspondent of the Times described it as one-sided, 
writingi-
"If he should openly declare a Holy War, then all the Arabs of 
Palestine would gather under his flag and fanatically destroy everything 
that stood in their way. But he possesses no power to check the stone 
that he would set a-rolling"
The Royal Commission too in discussing this aspect stated :-
"the extremist has usually kept the lead, the moderate has rarely counted
11in a struggle for national independence."
The result was that torn between his better judgement and the call of
his nationalist followers, his policy gyrated from moderation to extremism,
showing different postures at the same time to different observers. "Policies". 
12says E. Kedourie "are meant to succeed, if they fail they are bad policies".
According to that criteria, the Mufti's policy and the Mufti's 
leadership failed. We could assume, however, and the assumption would 
most probably be right, that no other Arab Palestinian leader would have fared 
better at the time.
10. As repeated in L. Farago Op-Clt p.60 I did not find the Times issue in 
which the a/m passage appeared.
11. The Peel Report p.146. In other places the Royal Commission wrote :
"But the history of nationalist movements in all parts of the world goes to 
show that in a struggle for national independence, it is always easier for 
the extremist than for the moderate to secure the allegiance of his people. 
And the reason is plain. The mainspring of nationalism in revolt is the 
desire of a people not merely for freedom but for the equal status with 
other self governing peoples which freedom implies. And if freedom can 
be, equality cannot be a matter of degree. Every time, therefore, that a 
moderate nationalist appeals to his people to accept something less than 
national independence, he is invariably outbidden by the extremist who 
demands it in full". Ibid. p.57.
. Kedourie Op. Cit p.22912
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